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	<title>South Asian security &#8211; The Milli Chronicle</title>
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		<title>POJK and Gligit-Baltistan: Pakistan’s Governance Faultlines Beyond Repair</title>
		<link>https://millichronicle.com/2026/06/68673.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arun Anand]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 06:54:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[accountability in Pakistan]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[constitutional rights Gilgit Baltistan]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[East Pakistan lessons]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[governance faultlines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[governance legitimacy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[transparency in governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wheat subsidy protests]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-post-author"><div class="wp-block-post-author__avatar"><img alt='' src='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/bb9e54675a4e13ec52632e18de1bbd93?s=48&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g' srcset='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/bb9e54675a4e13ec52632e18de1bbd93?s=96&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g 2x' class='avatar avatar-48 photo' height='48' width='48' loading='lazy' decoding='async'/></div><div class="wp-block-post-author__content"><p class="wp-block-post-author__name">Arun Anand</p></div></div>


<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions.</p>
</blockquote>



<p>The political unrest witnessed across Pakistan administered Kashmir since 2023 and the parallel grievances emerging in Gilgit-Baltistan represent one of the most significant governance challenges confronting Pakistan in recent years. While public attention has largely focused on the immediate triggers of protests; electricity tariffs, wheat subsidies, inflation and rising costs of living, the underlying causes are far deeper and more structural.<br><br>The rise of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has transformed local economic grievances into a broader movement demanding accountability, transparency and political responsiveness. The movement has highlighted growing dissatisfaction regarding governance practices, implementation of government commitments and the perceived disconnect between decision makers and ordinary citizens.</p>



<p>At the same time, recurring protests in Gilgit-Baltistan regarding constitutional status, resource utilisation, development priorities and economic opportunities have exposed similar governance fault lines. Although Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain distinct political entities, both regions demonstrate increasing demands for meaningful participation in decision making and a greater share of economic benefits arising from strategic projects.</p>



<p>The central question confronting Pakistan government is whether existing institutions can adapt to rising public expectations regarding accountability, representation and development.</p>



<p>The mountains of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan have historically been viewed through the lens of geopolitics. However, political developments of the last five years suggest a gradual shift in public priorities.</p>



<p>Increasingly, ordinary citizens are focusing on issues that directly affect their daily lives. The cost of electricity, availability of employment, quality of infrastructure, reliability of public services and effectiveness of governance have become central concerns. These issues have generated a new form of political mobilisation that differs significantly from traditional political movements.</p>



<p>The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents perhaps the clearest example of this transformation. Unlike conventional political organisations, JAAC derived its legitimacy not from ideological positions or constitutional debates but from its ability to articulate practical concerns affecting ordinary citizens.</p>



<p>The current unrest should therefore be understood not simply as a reaction to economic hardship but as part of a broader process through which citizens seek greater accountability, responsiveness and participation in governance.</p>



<p><strong>&nbsp;Rise of&nbsp; Joint Awami Action Committee</strong></p>



<p>The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents one of the most significant political developments in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir in recent years. Unlike traditional political parties, JAAC emerged organically from civil society and grassroots activism. Its origins can be traced to growing public dissatisfaction regarding inflation, rising electricity tariffs and the increasing cost of essential commodities.</p>



<p>Initially, the movement focused on economic concerns. Citizens questioned why regions possessing significant hydropower resources continued to face high electricity costs. Many argued that local populations were not receiving adequate benefits from resources generated within their own territory.</p>



<p>What distinguished JAAC from previous protest movements was its ability to unite diverse segments of society. Traders, transport unions, lawyers, students, labour organisations and civil society groups increasingly coordinated their activities under a common platform.</p>



<p>As demonstrations expanded, the movement&#8217;s demands evolved. Economic grievances gradually merged with governance concerns. Protesters began demanding greater transparency, accountability and implementation of previous commitments. Public discourse increasingly focused on whether institutions were capable of responding effectively to citizen concerns.</p>



<p>The rise of JAAC reflects broader regional trends where issue-based movements centered on governance, accountability and public services increasingly challenging the traditional political structures.</p>



<p><strong>Accountability and Crisis of Trust</strong></p>



<p>At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions. Repeated protests indicate growing concern regarding responsiveness, transparency and implementation of commitments. Disputes over agreements reached between protest leaders and authorities have reinforced perceptions that institutions are not adequately accountable. Economic hardship has intensified these concerns, while digital connectivity has enabled citizens to compare governance outcomes across regions and just across the LoC in Jammu &amp; Kashmir. The resulting crisis is therefore not merely administrative but fundamentally political, centered on legitimacy and public confidence.</p>



<p><strong>POJK and Balochistan: Similar Fault Lines, Different Challenges</strong></p>



<p>Although Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Balochistan differ substantially in history and political context, both reveal recurring debates regarding resource utilisation, local participation and development outcomes. In both regions, citizens frequently question whether the benefits generated from local resources are distributed equitably. Another similarity concerns perceptions of centralised decision making and limited local influence over major policy choices. However, important differences remain. The movement in POJK has largely remained civil and issue based, while Balochistan has experienced a prolonged insurgency alongside political activism. The comparison highlights how governance grievances can evolve into broader political challenges when populations feel excluded from decision making processes.</p>



