“De-escalation of tensions between the two Muslim countries in the Persian Gulf region is in the interest of both nations and the region,” foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said in a televised weekly news conference.

“We welcome resolving of the issues that have existed between the two countries … We will use our best efforts in this regard”, he added.

Ambassador Rayed Krimly, head of policy planning at Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry, told last week that talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran were aimed at reducing regional tensions.

He also said that it would be too early to judge the outcome and Kingdom wanted to see “verifiable deeds”.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have been locked in disagreements, for Iran’s meddling in countries from Yemen to Syria to Iraq. The two nations cut diplomatic ties in 2016.

Middle East officials and sources said last month that they had held two rounds of talks.

Based on inputs from Reuters.

It is clear that the people no longer accept the promises of regime leaders.

The vast majority of Iranians are struggling with poverty, unemployment and skyrocketing prices, with more than 60 million of Iran’s 82 million population living below the poverty line, and millions left to fend for themselves for their most basic necessities of life. The value of Iran’s currency has decreased 3,500 times compared to its value before the 1979 revolution.

In 2020, Iran’s currency became the least valuable in the world, after Venezuela. Social uprisings, rallies, and protests by the people of Iran regarding their poor living conditions and lack of civil liberties are daily occurrences throughout the country. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime has increased all its repressive measures, such as arbitrary arrests, cracking down on rallies and executions, to prevent another nationwide protest similar to the one in November 2019.

Just recently, on 23 February, the regime’s Revolutionary Guards killed dozens of Baluch people in the city of Saravan. Considering the above, it can be said that the Iranian society is very much ready for an overwhelming change. Iran’s 11th presidential election since the anti-monarchical revolution of 1979 is fast approaching, for which the people’s participation is of crucial importance to the regime.

In a recent speech, Khamenei referred to the presidential elections as a cure for all Iran’s social and economic problems and promised that the country’s problems would be solved by installing a young hardline government. In a meeting on 21 February with provincial governors of Iran, including the governor of the northwestern province of Ardabil, Iran’s Interior Minister, Rahmani Fazli said the credibility and prestige of the regime depended on the upcoming elections. Furthermore, most Friday prayer sermons are calling for a large outcome for elections. By showcasing the people’s participation in the so-called elections, the regime wants to legitimize its dictatorship.

After years of dictatorship by the Shah, in 1979 the people of Iran decisively rose up, brought the Shah’s monarchy to an end and hoped for a better future. But instead, they had to face another dictatorship, much more brutal than before.

Unlike the Shah, the clerical regime does actually hold presidential elections every four years, to give itself an air of democracy and to mimic democratic countries around the world. In the end, a president is elected. But what really goes on? Do the people really elect the president, and does he possess any real authority and autonomy?

In the last 42 years, from the very first elections, it became clear that in practice the person who has the real power and control of Iran’s government is the Supreme Leader and those affiliated with him. In Iran, elections are carried out under the close supervision of the Supreme Leader. The candidates must be approved by a body called the Guardian Council, affiliated with the Supreme Leader. That means only those candidates who are completely dedicated to the Supreme Leader and his leadership and policies are going to be approved by the Guardian Council.

The Guardian Council consists of 12 members, six of whom are “Faqih” and are directly elected by the Supreme Leader. The other six “jurists” are nominated by the head of the Judiciary, who the Supreme Leader appoints. This means that, in fact, all 12 members of the Guardian Council are directly or indirectly appointed by the Supreme Leader in order to engineer his wishes in the presidential elections and elect the candidates he wants from the ballot box. In this way, even those who were once part of this government’s leadership but refused to surrender to the Supreme Leader due to their desire for power, have been disqualified and no longer allowed to participate in the elections.

As a prime example, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was himself the head of government, serving two terms as president and two terms as speaker, was disqualified from running in the 2013 elections due to a dispute with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Similarly, Ahmadinejad, who was president for two terms, was not allowed to run again in the 2017 elections. These, and others who were also disqualified, displayed their disagreements with the Supreme Leader in various ways. The conflict was always about receiving a share of the power. Those individuals who did not comply with the Supreme Leader were axed from their candidacy in the upcoming elections.

