The violence on Monday killed seven civilians and wounded 85 others, according to a provincial health official, marking the latest escalation in tensions between the two countries after months of cross-border fighting.The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said it had documented “tens of civilians killed or injured” in strikes that hit Asadabad, including a university and surrounding areas of the city.

Afghanistan’s foreign ministry condemned the attacks as “a clear breach of the country’s territorial integrity” and summoned Pakistan’s charge d’affaires in Kabul in protest.Pakistan’s information ministry denied carrying out strikes on residential neighborhoods or the university, calling such allegations a “blatant lie.”

At the university campus in Asadabad, an AFP journalist reported broken windows and damaged solar panels following the attack.Irfanullah, a 20-year-old psychology student, said students dropped to the floor after hearing a loud explosion during class.“Each student tried to get to a safe place, but the windows were broken and some of the students were wounded,” he said.

Another student, Ibadullah, 23, said panic spread immediately after the strike.“Students ran, shoes and books were left on the ground,” he said.Both students declined to provide their surnames for security reasons.Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained strained since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021.

The latest violence follows heavy fighting along the frontier earlier this year, as well as Pakistani airstrikes on Afghan cities including Kabul, an escalation that marked one of the most serious military confrontations between the neighbors in years.A temporary ceasefire was agreed in March, and mediator China later said both sides had committed to avoiding further escalation.

Islamabad has repeatedly accused Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities of sheltering militants responsible for attacks inside Pakistan, an allegation Kabul denies.

The border between the two countries has remained largely closed since deadly violence in October, severely disrupting trade and cross-border movement.

The Afghans, housed at Camp As Sayliyah on the outskirts of Doha, say returning to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would expose them to reprisals because of their past work with U.S. and allied forces, while resettlement options remain limited after President Donald Trump’s administration suspended Afghan immigration cases and paused refugee admissions.

“We are all living in extreme anxiety. We feel that we are in limbo,” said Rasouly, a former interpreter for U.S. forces who has spent 19 months at the camp with his family.Camp As Sayliyah, once used by the U.S. military, has served as a transit and processing center for Afghan evacuees since the chaotic U.S. withdrawal in August 2021.

Many of those still there had expected eventual resettlement in the United States under refugee or special immigration pathways.That process stalled after Trump paused refugee admissions in January 2025 and later suspended Afghan immigration cases in November, leaving hundreds of families in prolonged legal and humanitarian uncertainty.

Advocacy group AfghanEvac said the U.S. administration is considering requiring residents to choose between returning to Afghanistan or relocating to countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, a proposal first reported by U.S. media and later confirmed by campaigners as under review.In an open letter shared by AfghanEvac, camp residents rejected the possibility of relocation to Congo, citing both security concerns and trauma from years of conflict.

“We have been in enough war. We cannot take our children into another one,” the letter said. “We also cannot return to Afghanistan. The Taliban will kill many of us for what we did for the United States.”The U.S. State Department has not confirmed Congo as a destination but said relocation to a third country could provide safety and an opportunity to rebuild lives. Officials in the Democratic Republic of Congo have not commented publicly on the reports.

Afghanistan’s foreign ministry, responding to the reports, said Afghan nationals abroad could return in “confidence and peace of mind,” rejecting concerns over retaliation.However, the United Nations has documented arbitrary arrests, detentions and cases of torture involving former Afghan officials and security personnel who returned to Afghanistan, raising concerns among rights groups over the safety of returnees.

Residents at the camp said they have received little formal communication and rely largely on rumors about resettlement plans or possible camp closure.“Different rumors have circulated,” said Mahmoud, 38, who worked with U.S. and international forces and has lived at the camp for more than a year. “Rumours such as sending people to the Democratic Republic of the Congo are being spread to increase psychological pressure.

