In his post, Al-Amari stated, “The Syrian army is supplying food and aid to Alawite families. This reflects the strength of the Syrian army. Syria belongs to everyone, and there should be no distinction between Sunni and Alawite. What truly matters is being a Syrian who loves their country”.

The video has sparked conversations about inclusivity in aid distribution, with many advocating for a fair allocation of resources to all affected communities, regardless of sectarian identity. While some view the move as a step toward strengthening social cohesion, others stress the need for aid to reach all displaced and war-affected Syrians.

This development comes amid President Ahmad Al-Shar’a’s recent address, in which he reaffirmed his administration’s commitment to justice and national unity.

“We will not tolerate the remnants of the Assad regime who have attacked civilians, hospitals, security forces, and security centers. The only option left for those remnants is to surrender to the law immediately”, President Al-Shar’a declared.

He further emphasized that accountability will be enforced without leniency for those involved in harming civilians, abusing power, or exploiting authority for personal gain.

“No one will be above the law. Anyone whose hands are stained with the blood of Syrians will face justice”, he affirmed.

The president also reiterated his stance on national unity, condemning any attempts to incite division.

“We criminalize any call or appeal that seeks to interfere in the affairs of our country or incite discord or division. Syria, with all its components, will remain united. We will not allow any party to undermine our national unity or disrupt civil peace”.

With both the journalist’s report and the president’s statement, the discourse on Syria’s path forward remains central. Observers highlight that fostering reconciliation and ensuring aid reaches all communities without bias will be key factors in Syria’s long-term stability and recovery.

Baghdad (AFP) — Lawmakers in crisis-hit Iraq are set to meet Thursday for their fourth attempt this year to elect a new state president and break political gridlock that has sparked protests and deadly violence.

ISIS relies purely on geographic terrain to plan and execute its activities…

ISIS has significantly increased its operations over the past year after a reorganization that saw it focus on creating mobile groups of fighters to conduct smaller-scale attacks. Understanding how its reconstituting itself as an insurgent force and at these early stages is critical to preventing its resurgence.

ISIS in Iraq’s urban areas appears to have reorganized its fighters in small “mobile” subgroups. The group has reformulated its fighting strategies in accordance with new realities on the ground: a decline in its ability to fight after losing first-tier leaders and thousands of fighters in its 2017 territorial defeat, U.S. sanctions on many of its financial resources, and its decreasing ability to recruit and sustain new blood. Nonetheless, ISIS  is ramping up its activities in areas in which it still has influence by exploiting Iraq’s internal problems and utilizing familiar geographical territory.

Varying Estimates of ISIS Fighters 

In August 2020, almost two years after the group’s military defeat, the U.N. estimated that more than 10,000 ISIS fighters were still operating in Iraq and Syria. This is similar to a late 2019 assessment from counter-terrorism authorities in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which estimated 10,000 ISIS members in Iraq, 4,000-5,000 of whom were fighters and the rest of whom were supporters and sleeper cells integrated into local communities in the majority-Sunni provinces of western and northwestern Iraq. 

These numbers far exceed estimates from Iraqi intelligence, which puts the number of ISIS fighters in Iraq at 2,000-3,000, including 500 fighters who infiltrated the country out of 859 fighters who escaped from the detention of the Syrian Democratic Forces in October 2019.

All these estimates may be more than the real numbers of ISIS combatants who launch attacks on selected targets, set up ambushes, plant explosive devices, kidnap and assassinate social and political leaders, and undertake other operations in keeping with the organization’s strategic priorities. ISIS has been able to revive these operations three years after its military defeat in its last stronghold in the Iraqi city of Rawa, 90 kilometers (56 miles) east of the city of Al-Qaim on the Syrian border, on Nov. 17, 2017.

A study of security operations against ISIS in Iraq shows that most do not result in the arrest or killing of large numbers of ISIS fighters. Military units from various branches of the security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces Shia militia alliance, including tribal units, from multiple provinces participate in these operations, which are supported by the air forces of the Iraqi Army and the international coalition and cover large areas of more than one province. These include, for example, the “Lions of al-Jazeera”  operation that was launched in May 2020 and encompassed the provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. These operations often uncover tunnels, which are — in addition to caves — essential places, called madafat or “guest houses,” for harboring ISIS fighters, and finding explosive belts and IEDs. 

The military operations to combat ISIS cells are disproportionate with the results. The officially announced outcome of the “Lions of al-Jazeera” campaign resulted in the arrest of two suspects, the destruction of two hideouts, the controlled detonation of four explosive devices, the deactivation of a booby-trapped house, the destruction of a tunnel, and the seizure of two motorcycles. 

In Anbar Province, according to official results announced by the Defense Ministry’s Security Media Cell, the security forces participating in “Lions of al-Jazeera” announced on Oct. 1, 2020, that three ISIS fighters had been killed in one of the tunnels in which they found projectiles of various types in modest numbers. 

In Salah al-Din province, after a series of operations to clear the Makhoul mountain range, the Security Media Cell announced in November 2020 that it had found five tunnels and some military equipment but did not arrest or kill any of the organization’s fighters. 

The press briefings about these security operations do not indicate that a significant number of ISIS fighters were killed, nor do they indicate that clashes between security forces and ISIS fighters took place except in rare cases. They do reveal the destruction of shelters, weapons, and combat equipment that the organization had stored in desert and mountainous areas once ISIS realized that defeat was inevitable.  

The security forces, including units of the Popular Mobilization Forces, attach great importance to decoupling Iraq from Syria such that it does not serve as a singular battlespace for ISIS by restricting the cross-border movement of fighters and weapons. In this way, they seek to prevent the infiltration of ISIS fighters from Syria into Iraq, as these fighters hide in the deserts of Anbar and Ninewa to prepare to move to areas that are important to the organization in terms of security, such as the Makhoul and Hamrin mountain ranges in Salah al-Din. At the same time, the Popular Mobilization Forces control the Syrian-Iraqi border to facilitate their own interests such as trade and weapons flow from and to Syria. 

The security forces succeeded in securing more than 450 kilometers (280 miles) of the 610-kilometer (379-mile) Iraqi-Syrian border by cooperating with the International Coalition to install surveillance towers, barbed wire, and thermal cameras, in addition to reconnaissance drones. 

ISIS’s Geographic Distribution 

ISIS’s increased use of “mobile groups” that carry out operations in different areas — often far from its bases or from shelters such as the madafat, which are located in rough terrains, rocky caves, or underground tunnels — means the group’s actual presence cannot be judged by its territorial claims or by announcements from Iraqi authorities. 

No longer concerned about maintaining its wilayat (province) structure, and by ignoring the federal government’s administrative divisions, ISIS relies purely on geographic terrain to plan and execute its activities. Even though the group is no longer acting as a state as it was during the caliphate years from 2014 to 2018, its communiques claiming attacks still refer to the wilayat as part of its PR strategy. 

Iraqi security officials’ statements indicate that the organization relies on remote bases deep in the desert in Anbar, Ninewa, mountain ranges, valleys, and orchards in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala to house its fighters and establish monitoring and control points to secure supply routes. It also uses these bases to establish command centers and small camps for training, digging tunnels, and exploiting caves in mountainous areas. 

ISIS fighters’ geographical distribution can be inferred by examining the operations it launches against security forces and the Popular and Tribal Mobilization Forces. These fighters are distributed mainly in overlapping “geographical sectors” in Anbar, Baghdad, Babil, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, and Diyala.

The first sector is an extension of the desert in eastern Syria. It constitutes a meeting point between ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq, who move from there to Salah al-Din, which represents the main land communication node for the organization. It links ISIS groups coming mostly from Syria through Anbar and then moving to neighboring provinces: to the south reaching the northern belt of Baghdad, east to Diyala, north to Kirkuk, and to the northwest reaching Ninewa. This sector includes Anbar and Ninewa provinces within a wide desert area interspersed with valleys, mountain ranges, and bodies of water.

One of the most important valleys in this sector that ISIS uses to house its fighters is Houran Valley, which descends 350 kilometers (217 miles) from Saudi territory and enters Iraq, ending in the Euphrates near Albaghdadi. Another is the Wadi Al-Ubayyid Valley, which passes the Saudi border and Anbar Governorate in the border region of Arar, and ends in Razzaza Lake in Karbala Governorate, south of Baghdad. 

This sector also includes the desert of Al-Baaj district, southwest of Mosul and 50 kilometers (31 miles) east of the Syrian border, and the desert of Hatra district, south of Mosul. These two areas overlap geographically with the Anbar desert in the Al-Qaim region north of the Euphrates River and include the Badush mountain range, as well as the Al-Tharthar Valley and Al-Tharthar Lake, northeast of Anbar, next to Salah Al-Din province. 

The second geographical sector includes areas overlapping with the first geographical sector in the southeast of Ninewa and northwest of Salah al-Din. It includes the geographical areas between the districts of Sharqat in Salah al-Din next to the Kirkuk and Makhmur in the southeast of Ninewa near Kirkuk and Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region. 

The third geographical sector is the most important for the organization and the center of ISIS’s main activities. It includes Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala provinces, extending to the Al Kateon sector and the areas of Al-Muqdadiya, Khanaqin, Jalawla, and Qarataba. 

The sector features valleys such as Zghitoun and Shay in Kirkuk, agricultural areas with dense orchards suitable for hiding and transporting ISIS fighters, setting up ambushes, and planting explosive devices. ISIS mobile groups in this sector in Salah al-Din overlap groups in Diyala through the Makhoul and Hamrin mountain ranges. 