<p><strong>Lessons from East Pakistan</strong></p>



<p>The history of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 remains a significant lesson in political legitimacy, representation and governance. Historians point to a combination of political exclusion, economic disparities and institutional failures as contributing factors. The contemporary relevance of this experience lies not in drawing direct parallels but in recognising the importance of responsive institutions and public trust. States derive resilience from legitimacy as much as from administrative capacity. The lesson for policymakers is that sustainable stability requires meaningful participation, accountable governance and confidence that institutions represent citizen interests.</p>



<p><strong>Gilgit-Baltistan: Pakistan&#8217;s Emerging Strategic Challenge</strong></p>



<p>Gilgit-Baltistan occupies a critical strategic position linking South Asia, Central Asia and China. Its importance has increased significantly with regional connectivity projects and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite this strategic significance, recurring public debates concerning constitutional status, subsidies, electricity shortages, trade restrictions and local participation in development have generated periodic protests. Many residents argue that while the region contributes substantially to national strategic objectives, local communities do not always perceive proportional economic benefits. This tension between strategic priorities and local expectations represents one of the most significant governance challenges facing policymakers.</p>



<p><strong>Comparative Development Across LOC</strong></p>



<p>The digital age has transformed public awareness. Citizens increasingly compare governance outcomes, infrastructure, education, healthcare and economic opportunities across regions mainly in Jammu &amp; Kashmir. Such comparisons influence perceptions of governance effectiveness and political legitimacy. Arguably, comparative narratives has shaped the public expectations and it has placed pressure on Pakistan government to demonstrate tangible development outcomes. Infrastructure, tourism, public services and employment opportunities have become important indicators through which populations evaluate governance performance.</p>



<p><strong>Pakistan&#8217;s Strategic Dilemma</strong></p>



<p>Pakistan faces a complex challenge in balancing security, development and political responsiveness. Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain strategically important regions. However, democratic protest movements differ fundamentally from conventional security threats. While administrative and security measures may restore temporary stability, long term legitimacy depends upon public confidence, institutional credibility and meaningful participation. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of addressing governance concerns without overt or covert use of Pakistan Army to silence the people by use force or fear of jail.</p>



<p><strong>Future Outlook and Policy Implications</strong></p>



<p>The government of Pakistan immediately needs to restore confidence of the people of the region by increased participation in governance and central institutions. Exploitation of the resources allowed by Pakistan Army and China needs to stop. Failure to address recurring grievances, however, risks perpetuating cycles of protest and mistrust. The broader lesson is that development and governance must progress together. Citizens increasingly expect institutions to be accountable, responsive and capable of delivering measurable improvements in quality of life. Pakistan has to accept the internal challenges first without attributing all its problems to Indian state.</p>



<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>



<p>The ongoing protests in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan highlight the growing importance of governance, accountability and public trust in contemporary politics. Economic concerns provided the initial catalyst for mobilisation, but the underlying debate increasingly concerns institutional responsiveness and legitimacy. Sustainable stability will depend not only on strategic considerations but also on the ability of institutions to address citizen expectations through transparent governance, meaningful participation and effective development policies. Pakistan needs to take cue from 1971 on how largescale suppression of homogenous communities can lead to outburst of violent protest. The country needs to look inside rather than involve itself in more that what it can chew.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>From Denial to Exposure: How Operation Sindoor Unmasked Pakistan</title>
		<link>https://millichronicle.com/2026/05/66566.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arun Anand]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 19:11:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bahawalpur airstrike]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counter terrorism strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cross border terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical analysis Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India counter terror strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India national security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India Pakistan conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India Pakistan tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India security policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian airstrikes May 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian defense analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian military operation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international terrorism analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISI support for terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jaish e Mohammed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jaish headquarters Bahawalpur]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lashkar e Taiba]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lashkar Muridke complex]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Masood Azhar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mumbai attacks 2008]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Muridke terror camp]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Sindoor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Sindoor 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan and terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan exposed]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan victim narrative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Asia geopolitics]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[strategic affairs South Asia]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[The international community has, for too long, accepted Pakistan&#8217;s victim narrative at face value. The reasoning has often been geopolitical.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-post-author"><div class="wp-block-post-author__avatar"><img alt='' src='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/bb9e54675a4e13ec52632e18de1bbd93?s=48&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g' srcset='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/bb9e54675a4e13ec52632e18de1bbd93?s=96&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g 2x' class='avatar avatar-48 photo' height='48' width='48' loading='lazy' decoding='async'/></div><div class="wp-block-post-author__content"><p class="wp-block-post-author__name">Arun Anand</p></div></div>


<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>The international community has, for too long, accepted Pakistan&#8217;s victim narrative at face value. The reasoning has often been geopolitical. </p>
</blockquote>



<p>Every time the world confronts Pakistan with evidence of its support for terrorism, it responds with the same script. It is a victim of terrorism, not a sponsor. Its neighbours are out to defame it. The groups operating from its soil are rogue actors, beyond state control. The script has worn thin. Operation Sindoor, in May 2025, demolished it.</p>



