Dr. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Saudi Arabia, known for his expertise in Islamic studies and Middle Eastern affairs responded to questioned posed by a JNU’s PhD researcher. He said, “If you decide, of your own will, to follow the Hanbali school, the unitarian traditions… I didn’t use the term ‘Wahhabi’ because that’s a pejorative term”.

He explained that labeling someone as “Wahhabi” can be seen as an insult, as it oversimplifies and misrepresents the beliefs of individuals who are simply practicing Muslims.

According to Dr. Kéchichian, to call someone “Wahhabi” disregards their identity as a believer who follows specific traditions rooted in the teachings of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, a 18th century revivalist, who emphasized the concept of Tawheed, or unity of God. “You might not agree with the unity quest, that’s fine. He believes it, and he doesn’t want you to believe it. You are free to accept or reject it”, he remarked.

The discussion took a broader turn as Dr. Kéchichian explored the exposure of Indian Muslims to different Islamic interpretations, particularly through interactions with Saudi Arabia and its cultural milieu. “Whether or not an Indian Muslim goes to Saudi Arabia and is influenced by these outlooks is a personal choice,” he noted. “It’s up to the individual to decide whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing”.

While Dr. Kéchichian is not a Muslim himself, he underscored the significance of tolerance and respect for all religions. “What I have learned is to be tolerant and respect all religions”, he affirmed, encouraging a nuanced understanding of faith and belief systems.

The five-day workshop, was part of the Global Initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN) at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). It attracted top scholars and PhD candidates eager to explore contemporary issues related to Saudi Arabia and its cultural dynamics.

Sectarian identity became incompatible with Saudi Arabia’s 2030 Vision, while Iran shored up its sectarian identity because changing it would mean the collapse of the system.

Many analysts oversimplify the political conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia as one driven by sectarianism or Shi’a-Sunni tensions that has shaped the two states’ outlook and actions in the Middle East. However, their political differences are actually much more complex and deeper rooted.

One of the main differences is that the Saudi monarchy is not a theocratic regime like Iran, but rather a monarchy with a hybrid structure, neither wholly secular nor wholly religious. The Saudi sectarian movement was a reactionary response to the threats posed by the 1979 Revolution in Iran and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s regime. In contrast, sectarianism is the main component of the revolutionary Khomeini regime and it is magnified in its constitution to assert its own hegemonic geopolitical ambitions. Therefore, when sectarian identity became incompatible with Saudi Arabia’s 2030 Vision and its development, the country embraced Saudi nationalism instead, while Iran shored up its sectarian identity because changing it would mean the collapse of the system.

To better understand the sectarian differences in both countries, it is important to first shed some light on the historical context as well as investigate the ideological and political differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s ideological strategy

After the 1979 Revolution, the Khomeini regime turned Iran from a secular state into a fundamentalist theocracy, setting the scene for a dark historical period in the region that centered on magnifying sectarian differences. What distinguished the regime, and this is often missed by more sympathetic observers in the West, is that Iran under the Khomeini regime was an Islamic Revolution first, and an Islamic Republic second. The revolution did and does not exist to perfect the state; the state — the republic — is simply a means to support and perfect the revolution. As a result, the revolution is prioritized.

The supreme leader is the leader of the revolution, not of the republic, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is sworn to defend the purity of the revolution from enemies both within and without. Therefore, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the regime has sought to export its revolutionary ideology in an effort to establish Iranian hegemony across the Islamic world. This has prompted the American diplomat Henry Kissinger to remark on several occasions that Iran needs to decide “whether it wants to be a nation or a cause.”

So, the principal theme that unifies Iran’s revolutionary ideology is the rejection of foreign dominion over Iran, especially the influence of the United States. The most popular slogans are Anti-American and anti-imperialist ones that assert Iran’s desire to strike a politically and ideologically independent path — “neither East nor West.” In order to resist American hegemonic power, it sees its duty as supporting vulnerable people, and Iran views the Shiites in Arab countries and the Palestinians as falling into this category.