”Many families live in cramped, windowless containers and are generally unable to leave except for serious medical emergencies, residents said.The insecurity deepened during Iranian missile attacks targeting U.S. bases in the Gulf earlier this year, when explosions and interceptions were visible from the camp despite the base no longer being operational.

“It reminded us of Afghanistan,” said Shabnam, who arrived at the camp in January 2025 with her young son after her father’s work with U.S. and allied forces in western Afghanistan. “Many of us came here to escape conflict. It felt like we were reliving those same fears.”The State Department confirmed in February that Washington had offered financial assistance for voluntary return to Afghanistan.

AfghanEvac and camp residents said the package included $4,500 for each main applicant and $1,200 per dependent.Around 150 people have accepted the payments and returned, according to U.S. officials.For others, the offer does little to ease fears.“Security is not something that can be negotiated,” Rasouly said. “If they pay me $50,000 for me and my family, I cannot go to Afghanistan because my life is in danger.”

The statement came after reports that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump was discussing the possible relocation of around 1,100 Afghans, including former U.S. war helpers and relatives of American service members, to the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of efforts to resolve their prolonged displacement.

Foreign ministry spokesperson Abdul Qahar Balkhi said Afghanistan remained the “shared homeland of all Afghans” and invited those concerned to return with “full confidence and peace of mind,” rejecting concerns that they faced security threats under Taliban rule.

He said those wishing to migrate to other countries could do so later through “legal and dignified channels” and added that Kabul was ready to engage with all countries on the matter.

The remarks followed disclosures by advocacy group #AfghanEvac, which supports Afghan resettlement efforts, that U.S. officials had informed the group of talks between Washington and Congo regarding refugees housed at Camp As-Sayliyah, a U.S. base in Doha, where many have remained in limbo for more than a year.

The U.S. State Department said it was working to identify options for “voluntary” resettlement in a third country, but did not confirm which countries were under discussion.

For many of the Afghans at the camp, returning to Afghanistan is not considered safe. Many had worked directly with U.S. military forces, diplomatic missions, or affiliated programs during the war and fear retaliation from the Taliban, who returned to power in 2021 following the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces.

In a joint statement shared by #AfghanEvac, refugees at the camp said they had not been formally informed by U.S. officials about the possible transfer to Congo and learned of the discussions through media reports.

They said the prolonged uncertainty had severely affected their mental health.“Many of us are not well. The uncertainty has been more than some of us can carry. There is deep depression,” the group said, describing worsening psychological distress among families who have spent months waiting for relocation.

The refugees also firmly rejected the idea of being moved to Congo, citing ongoing violence there.“We do not want to go to the Democratic Republic of Congo,” the statement said. “It is a country in its own war. We have been in enough war.

We cannot take our children into another one.”The Democratic Republic of Congo has faced decades of instability, particularly in its eastern region, where fighting between government forces and Rwanda-backed rebel groups has intensified.

Camp residents also said returning to Afghanistan was not an option.“The Taliban will kill many of us for what we did for the United States,” the statement said. “This is not a fear. This is a fact.”The relocation discussions come more than a year after President Trump suspended his predecessor’s Afghan refugee resettlement program as part of broader immigration restrictions, leaving thousands of vetted Afghan applicants stranded in transit hubs across the world, including Qatar.

Many had already completed years of security screening and documentation for U.S. resettlement before the process was halted.

The uncertainty over their future continues to underscore the unresolved humanitarian fallout of America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fate of those who supported its mission there.

A United Nations human rights report has warned that conditions in Afghanistan continue to deteriorate sharply under the country’s de facto Taliban authorities, with women and girls facing the most severe restrictions and millions struggling amid a deepening humanitarian crisis.

The assessment, presented by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk at the latest session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, covers developments between August 2025 and January 2026. It highlights a convergence of economic decline, reduced international aid, environmental stress, and governance policies that have significantly constrained civil liberties.

