The Election Commission said the BJP had won at least 124 seats in the 294-member state assembly and was leading in 83 others, placing it on course to form the government. The TMC, led by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, had held power in the eastern state since 2011 and had been one of the BJP’s most resilient regional opponents.

The outcome represents a major expansion for the BJP into a politically influential state where it has historically struggled to gain a foothold.

Addressing party supporters in New Delhi, Modi said the result marked “a new chapter” for West Bengal, pointing to what he described as the party’s growing appeal across regions.Opposition parties, however, criticized the conduct of the election, alleging irregularities after millions of voters were removed from electoral rolls.

The Election Commission has not publicly detailed the basis for the removals in the data provided.Banerjee’s defeat is expected to weaken her position within India’s fragmented opposition, where she had emerged as a key figure attempting to unify regional parties against the BJP.

Her loss underscores the broader challenges faced by opposition groups in mounting a coordinated national challenge to Modi’s party.The West Bengal result comes amid a broader cycle of state elections across India. Governments were also unseated in two other states, while the BJP retained power in Assam for a third consecutive term.

In Tamil Nadu, actor-turned-politician Joseph Vijay led his Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam party to victory over the incumbent DMK government, while in Kerala, the Congress-led opposition defeated the ruling communist administration.

The BJP’s gains in West Bengal are likely to bolster Modi’s political standing midway through his third term, particularly after the 2024 national election forced the party to rely on regional allies to form a government.

Analysts say the expansion into new regional strongholds could strengthen the party’s position ahead of the next general election scheduled for 2029.India, with more than 1.4 billion people, conducts elections across its 28 states and eight federal territories in staggered cycles, making state-level outcomes a critical indicator of national political momentum.

The proposed law, which sought to increase the size of the lower house by about 55% to 850 seats ahead of the 2029 general elections, fell short of the required two-thirds majority, with 298 lawmakers voting in favor and 230 against in the Lok Sabha.

The government had linked the expansion to the implementation of women’s reservation, arguing that redrawing constituency boundaries based on updated population data was necessary to ensure equitable representation. Seats in parliament have remained frozen since the 1971 census, despite significant demographic changes.

Opposition parties supported the principle of reserving seats for women but opposed tying it to a nationwide delimitation exercise, alleging the move could be used to alter electoral dynamics in favor of the ruling party.

Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi criticized the bill shortly after the vote, calling it an “unconstitutional trick” that undermined the Constitution under the guise of advancing women’s representation.The government rejected those claims, maintaining that the proposal was essential for modernizing India’s electoral framework.

Interior Minister Amit Shah defended the bill in parliament, warning that blocking it would disappoint women across the country and vowing continued efforts to secure legislative backing for gender quotas.

A law passed in 2023 had already approved reserving one-third of parliamentary seats for women, but its implementation was contingent on the completion of the next census and subsequent constituency redrawing, a process still underway and expected to delay enforcement beyond the next election cycle.

Women currently account for about 14% of members in the lower house and 17% in the upper house, with representation in state legislatures averaging around 10%, according to official data.

The failure of the bill highlights ongoing political divisions over electoral reforms and gender representation, as well as the challenges of securing broad consensus for constitutional amendments in India’s increasingly polarized parliament.

Oli, 74, who resigned after the unrest, was taken into custody along with former home minister Ramesh Lekhak following a recommendation by an official panel that they be prosecuted over their handling of the violence.

Police spokesman Om Adhikari said both men were being held at the Kathmandu Police Office and would be produced before a court on Sunday.The arrests come a day after rapper-turned-politician Balendra Shah was sworn in as prime minister, marking a shift in Nepal’s political leadership after elections influenced by public anger over the deaths.

Authorities said the detentions were made in line with the findings of a commission that examined the September protests, during which 76 people were killed over two days of unrest.

The panel held Oli responsible for failing to act to halt prolonged firing that killed at least 19 Gen Z protesters on the first day.“We have arrested them as per the recommendations made by the investigation commission,” Adhikari said.

Oli was later transferred to a hospital from police custody, witnesses said, citing his health condition. He has undergone two kidney transplants in the past.

Oli’s lawyer, Tikaram Bhattarai, said the arrest lacked legal basis, arguing there was no risk of his client fleeing or evading questioning.“They have said it is for investigation. It is illegal and improper,” Bhattarai told Reuters.

Lekhak and his legal representatives were not immediately available for comment.political falloutThe deaths during the protests became a central issue in Nepal’s recent elections, helping propel Shah’s Rastriya Swatantra Party to a landslide victory.