Thus, there are two pillars of Iran’s foreign policy: Sectarianism and an “Arab Street” strategy that emphasizes Iran’s commitment to the Palestinian cause and opposes Western imperialism — mainly Washington’s hegemonic schemes in the region — although ironically it does so to assert its own hegemonic geopolitical ambitions. Putting its foreign policy into practice, Iran has pursued a two-pronged approach, employing both hard and soft power strategies.

In terms of hard power, Iran has offered financial, ideological, and material support to non-state groups to help promote its strategic interests, notably Shi’a armed militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and also Sunni groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. As for its soft power, it uses its media empire, universities, charitable organizations, government-sponsored initiatives, and international revolutionary activities. The aim of this is to promulgate Khomeinist and anti-Western ideology at home and abroad in order to compel the masses to rise up in support of Khomeinist revolutionary ideology and against what are considered to be “illegitimate” forms of government.

Since the revolutionary ideology of the Khomeini regime is anti-monarchical, Iran uses its foreign policy to cause unrest and topple Arab Gulf monarchies, but its main focus has been to challenge and undermine Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. Saudi Arabia has responded in various ways over the years in the face of these threats.

Saudi’s response and the rise of Sunni fundamentalism

The Khomeini regime did not only upset Saudi Arabia when it criticized and embarrassed its rulers — the country that includes the two holy mosques, in Mecca and Medina — by suggesting they were not sufficiently virtuous to act as the custodians of Islam’s holiest sites, but Iran’s revolutionary message also contributed to an Islamic uprising across the Arabian Peninsula. Khomeini’s call for the abolition of the ruling House of Saud grew ever louder and the Saudi leadership began to fear they would suffer the same fate as the shah.

The siege at the Grand Mosque confirmed the fears among the Saudi elite about the challenges they faced. On Nov. 20, 1979, only 10 months after the revolution in Iran, a Sunni Islamist insurgent or Ikhwan uprising led by Juhaiman al-Utaibi seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca in a direct challenge to the House of Saud’s leadership in the Holy Land. The seizure was motivated by a desire to depose the Saudi monarchs and restore Islamic rule over the birthplace of the Prophet. Utaibi and his men berated the al-Saud family for being corrupt and influenced by the West. To combat this challenge, Islamist fundamentalism was aggressively reinforced in Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, Riyadh also sponsored the production of an expansive array of anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian tracts, designed to highlight the sectarian aspirations of the Khomeinist regime and mitigate its more universal appeal throughout the region and the world. Saudi Arabia wanted to debunk Khomeini’s vision of Islam by underscoring its Shi’a identity. In addition, Saudi-funded educational institutions and mosques connected Riyadh to religious scholars across the world, from Nigeria to Indonesia. Rather than countering the extremism emanating from Iran’s Islamic Revolution with a moderate brand of Islam, Saudi Arabia decided to beat Khomeini at his own game — a decision the current Saudi leadership has since said was a mistake.

The Saudi monarchy is not a theocratic regime like Iran but a hybrid structure, neither wholly secular nor wholly religious. The state is in charge of the political arena and the religious establishment oversees culture, society, and religion. Saudi Arabia has taken on different identities over the years and the changes have been driven by political narratives. Firstly, religious nationalism was established after the creation of the state in 1932. Secondly, beginning in the 1960s a pan-Islamic transnational identity was promoted in the context of the Cold War with Gamal Abd al-Nasser espousing a pan-Arab platform. Thirdly, in the aftermath of the Khomeini revolution, the 1980s were dominated by the Sahwa (Islamic Awakening) movement, part of a kind of sectarian bidding war against Iran, strengthened by the importance of Saudi Arabia as the birthplace of the religion and the host of its two most holy sites. Lastly, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (better known as MbS) there has been a retreat into Saudi nationalism to make it compatible with the leadership’s 2030 Vision.