According to the report, approximately 21.9 million people around 45 percent of Afghanistan’s population—are expected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026. The situation has been exacerbated by a reduction in external funding, the return of nearly three million Afghans from neighboring countries during 2025, and persistent drought conditions affecting livelihoods and food security.

Türk said a series of directives issued since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has had a “crushing impact” on the population, particularly women and girls. These measures, the report states, have effectively excluded women from most areas of public and professional life.

Since September 2025, Taliban security forces have barred Afghan women, including United Nations staff and contractors, from entering UN premises across the country. The restriction remained in place as of late January 2026, significantly limiting the organization’s operational capacity and its ability to deliver humanitarian assistance.The report also details the formal dismissal of women civil servants.

After being instructed to remain at home following the Taliban takeover while receiving a reduced monthly salary of 5,000 Afghanis, women were informed in January 2026 that their employment had been terminated without due process or compensation. The UN noted the absence of transparency and mitigation measures in this decision.

Educational restrictions remain in place, with girls excluded from schooling beyond the sixth grade and barred from higher education since December 2022. The report notes that medical graduation examinations were conducted in November 2025 without female candidates for a second consecutive year, following a ban on women attending medical institutes imposed in December 2024.

Additional measures have further limited women’s participation in public life. Authorities have enforced dress codes under the “Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,” and although the requirement for full-body covering appears to have been relaxed in some areas, women not adhering to prescribed attire continue to face denial of access to public transport, markets, and services.

The closure of beauty salons and the removal of books authored by women from libraries and bookstores, regardless of subject matter, have further restricted cultural and intellectual expression.“The de facto authorities have, in effect, criminalized the presence of women and girls in public life,” Türk said, adding that these policies affect access to healthcare, civic participation, and freedom of movement and expression.

The report also identifies broader human rights concerns, including the use of public executions and corporal punishment. Since 2021, authorities have carried out 12 public executions, including two during the reporting period, often in sports stadiums. Public floggings are reported to occur on a weekly basis.In late September 2025, Afghanistan experienced a nationwide shutdown of its fibre optic network, resulting in a 48-hour blackout of internet and mobile services.

The disruption affected healthcare delivery, emergency response systems, aviation operations, and financial services, according to the report, which noted that no official explanation was provided.Media freedom has also come under increased pressure. Journalists face arbitrary detention and restrictions on content, while live political talk shows have been banned since February 2025.

Broadcasting of music and drama has also been prohibited. Women journalists who remain active in the profession encounter additional barriers, including reported incidents of being silenced during official briefings.Türk described the overall situation as severe, citing widespread poverty and limited access to essential services.

“Millions of Afghans live in utter poverty, deprived of their right to adequate food, clean water, and access to education, healthcare and employment,” he said. He added that natural disasters, including two earthquakes in late 2025, have compounded existing challenges, while funding cuts have weakened humanitarian response efforts.

Security conditions along Afghanistan’s borders have also contributed to instability. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented 70 civilian deaths and 478 injuries attributed to Pakistani military actions during cross-border incidents in the final quarter of 2025.

The report notes that these figures exceed annual civilian casualty levels recorded in previous years, with the most intense period occurring between October 10 and 17, when more than 500 civilians were affected.In response to these developments, the UN has called on Afghanistan’s de facto authorities to reverse policies that restrict fundamental rights.

Recommendations include restoring women’s access to education and employment, halting executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty, ending arbitrary detentions, and ensuring fair trial standards. The report also calls for respect for freedom of expression and unimpeded humanitarian access.

The UN has urged member states to suspend forced returns of Afghan nationals, warning that deportees face credible risks of persecution, torture, and other serious harm. It has also emphasized the importance of supporting a newly established Independent Investigative Mechanism mandated to collect evidence of potential international crimes.

Türk noted that accountability efforts have gained some traction, referencing arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court in July 2025. He called on states to cooperate with ongoing investigations and provide financial support for accountability mechanisms.

