The crisis in Suwayda is not about religion—it’s about power, control, and the future of a nation struggling to unify.

As Syria attempts to rebuild after over a decade of civil war, a new and unexpected front of unrest has emerged—not from Sunni rebels or Kurdish militias, but from within the traditionally neutral Druze community in the southern Suwayda governorate. The recent escalation shatters the myth of Druze unity and exposes deep divisions fueled by opportunism, external manipulation, and conflicting visions for Syria’s future.

The Druze, an esoteric religious minority that emerged from Shia Ismailism in the 11th century, have historically preferred isolation and neutrality in regional conflicts. In Syria, their base is Suwayda, a mountainous and relatively quiet region that largely remained detached during the peak of the war. Today, however, Suwayda is fractured between three competing power centers led by prominent sheikhs: Sheikh Al-Hinawi, Sheikh Laith Al-Balaous, and Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri.

Al-Hinawi and Al-Balaous have aligned with Syria’s new government under Ahmed Al-Sharaa and pledged to reintegrate the Druze region into the national framework. Meanwhile, Al-Hijri—once a loyalist of Bashar al-Assad—has rejected the new order. Seeking to control Suwayda as an autonomous stronghold, his militia has resisted disarmament and openly attacked government forces, plunging the region into renewed conflict.

Tensions surged after a clear message from Washington that Syria will not be divided into ethnic or sectarian enclaves. The statement triggered a realignment among Suwayda’s factions. Militias under Al-Hinawi and Al-Balaous agreed to disarm, signaling a desire to return to national unity. But Al-Hijri doubled down on defiance—launching violent attacks, desecrating corpses, and distributing sectarian propaganda against Syria’s Sunni majority.

His forces also began targeting nearby Arab Bedouin tribes, sparking widespread outrage. Kidnappings, shelling of villages, and acts of lawlessness plunged Suwayda into chaos. Amid the growing instability, Israel intervened militarily, claiming to protect Druze interests. Israeli airstrikes targeted Syrian army positions, killing soldiers and escalating regional tensions.

Observers note that Israel has long viewed the Druze near the Golan Heights—especially in Hadar and Quneitra—as buffers against Hezbollah and Iranian proxies. Supporting the Druze also allows Israel to highlight its internal diversity and counter accusations of regional oppression. But when that support leads to bloodshed in Syria, the moral narrative becomes increasingly complex and politically fraught.

Turning Point: National Unity vs. Sectarian Warlordism

On July 15, a landmark statement was issued jointly by Sheikh Al-Hinawi, Sheikh Laith Al-Balaous, and Druze tribal elders. It declared full support for reintroducing Syrian state institutions in Suwayda, rejected separatism, and welcomed the Syrian army’s return. The agreement was endorsed by Christian, Sunni, and Druze representatives, marking a broad consensus toward restoring peace and normalcy.

But just hours later, Sheikh Al-Hijri rejected the accord. In a televised address, he denounced the Syrian government, called for tribal mobilization, and invited international intervention. Almost immediately, Israeli airstrikes resumed, fueling fears of a wider proxy conflict.

Al-Hijri’s rebellion is not rooted in religious ideology—it’s a calculated power grab. By portraying himself as a protector of the Druze against a Sunni-dominated state, he seeks total control over Suwayda, regardless of the cost. His campaign has already resulted in hundreds of deaths, severe economic decline, and regional instability. Worse still, it risks painting the entire Druze population as complicit, despite growing internal opposition to his actions.

Reports indicate that Al-Hijri’s fighters have stockpiled advanced weapons, some allegedly supplied via covert external channels. His propaganda claims the Syrian state is failing to protect minorities, but his own forces have been implicated in abductions, illegal checkpoints, and smuggling operations. Locals say his militias extort money, confiscate land, and obstruct humanitarian aid.

While Syria’s central government appears determined to avoid full-scale confrontation, it has quietly mobilized elite units near Suwayda. The aim is to isolate Al-Hijri without sparking a broader Druze backlash. Intelligence sources confirm that talks are ongoing with moderate Druze leaders to ensure a peaceful handover of power and weapons in exchange for local autonomy under state supervision.

A Community’s Plea for Peace

In a rare interview with Al Jazeera, the Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou made it clear that the majority of the community opposes Al-Hijri’s actions.

“Any aggression against the Syrian state is an aggression against us. We are part of Syria,” he said. “Exploiting the Druze for political gain brings us no benefit.”

“The ceasefire agreement had full public support and interfaith representation,” he added.