Nationalism vs. sectarianism

Since the sectarianist Sahwa movement, which flourished in the 1980s due to the threat of the Khomeini regime, was reactionary, it did not last. This is because Saudi Arabia is a Muslim state, not an Islamist revolution, and religion is there to sustain the legitimacy and stability of the country. Saudi Arabia’s priority is the state and nation and when sectarian identity became incompatible with the kingdom’s 2030 Vision and its development, it embraced Saudi nationalism, which has unified the country. “Saudi First” foreign policy puts the interests of the state and nation first and means the nation is no longer held hostage to political events and regional ideologies.

In contrast, because Iran is first and foremost an Islamic Revolution and the state is a means to support and perfect the revolution, it has remained sectarian. The recent ascent of Ebrahim Raisi to the presidency is evidence that the state exists to perfect the revolution. From the outset, it was clear that Raisi did not run for the presidency, rather he was supported by the supreme leader to defend the revolution from both its internal and external enemies.

Raisi’s qualifications are compatible with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s requirements not only for being president, but also as a potential successor. His commitment to the revolution is clear. Raisi worked in Iran’s judicial system as a prosecutor in the early 1980s and oversaw the deaths of thousands of political prisoners. He was also elected to the Assembly of Experts in 2009, a clerical body tasked with monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. In 2016, Raisi was appointed head of Astane Qods Razavi, Iran’s economic conglomerate that manages the investments of the Mashaad-based Imam Reza Shrine — holding this position shows that he was trusted by Khamenei.

It is important to note that Raisi, like Khamenei, embodies the principal theme that has unified Iran’s revolutionary ideology, which is the rejection of foreign dominion over Iran, especially the influence of the United States. This is reflected in his statement that “relationships with the West or the East must not be a priority for a future government, but a pragmatic move to preserve the national interest.” This also shows that revolutionary ideology is used for nationalist ends.

The great shift in Saudi identity from sectarianism to Saudi nationalism, contrasted with Iran’s hardening of its adherence to the principles of the 1979 revolution, proves that political systems can change depending on the requirements of the time, while ideological systems never do. On the contrary, they become more entrenched because change means the end of the system.

Article first published on Washington-based Middle East Institute.

Najat Al-Saeed is a UAE-based Researcher, and political commentator. She is a columnist for different newspapers. She authored Screens of Influence, and she holds Ph.D. in Media Studies. She tweets under @Najat_AlSaeed.

The first and last chapter of India’s freedom movement was written by the Wahabis, with the intervening parts not devoid of them.

Indian Independence is indebted to the contribution of Wahabi Scholars for their role in mobilizing not only Muslims but all the split-up rebel units to fight the British Colonial rule. The Wahabis were the first frontiers of Freedom Struggle in India. It was the Wahabis who started the first united war of India’s Independence or The Indian Rebellion of 1857, Wahabis were the architects of this historic uprising with no personal ambitions nor appetite for political powers.

It was the struggle of Wahabis to assemble the rebel centers, who spearheaded the rebellion and were the motivating force behind it, during the 1857 rebellion. Wahabis evolved strategies to contact native rulers and primes of neighbouring countries. They deputed activists to contact native soldiers of British Army. Wahabis were well aware that native soldiers were seething with anger, and will join disgruntled elements for the freedom struggle. Wahabis also persuaded tribals to join them in campaign against the British, but only the names like Mangal Pande, Nana Saheb and Jhansi Lakshmibai remains now in the history for the Sepoy Rebellion.

Maulvi Najmuddin established contacts with Muslim soldiers of Sikh Army in Punjab. Maulana Wilayat Ali and his associates corresponded with British Army soldiers stationed in Hyderabad. Ahmadullah was another preacher who was active in Madras. The center of Wahabi training and recruitment in Patna was raided by British soldiers leading to the arrest of Maulana Ahmadullah and Muhammed Hasan which paralyzed the center. The uprising of 1857 ended in failure but it saw a national determination to liberate homeland.

Fatwas also played an important role in mobilizing Muslims to join freedom struggle against the British. It was Shah Abdul Aziz Dehlawi, the son of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi who issued the first Fatwa in 1803 against the British Rule in India. He proclaimed, “Our country has been enslaved. To struggle for independence and to put an end to the slavery is our duty”. This proclamation witnessed a new momentum in India’s freedom struggle. The historic fatwa was endorsed by many Ulema of that time including Mufti Ilahi Baksh, Sanaullah Panipati, Shah Rafiuddin, and Shah Abdul Qadir.