<p>The Indian airstrikes on the night of May 6 to 7, 2025, did not target shadowy hideouts in remote tribal regions. They targeted Bahawalpur, a city of nearly a million people in central Punjab, well within Pakistan&#8217;s settled and policed heartland. They targeted Muridke, the sprawling Lashkar-e-Taiba complex on the outskirts of Lahore. They struck nine sites in total, four in Pakistan proper and five in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The locations told their own story. These were not camps that Pakistan had failed to find. These were camps that Pakistan had built.</p>



<p><strong>The Family Business of Terror</strong></p>



<p>Consider the case of Jaish-e-Mohammed, the group whose Bahawalpur headquarters India struck on May 7. Jaish was founded in 2000 by Masood Azhar, a man Pakistan released from Indian custody in December 1999 in exchange for hostages on a hijacked plane. According to multiple accounts cited by Pakistani journalists and Western researchers, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate paraded Azhar through Pakistan after his release on a fundraising tour, and helped him stand up the new outfit.</p>



<p>Pervez Musharraf, who served as Pakistan&#8217;s president from 2001 to 2008, admitted in a 2019 interview that Jaish-e-Mohammed had carried out attacks in India on the instructions of Pakistani intelligence. This was not an Indian allegation. This was the former military ruler of Pakistan acknowledging that Pakistan&#8217;s spy agency had directed terror operations against a neighbouring country.</p>



<p>Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group whose Muridke complex India also struck, has a similar profile. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies has documented that Lashkar conducts its attacks, including the 2008 Mumbai siege, with the consent and support of the ISI. David Coleman Headley, the Pakistani-American operative who scouted the Mumbai targets, testified that he met with six different ISI officers during his time with Lashkar. American investigators identified one of them, known only as Major Iqbal, as having provided 25,000 dollars in cash and direct operational guidance for the attack that killed 166 people.</p>



<p><strong>What the Strikes Revealed</strong></p>



<p>If Jaish and Lashkar were really rogue outfits operating outside Pakistani state control, the strikes of May 7 should have produced confused and uncertain reactions. Pakistan should have struggled to identify what had been hit, who had died, and why. Instead, the response was immediate and revealing. Pakistan&#8217;s military leadership knew exactly what had been targeted, because the targets were on Pakistan&#8217;s books in all but name.</p>



<p>In September 2025, a senior Jaish commander named Masood Ilyas Kashmiri appeared at the group&#8217;s annual Mission Mustafa conference and openly admitted that Masood Azhar&#8217;s family had been killed in the Bahawalpur strikes. Ten members of the family died, including Azhar&#8217;s sister, her husband, a nephew, a niece, and five children. Four close aides also died. The location of the strike was Jamia Masjid Subhan Allah, the headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammed, sitting comfortably inside Pakistani territory, with a UN-designated terrorist living openly within its walls.</p>



<p>The picture this paints is unambiguous. Masood Azhar, listed as a global terrorist by the United Nations Security Council since May 2019, was not in hiding. He was at home, with his family, in a complex protected by the Pakistani state. His brother Abdul Rauf Asghar, also a UN-designated terrorist and the operational head of Jaish, was reportedly killed in the same strike. Pakistan&#8217;s posture of plausible deniability has rested for decades on the fiction that men like these are difficult to find. India&#8217;s strikes proved that the only people who found them difficult to find were Pakistan&#8217;s own authorities.</p>



<p><strong>The Cost of the Charade</strong></p>



<p>The international community has, for too long, accepted Pakistan&#8217;s victim narrative at face value. The reasoning has often been geopolitical. Pakistan was a frontline state in the Cold War. Pakistan was a partner in the war on terror. Pakistan held nuclear weapons that demanded careful handling. Each of these arguments contained a fragment of strategic logic. None of them justified the systematic protection of men who killed civilians in Indian cities and villages.</p>



<p>The cost of this charade has been borne by India and by the broader region. Pakistan&#8217;s continued sponsorship of terror groups has poisoned the entire South Asian neighbourhood. It has prevented the development of normal trade and travel relations. It has consumed resources that could have built schools and hospitals on both sides of the border. And, most tragically, it has cost thousands of innocent lives across decades of attacks that Pakistan&#8217;s intelligence services helped plan, fund, and execute.</p>



<p>Operation Sindoor changed the equation. By striking Bahawalpur and Muridke, India made plain what had always been true. The terrorist infrastructure attacking India operates from inside Pakistan, with the protection of the Pakistani state. The terrorist leadership lives in Pakistani cities, raises families in Pakistani neighbourhoods, and runs operations from Pakistani buildings. The fiction of state distance from these activities has collapsed.</p>



<p>The world now has a choice. It can continue to accept the Pakistani script of victimhood, in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Or it can finally treat Pakistan as what it has long been: a state that uses terrorism as an instrument of policy, and that pays a price every time it does. India has decided which path it will follow. The international community must now decide which path it can credibly continue to ignore.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.</p>
</blockquote>
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