In addition to the three main geographical sectors, ISIS groups have a presence in the western Baghdad belt areas in Abu Ghraib and Radwaniyah and in the northern Baghdad belt in Rashidiya, Tarmiyah, and Al-Mashahidah. They also exist in the cities of Balad and Samarra, in the south of Salah al-Din, and south of Baghdad in the Jurf al-Sakhar area, located 50 kilometers to the east of Amiriyat al-Fallujah in Anbar.

ISIS cells are also present in areas that are in dispute between the Iraqi central and Kurdistan regional governments, where the lack of security coordination gives the organization some freedom of movement. This was especially true after the Kurdish peshmerga forces evacuated these areas in October 2017 following then-Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi’s decision to move Iraqi security forces and Popular Mobilization Forces to control these areas after a September 2017 independence referendum organized by the Kurds.

Other areas, however, have witnessed joint operations by security forces from several governorates to track down and hunt ISIS fighters and destroy their bases. The first phase of the operation “The Lions of Al-Jazeera II” operation, which was launched on Feb. 1, 2020, with the participation of units from the Al-Jazeera Operations Command, the West Ninewa Operations Command, the Salah al-Din Operations Command, and Popular Mobilization Forces brigades (including tribal units) is a key example of this kind of coordination. 

ISIS’s Operations on the Rise 

According to information I have obtained through monitoring official Iraqi and non-Iraqi sites and other sites close to ISIS, the organization has carried out dozens of operations in Iraq since the start of 2021. The propaganda ISIS has employed often takes advantage of highly publicized global events to carry out attacks and show the world they are still present. The election of U.S. President Joe Biden was such an event, and ISIS escalated the pace of its attacks after Biden’s inauguration.  

According to media outlets close to ISIS, such as Amaq News Agency, the group carried out 1,422 operations in 2020, an average of four per day. The organization’s main tool was explosive devices, used 485 times, followed by 334 sniping operations, in addition to 252 clashes or exchanges of fire. Another 94 execution operations were carried out against individuals affiliated with security services, the Popular Mobilization Forces, or the Kurdish peshmerga forces and against people cooperating with the government, including mayors and tribal leaders. There were an additional 257 operations that ISIS’s media outlets mention but do not classify. 

Amaq claims the organization killed or injured 2,748 people in 2020, including 724 killings in Diyala, 643 in Salah al-Din, 576 in Anbar, 474 in Kirkuk, 210 in Baghdad, 104 in Babil, and 26 in Ninewa. This indicates a 50% increase in operations compared to 2019 and 11% more deaths and injuries. 

The group also claimed to have destroyed or damaged 559 vehicles of various types, 85 houses and farms, 60 thermal cameras, 34 barracks, and 28 electrical energy transmission towers, most of which were in Diyala, Babil and Anbar. 

ISIS was limited to operations that do not require large numbers of fighters, including planting IEDs, setting up ambushes, sniping operations, assassinations, and burning homes and farms, none of which have major political or security repercussions. An exception is some limited “special operations,” such as the one in which two suicide bombers detonated in Tayaran Square in central Baghdad on Jan. 21, killing more than 30 people and wounding dozens in a “rare” security breach, nearly three years after the last operation in the capital that was claimed by the organization. 

Pandemic, Security Vacuum Provided Openings 

ISIS took advantage of the security vacuum in early 2020 after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and the tensions between the U.S. and Iran. Two days after the Jan. 2 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, coalition forces, wary of escalation, announced a brief halt in training Iraqi forces. The training resumed but was halted again on March 19 due to the spread of COVID-19 in Iraq. Coalition forces repositioned to different camps, and some countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain withdrew soldiers from Iraq. 

Soleimani’s assassination also prompted the Iraqi parliament to vote in January 2020 for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Official figures stated that before the pandemic there were about 8,000 foreign troops in Iraq, including 5,200 from the United States, while unofficial sources say the real number exceeds 16,000. The United States reduced the number of its soldiers in Iraq in September 2020 to about 2,500 soldiers in response to the Iraqi government’s request. 

This vacuum gave ISIS more freedom of movement for its mobile groups, facilitating logistical support and the restructuring and distributing these groups in a way that allowed the organization to securely cover the areas where its fighters are deployed. These deployments were in areas far from Iraqi security forces, which did not announce any military operations until April 2020. The first operation included the governorates of Diyala, Anbar, and Salah al-Din and was undertaken in response to the killing of 170 civilians and soldiers, along with 135 militants during the first quarter of 2020. 

Weakened but Still Effective 

Via its mobile groups, ISIS still possesses sufficient combat capabilities to threaten security and stability, but the group remains very weak. Currently, the organization still lacks the ability to execute major operations, and its attacks are limited to open targets that are not of strategic importance. What this means is that it is unlikely to attempt to take control of territory in Iraq or Syria due to the decline in its combat capabilities and financial resources. The group also remains vulnerable to the international coalition and Iraqi security forces if it tries to accelerate the pace of its resurgence. 

ISIS needs to recruit new fighters and rebuild its leadership system to centralize control, whether in directing orders or gathering security and intelligence information to prepare for major operations. Recruiting is more difficult, especially after its four years of control over territory led to widespread societal rejection of its authority. Local communities have been more closely cooperating with coalition and security forces to prevent ISIS from making a comeback, especially after witnessing increased stability in areas where tribes cooperated with the authorities. That said, the organization still attracts some unemployed people, outlaws, or people hunted down for social reasons, all of whom find that joining the ranks of the organization is a means of escaping from social and judicial prosecutions, in addition to ensuring minimum means of subsistence.    

This decline in local support also gives ISIS less flexibility in attracting funding. After gaining control of Mosul in 2014, ISIS relied on diversifying its sources of financing, whether by controlling hundreds of millions of dollars (for example, more than $420 million from state banks in Mosul) or by producing and marketing oil from fields it controlled in Iraq and Syria. It also trades in hard currencies through exchange and transfer networks, using third parties such as the Al-Ard Al-Jadidah company that moved from its headquarters in the city of Al-Qaim to the Turkish city of Samsun after the defeat of ISIS in Iraq. The company is part of the Al-Rawi Network that was run by Fawaz Muhammad Jubayr al-Rawi in the Syrian city of Albu Kamal, before he was killed in a June 2017 airstrike.  

In December 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department included Fawaz Muhammad Jubayr al-Rawi and other members of the Al-Rawi Network and associated entities such as the Al-Ard Al-Jadidah company on the sanctions list for providing important financial and logistical support to ISIS. 

Most of the organization’s activities during January and February of this year were concentrated in the Iraqi governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din. ISIS took advantage of some security gaps resulting from the decline in the level of coordination between the active forces, whether the security forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces or the Kurdish peshmerga forces.  

Ending ISIS is More than Combatting Terrorism 

During more than four years of the war against ISIS, and in addition to the dozens of security operations announced by the Iraqi forces to hunt down the remaining ISIS fighters, the U.S.-led international coalition carried out more than 34,000 air and artillery strikes that contributed to a large extent in taking control of all ISIS-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq by March 2019. Yet, according to U.S. intelligence sources, , the organization was not defeated and remains a threat to the security and stability of Iraq and Syria, with evident activity in more than six provinces in western and northwestern Iraq. 

The organization focuses its operations on targeting influential figures, especially those cooperating with the government and security agencies, to remove the obstacles it believes prevent it from recruiting more young people into its ranks and to limit the security cooperation that leads to the exposure of the organization’s members and fighters’ hideouts. It also aims to secure a “friendly” environment for the activities of its members in the Sunni community. 

Ending the threat ISIS poses cannot be realized without a political settlement that reintegrates Sunni Arabs in the political process, a fair distribution of power and wealth according to the population proportions of Sunni Arabs, and rebuilding cities destroyed by the war on ISIS that lasted from 2014 to 2018. In addition, emigrants and forcibly displaced people should be allowed to return to the governorates in the west and northwestern Iraq, and the Popular Mobilization Forces’ control of most of these areas must end. 

Additionally, efforts by the government and civil society organizations are needed to accept the social impact of the return of ISIS members’ families who are still in the camps and who are taught an ideology that adopts the ideas and approach of the organization. This is especially evident in the Al Hol camp in Hasakah, Syria, which includes thousands of ISIS families and members.  

Article first published on New Line Institute For Strategy And Policy based in Washington D.C.

Raed Al-Hamid is an independent Iraqi researcher and former consultant for the International Crisis Group. He tweets under @Raedalhamid1.

Iran had its eye on shrines since the fall of the (Iraqi) regime in 2003…

In September, a senior Iranian commander made an unannounced visit to one of Shia Islam’s holiest sites in the southern Iraqi city of Kerbala.

Hassan Pelarak, a top officer in the Revolutionary Guards’ elite Quds Force, had recently been sanctioned by the US for weapons smuggling. He was checking in on a construction project led by a firm he owns together with other Revolutionary Guards, a foundation linked to Iran’s Supreme Leader. This foundation too is under US sanctions.

The vast, $600 million expansion at the Imam Hussein shrine, which is revered as the place of martyrdom of the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, will swell the capacity of what is already the world’s largest annual pilgrimage, dwarfing the Hajj to Saudi Arabia’s Mecca. It is the biggest development at the shrine in 300 years.

An Iraqi worker at the site sent Reuters pictures of Pelarak, wearing a hard hat and sporting a blue surgical mask, having his temperature taken before entering. The visit, confirmed by an Iraqi employee of the foundation, was not reported by Iranian or Iraqi media. But his visit was not unusual. Pelarak and other Guards commanders overseeing the project freely drop in, workers say, and are given quick tours by the exclusively Iranian companies and engineers they have contracted to carry out the work.

