The broker gets the headline. Whether the broker shapes the outcome is a different matter entirely.

Every few years, usually after some dramatic diplomatic moment, a version of the same argument resurfaces in Western policy circles: Pakistan, despite being economically fragile and institutionally troubled, keeps showing up at the table. India, despite being the region’s dominant economy and a democracy with global ambitions, somehow doesn’t. The implication is usually that India is doing something wrong, or that Pakistan has figured out a trick India refuses to learn. This reading is understandable. It is also, on closer inspection, considerably overstated.

What Pakistan Actually Does — and What It Costs

Let’s be clear about what Pakistan’s diplomatic record actually consists of. It has, at various points, served as a conduit between parties that could not talk to each other directly. In 1971, it facilitated the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China. Through the 1980s, it managed the American and Saudi pipeline to the Afghan mujahideen. Most recently, in early 2026, it apparently relayed a fifteen-point American peace proposal to Tehran as Washington and Iran traded strikes across the Middle East.

These are real accomplishments. The structural explanation for them is also fairly persuasive: Pakistan is nuclear-armed, so India cannot simply overwhelm it; it is perpetually broke, so it needs patrons and is therefore always in the market for a useful role to play; and it sits at a geographic crossroads that makes it hard for any outside power with regional ambitions to simply ignore. A state that needs patrons to survive is a supplicant. A state that needs patrons for everything except survival has leverage.

But this picture has a shadow side that tends to get glossed over. The same army that makes Pakistan useful as a broker also spent two decades as the Taliban’s primary patron and ran the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, which is perhaps the most consequential act of nuclear irresponsibility since the Cold War. The Saudi-Pakistani defence pact signed in September 2025 — widely celebrated as evidence of Pakistani strategic genius — places Islamabad in the position of simultaneously acting as Sunni military guarantor to Riyadh and back-channel to Tehran, while managing a domestic population that includes forty million Shia Muslims. That is not strategic elegance. That is a set of contradictions held together by willpower and ambiguity, and ambiguity eventually runs out.

As for the 2026 Iran ceasefire — the centrepiece of Pakistan’s current claim to indispensability — what has it actually produced? A communication channel, some announcements, a few deadlines that came and went, and a running commentary on Truth Social that has alternately declared peace imminent and threatened renewed bombardment, sometimes within the same week. Pakistan relayed a message. That is nothing. But it is a long way from a settlement, and attributing structural significance to a back channel whose existence owes something to a crypto deal signed in January 2026 between Pakistan’s army chief and the Trump family’s business venture requires a certain generosity of interpretation.

India’s Forgotten Record

The standard critique of Indian foreign policy — that it is all relationships and no obligations, all presence and no commitment — proceeds as though India’s diplomatic history began sometime around 2014. It didn’t.

During the Korean War, it was India’s V.K. Krishna Menon who broke the armistice deadlock that had stalled negotiations for over a year. The specific problem was prisoner-of-war repatriation — neither side could accept the other’s terms, and the talks had collapsed. India proposed voluntary repatriation overseen by a neutral commission. The formula was adopted in the 1953 Armistice, and India chaired the commission that implemented it. This is precisely the kind of creative, trust-based mediation that gets attributed exclusively to Pakistan in contemporary analysis. It happened, it worked, and it has been largely forgotten.

In Cyprus, from 1964 onward, India contributed meaningfully to the UN peacekeeping force at a moment when Greek and Turkish Cypriot violence was threatening to pull NATO members into direct confrontation. Again, not a passive gesture — load-bearing participation in a genuinely difficult situation.

In South Asia itself, India built SAARC in 1985 as a regional integration framework, and the diagnosis of its failure matters enormously. SAARC did not fail because India lost interest or refused to make commitments. It failed because Pakistan consistently used it as a platform for bilateral grievance rather than regional cooperation — most visibly when the 2016 Islamabad Summit was cancelled after Pakistan-based militants attacked an Indian Army base at Uri. When an institution you helped build gets repeatedly blocked by one of its members, the conclusion to draw is not that you should have built more institutions.

The Gulf: A Different Kind of Presence

The argument that India has no real presence in West Asia because it has no defence pacts or troops stationed in Gulf states reflects a fairly narrow idea of what presence means. Over nine million Indian nationals live and work across the Gulf. Their remittances — exceeding forty billion dollars annually — are not just an economic statistic. They represent a web of human and institutional relationships that generates its own diplomatic weight.