Separately, a civil society-led People’s Tribunal for Women of Afghanistan delivered a symbolic judgment in December 2025, finding the Taliban and associated authorities responsible for crimes against humanity, including gender-based persecution and arbitrary detention.

The tribunal also called for the recognition of “gender apartheid” as a distinct international crime.Türk endorsed efforts to formalize this concept in international law, stating that defining gender apartheid would be a critical step toward addressing systemic discrimination. He urged Afghan authorities to reconsider policies excluding women from public life, emphasizing their central role in the country’s future.

“Women and girls are the present and the future, and the country cannot thrive without them.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said the two sides, along with China, committed to continued dialogue after seven days of negotiations in the western Chinese city.

The parties agreed to address key issues in bilateral relations, with terrorism identified as the central concern affecting ties.

“The three parties agreed to explore a comprehensive solution to the issues in the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and clarified the core and priority issues that need to be addressed,” Mao said at a regular press briefing in Beijing.Both Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged they would not take actions that could “escalate or complicate the situation,” according to the Chinese readout.

Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Abdul Qahar Balkhi said the talks concluded in a “constructive atmosphere,” focusing on security, bilateral relations and regional stability.

Writing on X, he thanked Beijing for facilitating the discussions and expressed hope the process would build trust and enhance cooperation.There was no immediate comment from Pakistan on the outcome of the talks.

The discussions were convened after fighting that began in February escalated into what Pakistan described as “open war,” including airstrikes inside Afghanistan, among them in the capital Kabul.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the conflict has displaced about 94,000 people, while roughly 100,000 residents in two Afghan border districts have been cut off from assistance since the violence began.

Despite the talks, Afghan officials have continued to accuse Pakistan of cross-border shelling, while Islamabad has long alleged that Afghanistan provides safe haven to militants, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, an insurgent group allied with the Afghan Taliban.

Kabul denies the operations.

Senior officials from both countries are participating in the discussions, which are being facilitated by China as part of efforts to broker a negotiated settlement between the neighbours, long linked by security ties but increasingly at odds over militancy and cross-border attacks.

The talks are expected to focus on securing a ceasefire and reopening key border crossings to restore trade and travel flows, according to sources cited in earlier reports, signalling an attempt to stabilise economic and civilian movement disrupted by months of hostilities.

“Our efforts for talks will continue despite the problems that will keep coming,” a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson said during a regular media briefing, underscoring Islamabad’s position that dialogue remains the primary channel for de-escalation.

Pakistan has also acknowledged China’s role in facilitating the engagement, describing Beijing as an important global actor whose diplomatic efforts are complementary to regional stability initiatives.

Tensions between the two countries have escalated sharply since late 2025, with Islamabad accusing the Afghan Taliban authorities of harbouring militants from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an insurgent group it says is responsible for attacks inside Pakistan.

The Afghan Taliban has rejected those allegations, maintaining that militancy within Pakistan is an internal issue and denying any official support or sanctuary for the group.

The two countries share a 2,600-kilometre border that has historically been porous and contested, and recent fighting has marked a significant deterioration in ties that had initially shown signs of alignment following the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021.

A return to the zero-sum mentality that dominated earlier epochs — where Kabul was binary: allied or hostile — will not suffice.

For decades Islamabad regarded Afghanistan as a strategic depth and a zone of influence — a buffer to be shaped, not simply neighboured. That assumption has been upended. What was once a relationship of patronage and leverage has become a volatile adversarial space in which Pakistan’s ability to shape outcomes is eroding fast.

The proximate causes are familiar: the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) resurgence, the Afghan Taliban’s evolving priorities, and renewed regional manoeuvring — but the deeper story is institutional: Pakistan’s coercive and diplomatic instruments have less purchase in Kabul than they did a decade ago, and the result is a dangerous ambiguity for peace along a porous frontier.

The unraveling of influence

Pakistan’s influence was built on long-term ties with elements of the Afghan insurgency, cross-border sanctuaries for proxies and a security apparatus that assumed it could cajole Kabul.