Qassem Soleimani, the late Quds Force commander who spearheaded Iran’s military and political strategy across the region, was filmed touring the project in 2018, 18 months before he was killed by a US drone strike. His successor, Esmail Ghaani, made an unannounced visit to the shrine two weeks after Pelarak, said an Iranian source in Kerbala.

Day and night, Iranian laborers fill in a 40-metre deep, 50,000-square-metre crater next to the shrine with steel girders and cement brought from Iran. The multi-story buildings they are erecting will contain ablution stations, a museum and a library. Millions of predominantly Shia pilgrims from across the Islamic world will access the Hussein shrine via a large road tunnel.

It is one of the largest of the multi-million dollar projects that the Revolutionary Guards-owned Kawthar foundation (Kowsar in Persian) is leading to develop religious tourism in Iraq and Syria – with more in the pipeline.

For this report, Reuters paid five visits to the Kerbala project site, examined public information from the shrines and companies and interviewed at least 20 Iraqi and Iranian workers, engineers, businessmen, religious and political officials. The examination reveals how Iran’s close involvement in religious tourism is bringing Tehran soft power and cementing a presence in Iraqi religious centers that are the nexus of Shia regional influence.

Control of shrine development also deepens trade ties and is a target of potential economic opportunity for Iran: Religious tourism is worth billions of dollars a year in Iraq, the second-largest earner of revenue for the country after the oil sector.

“Iran has long penetrated the Iraqi deep state,” said Bangen Rekani, a former Iraqi housing minister with knowledge of the projects. Increasingly, he said, “Iranians use their soft power and religious ties, which can be more important than political ties.”

Iraq’s government grants religious projects special privileges, including tax exemptions on imports of Iranian cement, steel and other materials. According to multiple sources, many of these goods are brought into Iraq ostensibly for shrine development but are then sold elsewhere in the country. Reuters couldn’t determine the extent of this trade, which helps counter Western sanctions on Iran.

The development of Shia shrines is being spearheaded by Iran’s Holy Shrines Reconstruction Headquarters, a body set up by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and run by the Revolutionary Guards’ appointees. In March, Washington sanctioned the Headquarters and Kawthar, its Iraq-based engineering wing. Pelarak was among officials targeted. The Americans alleged the Headquarters and Kawthar were involved in “lethal aid” to proxy militias in Iraq and Syria, intelligence activities and money laundering. A Treasury spokesperson told Reuters that Iran sought to expand its influence and exploit Iraqi financial and business sectors.

Khamenei has condemned US sanctions as an attempt to destroy Iran’s economy and overthrow its ruling system. Reuters sought comment for this article from the Iranian government, the Revolutionary Guard, its engineering wing Kawthar and Pelarak, but didn’t receive a response. An Iraqi government official said he couldn’t comment about Kawthar’s activities in Iraq because he didn’t have details, a remark echoed by a spokesperson for the Iraqi state body that administers religious sites.

A spokesman for the Hussein shrine, Afdhal al-Shami, told Reuters that Iran’s involvement was needed because “Iraq’s economy is such that we can’t undertake a project like this on our own.”

“Iranians love the shrines. When this money comes in from Iranian donors, through an official body, that’s a psychological boost and good publicity at home and abroad for the Iranian government,” he said in an interview.

“Down to the mirrors, it’s all Iranian”

Iran built power in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion that toppled Sunni ruler Saddam Hussein and brought rule by Iraq’s Shia majority, especially parties supported by Tehran. The Revolutionary Guards grew a military-business empire in Iran, then expanded their influence across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. They created a corridor to support militia allies across the region and dominate land borders, overground trade, and expand their presence at Shia holy places.

But now the Islamic Republic’s attempts to expand influence in Iraq are facing new challenges. Iran is distracted by the coronavirus pandemic at home and dissent against the political parties and militant groups it backs in Iraq and Lebanon. Iraq’s top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has supported calls for political reform and long opposed foreign interference, including that of Iran. The United States and its allies are trying to roll back Iranian influence with sanctions, assassinations of military commanders and a new alliance between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. For the first time in years, an Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, has sided with the United States. Kadhimi’s appointment was opposed by Iran-aligned militia groups.

Pelarak’s September visit to Kerbala was the latest sign that despite US pressure on the Revolutionary Guards’ activities in Iraq, the Guards press on with Kawthar’s work.

The US Treasury’s sanctions in March said Kawthar “served as a base for Iranian intelligence activities in Iraq, including the shipment of weapons and ammunition to Iranian-backed terrorist militia groups.” An Iraqi customs official told Reuters Iran did not need Kawthar, an organization focused on trade and soft power, to transfer weapons. “There are other ways of doing that – their proxy militias control the borders from the Kurdish north to the south of Iraq,” he said.

Kawthar carries out shrine development on behalf of the Holy Shrines Reconstruction Headquarters using a number of specialized Iranian companies. Kawthar is owned by Pelarak and at least two other Guards-linked officials, including a Quds Force commander based in the southern Iraqi holy city of Najaf, according to the US Treasury.

Iraqi traders and officials described how during Iran’s economic downturn Kawthar has become more important because of its grip on development of religious sites.

“Iran had its eye on shrines since the fall of the (Iraqi) regime in 2003,” said Dhiaa al-Asadi, a former lawmaker close to Najaf-born Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

The Hussein shrine, visited by up to 50 million pilgrims each year, is housed within a vast, golden-domed mosque decorated with ornate entrances, wooden gates and glass – all from Iran, according to former Iraqi housing minister Rekani and several other government sources. “Down to the mirrors in the shrines, it’s all Iranian,” Rekani said.

The faithful eat for free in adjoined dining halls and pray on carpets while drilling and other sounds of upkeep punctuate an otherwise quiet reverence.

A Reuters reporter visited a Kerbala hotel leased out by the Hussein shrine to host engineers working on the project. The hotel lies on a secured street monitored by cameras. In the reception, a calligraphic sign commemorates the assassinated Soleimani. Engineers dropped by reception on their break to collect packed lunches of rice, chicken and barberries, typical Persian fare. Iranian workers occupy two more hotels in the city and temporary cabins next to Kawthar’s nondescript offices, which overlook the shrine expansion project.

There, Iranian workers wearing the overalls of the companies contracted by Kawthar toil next to health and safety signs in Persian. The engineers in hard hats are often graduates of Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, according to an Iraqi contractor working with Kawthar. The university is on Western sanctions lists for alleged involvement in nuclear weapons research. Iran’s science minister has said its activities have nothing to do with atomic weapons research.

The construction site, half empty about a year ago, has quickly been filled with the skeletons of buildings. Pelarak signed a nearly $650 million contract in 2015 with the Hussein shrine for Kawthar to build the extension, named the Sahn al-Aqila Zeinab, the Courtyard of Zeinab, Hussein’s sister.

The Headquarters lists at least 17 projects it is overseeing at important shrines in Najaf, Kerbala, Baghdad and the northern city of Samarra. These contracts are often years-long and worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

In Najaf, Kawthar and the Headquarters have repaired the Imam Ali shrine’s golden dome and facade, and are carrying out a $500 million infrastructure expansion there too. In Baghdad, they have built ornate windows at the shrines of two Shia imams and have been repairing a minaret that is leaning because of swelling groundwater, according to a shrine official. The Headquarters is also working on an expansion of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra.

Pelarak is eyeing more work. He told Iranian semi-official news agency Fars in August he hoped to carry out an expansion at another site in Kerbala, the Imam Abbas shrine, part of a plan “agreed by Iraq’s housing ministry” but not yet requested by the shrine. A spokesman for Iraq’s housing ministry said he couldn’t comment because, “there is no accurate information available on this.” The shrine didn’t comment.

Several Iranian firms carry out the work, serving as contractors. A tunnel, foundation and water specialist called Abtaban is working on the Kerbala project, according to the Revolutionary Guards-linked Tasnim news agency. Padideh, a civil engineering contractor, and Mana, a construction firm, are involved in both the Kerbala project and the development of the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf, according to Iranian news and company websites. Padideh says on its website it is aiming to increase its work in the region.

Reuters found no link between these companies and the Guards beyond the contracts with Guards-run organisations, and the firms are not under US sanctions. The companies did not respond to requests for comment.

An Iraqi government official said Kawthar’s activities and finances are not shared with any Iraqi government departments.

A spokesman for the Iraqi state body that administers Shia religious sites said: “We can’t discuss any topics related to the work of Iranian companies because we do not intervene or have specific details on their activities. They work in holy cities but other than that we don’t know anything.”

Shami, the spokesman for the Hussein shrine, said “if Kawthar has other activities, we don’t know about this.” He said he was also unaware of US sanctions against Kawthar.

Special status

The Iraqi state funds the initial buying up of private and public land at the sites through budget allocations to Shia religious authorities which make the purchase, said Rekani, the former housing minister.

For the Sahn al-Aqila, part of the Kerbala project, religious authorities paid some $170 million to buy at least 300 properties, according to shrine officials. The Hussein and adjacent Abbas shrines plan to take over more land nearby, the officials said.

Mohammed Musawi, who used to live where the Sahn al-Aqila is being built and owned two hotels there, said the demolition of his properties brought a handsome fee but erased his business and a generations-old family property.

“I didn’t want to sell the house, but when the shrine decides to expand, there’s nothing you can do,” he said. “People receive a lot of money to sell, and if they refuse are given a court order.”