As the government, now backed by Druze leadership, regains control of Suwayda, large weapon caches have been discovered—proving that Al-Hijri’s uprising was long in the making. The government has vowed to disarm all militias, arrest rogue actors, and fully restore rule of law.

Yet external actors, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), view Al-Hijri’s rebellion as a last line of resistance against a unified Syrian state. Their support further complicates the situation, revealing how local unrest is often amplified by broader geopolitical agendas.

Moreover, there are concerns that foreign media and Western think tanks may attempt to frame the Suwayda conflict as an “ethnic persecution” narrative to further isolate the Assad government. This risks ignoring the complex local dynamics and empowering the most destabilizing factions.

Inside Israel, the Druze community—many of whom serve in the Israeli army—have openly expressed solidarity with Syrian Druze. This provides Tel Aviv a diplomatic card to play, showcasing its support for minority rights. However, critics argue that such gestures are part of a broader strategy to legitimize Israeli presence in the occupied Golan Heights and undermine Iranian entrenchment near the border.

Meanwhile, Syria’s new President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has called for national reconciliation and vowed to restore Suwayda through political dialogue, not military conquest. His government has proposed a regional council of Druze elders, clergy, and civil leaders to mediate the crisis and draft a roadmap for full reintegration.

Whether this plan succeeds will depend on international will to restrain spoilers and respect Syria’s sovereignty. It also hinges on the Druze community reclaiming its historic legacy as a force for stability rather than a pawn in foreign agendas.

Beyond the Crisis

The crisis in Suwayda is not about religion—it’s about power, control, and the future of a nation struggling to unify. The majority of Syria’s Druze community stands for peace and national unity. But one warlord, emboldened by foreign support, threatens to undo years of fragile progress.

The world must recognize: Sheikh Al-Hijri does not speak for the Druze. And Suwayda is not a bargaining chip for regional interests. If Syria is to emerge from its long night of war, it must do so as one nation—with all its communities moving forward together.

The announcement, made Monday by the Syrian presidency, marks a breakthrough in efforts to reunite the country after more than 13 years of civil war and internal fragmentation. The deal signals the beginning of the end of parallel administrations in Syria’s north and east and reasserts central authority over critical regions long outside Damascus’ direct control.

A statement published by the presidency emphasized that “all civilian and military institutions in the northeast, including border posts, airports, and oil and gas fields, will now be integrated under the administration of the Syrian state.”

State media also released a photograph of President Sharaa shaking hands with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, underlining the significance of the agreement. The document declared that “the Kurdish community is an essential component of the Syrian state” and reaffirmed its rights to full citizenship and constitutional protections.

End of Division?

The agreement comes just days after severe violence erupted in Syria’s coastal Alawite heartland — the community from which former president Bashar al-Assad hailed. This outbreak, sparked by attacks from Assad loyalists, represented the most serious internal security challenge since Assad was ousted in December.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, over 1,000 civilians—primarily Alawites—were killed in a brutal crackdown by new government forces. Additionally, 231 security personnel and 250 pro-Assad fighters lost their lives during the clashes.

Despite the bloodshed, the government declared the operation concluded on Monday and shifted its focus to stabilizing the country through national integration. The timing of the SDF agreement suggests a strategic pivot toward unity, following the decapitation of Assad-era loyalist resistance.

SDF’s Strategic Role

The SDF, which emerged during the civil war as a U.S.-backed force, had established a de facto autonomous administration across much of northern and eastern Syria, including areas rich in oil and gas — resources critical to Syria’s post-war reconstruction.

The group, led largely by Kurdish forces, was instrumental in defeating ISIS in its final territorial stronghold in 2019. However, the SDF’s refusal to disarm had led to their exclusion from a recent national dialogue conference hosted by Syria’s new authorities.

The current agreement, however, offers a compromise: recognition and inclusion in exchange for institutional integration. The document also stresses support from the SDF in the government’s campaign against “remnants of Assad’s forces and all threats to Syria’s unity and security.”

A Reversal of History

For decades under the Assad regime, Syria’s Kurdish population was systematically marginalized. Many were denied citizenship, barred from using their language, and forbidden from celebrating their cultural identity.

The tide turned during the civil war, when the Syrian military’s withdrawal from the north enabled Kurdish groups to establish local governance. Yet, their ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU—complicated relations with regional and international powers.

Despite Ankara’s concerns, the SDF insists it operates independently of the PKK. However, its backbone—the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)—is widely considered by Turkey to be an extension of the PKK. Turkish forces have routinely targeted Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria and supported proxy militias against them.

The agreement with Syria’s new authorities, who have established close ties with Turkey since Assad’s fall, could reduce Ankara’s justification for continued military action—provided the SDF’s integration is fully realized and verified.