The demonstrations, largely driven by younger voters, were fuelled by allegations of corruption and demands for accountability.Oli’s arrest underscores the new administration’s apparent willingness to act on the findings of the investigative panel and pursue legal accountability for the violence.

Shah, 35, was appointed by President Ram Chandra Paudel after his Rastriya Swatantra Party won nearly two-thirds of seats in the 275-member House of Representatives in the March 5 polls, giving him a strong parliamentary mandate.

A political outsider popularly known as Balen, Shah faces the immediate challenge of addressing widespread dissatisfaction with Nepal’s traditional political parties, which voters have blamed for entrenched corruption and prolonged instability.

He rose to prominence during the September unrest that brought down the government, aligning himself publicly with largely youth-led protests that reflected growing generational discontent, although he did not directly participate in demonstrations.

The oath-taking ceremony in Katmandu incorporated Hindu and Buddhist rituals, reflecting Nepal’s religious traditions. The ceremony included “shankhnaad,” or the blowing of conch shells, alongside chanting by priests and lamas, as Shah took office with members of his newly appointed cabinet.

Religion and astrology continue to influence public life in Nepal, where auspicious timing is often observed for major events, including political ceremonies.

Trained as a structural engineer, Shah first gained national attention as a rap artist before entering politics and winning the mayoral election in Katmandu.

His rise from cultural figure to national leader has reshaped Nepal’s political landscape, particularly among younger voters.

The findings come two days before rapper-turned politician Balendra Shah is set to be sworn in as prime minister after securing a landslide victory in parliamentary elections triggered by the unrest.

The 970-page report held Oli, 74, responsible for not intervening during hours of firing on the first day of youth-led demonstrations, in which at least 19 Gen Z protesters were killed. Overall, 76 people died and 2,522 were injured during two days of violence, the panel said, broadly aligning with earlier government estimates.

“As the executive head Oli should be held responsible for anything good or bad,” the report stated.The panel also recommended prosecution of former home minister Ramesh Lekhak and then police chief Chandra Kuber Khapung, citing their roles in the handling of the crackdown.

None of the individuals named could be immediately reached for comment.Legal experts said the panel’s findings do not constitute formal charges and must be followed by a criminal investigation before any case is brought to court.“It is not a charge sheet and they cannot be jailed on the basis of this report,” said senior lawyer Dinesh Tripathi.

“There has to be a criminal investigation by police … The government can file the case in the court only after that.”If prosecuted and convicted, those named could face prison terms of up to 10 years, according to the report.

Analysts say the decision on whether to act on the recommendations now rests with Shah, 35, and his Rastriya Swatantra Party, which rose to power on the back of anti-corruption sentiment following the protests.

The panel also called for action against dozens of other officials and security personnel involved in the crackdown. Families of victims have continued to demand accountability for the deaths and injuries during the demonstrations.

In an exclusive email interview, former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina speaks to The Milli Chronicle about the violent turn of the 2024 protests that led to her departure, failure of Yunus-led interim government, and her concerns over extremism, democratic legitimacy, and Bangladesh’s political and strategic future.

Question: Could you share what factors influenced your decision to leave Bangladesh, and what assurances you would need to consider returning?

Answer: What began as a genuine student movement was escalated by radicalists who led the crowds into violence, destroying state and communications infrastructure and burning down police stations. By then, this was no longer a peaceful civic movement, but a violent mob.

My instinct has always been to protect our country and our citizens, and it was not an easy decision to leave while my country erupted into lawlessness. I regret that I was compelled to leave, but it was a decision I took to minimize any further loss of life, and to ensure the safety of people around me.

For me to return, Bangladesh must restore constitutional governance and the rule of law. This means lifting the unlawful ban on the Awami League, releasing political prisoners detained on fabricated charges, and holding genuinely free elections. You cannot claim democratic legitimacy while banning the party elected nine times by the people.

Question: How do you reflect on your government’s handling of the 2024 protests, and how do you respond to the concerns raised about the use of force and the legal cases that followed?

Answer: In the initial days, we allowed students to protest freely and accepted their demands. Then extremists transformed peaceful demonstrations into a violent insurrection. We responded as any government would when faced with burning police stations and attacks on state infrastructure; we acted to restore order and to prevent further bloodshed.

I attempted to gain a full picture of the events in August 2024 by establishing a judicial inquiry commission to investigate every death. The conspiracy behind these attacks became clear only later when Yunus immediately dissolved this inquiry, released convicted terrorists, and granted blanket immunity to those he now glorifies as ‘July Warriors.’ These same actors marched on the Indian embassy last week, no doubt emboldened by the protection of the interim government.