The shrine paid Musawi and his six siblings nearly $1 million for their property. He now runs a corner shop and relies heavily on the pilgrimage business.

After land acquisition, shrine projects are then fully funded by Iran – ostensibly from donations by devout Iranian Shia and through charities linked to Shia shrine organizations, officials at the Hussein shrine said. An Iranian employee of Kawthar, who declined to be named, said much of the money came from Iranian state coffers, but he didn’t know what proportion. A project costing in excess of $600 million “can’t just come from donations, you need a state behind that,” he reasoned. Other Iranian and Iraqi sources supported this view.

Shrine projects get special status under Iraqi law, meaning they are overseen by the shrine organisations, not by the state. There are customs exemptions for all materials coming from Iran for religious, donor-funded projects.

An engineering official at the Hussein shrine declined to say how much steel, cement, wood and other imports are brought from Iran for the project. An Iraqi trader who has worked with Kawthar said large quantities of Iranian steel and cement are imported tax-free under the guise of shrine projects, but then sold via middlemen onto the Iraqi market, where prices are higher than in Iran. A senior Iraqi official with direct knowledge said firms involved in shrine projects “often order several times the required amount” of building materials.

Shami, the Hussein shrine spokesman, maintained that it would be difficult to siphon off goods in this way because they are inspected by Iranian and Iraqi customs officials then transferred straight to the shrine’s warehouses. He didn’t rule out the possibility that some imports had forged shrine documentation, however. “Everything is possible in Iraq,” he said.

The firms have had their workers bussed in from Iran even when the borders are closed, as during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. One Iranian employee of Kawthar told Reuters that when the borders first closed there were problems getting into Iraq, “but the Hussein shrine intervened to get exemptions.” He estimated there were around 200 Iranian workers currently, down from 2,000 earlier.

Shami said he didn’t know if the shrine had sought travel exemptions for Iranian workers.

The Iraqi customs official and an Iraqi contractor said Kawthar is also involved in other infrastructure projects, including energy. Among these projects, according to the contractor, is a power plant in Basra. The power plant project was led by an Iranian energy company called Mapna, which has also been sanctioned by the United States. Mapna is building power plants in Najaf and Baghdad, as well as one of Kerbala’s largest hotels, a Reuters review of official filings found. Mapna didn’t respond to a request for comment.

A long game

Workers in Kerbala say they see evidence that US sanctions are hurting Iran, and Kawthar. The Iranian Kawthar employee told Reuters he used to take home $1,100 a month, paid in the stable Iraqi dinar, but since the sanctions kicked in, he gets only around $200 because he is now paid in the weak Iranian rial. Work on the site for local Iraqis has all but dried up. An unemployed Iraqi engineering graduate, who used to get regular labor at the shrine, told Reuters he now spends his days hoping for work. He struggles to support a young family.

For the Islamic Republic, its involvement in Iraq’s Shia shrines is a long game. It brings an enduring presence in Shia centers of power, where Iran hopes to influence the succession of Iraq’s most powerful Shia cleric, Sistani. The Guards are regularly in Najaf, where Sistani is based. Sistani’s office didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Sistani’s edicts sent Shia Iraqis to the polls for the first time in their lives in 2005, created an amalgam of Shia paramilitaries to fight Islamic State in 2014, and toppled an Iraqi government last year. Sistani stands against Iranian and other foreign interference in Iraq, and opposes the theocratic model of rule by Khamenei. The Iranian pick to succeed the 90-year-old Sistani died in 2018 in a setback to the Islamic Republic’s plans for Iraq.

Though Iranian influence is resented by large sections of Iraq’s Shia population, religious ties run deep. At the Hussein shrine, bullet holes from where Saddam’s soldiers gunned down Shia rebels in 1991 are framed. At the time, Iran was a haven for Shia opposition to Saddam, a Sunni.

The pilgrimage to commemorate Hussein, slain in battle in 680, is closely associated with the martyrdom of today. Next to images of Hussein on Iraqi highways are posters of Shia militiamen killed fighting Islamic State, which counted Shia Muslims among its most bitter enemies and considered them heretics. Next to them are pictures of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the godfather of those militia groups, killed alongside Soleimani by America.

Abu Mahdi and Soleimani featured this year on a banner at one stall next to the Hussein shrine offering pilgrims free tea and juice, run by Kawthar employees. Just next to the stall were the flags of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces, the state paramilitary grouping dominated by Iran-aligned fighters. At Baghdad’s Kadhimiya shrine, one donation box is for the Forces.

Iran uses its presence to project regional strength to Sunni Muslim rival Saudi Arabia and bolster its legitimacy at home as a defender of Shia holy places, said Iraqi officials and Iran experts. Saudi officials did not comment for this article.

“Iran wants economic, religious and political influence. The best place to do that is Kerbala and Najaf,” said Mohammed Sahib al-Daraji, a lawmaker on Iraq’s finance committee. “Iran is weakened, but it’s stronger than America in Iraq.”

Ordinary Iraqis say they find themselves once more in the middle of the contest between Iran and America. The Iraqi engineering graduate, who looks older than his 30 years and wears a frayed baseball cap, resents that the only work he’s ever found in his hometown is run by the Revolutionary Guards. But he also resents that when US sanctions kicked in, that work began to dry up.

He spends most days looking for menial jobs. When he’s bored, he borrows for his bus fare and travels to Baghdad with other out-of-work engineers to hold protests demanding jobs and railing against Iraq’s ruling elite – and Iran.

“I’m now working a few days here and there on the shrine project, whenever I can get it,” the worker said. “They’ve reduced my pay by half. But I’ll work for the Iranians if it puts bread on the table – what else is there?”

Traffic snarls across battered bridges and disabled war victims sell tissues, cigarettes and tea at junctions…

Mosul (Reuters) – Three years ago, the world rejoiced when Iraqi forces backed by the United States and Iran liberated this ancient city from the brutal rule of Islamic State. The people of Mosul hoped to rebuild their shattered lives.

Today, a different battle plays out.

Taking place largely behind the scenes, from legislative halls that overlook the city’s bombed-out streets to hotel meeting rooms in Baghdad, it is a power struggle among parties, politicians and militiamen. Some are backed by Iran. Others favour the United States.

At stake: political control of Nineveh province, of which Mosul is capital – a region rich in natural resources and a link in a supply route from Tehran to the Mediterranean. The route serves Iran-backed militias, Washington’s fiercest enemy here since the defeat of Islamic State.

Iran’s allies had been winning. They installed a governor favoured by Tehran a year ago. But then anti-government protests, U.S. sanctions and the assassination of Iran’s military mastermind Qassem Soleimani challenged Iranian influence. The pro-Western camp replaced the Nineveh governor with a longtime U.S. ally.

The contest mirrors a wider struggle over the future of Iraq itself.

Speaking to Reuters over the span of a year, around 20 Iraqi officials involved in the political tussle over Nineveh described how Iran and its allies developed the networks to influence local government, how pro-Western officials tried to hit back, and how this tug of war has crippled Mosul’s recovery. If any side prevails, many of these insiders believe, it will ultimately be the side aligned with Iran. Iran helps its allies with money, political backing and sticks with them, explained Nineveh councilor Ali Khdeir. The United States, in contrast, “has left no real mark on Iraq.”

Mosul, meanwhile, lies largely in ruins. Traffic snarls across battered bridges and disabled war victims sell tissues, cigarettes and tea at junctions – the kind of misery that Iraqi officials fear is the perfect breeding ground for Islamic State to reemerge.

Two changes of governor in 2019 meant contracts for projects worth at least $200 million were not awarded by the local government last year. They included building a new emergency hospital, procuring vehicles to clear rubble from bombed-out homes and bolstering the fleet for Mosul’s under-equipped first-responder teams, according to officials and a local government document seen by Reuters.

A spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State accused Iran of working “overtime to dominate every aspect of Iraq’s political and economic life.” The United States is committed to helping Iraq build its economic prospects and improve stability and security, said the spokesperson, Morgan Ortagus.

A spokesperson for Iran’s mission to the United Nations in New York, Alireza Miryousefi, insisted: “Iran does not interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs.”

The Iraqi government didn’t respond to detailed questions for this article. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi told Reuters in response to a question about Mosul that corruption and political infighting hampered the city’s recovery, but denied it was part of a proxy contest.

“We Had A Modest Life And Simple Dreams”

Rasha Saeed’s young family is one of thousands suffering from the failures of city hall.

Still mourning the death of their nine-year-old son, killed in a U.S. coalition air strike in 2015, the family returned to their neighbourhood after its liberation from Islamic State. They found their home had been destroyed by bombs and bulldozed over. Rasha, her husband Luay Shaker and their three remaining children live in debt and in limbo in a partially-repaired rented flat nearby. They watch grass grow on the earth where their old house stood. Residents say Islamic State fighters’ bodies are buried beneath.

Luay, a manual labourer who ferried supplies before the war to stores in Mosul’s historic Old City markets, cannot work while he recovers from an operation to remove a tumour from behind his ear. Limited space at the West Mosul medical complex nearby – where a new hospital was meant to go up – means follow-up treatment is sporadic and slow. “It can be a long wait between appointments because Luay’s doctor can take only three patients on site a week,” Rasha said.

The medical complex is a cluster of portacabins on a vast bombed-out site that once boasted five fully-equipped hospitals with hundreds of beds. It currently has around 80 emergency ward beds for a population of more than a million people living in the area, doctors say. They describe a lack of equipment and medicine, including masks and gloves – a concern especially as cases of COVID-19 rise in Iraq. A spokesperson for Iraq’s Health Ministry responded that protective equipment is available in all state health institutions.