The first commander of patriot warriors was Shah Ismail Dehlawi, the grandson of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, who was another revivalist, who joined Syed Ahmed Barelvi despite of difference in ideologies. Both Shah Ismail and Syed Ahmed led many revolts and attacks on British, they were martyred along with 300 of their followers in 1831 during the fierce battle at Balakot.

Wilayat Ali was one of the prominent disciple of Syed Ahmed. He was deputed to the Deccan (in south), to mobilize masses in Hyderabad, which attracted many scholars and nobles, including Nawab Mubariz-ud Daula, the brother of Nasir-ud Daula, the Nizam of Deccan. Later Nawab Mubarizud Daula was arrested and was imprisoned in Goconda Fort, the episode is known as Hyderabad Conspiracy Case 1839.

Inayat Ali, the younger brother of Wilayat Ali was deputed to mobilize Muslims in Bengal. He was also deputed to go to the frontiers with over 2000 followers, who captured many forts. Both Wilayat Ali and Inayat Ali were later arrested and taken to Lahore. Maulana Abdullah, the eldest son of Wilayat Ali succeeded Inayat Ali and revived the activities in the Frontier region.

Wahabis ignited flame of rebellion in millions of countrymen, which ultimately led to a raging fire and burnt the colonial rule to ashes. The Wahabi activities and activists in Bengal and Bihar inspired revolutionaries like Abul Kalam Azad, the first Education Minister of Independent India, who raised his voice against the British rule. He established close contact with non-Muslim Bengali revolutionaries. He revived the Wahabi Mission with his call which was an echo of his great predecessors Shah Abdul Aziz, Shah Ismail and Syed Ahmed. Maulana Azad established his Urdu Journal ‘Al-Hilal’ and infused spirit in 20^th Century Muslims.

In short, the Wahabi Movement gave a number of freedom fighter personalities to the nation in the form of Shah Ismail, Syed Ahmed, Wilayat Ali, Inayat Ali, Mia Syed Nazri Hussain, Nawab Siddiqui Hasan, Sir Syed, Sanaullah Amritsari and Abdul Kalam Azam. The first and last chapter of India’s freedom movement was written by the Wahabis, with the intervening parts not devoid of them.

References:
The Salafis (History of The Ahle Hadees Movement in India) – by A.Q Naqvi.
The Wahhabi Movement in India – by Qeyamuddin Ahmed.
The Indian Musalmans – by William Wilson Hunter.
The First War of Indian Independence: Recounting untold history – M. Burhanuddin Qasmi.
‘Our Introduction’ section from website of Markazi Jamiat E Ahle Hadees Hind.

The Muslim Brothers proposed to the Pasdarans of Iran to “ally to fight the common enemy which is Saudi Arabia”…

Nothing predestined the Quds Force, an elite unit within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) and the World Organization of Muslim Brotherhood to come together. Yet, documents issued by secret archives of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence reveal the inconceivable: negotiations took place between these two apparently rival organisations, in order to confront their common enemy, Saudi Arabia.

The leaking of these documents issued by the archives of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Iran’s National Security (rival of the Revolutionary Guards) reveals a secret rapprochement between the Sunni Islamic Muslim Brotherhood Confraternity and the Quds Force, the elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards, considered to be the sword arm of political Shi’ism in power in Iran, long led by powerful General Qasem Suleimani, who was assassinated by an American drone in Iraq on January 3, 2020.

According to these documents revealed by the online investigative newspaper The Intercept (see box below), senior officials from Muslim Brotherhood and Pasdaran met in 2014 at a secret summit held in a hotel in Turkey. The meeting’s aim was to “find a common ground between the two sides and explore possibilities for coordination in countries where they are present”.