If there were genuine concerns about excessive force or wrongful prosecutions, why destroy the very mechanism designed to investigate them? The truth is that Yunus has consistently thwarted attempts to establish what really happened in July and August 2024, because an impartial investigation would reveal the orchestrated nature of the violence.

Question: What is your assessment of the current Yunus-led regime, and how do you view Bangladesh’s future—both with the proposed February 2026 elections and in the longer term?

Answer: We cannot forget that Yunus governs without a single vote from the Bangladeshi people. He has placed extremists in cabinet positions, released convicted terrorists, and done little or nothing to stop attacks on religious minorities. The economy that quadrupled during my tenure is now stalling.

Yunus came to power promising reform yet all he has sown division and banned the country’s oldest and most popular political party, thus disenfranchising millions. These elections can never be legitimate if the Awami League is banned.

My concern is that extremists are using Yunus to project an acceptable international face while they radicalise our institutions domestically. But Bangladesh and its people have extraordinary resilience and an unwavering belief in the power of participatory democracy. I trust that democracy will prevail and that we will set our great country back on the path to recovery and growth.

Question: Looking back, how do you view the debate over democratic space during your tenure, and what reforms or new approaches would you prioritize if given another opportunity to lead?

Answer: I believe our greatest achievement as a party was the restoration of democracy in the 1990s. When I returned to Bangladesh following my father’s assassination, the biggest challenge facing our country was a lack of popular representation. Those years of military rule and unelected leadership taught us valuable lessons about the power of democracy that we never took for granted during our time in government. As a government, we encouraged political engagement and participation across the nation. Democracy thrives with healthy opposition, yet some of those parties chose to boycott previous elections, restricting the democratic choice of millions of ordinary citizens.

It is interesting that those who accused us of restricting democratic space now rule without a single vote, have forced judges to resign, and have detained journalists brave enough to critique their increasingly authoritarian grip on our nation. The question isn’t what reforms I would implement, it’s whether Bangladesh will retain any democratic institutions to reform.

We are proud of our record in government. During those 15 years, we helped to lift millions out of poverty, empowered women, and transformed Bangladesh into one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies. We consistently protected the rights of minorities and prevented radicalism from eroding our democracy. It takes a legitimate and strong government to forge our country’s place both domestically and internationally, and we did so by operating within constitutional boundaries. We were repeatedly mandated by voters at the ballot box.

Question: How do you assess the country’s current political course under the interim government, particularly in terms of national stability and long-term strategic interests?

Answer: The Yunus government took power with a wave of western support from those who confused economic success with political aptitude. Reality has now set in. International bodies condemn his actions, cabinet members have stepped down in protest, and our citizens face unprecedented danger. Hundreds of innocent people have been detained arbitrarily under Yunus and journalists have been censored.

On the international stage, decades of carefully cultivated economic partnerships and regional stability have also been jeopardised.

This goes beyond mere incompetence; it is the systemic destruction of a once-stable country. Thankfully, such regimes never endure, and Yunus’ treatment of Bangladesh as his personal experiment will soon end. I can only hope that the international community will do its part in ensuring free, fair and participatory elections, so that the next legitimately elected government can rebuild what Yunus and his cronies have destroyed.

Question: Since your departure, Pakistan’s outreach and influence in Bangladesh appears to have grown. How do you think Bangladesh can balance evolving regional relationships while preserving its historical commitments, security priorities, and ties with India?

Answer: Bangladesh requires stable relationships with all neighbours, including Pakistan. But Yunus’ rushed embrace of Pakistan, which has never acknowledged the genocide of 1971, reveals a desperate search for any international validation.

The fundamental issue is legitimacy: Yunus lacks any mandate to realign our foreign policy. Strategic decisions that could affect generations should not be made by an unelected administration serving ideological interests. Once Bangladeshis can vote freely and we have a legitimate government in place, I hope that our foreign policy will once again be based on sober and pragmatic assessments of the country’s national interests.

Excerpts from this interview may be reproduced or quoted, provided that The Milli Chronicle is clearly credited as the source.

Hyenas of the defeated forces of 1971 now roam unchallenged.

A medieval darkness has descended upon the sacred land of independent Bangladesh. Law and order lie in shambles. Robbery and organised plunder now stain towns and villages alike. The nation stands captured by anti-Bangladesh forces—those who once trembled before the ideals of 1971 but now strut shamelessly across the land in this grim interregnum.