Rasha’s temporary home stands alone amid destruction on a hill above the Tigris River, overlooking Mosul.

“We had a modest life before Islamic State, simple dreams to live without violence, for our children to be educated and maybe one day to afford a bigger home. That is now impossible,” Rasha said.

A Change In City Hall

The political contest for Nineveh is part of a wider picture across Iraq’s northern Sunni-majority provinces, former strongholds of dictator Saddam Hussein which hold strategic value for Tehran – and where Washington wants to curb Iranian influence.

The fertile plains of Nineveh flank Syria to the west, where Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have fought alongside President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Beyond is Lebanon, home to Shi’ite Iran’s Hezbollah allies. The provinces of Anbar, bisected by the vast Euphrates River, Salahuddin, home to an important Shi’ite shrine, and Diyala, which borders Iran, form the rest of that mostly Sunni land corridor. Many of the 5,000 U.S. troops in Iraq – a number that is being reduced – have been deployed at bases dotted through three of these provinces and are regularly harassed by rocket attacks that U.S. officials have blamed on Iranian proxies who want U.S. troops to leave.

Iran firmly established dominance over Baghdad and Iraq’s southern Shi’ite provinces after the 2003 U.S. -led invasion that ousted Saddam. But the country’s Sunni areas, home also to minority groups of Kurds, Christians, Shi’ite Turkmen and Yazidis, presented more of a challenge. They became hubs for a Sunni insurgency against U.S. forces in the mid-2000s and strongholds for Islamic State, which made Mosul its capital in 2014.

After Iran-backed militias helped drive Islamic State from Mosul in 2017, the militias stayed put. Their flags fly throughout northern Iraq, next to banners and billboards that honour their leaders, including the late Soleimani.

Twenty local government officials, Baghdad lawmakers and tribal leaders interviewed by Reuters described how Iran then deepened its political influence until it had allies in almost every provincial administration.

Central to such efforts in Nineveh, these sources said, were two powerful Sunnis – Khamis al-Khanjar, an Anbar businessman turned politician, and Ahmed al-Jabouri, widely known as Abu Mazen, a former governor of Salahuddin province, now sitting in the Iraqi parliament.

Khanjar was an outspoken opponent of Iran. He supported Sunni protests against the Iran-backed Baghdad government in 2013 and later accused Iran-allied Shi’ite militias of human rights abuses. Abu Mazen was once a U.S. ally. He described working closely with U.S. forces after the 2003 invasion.

In 2018, Khanjar and Abu Mazen unexpectedly joined a bloc of Iran-backed parties and militia leaders in the Iraqi parliament. Explaining this shift, Khanjar said: “The strongest on the ground can get things done … I go with the bloc that’s (strongest) on the ground. If that coalition has Iranian links, that’s not on us.” He denied being an ally of Iran. Abu Mazen declined to comment for this article.

Then, in May 2019, Khanjar and Abu Mazen intervened in the selection of Nineveh’s new governor, according to nine sources, including several members of the regional administrative council and relatives of the two men. A majority of Nineveh’s 39 councilors, tasked with electing the new governor, initially favoured a candidate critical of Iran, these sources said. But two days before the council was due to vote, Abu Mazen and Khanjar invited nearly two dozen council members to a meeting in a hotel in nearby Erbil, said several people, one of whom attended.

The council members were promised local government posts or payments of up to $300,000 apiece from the men or their offices if they voted for a different candidate, Mansour al-Mareid, a Sunni favoured by Iran and its allies in Baghdad, these people said. One council member told Reuters he accepted money and used it to buy a new home.

Mareid was duly elected with the votes of 28 of the 39 council members.

Khanjar confirmed he and Abu Mazen met with councilors in Erbil to agree on the governor and negotiate over provincial posts. He also confirmed he supported Mareid, but denied that votes were bought. “I didn’t pay a single dinar,” he said.

Mareid, the winning candidate, said he had no knowledge of bribes being given to councilors and he denied any loyalty to Iran, but he added: “Council members can be bought, so it wouldn’t surprise me, and nothing can happen in this country without Iran approving it.”

The gathering in Erbil wasn’t the only meeting that took place around that time. Three of the councilors interviewed by Reuters described further meetings and contacts with senior Iraqi paramilitary officials who were trying to win support for Mareid.

Another Nineveh councilor recounted that he and a colleague were invited to a hotel in Baghdad shortly after the vote to meet a senior Iranian diplomat and an Iraqi militia leader loyal to Iran. The councilor, who had loudly criticized Mareid’s appointment, said he was offered a post in the Nineveh government if he would drop his opposition to the new governor. He said he declined the offer. The Iranian embassy didn’t reply to questions about the meeting. Reuters couldn’t reach the militia leader. The Iraqi state paramilitary Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) that oversees militias didn’t respond.

U.S. pushes back

Within a few months the pendulum had swung again.

The United States imposed sanctions on Iran-aligned militia leaders and on their Iraqi Sunni allies – among them Abu Mazen in July and Khanjar in December.

The U.S. Treasury said it was freezing Abu Mazen’s assets because he had protected “his personal interests by accommodating Iran-backed proxies that operate outside of state control.” It targeted Khanjar in a round of sanctions against Iran-backed militia leaders, accusing him of bribery and saying he had spent “millions of dollars in payments to Iraqi political figures in order to secure their support.”

Abu Mazen and Khanjar denied any wrongdoing at the time and condemned the U.S. sanctions as interference in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Abu Mazen felt under pressure as a result of the U.S. move, said a relative and five Nineveh councilors. The measures helped persuade Abu Mazen, these sources said, to withdraw support for Mareid and back a former military commander and U.S. ally, Najm al-Jabouri [no relation], to replace him as governor. In November, 23 of the council’s 39 members voted to dismiss Mareid and appoint Jabouri.

Jabouri’s appointment and the pressure on Iran’s allies across the country from U.S. air strikes and sanctions have given militia groups pause in Mosul, local officials say. Their military presence has reduced on inner city streets where Shi’ite and militia flags once flew atop mosques and junkyards they controlled.

Pro-U.S. officials in Mosul hope that the government of Prime Minister Kadhimi, who is accepted by both the United States and Iran, together with fractures among Iran-backed militias following the death of Soleimani, will turn the tide against Tehran’s influence. But they also complain that Governor Jabouri is mostly hamstrung against Iran’s militia and political allies in Mosul.

“Jabouri is weak politically,” said Mosul council member Ali Khdeir. “Because of their power on the ground, he’ll have to deal carefully with the militias at first.”

Jabouri told Reuters that any governor would face criticism and he defended his record. He conceded that political rivalries were impeding progress in rebuilding the city. “It makes my work harder,” he said.

Four local officials said some administrative posts have changed hands and are no longer controlled by allies of Iran-backed militias, but others are still held by officials with links to militia groups. The militias also have offices in Mosul, these local officials said, through which they win construction and other business contracts, even though such offices were banned by a central government decree last year. The militia groups did not respond to Reuters questions about their activities.

A City in Ruins

Amid this chaos, reconstruction stalls.

The power vacuum between Mareid and Jabouri just weeks before the end of 2019 prevented contracts being awarded at a crucial time when the annual budget needed to be spent, a senior local administrator and a second official said.

A document signed by the head of municipalities, Abdul Qadir al-Dakhil, and reviewed by Reuters showed that provincial authorities failed to award contracts worth more than $200 million in Nineveh province in 2019. They included the new emergency hospital, equipment for another nearby hospital, providing additional vehicles for the civil defence rescue services and rehabilitating 13 schools, Dakhil told Reuters.

Dr Omar Hamudat, who helps run the West Mosul emergency medical complex, worked in Mosul hospitals under international sanctions in the 1990s and under Islamic State’s occupation. Hamudat said healthcare infrastructure was the worst it had ever been.

“Once we could carry out 200 emergency operations a day here. Now, we manage about 15,” he said, speaking in his cramped portacabin office at the complex.

Nineveh province had hospitals with a total of about 4,000 beds before the arrival of Islamic State. It has a little over 1,000 now, including in what Hamudat called his “caravans,” a reference to the portacabins.

Mosul’s civil defence chief, Hossam Khalil, said a provision of emergency vehicles such as fire engines and ambulances, expected in 2019, had not come through. “Sometimes we have to use our own cars for work,” Khalil said, “but try not to do that for crucial life-saving work, or putting out fires.”

Residents of Mosul have praised Jabouri’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis, where a lockdown has so far avoided a mass outbreak, but some worry he is not up to the task of rebuilding the city. Many just want a competent governor, regardless of political affiliation.

“Mareid began getting things done,” said Safwan al-Madany, a 30-year-old activist who has been involved in voluntary aid projects for his city since 2011 and rebuilding work since the fall of Islamic State.

During Mareid’s six-month tenure, some bridges in the city were fixed. “He had the contacts, power and connections in Baghdad to make things happen, even if those were paramilitary-linked. He’s an engineer by trade and understands construction. Jabouri is a military man. We wish Mareid would come back,” said Madany.

Enduring Influence

Across the rest of the Sunni provinces that lie between Nineveh and Baghdad, regional councilors, tribal chiefs and members of Iraq’s parliament say Iran’s efforts to entrench local political allies will likely outlast the U.S. tactics of air strikes and economic sanctions.

Potential friends of America lament what they see as a lack of U.S. interest or ability to blunt Iran’s influence in the country allied troops invaded 17 years ago. In February 2019, the head of Salahuddin provincial council, Ahmed al-Krayem, travelled to Washington to drum up U.S. support for his region and help counter Iran.