After the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021 Islamabad briefly believed those ties would translate into control over insurgent groups that threaten Pakistan’s internal security, especially the TTP. That belief has been proven increasingly fragile.

Since 2023 and into 2024–25, the TTP has consolidated, carrying out a wave of attacks inside Pakistan and openly operating from Afghan territory, according to Pakistani officials and independent monitors — a reality Islamabad blames on Kabul’s unwillingness or inability to rein in militants.

The rhetoric has hardened into kinetic confrontation. October and November 2025 saw some of the deadliest border clashes since 2021, with both sides trading heavy accusations of cross-border strikes and of harbouring militants.

Pakistan’s military leadership framed the dispute in stark terms: peace depends on the Taliban preventing attacks originating on Afghan soil — an implicit admission that Islamabad’s old levers of influence are no longer decisive.

Kabul, for its part, denies institutional complicity while insisting it is a sovereign government contending with its own domestic pressures and complex local actors.

Analysts have been blunt. “Pakistan misread the Taliban and lost peace on the frontier,” wrote commentators after a string of confrontations, arguing Islamabad had underestimated the Afghan leadership’s need to assert independence from Islamabad and to cultivate alternative patrons and legitimacy.

The practical consequence is a loss of predictive power: Islamabad cannot reliably forecast which militant actors Kabul will tolerate or contest, and therefore cannot control the border dynamics that have long defined its security calculus.

New players, old grievances

The decline of unilateral influence does not mean Pakistan has been entirely sidelined; rather, the relationship has been recalibrated amid a broader regional realignment.

China and Turkey have moved to mediate and cajole, economic corridors and diplomatic initiatives have proliferated, and even India has quietly sought to re-engage with Kabul, reopening channels that complicate Islamabad’s calculations.

These shifts give the Afghan Taliban alternatives for diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation that do not depend on Pakistan’s patronage.

Inside Pakistan, the domestic politics of counter-terrorism and the resurging profile of the Pakistani Taliban have also altered official thinking. Policymakers face a grim choice: assertive military options across the border that risk escalation and international censure, or a patient diplomatic strategy that depends on a Kabul willing and able to act.

The ambiguity has produced episodic violence rather than a durable settlement; ceasefires have been brokered and violated, and confidence-building measures are fragile. Observers note that Islamabad’s traditional tools — patronage networks, cross-border pressure and economic inducements — are necessary but not sufficient to resolve the multi-layered conflicts now playing out.

The human cost is immediate. Civilians on both sides of the Durand Line have borne the brunt of the violence: displacement, disrupted trade and a renewal of mistrust that undercuts any long-term reconciliation.

The border is not simply a line on a map; it is a lived geography of interdependence and grievance. As violence spikes, international actors — from Qatar and Turkey to regional capitals — are scrambling to re-establish mediation channels even as the ground reality resists neat diplomatic fixes.

What comes next

If Pakistan’s grip is slipping, the strategic implication is that South Asia’s security architecture must be rethought. A return to the zero-sum mentality that dominated earlier epochs — where Kabul was binary: allied or hostile — will not suffice.

Instead, any viable approach must accept multiplicity: a Taliban government with agency, non-state militant actors with transnational reach and regional powers willing to assert influence through economic and diplomatic means. This requires Pakistan to invest in multilateral mechanisms, to deepen intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation that respects Afghan sovereignty, and to concede that punitive cross-border strikes are not a sustainable substitute for political solutions.

The stakes transcend bilateral rivalry. A durable peace on the frontier matters to refugee flows, counter-terrorism, narcotics trafficking and the broader stability of a region that is again the focus of great-power competition.

If Islamabad wants to protect its core security interests it must adapt to an Afghan polity that no longer responds predictably to old incentives. That adaptation will be neither quick nor comfortable, but it is necessary: failing to do so will leave both countries mired in a costly oscillation of strikes, reprisals and diplomatic ruptures that benefits no one.