The illegal and unconstitutional “Interim Government” led by Prof. Dr. Muhammad Yunus has exposed its moral bankruptcy by failing to safeguard the sanctity of our national icons—Bangabandhu Memorial Museum, his murals, his statues, and the homes and temples of our religious minorities, especially the Hindu community.

Hyenas of the defeated forces of 1971 now roam unchallenged. Bangladesh has been thrust into the hands of the very criminals and collaborators whom history had once consigned to disgrace.

Let us be absolutely clear: Sheikh Hasina’s fall did not occur because of a student-led anti-quota movement. That movement was merely the surface ripple concealing a deep and treacherous undercurrent. From the very beginning, the unrest was a meticulously crafted pretext—a multilayered, billion-dollar blueprint engineered by a powerful Western intelligence agency acting in close concert with its local henchmen.

Among these were Dr. Yunus, long a favoured protégé of foreign powers; the Jamaat-BNP nexus; the Pakistani ISI; extremist right-wing Islamist networks; an ambitious army chief and his loyal cabal; and even the strategic manipulations of the Chinese dragon. Together, this unholy coalition executed a hawk-eyed operation to unseat Sheikh Hasina through an unlawful coup on 5 August 2024.

The objective of this foreign power was as brazen as it was sinister: to compel Bangladesh to surrender Saint Martin’s Island. Situated in the northeastern Bay of Bengal, the island offers unparalleled strategic advantage over Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. Sheikh Hasina, steadfast and patriotic, refused to reduce Bangladesh to a tributary state by allowing the establishment of a foreign military base.

For this refusal, she was removed.

What followed her ousting exposed the true barbarism of the conspirators. Looting, arson, temple desecration, forced occupation of minority homes, and unchecked violence swept across the nation with an intensity unseen in decades.

The perpetrators were not faceless; they were the same elements who opposed the Liberation War in 1971—Jamaat-e-Islami mass-murderers, their Shibir offspring, extremist mullahs, and various mercenary groups driven by religious bigotry and political vengeance.

On television, I witnessed scenes that seared my soul: a Hindu girl being dragged away by bearded zealots in a van while her father ran behind, crying in desperation; mobs of students—many naïve, many manipulated—raiding Sheikh Hasina’s home and proudly displaying stolen sarees before TV cameras; thugs parading items looted from the Prime Minister’s residence as if these were trophies of national triumph.

These were not acts of rebellion; they were acts of savagery.

And then came the final abomination: the attack on Bangabandhu’s historic home at Dhanmondi 32—the lighthouse of our national identity. What kind of nation allows the house of its founding father to be desecrated? What kind of creatures tear apart the very symbols of their own freedom?

These hellish beings sought not only to erase Sheikh Hasina’s legacy but to wipe out every sign of the Awami League’s monumental development achievement—bridges, highways, mega-projects, and the billions of dollars invested for the people’s welfare.

The “Interim Government” formed on 8 August 2024—under the shadow of guns and the blessing of foreign manipulators—had no constitutional basis. It was a grotesque aberration led by an octogenarian whose own judicial record is marred by convictions for labour law violations. Yet he postured as a saviour while presiding over the country’s descent into ruin.

Russia had warned us. On 15 December 2020, and again in 2023, Moscow publicly stated that a certain Western power intended to topple Sheikh Hasina if she returned to power. They predicted an Arab-Spring-style operation—one centred on university students, amplified by media propaganda, and lubricated by covert funding.

The children of this country—who never saw 1971, who do not know the long, treacherous shadow of the U.S.-Pakistani conspiracy behind Bangabandhu’s assassination—walked blindly into a geopolitical minefield. One day, they will look back in regret, realising they were pawns in a far greater game. By then, the damage may be irreversible.

Why were the verdicts timed as they were? Why did certain newspapers and television channels give extraordinary coverage from the very first hour? Who coordinated the protests? Who supplied funds, food, and logistics? Who weaponised social media? Who reaped the benefits? These questions answer themselves.

Most critically: Sheikh Hasina has not resigned. She remains the lawfully elected and rightful Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Her removal was effected at gunpoint—by an unworthy army chief and his mango-twigs, acting under the directives of foreign masters and their local Islamist proxies.

Today, Bangladesh is being forced toward a Hamas-ISIS styled banana republic, a grotesque distortion of the secular, democratic state for which we fought in 1971.

As a frontline Freedom Fighter who witnessed the brutal birth of Bangladesh with my own eyes, I pledge—until my final breath—to proclaim: Joy Bangla, Joy Bangabandhu, and Joytu Sheikh Hasina. Bangladesh awaits her return. And return she shall.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

In a cruel twist of fate, the criminals’ progeny now don the robes of righteousness while the true patriots stand accused.