When conflict has broken out in Yemen, Sudan, or Lebanon, India has mounted large-scale evacuation operations for its citizens. These operations do not happen without the quiet cooperation of Gulf governments. That cooperation reflects a relationship of mutual utility — not formalised in a treaty, not legible in alliance databases, but real. India also does not need troops in Riyadh to have influence in Riyadh. It needs Saudi Arabia to care whether India is doing well. Given the depth of economic and human ties, Saudi Arabia does.

More recently, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor — announced at the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi — represents exactly the kind of connectivity architecture that is supposedly absent from Indian foreign policy. It ties Indian ports to Gulf infrastructure to European markets, and it gives multiple partners a concrete stake in Indian diplomatic stability. It is slower than a defence pact. It is also, arguably, more durable.

Strategic Autonomy and its Variables

None of this means India’s foreign policy is without genuine limitations. The doctrine of strategic autonomy — India as friend to all, obligated to none — has real costs that deserve honest acknowledgement. A state that declines binding commitments on most contested questions of international order does not accumulate allies in the deep sense — states that owe their security to Indian support and therefore have a structural interest in Indian success. Strategic autonomy, practised consistently, means India has many friends and few clients. That is a real constraint on the kind of influence that gets exercised in crisis moments.

Whether that is a correctable policy or structural reality is the more interesting question. India’s size and economic trajectory mean that many states want its friendship regardless of whether it takes sides. The United States cultivated a similar posture through much of the early twentieth century — extensive economic engagement, minimal alliance obligations — and the transition from that posture to full great-power engagement was ultimately forced by external events rather than chosen. Whether the current deterioration of the regional security environment, including the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, might function as a similar forcing moment is perhaps the most consequential open question in South Asian foreign policy today.

What the Competition Actually Is

The framing of India versus Pakistan as competing models of diplomatic influence obscures something important: they are not competing for the same thing. Pakistan is optimised for crisis relevance — it is useful when things are going wrong, when parties cannot talk to each other, when someone needs a conduit. That is a real and valuable role. It is also, by definition, dependent on there being a crisis, on the crisis involving parties who both trust Pakistan, and on the political incentives of outside powers aligning in ways that make Islamabad useful rather than inconvenient.

India is building something slower and harder to see — economic interdependence, connectivity infrastructure, institutional presence across multilateral forums, and the accumulated credibility that comes from not being anyone’s instrument. Whether that model generates more durable influence over the next two decades than Pakistan’s brokerage model is a genuinely open question. But it is the right question to ask, and it is not answered by pointing to who was on the phone with Trump and Tehran in the same week. The broker gets the headline. Whether the broker shapes the outcome is a different matter entirely.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Putin highlighted decades of mutual trust, strategic alignment and shared interests that continue to anchor the relationship even in a complex global environment.

The two leaders agreed to broaden bilateral trade, enhance technology partnerships and work toward a more balanced economic relationship.

Russia expressed its readiness to ensure steady fuel supplies to India, while New Delhi reiterated that energy decisions remain guided by market conditions and commercial considerations.

Despite differing views on immediate energy dynamics, both sides demonstrated strong willingness to maintain cooperation in a mutually beneficial framework.

India emphasised that its energy choices reflect evolving international circumstances, but it continues to value Russia as a long-term and reliable partner.

The discussions underscored that collaboration in oil and energy will adapt to global shifts while keeping strategic cooperation intact.

State refiners in India have already placed new orders from non-sanctioned Russian suppliers, signalling continued engagement within permissible channels.

Prime Minister Modi described India–Russia ties as a relationship that has consistently stood firm through geopolitical changes.

The leaders adopted a comprehensive economic cooperation plan extending to 2030, designed to diversify trade, strengthen investments and support sustainable growth.

This framework aims to elevate bilateral trade to new heights, with Russia expressing interest in increasing imports of Indian goods to rebalance trade flows.

A major highlight of the visit was the emphasis on modernising defence partnerships. India and Russia agreed to expand joint research, co-development and local production of critical defence systems.

This approach aligns with India’s vision for greater self-reliance, enabling advanced manufacturing of components, spare parts and military technologies within Indian facilities.