A Step Toward Peace?

The timing of this deal is also significant in light of a recent call from jailed PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, urging the group to disband and abandon armed struggle. If realized, the dissolution of the PKK could signal a new era of regional stability, and the SDF’s absorption into Syrian state structures may mark a move away from militia rule toward centralized governance.

While challenges remain, including Turkish military presence and latent sectarian divisions, the agreement could serve as the first genuine blueprint for Syria’s reunification — built not on military might, but on negotiation and mutual recognition.

Syria’s recovery is not just symbolic—it’s strategic. A stable, unified Syria is essential for regional security, refugee returns, and long-term economic integration.

The war in Syria may not be over on paper, but on the ground, the tide has clearly turned. Since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, nearly 250,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey have returned home. This movement is not driven by propaganda or pressure, but by something far more powerful: the hope that Syria, at long last, is stabilizing.

That hope is grounded in real, visible change. The Damascus Stock Exchange has reopened, signaling a cautious but meaningful restart of the formal economy. Finance Minister Mohammed Yisr Barnieh called it a message to the world—that Syria is back in business.

The turning point came on May 13, when U.S. President Donald Trump, during a landmark visit to Riyadh, announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria. Ten days later, the U.S. Treasury issued General License 25, permitting transactions with Syria’s new transitional government, headed by President Ahmad Al-Sharaa. The EU swiftly followed with a coordinated suspension of its own sanctions regime. In less than two weeks, Syria went from pariah to partner in the eyes of global policymakers.

The momentum is not only diplomatic. Gulf states are stepping up. On Saturday, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, speaking from Damascus, announced a joint initiative with Qatar to help fund salaries for Syrian civil servants. These are the sorts of actions that turn ceasefires into recoveries.

And yet, despite these gains, Syria’s path forward still faces one last—and deeply entrenched—obstacle: the PKK-affiliated administration in northeast Syria, branded to the world as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and militarily represented by the PYD and SDF.

Let’s be candid. For years, Western governments, NGOs, and think tanks have celebrated the AANES as a “progressive” alternative in Syria. But the reality on the ground tells a much darker story. Despite controlling vast natural resources, receiving billions in foreign aid, and enjoying unprecedented U.S. military protection, the AANES has delivered little more than corruption, repression, and instability.

Entire Arab and Assyrian communities have been displaced under their watch. Basic services remain in disrepair. Youth conscription, political detentions, and even child recruitment are not allegations—they are documented practices. Many in Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hasakah view the AANES not as a government but as an occupying structure—an extension of the PKK’s transnational project, not a legitimate representative of the Syrian people.

This is not just Syria’s internal issue. It’s a regional problem. The longer these entities maintain their grip, the harder it becomes to achieve a unified, sovereign Syrian state capable of rebuilding and reconciling.

To its credit, the transitional government in Damascus has not responded with vengeance. President Al-Sharaa has focused on restoring institutions, rebuilding national infrastructure, and pursuing a post-conflict political identity that moves beyond sectarianism. But these efforts will remain incomplete until all Syrian territories are returned to accountable, sovereign administration.

In this context, the reopening of the U.S. embassy in Damascus sends a powerful signal. Newly appointed American envoy Thomas Barrack—who also serves as the U.S. ambassador to Turkey—raised the American flag over the embassy for the first time since 2012. He praised Syria’s new leadership and openly discussed the prospect of peace between Syria and Israel—once a diplomatic impossibility. Barrack noted that the Caesar Act sanctions must now be repealed by Congress, describing President Trump as impatient with sanctions that obstruct reconstruction.

None of this should be mistaken for instant success. The Syrian state remains fragile. Public sector wages are still well below the cost of living. Corruption, while being addressed, is not yet defeated. And sectarian wounds—especially those left by clashes between pro-Assad remnants and local communities—will take time to heal.

But from my perspective as a European political analyst, this is the first time in years that Syria’s future feels negotiable rather than doomed.

To my Arab readers: Syria’s recovery is not just symbolic—it’s strategic. A stable, unified Syria is essential for regional security, refugee returns, and long-term economic integration.

To Western policymakers: the failed experiment of non-state actors ruling eastern Syria must end. It did not bring democracy. It brought dysfunction. The time has come to support a Syrian solution, not a Kurdish separatist detour funded by Western guilt and strategic confusion.

The Syrian war broke the country. But the outlines of recovery are finally emerging. The world has a choice: engage constructively—or prolong the suffering under the illusion of alternatives that have long since collapsed.