In the dismal theatre of Bangladesh’s recent political tragedy, a new act of deception unfolds. Draped in the solemn garb of justice but driven by blood-soaked ambitions, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) Bangladesh now stands as a grotesque caricature of its former purpose.

The very institution once designed to mete out justice for the heinous atrocities of 1971 has been infiltrated—occupied—by those whose ideological ancestors – Jamaat-e-Islami mass-murderers bathed this soil in the blood of innocents.

Today, the hangman wears a wig, and justice lies gagged beneath his boot.

The ICT Bangladesh, once hailed as a beacon of national redemption, is now but a blighted husk—a sanctimonious facade controlled by those who once sought to crush the very birth of Bangladesh in 1971. Its judges, its prosecution panel, and its operatives are no longer guardians of truth. They are, in many cases, ideological descendants or direct cronies of the very Jamaat-e-Islami mass murderers who collaborated with the Pakistani army to massacre our people in 1971.

This is no idle allegation. It is a scream from the soul of a wounded nation. How did the butchers of Al-Badr and Al-Shams—the enforcers of genocide—regain the power to adjudicate truth and fiction? How dare they now point a crooked finger at the very architects of our liberation?

Those who once carried the green flag of Pakistan into our neighborhoods, who torched our villages, raped our mothers, and hanged our fathers, now sit in judgment over HPM Sheikh Hasina—the daughter of our founding father—and the Awami League stalwarts who carried the torch of independence through blood and fire.

The July–August 2024 events in Bangladesh—twisted into a grotesque narrative of state-led genocide—are being weaponized by these impostors. 98% murders were committed by the Jamaat-Shibir butchers and their direful mango-twigs! But they have now seized the ICT Bangladesh as their instrument, not of justice, but of revenge. They seek to rewrite history, to humiliate the legacy of 1971, to exonerate the traitors and criminalize the freedom fighters.

This is a blasphemy of the highest order.

The tribunals have become kangaroo courts where truth is the first casualty. The prosecutors do not seek justice; they seek retribution for the defeat their fathers suffered in 1971. The judges do not interpret the law; they distort it, drape it around the gallows they build for patriots. These are not courts of law. They are execution chambers for history itself.

Let us remind these usurpers: HPM Sheikh Hasina’s government did not commit genocide in July–August 2024. Her government sought to preserve order when chaos was unleashed by foreign-backed infiltrators, aided by the very ideological heirs of Jamaat-e-Islami.

The arson, sabotage, and killings were not orchestrated by the state, but by a coalition of dark forces determined to unseat the legitimate government and restore the regime of direful collaborators.

Let there be no confusion—this is not merely a judicial matter. It is an existential crisis. The ICT Bangladesh has mutated into a Trojan horse of the Jamaati-Shibir nexus. Its continued existence in this form is a mockery of every martyr who bled on the soil of Bengal for freedom. The very men who once branded the war of 1971 as “haram” and pledged allegiance to the occupying Pakistani forces are now masquerading as custodians of justice.

How far have we fallen when the freedom fighters must plead their innocence before the ideological descendants of their oppressors?

In courtrooms darkened by deceit, verdicts are preordained. The hallowed robes of justice are smeared with the filth of hypocrisy. And those who cry for a fair trial for Sheikh Hasina and her colleagues are dismissed, vilified, and condemned.

Yet it is the nation that must rise.

We must speak not just as citizens, but as inheritors of a sacred cause. We must rise in unison against this vile masquerade of justice. We must denounce the ICT Bangladesh for what it has become—a collaborator’s tribunal, a platform for vengeance, a stage for the desecration of our liberation war.

The institutions that betray the soul of a nation have no right to exist.

It is, therefore, imperative that ICT Bangladesh in designedly the current form be disbanded—tout de suite. Its structure, infiltrated by Jamaati sympathizers, has lost all credibility. Its verdicts are poisoned, its judges compromised, its mission perverted. The house must be torn down, brick by brick, and a new temple of justice must be built upon its ashes—one that honors the martyrs, that reveres the truth, and that punishes the real criminals of our blood-stained past.

This is not merely a political stance. It is a moral imperative.

Let us revisit the history these court jesters now seek to erase. In 1971, over three million of our people were butchered. Over three hundred thousand women were raped. The killers were not nameless shadows—they wore uniforms provided by Pakistan and were guided by the murderous hands of Jamaat-e-Islami and their Al-Badr militias. They swore to crush the dream of Bangladesh. They failed—because brave men and women stood tall, among them Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, his true-blue lieutenants and his indomitable daughter HPM Sheikh Hasina.