The visit also saw agreements aimed at enhancing mobility for Indian professionals seeking work opportunities in Russia, as well as collaborations in agriculture, healthcare, fertilisers and shipping.

These sectors are expected to deepen people-to-people ties and broaden economic integration between the two nations.

Putin’s ceremonial welcome at Rashtrapati Bhavan, complete with a 21-gun salute, reflected the warmth and respect associated with the India–Russia partnership.

The large delegation accompanying him signalled Moscow’s serious intent to strengthen economic engagement and explore new areas of cooperation.

Both countries highlighted their shared commitment to resilience, stability and diplomatic engagement amid today’s uncertain geopolitical landscape.

India reiterated its support for dialogue and peaceful solutions to global conflicts. The joint statement issued after the summit noted that bilateral ties remain stable despite external pressures, reinforcing the autonomy and trust that define the relationship.

Putin also questioned the logic of certain external pressures on India, stressing that nations should retain the right to pursue energy and trade decisions that align with their national interests.

The evolving global context, including U.S. tariffs and shifting energy markets, has added new layers of complexity for India’s foreign policy. Yet New Delhi continues to balance engagement with multiple partners while safeguarding its strategic autonomy.

The visit marked a significant step in that direction, illustrating India’s ability to strengthen traditional alliances while navigating new global realities.

As both countries look toward 2030, the renewed roadmap provides a strong platform for cooperation in trade, technology, industry and security.

With shared values of trust and long-standing friendship, India and Russia are poised to continue shaping a stable and constructive partnership that contributes to regional and global stability.

The visit comes at a time when global political dynamics, defence supply chains, and energy flows continue to shift, giving the discussions broader geopolitical significance.

Officials in Moscow said the bilateral agenda would include defence cooperation, energy collaboration, economic engagement, and strategic coordination across regional and global platforms.

India and Russia have maintained a close partnership for decades, and both sides view the meeting as an opportunity to strengthen areas where cooperation continues to align with their national interests.

India remains a major purchaser of Russian oil and has sourced defence equipment from Moscow for generations, forming the backbone of its military capabilities.

However, New Delhi has increasingly emphasized a diversified procurement policy, seeking suppliers from multiple countries while building a stronger domestic manufacturing base for long-term defence sustainability.

A senior Indian defence official recently noted that India has expanded its purchases from the United States in the past decade while simultaneously enhancing indigenous defence production.

He underscored that India adopts a policy of strategic autonomy, maintaining independent decision-making despite global pressure regarding its strategic choices and oil imports.

Despite international calls to reduce reliance on Russian energy, India continues to calibrate its purchases based on affordability, security considerations, and national interest.

Recent data indicates that India’s December oil imports from Russia may decrease compared with previous months, as refiners weigh global sanctions and logistical constraints when planning shipments.

Putin’s last official visit to India occurred in late 2021, months before the conflict in Ukraine reshaped global geopolitical alignments and energy markets.

Since then, both nations have maintained regular diplomatic engagement, but the upcoming in-person discussions mark an important renewal of leadership-level interaction.

The Kremlin has described the upcoming visit as a significant moment to review progress across political dialogue, economic ties, cultural exchanges, and defence cooperation.

Officials indicated that a series of intergovernmental and commercial documents are expected to be signed, although specific details have not yet been disclosed.

Trade between India and Russia has grown substantially in recent years, driven largely by energy flows and new financial arrangements designed to navigate international sanctions.

Both governments are now working to broaden the structure of trade to include manufacturing, technology partnerships, and long-term investments across various sectors.

Washington has urged India on several occasions to reduce its purchases of Russian oil, with recent U.S. policy measures adding pressure on New Delhi’s trade landscape.

Nevertheless, India continues to assert that its decisions will remain guided by national priorities, energy security, and the principle of maintaining balanced global relationships.

During his two-day visit from December 4 to 5, Putin will hold extensive talks with Prime Minister Modi in New Delhi, followed by a separate meeting with President Droupadi Murmu.

The meetings are expected to highlight the historic depth of Russian-Indian relations while addressing new challenges and opportunities emerging in today’s geopolitical environment.

Both sides continue to describe their partnership as steady and resilient, shaped by decades of cooperation and shared strategic interests.

Next week’s discussions are likely to reaffirm this trajectory while exploring areas where both countries seek enhanced collaboration in a rapidly changing world.