As one regional analyst put it, the old script for influence has been burned; the question for Pakistan is whether it can write a new, more cooperative one before the next conflagration.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

According to a statement from Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs early Sunday, the two South Asian nations committed not only to a halt in hostilities but also to “the establishment of mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries”.

They further affirmed that follow-up meetings will be held in the coming days “to ensure the sustainability of the cease-fire and verify its implementation in a reliable and sustainable manner”.

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, welcomed the accord as “a first step in the right direction”.

Posting on X, he expressed appreciation for the “constructive role played by brotherly Qatar and Türkiye”. He also flagged the next meeting to be hosted by Türkiye, underlining the need for “a concrete and verifiable monitoring mechanism … to address the menace of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil towards Pakistan”.

He added: “It is important to put all efforts in place to prevent any further loss of lives.”

Earlier, both Islamabad and Kabul held talks in Doha on Saturday after the worst violence between the neighbours since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

According to Afghan government spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, negotiations took place in Doha with Kabul’s team led by Defence Minister Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob. Meanwhile Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed its Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif led discussions with Taliban leadership.

The cross-border flare-up was triggered by Pakistan’s demand that Afghanistan rein in insurgent groups accused of staging increasingly frequent attacks on Pakistani territory—and which Islamabad says operate from safe havens inside Afghan soil.

The Taliban government denies harbouring armed groups for attacks on Pakistan, instead accusing Islamabad of misinformation, and of sheltering ISIL-linked militants undermining Afghan sovereignty.

On Friday, a suicide bomb near the border killed seven Pakistani soldiers and wounded 13 others, according to security officials. Pakistan’s Army Chief, Asim Munir, warned on Saturday that “the Afghan regime must rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan and are using Afghan soil to perpetrate heinous attacks inside Pakistan.”

While the cease-fire agreement marks a positive step, analysts caution that the true test will lie in sustained verification, cross-border monitoring and addressing deep-rooted mistrust. Establishing a credible mechanism to monitor adherence and respond promptly to violations will be crucial if peace is to hold.

Deoband’s embrace of the Taliban foreign minister is dangerous — but also offers an opening.

Amir Khan Muttaqi, Foreign Minister of the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and a senior figure in its political and ideological leadership, has recently completed a six-day visit to India — an episode loaded with meaning.

From his informal ban on female journalists, to the cancellation of his Agra leg, and his carefully choreographed stop at the Vivekananda Foundation. Yet, it is his visit to Dar ul Uloom Deoband, the theological heart of South Asian Deobandi Islam, that has invited sharpest scrutiny.

For years, Indian Muslims — particularly those aligned with the Deobandi school — have tried to draw a distinction between “their Islam,” described as democratic and egalitarian, and the Taliban’s brutal, patriarchal regime. Muttaqi’s pilgrimage to his ideological fountainhead has challenged that narrative.

When the Taliban’s foreign minister visits Deoband, and the seminary receives him with honor, it becomes almost impossible to sustain the claim that the Taliban are merely “misguided” Muslims. Why, then, should men who have subjugated women and silenced dissent be treated as heroes?

What emerges instead is a chilling recognition: the Taliban are not a deviation from Deobandi Islam according to the seminary, but one of its most literal political manifestations.

The confusion within India’s religiously-inclined Muslim intelligentsia over how to respond to this visit is telling — and repetitive. Some rush to rationalize it as “cultural diplomacy” or a gesture of goodwill in the national interest, strangely bringing the Muslim right and the Hindu right onto the same page.

Others recoil in discomfort but stop short of open criticism. Deoband’s endorsement of Muttaqi symbolically affirms the very doctrines that have justified gender apartheid, banned girls from education, and institutionalized moral policing across Afghanistan.