And now, fifty-four years later, we see the grotesque irony of history: the children of those butchers deciding the fate of those who built this nation.

No! A thousand times, no!

We cannot allow this to continue. We must name the imposter judges. We must unmask the collaborators in prosecutor’s clothing. We must confront every verdict that reeks of vengeance and vendetta. The ICT Bangladesh, as it stands today, is a dagger in the back of our history. It has become a safehouse for the ideological murderers of 1971.

If we stay silent, we become complicit.

This is the hour to rise—not with arms, but with truth. Not with blood, but with remembrance. Let every Bangladesh’s people who still feels the heartbeat of 1971 throb in their veins raise their voice. Let the youth know that justice is not a costume, that truth cannot be handed over to traitors, that history must be defended.

Sheikh Hasina is not on trial. Bangladesh is.

This tribunal is not about the past. It is a cold war for the future.

Do not allow the hangman’s wig to fool you. Beneath it is the same rotting head that once declared our liberation illegal, our flag a provocation, our language a blasphemy.

Disband ICT Bangladesh as it is twisted now to serve their evil designs. Root out the Jamaati infestation. Purge the judiciary of traitors. Let the nation reclaim the moral compass of 1971.

And to those who sit in judgment today—be warned. The people of Bangladesh are not blind. The river of our memory runs deep. And when justice returns, as it must, it will not be cloaked in hypocrisy. It will come roaring like a storm, not to hang patriots, but to redeem them.

History does not forget.

And neither shall we. A vile masquerade of justice – The International Crimes Tribunal, Bangladesh beneath Jamaati-Shibir butchers’ cloak.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) welcomed the Afghan minister in a post on X, formerly Twitter, stating: “We look forward to engaging discussions with him on bilateral relations and regional issues.”

Muttaqi, who will remain in India until October 16, is expected to meet External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval during his stay, according to diplomatic sources.

UN travel exemption cleared visit

The visit comes after weeks of delay caused by the need for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) exemption from travel restrictions placed on senior Taliban officials. Muttaqi’s name remains on a list of sanctioned individuals subject to a UN travel ban, which requires special permission for international travel.

Last week, MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal confirmed that the UNSC Sanctions Committee had granted permission for Muttaqi to visit India between October 9 and 16.

“All of you would have seen the exemption that has been granted by the UN Security Council Committee for the travel of the Afghan Foreign Minister to New Delhi,” Jaiswal said during a media briefing. “We shall keep you updated in this regard.”

India’s cautious engagement with the Taliban

Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, India has maintained a careful but pragmatic approach to engaging with the regime, stopping short of formal recognition while keeping diplomatic and humanitarian channels open.

“We have been having conversations with the interim government in Afghanistan,” Jaiswal said, noting past communications between the two sides.

“You would have seen the telecon that took place some time back between the External Affairs Minister and Foreign Minister Muttaqi. Also, we’ve had a conversation between the Joint Secretary in charge and his counterparts on the Afghan side.”

Diplomatic observers say New Delhi’s engagement reflects its efforts to safeguard regional security interests, prevent the spread of extremism, and ensure that Afghanistan’s territory is not used against India’s security concerns.

Humanitarian aid and reconstruction expected to top agenda

Humanitarian assistance, connectivity, and ongoing infrastructure projects are expected to feature prominently in the discussions. India has been among Afghanistan’s largest regional donors over the past two decades, funding roads, hospitals, and educational institutions.

“Recently, when the earthquake happened, we were able to transport relief material to Kunar province the same day, and subsequently we sent more relief material via Chabahar,” Jaiswal said, highlighting India’s continued humanitarian engagement despite the absence of formal diplomatic recognition.

New Delhi has also been quietly expanding cooperation on food and medical supplies, including wheat shipments and life-saving drugs. The recent visit of Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Medicine and Food, Hamdullah Zahid, to attend a pharmaceutical exhibition in India underscored growing functional ties between the two countries.

Broader diplomatic context

Muttaqi’s visit follows several months of behind-the-scenes diplomatic contact between India and Taliban officials. Earlier this year, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Afghan minister in January to discuss economic and regional issues.

Analysts view the latest visit as part of a gradual normalization process, in which India seeks to maintain influence in Afghanistan while avoiding premature recognition of the Taliban regime.

“India’s engagement with the Taliban is guided by both humanitarian necessity and strategic caution,” said a South Asia analyst based in Doha. “New Delhi does not want to leave a vacuum for Pakistan or China to fill.”