“The visit wasn’t fruitful,” said a senior Iraqi lawmaker, a relative of Krayem.

“Whoever he met didn’t seem interested in his proposals for a bolstered U.S. troop presence and U.S. investment.”

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which hosted Krayem at a private event during that trip, declined to give details about the gathering. Krayem also declined to comment.

A Salahuddin official said that by contrast, “the Iranians, including their diplomats at the embassy, reach out to people you’d never expect them to, at a local level.”

Asked about U.S. engagement in Iraq, Department of State spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said: “We will continue to stand with the Iraqi people in support of their calls for reform and change, and to help them achieve an Iraq that is economically prosperous, a pivotal country in the region, and free of foreign meddling.”

Other Salahuddin Sunni chieftains have met Shi’ite paramilitary officials to plead over the return of Sunni families displaced by the war with Islamic State and scattered in camps and temporary homes across northern Iraq. They worry about the drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq, saying it opens up their regions to the danger of a resurgent Islamic State.

“A few years ago I would never have dealt with Iran-backed officials,” said Sheikh Khalid al-Nasseri, a senior leader in Saddam Hussein’s clan. “Now I’ll work with anyone to get services for our people and return families to their homes from miserable camps.”

Who killed Al-Hussein ibn Ali (may Allaah be pleased with him)? Lecture in video is in Arabic by Shaykh Uthman Al-Khamees may Allaah preserve him. I have taken the time to transcribe the lecture in English for all to benefit. This ends with quotes from Shiite scholars and books, the sources of those who claim to love the household of the Prophet Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him.

571 CE – Muhammad peace and blessings upon him was born in Mecca after his father died and became an orphan at 6 years old when his mother died. His grandfather Abdul-Muttalib took care of him until he died when Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him was only 8 years old. Abu Talib, his uncle, then took care of him. Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him got married to Khadijah at 25. At 40, he became the messenger of Allaah, peace and blessings be upon him.

Allah chose for him people who gave him victory and supported him during 13 difficult years in Mecca. Then migration took place to Medina and Allaah praised the Muslims in Medina who supported their brethren from Mecca.

Allaah says in Noble Qur’an 59:9 – “And [also for] those who were settled in al-Madinah and [adopted] the faith before them. They love those who emigrated to them and find not any want in their breasts of what the emigrants were given but give [them] preference over themselves, even though they are in privation. And whoever is protected from the stinginess of his soul – it is those who will be the successful.”

They loved Muhammad peace and blessings upon him more than they loved themselves. Islam reached us because of their efforts.

Allaah says in Noble Qur’an 5:3 – “…This day I have perfected for you your religion and completed My favor upon you and have approved for you Islam as religion…”

Muhammad peace and blessings upon him passed away after he has delivered the complete message. He died in 632 CE (11 Hijri). Abu Bakr became Khalifa (Caliph) or 2 years and some months, people lived in peace. Then Umar became Caliph. The Ansar and Muhajiroon loved each other and all Muslims loved each other.

Allaah praises them in no uncertain terms in Noble Qur’an 9:100 – “And the first to embrace Islam of the Muhajirun (those who migrated from Makkah to Al-Madinah) and the Ansar (the citizens of Al-Madinah who helped and gave aid to the Muhajirun) and also those who followed them exactly (in Faith). Allah is well-pleased with them as they are well-pleased with Him. He has prepared for them Gardens under which rivers flow (Paradise), to dwell therein forever. That is the supreme success.”

This continued until Caliph Umar was killed by Abu Lu’lu’ah Persian, who stabbed him from behind during prayer. Uthman Ibn Affan was then given the pledge in the year 644 CE (23 Hijri) was given pledge of allegiance. 12 years under his rule, Islam spread and life was peaceful for Muslims.

People outside of Medina and Mecca, rather outside the Arabian Peninsula who were from Basrah, Kufah and Egypt – they did not like the peaceful conditions that the Muslims were living in. Abdullah Ibn Saba, who was originally Jewish, led this campaign of rumors and lies. Some believed these rumors and a group came of out Basrah, Kufah and Egypt – they came supposedly for the Hajj (major pilgrimage). A group of 6,000 armed men came and surrounded Uthman’s house and told him to surrender his leadership.

Uthman consulted the companions may Allaah be pleased with them, and not a single one said that he should abandon his post as Caliph. Abdullah Ibn Umar told Uthman: “What more can they do to you than killing you? Can they give you paradise or hellfire?” Uthman responded in the negative, so Abdullah said then he doesn’t see that he should leave his post as Caliph. They entered Uthman’s house and killed him as a martyr.

During the time when the Prophet peace and blessings be upon him was alive, he once climbed the mountain of Uhud with Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman. The mountain shook with them. The Prophet peace and blessings be upon him said to the mountain, “Be firm, O Uhud! For on you there are no more than a Prophet, a Siddiq (truthful one, referring to Abu Bakr and two martyrs (referring to Umar and Uthman).” [Bukhari]

Ali then became Caliph via the Muslims pledging allegiance to him.

Many Muslims felt a sense of oppression and anger. How can these people enter Medina and kill the leader of the believers yet the Muslim armies are opening the lands of Ash-Sham (in today’s terms: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan), Egypt, Persia and reached Africa and other places?! How dare these people do this? Those Muslims in Medina were small in number compared to those people because many were in armies abroad. Uthman also refused to allow them to fight them. So much so that Zaid bin Thabit said to Uthman “if you wish we can be the Ansar of Allah twice,” meaning “just like we were with Muhammad peace and blessings upon him we can be with you.” Uthman said no, let each one of you to stay in his home based on my orders and authority. This is bravery for Uthman. He did not want one drop of blood to be shed for his sake, may Allaah be pleased with him.

Talha and Az-Zubair went to Mecca to meet some Muslims because those intruders were still in Medina. They met in Mecca and decided to avenge the murder of Uthman. A group of Muslims went from Mecca to Basrah to meet those who went back from Medina to Basrah. This exit from Mecca to Basrah to avenge was faulty in that they did not get Caliph Ali’s permission first (even though he was not going to object, but they should have asked permission). But this would cause chaos; people have to go back to Ali as Khalifa. Ali was upset with them and a small battle took place between them called the minor Battle of the Camel (the first one).

Talha and Az-Zubair were victorious over the people of Basrah, but when Ali heard this he went from Medina to Kufah and this is where the Battle of the Camel took place. Ali was in fact correct because he was the leader. None of them wanted to fight. In fact, Talha and Az-Zubair did not participate in the battle; they were killed in a treacherous way. Ali did not want to fight Talha and Az-Zubair, rather, when Ali saw Talha dead he cried, he said “I wish I died before this by 20 years.” Talha and Az-Zubair used to fight alongside Muhammad peace and blessings upon him.

Later on, there was the Battle of Siffin between Mu’awiyah and Ali again due to the murder of Uthman. Both Mu’awiyah and Ali wanted to avenge the death of Uthman, but there were misunderstandings. Mu’awiyah did not want to give Ali the pledge of allegiance until Ali avenged the death of Uthman, and Ali insisted that Mu’awiyah gives him the pledge fist so that Caliph Ali would establish his authority in order to avenge the death of Uthman.

The people of Iraq betrayed Ali and killed him. How did this happen? The Khawarij, who rebels, those literally want out against the leadership. They are an enemy from within and opposed both sides of the Muslims, the side of Ali and the side of Mu’wiyah, and just wanted to see bloodshed between them and benefitted from the status quo. Three Khawarij, Abdul-Rahman ibn Muljim was to kill Ali, Umar Ibn Bakr At-Tamimi was to kill Amr ibn Al-Aas, and Al-Barq Ibn Abdullah At-Tamimi was to kill Mu’awiyah – their claim was that they want to rid the Muslims of three, of Ali, Mu’awiyah, and Amr ibn Al-Aas. Ironically, they wanted to get close to Allah by killing his allies.

Ali was killed he was going to pray the Fajr (dawn prayers). Mu’awiyah was stabbed but was not killed. Someone else was stabbed and killed that was mistakenly thought to be Amr ibn Al-Aas.

After the death of Caliph Ali, the pledge of allegiance was done for Al-Hassan ibn Ali and then he abandoned his post in a year called the year of the Jama’ah (group, that is, to unite the Muslims). Muhammad peace and blessings upon him did predict this. Al-Bukhari narrated that Al-Hasan said that Abu Bakrah said that the Messenger of Allah gave a speech on the Minbar (pulpit) while Al-Hasan bin Ali was with him. He was repeatedly looking at Al-Hasan and then at the people; then said, “Verily, this son of mine is a Sayyid (chief or master), and may Allah make peace between two great groups of Muslims through him.” What the Prophet said, occurred. Al-Hasan brought peace between the people of Ash-Sham and Iraq, after they fought tremendous wars and frightening battles. [Tafsir Ibn Kathir in explaining Noble Qur’an 49:9 – And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.]

Things went back to being peaceful for the 20-year duration under the reign of Caliph Mu’awiyah may Allaah be pleased with him. Islam spread during his time.

In the year 60 Hijri – Mu’awiyah felt his end was near. He wanted the successor to be his son Yazid. Many companions were against this idea and told Mu’awiyah not to do this because in Quraysh there were those who were better such as Abdullah ibn Abbas, Abdullah Ibn Umar, Al-Hussein, others. They told him not to make it from father to son so it does not become a norm. This is why Abdur-Rahman ibn Abu Bakr As-Siddiq said to Mu’awiyah “Do you want to make it like Hercules, every time a Hercules dies another one comes in his place – as in an inheritance?” Mu’awiyah did not listen and still did it. The companions gave the pledge of allegiance so as to maintain order.