This moment is not merely about Afghanistan; it reflects a moral crisis within Indian muslims as well — a refusal to confront its own regressive solidarities under the pretext of religious kinship. The spectacle of Deoband greeting Muttaqi with reverence reveals the unbroken theological thread linking the 19th seminary to the taliban led theocratic governance.

Deoband’s embrace of the Taliban foreign minister is dangerous — but also offers an opening. If the Taliban truly draw their ideological legitimacy from Deoband, then Deoband carries a moral responsibility: to humanize that ideology, to insist that justice and compassion, not repression, define Islam.

The seminary has a proud history of standing against colonial injustice and for India’s freedom. Can it now stand for Afghan women denied education, or men imprisoned for thought?

If Dar ul Uloom Deoband wishes to remain relevant in a plural democracy, it must decide where it stands — with democracy, gender justice, and education, or with those who burn books, bury dissent, and blind the future of half their population.

The decision to dispatch Muttaqi to New Delhi is therefore not just about outreach to India — it is also a stinging rebuke to Pakistan.

In a significant turn that could recalibrate South Asian geopolitics, Afghan-Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi will travel to New Delhi on October 9 — his first official visit since the Taliban regained power in 2021. The United Nations Security Council has granted him a temporary waiver from international travel sanctions, allowing the trip to proceed until October 16.

The visit marks more than a symbolic breakthrough. It reflects months of quiet backchannel diplomacy between Indian officials and Taliban leaders in neutral venues such as Dubai, and culminated earlier this year in a direct conversation between India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Muttaqi.

In June this year, India handed over control of the Afghan consulate in Hyderabad to a Taliban appointee, Mohammad Rahman as the consular representative.

That call came soon after the Taliban condemned the Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir — an extraordinary moment, considering the Taliban’s long association with Pakistan’s security establishment.

India has simultaneously expanded its humanitarian footprint in Afghanistan, delivering wheat, medicines, earthquake relief tents, and medical supplies. Since the Taliban’s takeover, New Delhi has sent nearly 50,000 tonnes of wheat, over 330 tonnes of medicines, and substantial food and shelter assistance.

Following the devastating September earthquake, India was among the first responders, dispatching relief material within days. For Kabul, Delhi is emerging as a partner willing to engage pragmatically and without the overbearing demands that have characterized Pakistan’s approach.

The decision to dispatch Muttaqi to New Delhi is therefore not just about outreach to India — it is also a stinging rebuke to Pakistan. For decades, Islamabad claimed the Taliban as its creation and asset. Yet today, that influence has eroded so sharply that the Taliban are actively seeking to diversify away from Pakistan’s orbit.

From Patron to Pariah: Pakistan’s Broken Bond

Pakistan’s role in nurturing the Taliban is well documented. Seminaries like Darul Uloom Haqqaniyah produced many of the movement’s cadres, and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies offered sanctuary, arms, and financing.

For Islamabad, the Taliban were a tool to secure “strategic depth” against India. But influence is not permanent, and Pakistan has squandered it through hubris, duplicity, and coercion.

One turning point was Islamabad’s airstrikes inside Afghan territory. In December 2024, Pakistani aircraft struck Barmal district in Paktika province, reportedly killing civilians under the pretext of targeting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hideouts.

The Taliban reacted furiously, calling the raid a “violation of sovereignty” and warning of consequences. By repeatedly bombing Afghan soil, Pakistan crossed a line from patron to aggressor, undermining whatever goodwill remained.

Another blow came with Islamabad’s decision to expel Afghan refugees. More than 80,000 Afghans were forced to return earlier this year, many with nowhere to go. Kabul viewed this as a callous betrayal. Rather than brotherhood, Pakistan treated refugees as pawns in its strategic game.

For the Taliban, already struggling to manage humanitarian needs, the expulsions were proof that Islamabad valued leverage over solidarity.

The border dispute has deepened the rupture further. The Taliban refuse to recognize the Durand Line — the colonial-era boundary imposed by the British. Pakistan’s efforts to fence and formalize the border have sparked repeated clashes, especially at Torkham, where crossings have been closed and trade disrupted.