Regional security, counterterrorism, and the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan are also expected to be key points of discussion. Indian officials have repeatedly expressed concern about the potential for militant groups operating in Afghanistan to destabilize the wider region.

New Delhi is also closely watching Taliban interactions with Pakistan, China, and Iran, all of whom maintain varying degrees of engagement with Kabul.
“India recognizes the geopolitical reality that the Taliban are in control,” said a former Indian diplomat. “However, engagement does not equate to endorsement.”

No formal recognition yet

India has not recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the name used by the Taliban for their government. However, it has reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul in a limited capacity since mid-2022, primarily to oversee humanitarian programs and development assistance.

In past statements, India has emphasized that recognition of the Taliban government will depend on its actions on inclusivity, human rights—especially women’s rights—and counterterrorism commitments.

Despite these reservations, the continuation of dialogue signals a pragmatic shift in India’s foreign policy approach, particularly as the Taliban seeks broader regional legitimacy.

Growing regional diplomacy

Muttaqi’s trip to India is seen as part of Kabul’s broader diplomatic outreach to regional powers. Over the past year, Taliban officials have made visits to China, Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar, seeking investment and political engagement amid Afghanistan’s worsening economic isolation.

The timing of the visit is also notable, coming amid rising regional uncertainty over the security situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces and reports of renewed militant activity linked to the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).

For India, observers say the talks offer an opportunity to reassert its presence in Afghanistan and ensure its aid and investment efforts align with its long-term strategic interests in Central and South Asia.

A delicate balancing act

Experts caution that while India is expanding its contacts with the Taliban, it remains wary of being seen as legitimizing the group’s rule. “India’s position is clear — humanitarian engagement and talks on regional stability do not amount to recognition,” said a senior policy researcher at an Indian think tank.

Muttaqi’s visit, therefore, represents both a test and an opportunity for New Delhi — testing how far it can engage without crossing the recognition threshold, while offering a platform to advance shared interests such as trade, connectivity, and counterterrorism.

If any country, including Pakistan, ever invades India in the name of Ghazwa-e-Hind, they will find Indian Muslims defending their homeland

Among the many ideas that have found their way into the modern Islamic revivalist narrative, few are as persistently misunderstood—or dangerously misused—as the concept of Ghazwa-e-Hind. Popularized in contemporary times by figures like the late Dr. Israr Ahmed, it has come to be viewed not as a historical episode or a symbolic metaphor, but as a yet-to-be-fulfilled call to military conquest. This interpretation, though emotionally charged, is divorced from Islamic orthodoxy, historical context, and contemporary political reality.

This misreading of Islamic eschatology has become especially potent in Pakistan, where it has been weaponized by a segment of the clergy and even military-linked media. But what the masses often don’t see is that such a vision not only contradicts Islamic legal tradition, but also threatens the harmony of the Indian subcontinent, especially the future of Indian Muslims.

A Historical View—Not a Military Manual

The hadith that mentions Ghazwa-e-Hind is reported in Sunan an-Nasa’i (Hadith 3175), Musnad Ahmad (Hadith 23804), and al-Tabarani’s al-Mu’jam al-Kabir. The narration speaks of two groups saved from Hellfire—one that fights in India and another that accompanies Jesus, the son of Mary, during his second coming. However, Islamic scholars have long disagreed about the authenticity, context, and timeline of these narrations.

Renowned Hadith scholar Shaykh Nasiruddin al-Albani graded some of the chains as weak (da’if), while others like Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani in Fath al-Bari considered them authentic but possibly fulfilled during the early Islamic conquests. Ibn Kathir, in Al-Bidaya wa’l-Nihaya, also noted that the interpretation of these ahadith was limited to earlier periods of conquest.

Classical historians like al-Baladhuri in Futuh al-Buldan detail the campaign of Muhammad bin Qasim into Sindh (712 CE) as a response to an appeal from Muslim merchants and not as a sweeping religious war. The conquest was confined to a narrow region and did not reflect any systematic plan to convert India. Furthermore, the Chachnama, a semi-legendary Persian text documenting this campaign, narrates how religious freedom was granted to local Hindus and temples remained operational under Islamic rule.

Islamic scholar Dr. Ayesha Jalal, in her book Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, asserts that Ghazwa-e-Hind has been inflated in Pakistan’s religious discourse not because of religious necessity, but due to state-sponsored ideology. She writes that this hadith has “resurfaced with renewed intensity in Pakistan’s strategic imagination, filtered through a millenarian lens.”