Two refused to give the pledge, Al-Hussein ibn Ali and Abdullah ibn Az-Zubair. They acknowledged the Caliph but refused to give the pledge themselves. They were demanded to give the pledge but they refused. The leader of Medina told them that they have to. They both left at night from Medina to Mecca. Things were calmed down because the leader of Mecca was more mature than leader of Medina because he left them alone and did not force them to give the pledge to Yazid.

The city of Kufah (in Iraq) was the city that was inhabited and led by Ali and then Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein. Al-Hassan, as Caliph, was there for 6 months after Caliph Ali was martyred. As mentioned above, Al-Hassan left his post (and gave it to Mu’awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan in order to maintain peace and unity) and both he and Al-Hussein returned to Medina. The people of Kufah knew that Al-Hussein did not give the pledge of allegiance to Yazid, so they said that they would give the pledge to Al-Hussein – they wanted to return the chaos. They sent over 500 letters to Al-Hussein about this and claimed that in fact broke the allegiance to Yazid.

Al-Hussein sent his cousin Muslim ibn Aqeel ibn Abi Talib to check. So, he went and realized that it was true. 18,000 gave the pledge of allegiance on behalf of Al-Hussein to Muslim ibn Aqeel. So, Muslim ibn Aqeel sent a letter to Al-Hussein to come because 18,000 gave Al-Hussein the pledge.

Al-Hussein left on the day of Tarwiyah (same day are people coming to Hajj). Some companions said to Al-Hussein to stay back and perform the Hajj since there were only two more days for it to start. They suggested that he does this first and then see what he want to do afterwards. Al-Hussein responded in the negative and went. Some companions tried to stop him, such as Abdullah ibn Al-Abbas (who was blind at the time) – he said to Al-Hussein “Were it not for people seeing us I would have grabbed you by the hair so that you don’t go.” Abdullah Ibn Az-Zubair said: “Will you go to a people who killed your father and stabbed your brother? You will not see from them except treachery.” Abu Said Al-Khudri also tried to stop Al-Hussein.

Abdullah ibn Umar went after him after Al-Hussein travelled for 3 days and tried to stop him. Al-Hussein showed him the letters. Abdullah said: “Allaah gave the option to Muhammad peace and blessings upon him for this life and its splendors or what is with Allah, so Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him chose what is with Allaah. And you are a descendant of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him; you will not get it. Leave the people of Kufah, those who are treacherous.” Al-Hussein still went.

News came to the leader of Kufah, An-Nu’man ibn Bashir, that Al-Hussein was going to Kufah. An-Nu’man ibn Bashir did not give it much attention. Some went to Yazid in Ash-Sham and informed him that things are getting hot and that An-Nu’man was not doing anything and that there was a risk of a tribulation taking place. Yazid removed An-Nu’man ibn Bashir from his post and replaced him with Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad.

Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad was in Basrah, when he entered Kufah he entered it disguised, some thought he was Al-Hussein so they saluted him by saying “Welcome O son of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him’s daughter (Fatima).” Ubaydullah realized that this was serious. So, he sent his spies in Kufah to find out where this was being plotted. He came to know that it was Hani ibn Urwah. So, Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad asked Hani ibn Urwah about Muslim ibn Aqeel, he answered he did not know, even though Muslim ibn Aqeel was in his house. So Ubaydullah sent his spies to enter Hani ibn Urwah’s house and found Muslim ibn Aqeel there. Hani ibn Urwah said: “I swear, if he was under my foot I would not raise it.” He did not want to betray him.

So Ubaydullah put Hani ibn Urwah in jail. When Muslim ibn Aqeel heard of this he told those who gave him the pledge to exit in a resistance against Ubaydullah. 4,000 went out with Muslim ibn Aqeel and surrounded Ubaydullah’s house in the early afternoon. By late afternoon, only 30 remained. By sunset Muslim ibn Aqeel was by himself, he tried to escape but he was captured and killed.

Al-Hussein was on the way. When Ubaydullah realized that Al-Hussein was on the way he sent an army to meet Al-Hussein under the leadership of Al-Hurr ibn Yazid At-Tamimi. So, they met in Al-Qadissiyah (same site of the battle during Umar’s time between the Muslims and the Persians).

Al-Hussein did not leave Mecca to fight because he had his family with him, he went to assume leadership based on the pledges of allegiance. He was surprised that things were different.

Al-Hurr ibn Yazid At-Tamimi asked Al-Hussein where he was going. AL-Hussein said that he was going to Kufah and showed him the letters of the people. Al-Hurr ibn Yazid At-Tamimi said to Al-Hussein that they betrayed him and that Muslim ibn Aqeel was killed. He told Al-Hussein to go back. Al-Hussein wanted to go back, but the children of Muslim in Aqeel told their uncle AL-Hussein: “How can we return without avenging the death of our father Muslim ibn Aqeel?” So, they went ahead. Al-Hurr ibn Yazid told them to return for he feared that Allaah will test him with Al-Hussein’s blood (meaning he feared a war to take place in these mixed events).

Al-Hussein headed for Kufah and Al-Hurr was with him but told him that he will not enter Kufah, but instead, to go anywhere else other than Kufah. Al-Hurr suggested that Al-Hussein should to go to Yazid in Ash-Sham. Al-Hussein refused.

When Yazid knew that Al-Hussein was given the pledge and that he was going to come to Kufah, he sent lines of poetry to Abdullah ibn Abbas to prevent Al-Hussein from going there. Caliph Yazid stressed that they are both from Abd Manaf – in other words, there were blood relations between them.

Al-Hussein and A-Hurr reached Karbala – Al-Hussein asked what is this land? They said Karbala – Al-Hussien said Karb (distress) and Bala (affliction and calamity). Hussein was killed here eventually.

Al-Hussein stopped in Karbala – the rest of the army that Ubaydullah sent arrived. It was an army of 4,000 over and above the army already with A-Hurr which was 1,000. Al-Hussein only had 73 people vs. 5,000 from both armies. When Al-Hussein stopped at Karbala he was told that he will not enter Kufah. Umar Ibn Sa’d, the leader of the additional army of 4,000 he said that matters are done.

Al-Hussein said that he will give them three options:

• Let Al-Hussein go back
• To allow Al-Hussein go to any place of the Muslims to fight in the way of Allaah
• Go to Yazid in As-Sham

Umar ibn Sa’d said to Al-Hussien to communicate with Yazid and Umar ibn Sa’d himself will communicate with Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad to see what will happen. Umar Ibn Sa’d communicated with Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad but Al-Hussein did not communicate with Yazid.

Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad’s response what to let Al-Hussein choose whatever he wishes but that Al-Hussein will not enter Kufah. There was some bad company with Ubaydullah who was called Shamr Ibnu Thil-Jawsha. Shamr began to spew his poison by making statements to Ubaydullah such as: “This is strange – Al-Hussein sets conditions and you are the leader?” So Ubaydullah asked what he should do. Shamr said that Ubaydullah should take Al-Hussein as a hostage then send him wherever he wants. Ubaydullah agreed. So Ubaydullah communicated with Umar ibn Sa’d to bring Al-Hussein as hostage.

Umar ibn Sa’d refused. Shamr said to Umar ibn Sa’d that if he does not listen then he would be released from his post and that Shamr will take over. Umar ibn Sa’d refused to give up his post. Due to this pressure, Umar ibn Sa’d asked Al-Hussein to come as hostage. Al-Hussein refused, he was the son of the daughter of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him, how can he be taken as hostage? Al-Hussein wanted to leave Karbala and return to Medina. Al-Hussein talked to the people in the opposing army and reminded them of the letters they originally sent him. They all denied and said things have now changed, and they were in fact from the group of Ali in the battle of Siffin and pretended to be with Al-Hussein.

Contrary to what is being propagated that Al-Hussein went out die or to show the corruption of Yazid, all such claims are lies. Rather, Al-Hussein in fact went out of Mecca to take the leadership from the pledge of allegiance. When he realized the treachery, he wanted to return. This is mentioned in books of Sunnis and Shiites.

In Kitab Al-Luhoof by Ibn Tawuus – he said: “Al-Hussein said to one of them if you are now against your pledge according to your letters then I will return where I came from.”

Al-Hussein wanted to return but he refused to be hostage. Fighting started and Al-Hussein was killed and a group of the household of Muhammad peace and blessings upon him were killed. Form the sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib: Ja’far, Al-Abbas, Abu Bakr, Muhammad (other than Muhammad Ibn Al-Hanafiyyah), and Uthman – these are five from the brothers of Al-Hussein.

Who killed Al-Hussein? An army from Ash-Sham or who? In fact, it was the army of Iraq that sent him the letters claiming the pledge, and they are the ones that killed him. In fact, there are many testimonies that the Shiites in fact killed Al-Hussein. Ali ibn Abi Talib had 39 children, 19 males and 20 females. From the sons of Al-Hassan ibn Ali: Abdullah, Al-Qasim, and Abu Bakr. And from the sons of Aqeel ibn Abi Talib, the brothers of Muslim ibn Aqeel (mentioned earlier): Jafar, Abdullah, and Abdurrahman. And from the sons of Muslim ibn Aqeel: Abdullah and Aqeel. And from the sons of Abdullah ibn Jafar: Auon and Muhammad. And from the sons of Al-Hussein himself: Abdullah and Ali (referred to Ali the older, but Ali the younger was not killed, and he is referred to as Zain-Al-Abideen).