The Intercept points out that the Quds Force and the Muslim Brothers are apparently antagonist due to their ideological basis and organisational nature. Pasdarans are Shi’ites and respond to a near-military and state logic, whereas the Muslim Brothers are Sunnis and adopt a transnational network based essentially on entryism in state and international institutions.

Despite these fundamental differences, both organisations have begun negotiations to initiate a secret rapprochement, which took place in a particularly tense Middle East geopolitical context, especially with the rise of Daesh in Iraq and in Syria, in 2014 and Riyadh’s support of the coup d’état of Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi against Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi a year earlier.

The documents show that first contacts between Pasdarans and Muslim Brothers took place way before these negotiations in Turkey. Contacts were initiated during the rapprochement between Egypt and Iran, following the coming to power of Mohamed Morsi in 2012. But this process of rapprochement was interrupted by the putsch that impeached Morsi and forced the Muslim Brotherhood leaders to go back into hiding.

The Turkish government, being on good terms with both Muslim Brothers, whose ideology, known as “political Islam” it shares, and with Iran’s regime to which it is linked by strategic alliance, has given its approval for secret negotiations between the two organisations to take place on its soil, as confirmed by one of Iran’s secret documents published by The Intercept and commented by its great reporter, James Risen.

An agent of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, present during the negotiations, reported that General Suleimani, who was unable to take part in the negotiations in Turkey because he was subject to a UN visa ban, was replaced by Quds Force senior officials. On the Muslim Brothers’ side, many historical leaders, living in exile, attended the negotiations: Ibrahim Munir Mustafa, Mahmoud El-Abiary and Youssef Nada.

The latter, considered as being the Muslim Brotherhood’s occult financier, asserted in a statement addressed to The Intercept that he neither had knowledge of such meetings nor had he participated in them.

Talks between the two delegations explored the possibilities of forging alliances in countries going through political crises, such as Yemen, Iraq or Syria. “Present in 85 countries”, according to statements from Brotherhood leaders participating in the summit, the Muslim Brothers proposed to the Pasdarans to “ally to fight the common enemy which is Saudi Arabia”, as reported by one of the secret documents.

It adds that “According to them [the leaders of Muslim Brotherhood], Yemen seemed to be the propitious terrain for such a war, given the influence of both parties on Shi’ite and Sunni tribal components”. Iran being able to rely on Houthi militias in Yemen, while Muslim Brothers had total control over Sunni tribal armed factions, thanks to Brotherhood’s Islah movement and its alliances with tribal leaders.

Regarding Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood delegation said it was opposed to war and proposed to Pasdarans to “help reduce the gap between Shiites and Sunnis, by ending the war and allowing Sunnis to participate in the government”. As for Syria, Muslim Brotherhood representatives refused to take sides in the conflict, considering that the multitude of interveners in the Syrian war would force them to distance themselves from it, as “obviously, the question of Syria is out of the hands of Iran and of Muslim Brothers, and there is nothing special we can do about it”.

Besides, documents of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence reveal that, upon returning to Tehran, the Quds Force’s delegation attempted to present the alliance with Muslim Brotherhood as a possibility, but certain Iranian officials found this alliance to be meaningless.

The documents note that the willingness to work together against the common Saudi enemy did not prevent doubts and differences from arising in the negotiations between the Quds Force and the Muslim Brothers. For example, one document reports that the Brotherhood representatives declared that they were “patient” and wanted “peaceful reform” of the region. This was seen by Pasdaran representatives as being an “insult” to Iranian politics.

However, the document concluded on the differences that emerged, which did not prevent the parties from planning to extend their talks in new meetings held in Istanbul and Beirut.

The Intercept: Journalistic investigation servicing whistleblowers

Launched in 2014, The Intercept is an online investigative journal. The project was founded and funded by eBay boss Pierre Omidyar, through the First Look Media journalistic platform.

At its inception, the site published articles based on documents revealed by Wikileaks. It then created a “documents section” allowing whistleblowers to disclose documents classified as secret, while protecting their anonymity.

Thanks to its network of investigative journalists, The Intercept revealed several political scandals concerning the US Administration, including Edward Snowden’s revelations about the NSA’s global surveillance programme and the Drone Papers, about the US programme of targeted strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia.