The Qur’anic Command: No Compulsion in Religion

The most authoritative source in Islam—the Qur’an—states unequivocally: “There is no compulsion in religion” (Qur’an 2:256). This verse, supported by the consensus (ijma’) of scholars, has been interpreted as a foundational principle of religious freedom. In Tafsir al-Qurtubi, Imam al-Qurtubi elaborates that Islam forbids coercion because belief requires conviction, not force.

The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), when inviting tribes to Islam, used persuasion, kindness, and exemplary character—not threats. As recorded in Sirat Ibn Hisham and Tabaqat Ibn Sa’d, his approach to da’wah was rooted in wisdom, not warfare.

Moreover, Tafsir al-Tabari on verse 16:125—“Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching…”—explains that this verse sets the tone for all Islamic outreach. Any idea that religious dominance can be achieved through military force runs counter to the Qur’anic message and Prophetic model.

Prophecy ≠ Policy

Yes, Islam contains eschatological prophecies—many of which describe dramatic geopolitical changes in the end times.

The Prophet (peace be upon him) never told Muslims to build strategies around ghazwaat of the future. Instead, he focused on justice, reform, and internal purification.

Consider the Ghazwa of Abwa and Ghazwa of Ushayrah—expeditions that ended without a single arrow being shot. As documented in Al-Maghazi of al-Waqidi, many ghazwaat were precautionary or diplomatic. This is supported by Imam al-Nawawi’s commentary on Sahih Muslim, where he notes that military action in Islam is conditional on ethical, legal, and political necessities—not eschatological ambitions.

The Spread of Islam: A Moral Project, Not a Military One

Historically, Islam’s most significant growth occurred in regions where armies never marched. Southeast Asia, East Africa, and large swathes of India were introduced to Islam not through conquest but through trade and spiritual invitation.

Dr. Richard Eaton, in his landmark study The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, highlights how Sufi saints and local rulers facilitated Islamization in Bengal through land reforms, spiritual guidance, and social integration—not through war. Similarly, Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi in Islam and the World emphasizes that Islamic civilization at its best was spread through service, justice, and education.

The Prophet himself said: “I was sent to perfect noble character” (Musnad Ahmad, Hadith 8595). This foundational hadith is echoed in the works of Imam al-Ghazali in Ihya Ulum al-Din, who taught that spiritual excellence—not militarism—is the soul of Islamic revival.

Pakistan’s Fantasy vs Indian Muslims’ Reality

One of the more troubling developments is the Pakistani state’s occasional use of Ghazwa-e-Hind as a symbolic justification for cross-border ambitions. In textbooks, speeches, and even TV dramas, the narrative of a future campaign to “liberate” Indian Muslims is floated as a divine responsibility.

But such narratives overlook one major truth: Indian Muslims are not waiting for salvation. They are proud citizens of India, heirs to over a thousand years of Islamic contribution to the subcontinent.

India has produced towering Islamic scholars—Shaykh Abdul Haq Muhaddith Dehlawi, Shah Waliullah al-Dihlawi, Maulana Azad, and countless others. Its institutions—from Darul Uloom Deoband to Nadwatul Ulama—have trained generations of global scholars. The Indian Muslim identity is not subordinate to any external power. It is deeply rooted in the land, language, and ethos of India.

If any country, including Pakistan, ever invades India in the name of Ghazwa-e-Hind, they will find Indian Muslims defending their homeland, not cheering from the sidelines. As the Qur’an instructs: “Stand firmly for justice…” (4:135). That includes standing against unjust aggression—even if it’s done in the name of religion.

From Brigadier Muhammad Usman, the hero of Nowshera, to Captain Haneefuddin, who laid down his life in Kargil, Indian Muslims have proven their loyalty with blood.

Let no one mistake their silence for weakness or their faith for disloyalty. The Prophet loved Makkah. The Indian Muslim loves India.

Time for Responsibility, Not Rhetoric

Dr. Israr Ahmed’s intellectual legacy is mixed. While he awakened many to the idea of Islamic revival, his fixation on militarism—untethered from contemporary fiqh and political wisdom—misguided many. Today, young Muslims must be trained not in war slogans but in the Qur’an, Hadith, ethics, law, and service.

The return of a Caliphate, if it happens, must mirror the model of the Prophet—founded on justice, consultation, and mercy. Not through firebrand nationalism or weaponized hadiths.

Ghazwa-e-Hind has become more of a political trope than a theological reality. When read responsibly, Islamic tradition offers no justification for cross-border aggression dressed in prophecy. The real ghazwa we need today is against ignorance, sectarianism, and political manipulation.

Let us turn our energies toward rebuilding our societies—through knowledge, reform, and character. That is the legacy of the Prophet. That is the path of the righteous.