Who killed Al-Hussein? The people of Ash-Sham or the people of Iraq?! The army that went out to fihght Al-Hussein was the army of Kufah in Iraq, the very same army that sent Al-Hussein letters of support inviting him to give him the pledge of allegiance.

There are many who admit that the Shiites killed Al-Hussein. Here are statements of the household of the Prophet Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him on the people of Kufah:

In Najul Balaghah – Ali ibn Abi Talib who lived with them for four years until he was killed there described the people of Kufah in the harshest of terms, as those who can hear yet they play deaf, those who can speak yet pretend to be dumb, and those are blind yet they are able to see. He described them as being untruthful and treacherous. He described them to be like camels that disperse when their owners leave them.

Ali ibn Al-Hussein who witnessed the massacre of his father and household in Karabala and survived it, entered Kufah after this great crime, and reprimanded its inhabitants for tricking his father and claiming to have given him the pledge and yet betrayed him in the end. He lashed at them by wishing that they perish for betraying his father and fighting him. He questioned how they will look at Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him? – This was mentioned in the Book of At-Tabrasi called Al-Ihtijaj in volume 2 on page 32

Ali ibn Al-Hussein, Zain-ul-Abideen, nay Allaah be pleased with him, passed by those who were crying and waling for Al-Hussein and his family, so Ali ibn Al-Hussein said to them: “You wail and cry for us? Who killed us! And you you wail and cry?” – This is in the book of Al-Malhoof page 86.

Umm Kulthoom, daughter of Ali ibn Abi Talib, sister of Al-Hussein, said: “O people of Kufah, may evil befall you, what is it with you that you betrayed Al-Hussein and killed him?” – This was mentioned in Nafas Al-Malhoof Al-Mahmoum page 363.

Zainab bint Ali, the sister of the martyr Al-Hussein – she told them to shut up when she saw them crying, she said to them “You kill our men and your women cry, Allaah is the judge between you and us” – This was mentioned in Nafas Al-Mahmoom on page 365.

Any mention of Yazid or Ash-Sham? They were all from Iraq, just as Murtdadha al-Mutahhiri said that Kufah were the Shiites of Ali without doubt. A people of treachery and betrayal.

Jawad Muhaddithi, in his book Mawso’a Ashuraa’, page 59, said that all events point to the fact that Ali ibn Abi Talib suffered at the hands of the people of Kufah, and Al-Hassan faced betrayal from them, and Muslim ibn Aqeel was killed by them oppressively, and Al-Hussein dyed in Karbala while he was thirsty close to Kufah and by the army of Kufah.

These are killers of Ahlul-Bayt (Household of Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him) yet they claim to be the ones who support Ahlul-Bayt?!

Hussein Korani said that the people of Kufah did not just stop at abandoning Imam Al-Hussein, but they went out to Karaba to fight Imam Al-Hussein – This is in the book Rihab Karbala page 60.

Hussein Korani also says that Abdullah ibn Hawza At-Tamimi stood in front of Imam Al-Hussein and yelled to the congregation “Is Hussein among you?!” Abdullah ibn Hawza was one of the group of Ali before and perhaps one of those who wrote to Al-Hussein to come to get the pledge of allegiance. He addressed Al-Hussein by telling him “O Hussein, I give you the glad tidings of the Hellfire.” – This is in the book Rihab Karbala page 61.

Kadhim Al-Ihsa’I An-Najafi in his Book titled Ashura page 89 says that: “The army that went out to fight Imam Al-Hussein was 300,000 [he exaggerated the number], all of them were form the people of Kufah, there was not amongst them anyone from Ash-Sham, Hijaz, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, African, rather, all of them are from Kufah who gathered from various tribes.

Hussein Ibn Ahmad Al-Boraqi An-Najafi in his Book “Tareekhu Kufah” page 113 says – “The people of Kufah are guilty of stabbing Al-Hassan and killing Al-Hussein after the invited him.”

Murtada Al-Muttahiri, the Shiite philosopher, in his book “Al-Malhama Al-Hussayniyyah” volume 1 page 129 says – “There is no doubt that Kufah were from the group of Ali and that those who killed Imam Al-Hussein were his own group.” He also says “The killing of Al-Hussein by the hands of the Muslims, rather, by the hands of the Shiites, only 50 years after the death of Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him. It is indeed a confusing matter and a strange paradox which gravitates attention.” – this is from the same book in volume 3 page 490.

The Shiites cry for Al-Hussein yet they are his killers. They killed 18 members of the household of the Prophet Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him. Today they cry and want revenge! Revenge on who?

Muhsin Al-Ameen, a well-known Shiite scholar, in his book “A’yan Ash-Shia” in volume page 26 – he says – “Al-Hussein gave the pledge to 20,000 of the people of Iraq, then they betrayed him and went out to fight him while the pledge to him was on their necks, and they killed him.”

These are clear admissions, what more do you want?

After the martyrdom of Al-Hussein by four years, a group of them came out calling themselves the army of those who are repenting, and some of them were good. They organized an army that actually ended up killing Ubaydullah ibn Ziad (mentioned earlier).

Today they beat themselves every year in mourning. They wish they were with those people back at the time of Al-Hussein to save him, nay, if they were alive during that time, they would have been with the army that fought Al-Hussein.

The event took place on the 10th of Muhharam in the year 61 Hijri.In an ugly ending. Shamr the evil one cut off Hussein’s head, and Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad took his head to Ash-Sham.

Three participated in the killing of Al-Hussein:

• Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad leader of Kufah – the one who ordered it
• Shamr ibnu Thul Jawshan – severed the head
• Sinan ibn Anas An-Nakha’i – the killer

Those three, ironically, those three were in Ali’s army in battle of Siffin, supporting Ali, Al-Hussein’s father. These are a people of treachery.

Ibrahim An-Nakha’i, may Allaah have mercy, him said: “If I was among those who killed Al-Hussein, then I entered Paradise, I would be shy to look at the face of Muhammad peace and blessings be upon him”.

May Allaah have mercy on Al-Hussein the martyr. He is in Paradise as in the hadith which was reported by Ahmad, At-Tirmithi, Ibn Maajah and An-Nasaa’i, it was narrated by Abu Sa’eed Al-Khudri may Allaah be pleased with him who said: “The Prophet peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him said: ”Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein are the masters of the youth of Paradise.” Shaykh Al-Albaani may Allaah have mercy upon him classified it as Saheeh [sound].

Article is taken from Prof. Wasim Ismail’s Facebook Post.

Professor Wasim Ismail is of Palestinian origin settled in Canada. He earned Masters in Islamic Studies from Islamic Online University.

A suicide bomber sneaked into the convention hall with a waist-bomb and detonated himself resulting in a powerful explosion leaving the bodies of Muslim scholars torn apart into tiny pieces spread all over the hall.

Afghan Ulema body has denied any media reports attempting to create rifts among Afghan Muslims by giving it a sectarian “Wahabbi vs Sunni” color.

More than 20 people seem to be in critical condition while death toll is increasing, Public Health Ministry spokesperson, Wahid Majroh said.

Interior Ministry Spokesman, Najib Danish said, “the suicide bomber was able to sneak into a wedding hall in Kabul where hundreds of religious scholars and clerics had gathered for a conference.”

So far no terrorist organization has claimed the attacks, however, a local ISIS affiliated group has targeted Muslim scholars who were associated with the government in the past. Based on the past attacks, the affiliated groups are speculated.

Kabul Police Chief, Basir Mujahid said, “Police had not been asked to provide security for the event, and that the bomber had easily slipped into the hall. Most wedding halls have private security.”

“Most unfortunately all the victims of the attack were Muslim scholars,” added Mujahid.

The waiter at the convention hall, Mohammed Muzammil, was the first-hand witness of the attack, who had gone into the back to get water-cans for the scholars when he heard a heavy explosion. No sooner he came running, he saw everything was smoggy.

“There were dead bodies all around the chairs, in large numbers”, Muzammil said.

Distressed family members and relatives of the scholars have gathered in the hospital to track the list hanged outside the hospital about those who were killed and wounded in the blast.

In the meanwhile, Police and Army have been deputed to stop all the roads leading to the blast site.

In the June ISIS attacks against Muslim scholars of Afghanistan, the attackers accused scholars of being “scholars for dollars” or “paid Mullahs” for supporting Afghan government by calling peace-talks and prosperity of the country.

The organizations like Ikhwanul-Muslimeen, Al-Qaida, ISIS, Hezbollah, and their affiliated factions deem every Muslim scholar who calls for obeying the governments fit to be killed since “scholars have aligned with the tyrants” and “eventually left Islam.”

Most of the terrorists ascribe to “Wahabbi” ideology, however, the leading Salafi scholars of Saudi Arabia like Abdulazeez Bin Baaz and Shaykh Mohammed Uthaymeen issued grand fatwas declaring suicide-missions to be absolutely forbidden and a path to eternal hellfire.

Initially, Iranian security forces surrounded and desecrated Qalamoee Sunni school in Sirik – Hormozgan province, and later arrested Molavi Ahmad Qolandarzai, Molavi Ayyub Ahmadi, and Molavi Hashem Jafarzadeh.

[File photo: Qalamoee Sunni School raided by Iranian forces]

Following their arrest, security forces also raided the scholars’ houses, and threw some of their possessions on road.

The reason for the arrests remain unknown. Iranian authorities are infamous for voilently cracking down Sunni minorities of the country.