In Europe, The Intercept has forged partnerships with major media outlets, such as the Disclose investigative site in France and Der Spiegel in Germany.

Article first published on Global Watch Analysis.

Modern writers have directed multifaceted attacks on Saudi Arabia by spreading a calculated smear campaign and all sorts of malicious allegations, ranging from; Saudi Arabia promotes terror and violence, it harbors extremists, sponsors militant Islam worldwide and is responsible for the global threat against humanity through radicalization and terrorism. This is and are, indisputably shameless lies that only emanate due to a lack of knowledge and a deliberate concerted effort to malign Saudi Arabia and ultimately Salafi school of thought, whereas the concise truth and reality could not be furthest from the truth in relation to these baseless allegations. Cdr Youseff H. Aboul-Enein writes:

The Saudi Kingdom as a government has tamed Militant Islamists and settled back to Salafi Islamists trends, spreading its peculiar and intolerant brands of Islam through dawa and not violence [1].

This contradicts the views and claims of other writers, that Saudi Arabia promotes violence, this in of itself shows the fallacy of their arguments. Some writers have expanded on this discourse while explaining key facts associated with Saudi Arabia. They say Saudi Arabia is known to spread Salafism and according to the definition of Salafism, which I must add, is self-concocted and a fabrication, in order to justify their narrative and an understanding that conforms to their falsehood. In reality, all such terms related to Salafism are false as there is only one type of Salafism. I am referring to terms like ‘Quietist Salafism,’ ‘Political Salafism’ and Jihadi Salafism,[2] which, undoubtedly apart from minor fact of being conjured up to categorize modern trends, is outright erroneous.

We can deliberate on this later, but when Jessica Stern; a research professor out of Boston University and who also served on the Clinton administration’s National Security Council Staff and J.M Berger; a fellow with George Washington University’s programme on extremism, explained these terms,[3] whilst borrowing them from Quintan Wiktorowitz.[4] According to their definition of ‘Quietist Salafism’ they say:

The quietist faction is, in a sense, the strain of Salafism that has responded the least to the world events of the twentieth century. Individuals in this group understand their central project to be the purification of Islam and do not participate in politics.[5] Though there are quietists Salafis across the Muslim world, the center of gravity for this movement is the existing religious establishment in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is somewhat atypical for a country in the Muslim world, but the very things that make it unique have made is hospitable to the quietists.[6]

On one hand, many like J. Stern and J.M. Berger, the example here; argue that Saudi Arabia has been an influential champion of Salafism, and we know from the first principles of Salafism; that it vehemently denounces, rejects, refutes and openly warns against terrorism, extremism and militancy. However, both writers, naively allude to:

It suggests, in a sense, that Saudi Arabia is responsible for movements such as ISIS because of the role that the Saudi Arabian government played in facilitating the spread of Salafism across the region.[7]

As injudicious and untruthful as it sounds, which is undoubtedly the case, this diatribe would have been just ridiculed and brazenly dismissed as a very poor judgment of error, but to add insult to injury, they quote an article of Ed Hussain as evidence![8] This article is a culmination of half-truths and some rudimentary information, spun to give a repulsive intent; the authors quote it to suggest a colossal claim, this has but except caused them stern embarrassment. Furthermore, both writers have themselves defined Salafism as:

Salafism is a loosely organised movement within Sunni Islam…but there are core features to the movement. Salafism is call for a return to the beliefs, practises and sincerity of early Islam. In fact, the term “Salafism” is a direct reference to these early years, and refers to the first few generations of Muslims, known as the salaf. Salafis prefer the Islam of these early Muslims and believe that centuries of human interpretation – influenced by pre-existing religious traditions, cultural biases, political agendas and individual self-interests – have corrupted Islam and led to decline across the Muslim world.[9]

So, should it not be the case for anyone who “suggests,” that at the very least they look at the teaching, ideology and methodology of the Salaf, who the Salafis ascribe to, with regards to the modern trends and themes and labelling Salafism and thus Saudi Arabia being responsible for the terrorist group, ISIS?