For Afghans, resisting the Durand Line is a matter of sovereignty; for Pakistan, enforcing it is a security imperative. The clash is zero-sum, and Pakistan underestimated the symbolic power of the issue.

But perhaps Pakistan’s most corrosive mistake has been its double game. For years, Islamabad “hunted with the hounds and ran with the hare” — selling cooperation to Washington while harboring Taliban leaders, then betraying them when convenient.

The Taliban leadership has not forgotten the arrests and handovers of commanders to the U.S. during the post-9/11 years. Those betrayals bred deep suspicion of Pakistani intentions.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s internal security crisis has spilled across the border. The TTP, inspired by the Taliban’s victory in Kabul, has intensified its insurgency inside Pakistan. Islamabad demanded that Kabul rein in the group, but the Taliban balked at turning their guns on fellow militants.

The result has been open recrimination, with Pakistan accusing the Taliban of harboring terrorists and the Taliban accusing Pakistan of exporting instability.

Underlying all of this is a question of dignity. The Taliban, now rulers of Afghanistan, refuse to be treated as clients or proxies. Pakistan’s patronizing posture — airstrikes, expulsions, fencing, and demands — has alienated a movement that now insists on equal footing.

Kabul’s outreach to India, once unthinkable, has become a declaration of independence.

Why India, and Why Now?

India’s renewed relevance in Afghanistan is not ideological but pragmatic. For Kabul, Delhi offers what Islamabad no longer can: stability, resources, and respect.

First, India has sustained its humanitarian assistance. Wheat, medicines, earthquake relief, and development projects have directly benefited millions of Afghans. This tangible aid bolsters the Taliban’s domestic credibility at a time when international recognition remains elusive.

Second, India provides historic continuity. From constructing Afghanistan’s parliament building to investing in roads, dams, and schools during the 2000s, Delhi has built goodwill across generations. Even after 2021, when most Western embassies evacuated Kabul, India cautiously maintained a presence and continued delivering aid.

Third, India offers alternatives to Pakistan’s chokehold on trade. Through the Chabahar port in Iran, Afghanistan gains a maritime outlet that bypasses Karachi. For a landlocked country, this access is transformative — and strategically liberating.

Fourth, India’s diplomatic approach is carefully calibrated. It has engaged the Taliban without formal recognition, striking a balance between protecting its interests and avoiding premature legitimization. For Kabul, this provides engagement without subordination.

Finally, embracing India signals to other powers — from Russia to the Gulf states — that the Taliban are not beholden to Islamabad. Diversification of partners enhances Kabul’s strategic autonomy.

Pakistan’s Strategic Miscalculation

At its core, Pakistan’s loss of influence over the Taliban stems from one fatal error: mistaking coercion for control. By bombing Afghan soil, expelling refugees, fencing contested borders, and treating Afghans as pawns, Islamabad alienated the very force it once nurtured. Its duplicity — supporting militants while courting Washington — has left it distrusted by all sides.

The Taliban, in turn, have chosen pragmatism. They see in India a partner who delivers aid without interference, offers trade without humiliation, and engages without betrayal.

For New Delhi, the opportunity is clear: to secure its long-term interests in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan its long-cherished “strategic depth,” and to assert itself as a stabilizing force in the region.

As Amir Khan Muttaqi steps into his meetings in New Delhi, the symbolism will be unmistakable. The Taliban — once Pakistan’s prized proxy — are now opening their doors to India, Islamabad’s arch-rival. It is more than a diplomatic engagement. It is the visible consequence of Pakistan’s failed policies, its double game, and its arrogance.

In the great chessboard of South Asia, Afghanistan is moving away from Pakistan’s shadow and toward India’s embrace. For Islamabad, the message is painful but clear: the days of monopolizing Kabul are over.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.