Is this not a huge leap over clear facts and perhaps total disregard for the truth while ignoring fundamentals precepts of Salafism. We find further contradictions in the understanding of these modern writers, and this is the case with most of them. They, Cdr Youseff H. Aboul-Enein argue that Saudi Arabia spread Islam through daʿwah and not violence, where as Stern and Berger argue Saudi Arabia exported their brand of Salafism which ultimately and by default led to the formation of ISIS and their activities. However, when have ISIS ever been at the forefront of giving daʿwah and in a non violent manner, in fact the total opposite. ISIS have killed Muslims openly, is this the daʿwah that is being referred to? These basic points are indeed sufficiently adequate to show the intelligent mind – the fallacy of these points suggested and hypothesized by these writers.

Some writers have focussed on the Wahhabīs as a movement and have also obviously projected a vivid view of the association between them and Salafism. Malise Ruthven labels the Wahhabīs as fundamentalists and asserts they formed close ideological ties with the Muslim Brotherhood from around circa 1960 to spread Wahhabī fundamentalism.[10] This is also a gross error chronologically and also false because their ideology and the ideology of the Wahhabis and Salafis is poles apart, in doctrine and in methodology (Manhaj).

Even in recent times, when Saudi Arabia has continued its efforts in curbing radicalisation and fighting terrorism, ISIS continues its campaign of terror in the Kingdom and there have been at least Nine separate incidences of violence and terror attacks carried out with ISIS claiming responsibility. So much so that even the holy sanctuary of Madīnah and the Prophet H‘s mosque was not spared by these mindless terrorists, while the people were preparing to pray and break their fast in the Holy month of Ramadhān.

Saudi Arabia has seen terrorism and violence in its Kingdom prior to 9/11, from around 2000, with an increase in the violent terrorist attacks year by year, with the most recent being July 2018. Does a country subject its citizens and its visitors, who are protected and under the safety of the sovereign state; to violent terrorism, suicide bombings, destruction of property and life, indiscriminate senseless killings? Of course not! Then how do these modern writers, without any regard for the truth and respect for the dead, hurl baseless and false allegations at Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and Salafism for the spread of violent terrorism. Foreign secret services although implicated, were surprising cleared by the police of their country, very conveniently of any involvement, but the allegations of foreign involvement in destabilising Saudi Arabia with a relentless campaign of terror are very much still on the table.

This short treatise of the Saudi Arabian Salafī scholar, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Muḥsin b. Ḥamad al-ʿAbbād al-Badr is a repudiation of the people whose ideology is to cause corruption and chaos throughout the lands. They cause destruction and devastation physically; to life and property as well as emotional and psychological trauma to all those affected by their reckless killing, suicide bombings and indiscriminate killing under the satanic principle of ‘collateral damage’. In current times various groups and organisations have arisen, whose intent is to kill innocent civilians, Muslims and non-Muslim, the elderly, women and children. Such heinous crimes are severely reprimanded in Islam and they also oppose its pristine teachings based on divine scriptures. These wicked and evil people distort and manipulate the scriptural texts, so that they conform to their whims and desires.

This treatise, ‘With What Reasoning and Religion Can Bombings and Destruction Be Considered as Jiḥād?’of Shaykh ʿAbd al-Muḥsin addresses the important issues of killing innocent people, suicide bombings and senseless destruction, which was authored after the Riyadh bombings in 2003. This treatise also clarifies the Salafist view on the unlawfulness of suicide bombings, violent terror, the killing of innocent people and the sanctity of human life, which the Salafis have always advocated. Let this treatise also serve as a reminder to the detractors, who exert considerable effort to discredit the teachings of Salafiyyah, which is free from the so called brands of Salafism. We pray that individuals affected with the ideas of the Khawārij and extremists, benefit from this treatise while reading it with an open and sincere mind.

Abu Khuzaimah Anṣari, Abu Ḥibban, and Abu Rumaiṣah are preachers based in Birmingham-UK.

The article first published on Salafiri.com.