But, since the president and his government take charge of controlling the country’s finances, there is always competition and war between different factions of the regime, even though they are all in fact affiliated with the Supreme Leader.

Each side wants to have a firmer grip on the country’s wealth and wants to gain the leverage on obtaining more sources of wealth. The candidates themselves often accuse each other of looting, theft, and corruption, with thefts often amounting to several hundred million dollars. Once the elections are over, the same people who were accusing each other of theft and corruption come together, form the government, and it seems they have by then reached a deal to control various institutions after the elections by dividing power among themselves.

For example, there were several final candidates in the previous election, including former President Rouhani, Qalibaf, former Parliament Speaker and Raeisi, Chief Justice. In one of the debates, Qalibaf’s theft of several hundred million dollars during his tenure in Tehran’s municipality was revealed and mentioned, while Raeisi was revealed to have been one of the main perpetrators of the massacre of political prisoners in 1988.

Rouhani pointed to him and said he has done nothing but sentence people to death, imprisonment, and torture during these years. Ironically enough, after the election, Qalibaf was elected as speaker of Iran’s parliament and Raeisi was selected as head of the judiciary by Khamenei. That is, the three main branches of power were divided between these people, and the only ones who did not benefit from the elections were the people of Iran.

The regime’s situation has deteriorated so much that there are no political figures remaining in any of the factions of the regime whose corruption and grand thefts have not been exposed. So, during these years, it has been proven to the Iranian people that the presidential election is nothing more than a show and the people’s votes do not count. Election winners are all predetermined and engineered.

None of the so-called elected individuals are going to take any step towards the welfare of the people. This system does not allow for a fair election and representation. For example, women, who make up half of the country’s population, are not allowed to run for president. Despite the regime’s efforts and their false promises and propaganda, every election has witnessed lower participation, and many people have boycotted altogether.

According to recent polls taken by regime affiliated media, which usually differ greatly from reality by being several times higher than the actual number, the turnout in the upcoming elections is predicted to be 20%. It is clear that the people no longer accept the promises of regime leaders. The overwhelming majority of the people want regime change and the establishment of a secular democratic government where elections are free and democratic.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Assadi’s conviction demonstrates the Belgian court’s recognition that the Iranian Foreign Ministry is involved in the export of terrorism…

In a hasty speech on Wednesday, February 3, Rouhani warned the United States and Europe that “no clause of the JCPOA will be changed.” and “no one will be added to the talks” … He was referring to the US-European plan to involve Saudi Arabia in the new JCPOA talks and to add a missile program containment clause and curtailment of the regime’s ambitions in the region to the JCPOA. He, whose wild dreams of a return to the Obama era are not being realized, seemed, like Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament, to be hopeless and helpless in the face of the White House’s new stance. He accused the rest of the regime officials and said, “Some do not even swear once at the United States because they believe swearing is the job of the government and especially, the president himself.

The regime’s crisis over the fate of the JCPOA and regime gangs’ internal strife is the results of stalemate in the regime’s internal crisis and its foreign policy that it seeks to advance through state terrorism and blackmail, unaware that it no longer has the power and capacity to advance it.

One day after Rouhani’s speech, on February 4, the outcome of the trial of the Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi in Antwerp, Belgium, changed all the equations. Assadi was sentenced to 20 years in prison for transporting a bomb from Iran to Europe, handing it over to a couple there and directing them to blow up the 2018 annual conference of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.

The historic ruling of this court recognized the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in international terrorism. Rouhani, as head of the regime’s Supreme Security Council has been responsible for advancing the terrorist plots and coordination of the Ministry of Intelligence (VAVAK) agents and mercenaries for the past three decades. Information from a green notebook found in Assadi’s rental car in the German state of Bavaria, where Assadi was first detained at a gas station showed that he was just a low-level employee at the Vienna embassy.

In fact, he was a high-ranking Iranian regime intelligence officer who, under the guise of a diplomat, led a network of spies and informants in 11 countries, including Germany, France, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, and paid cash to spies and agents.  Zarif and the regime’s foreign ministry have always planned and controlled the foreign policies set by the regime’s Supreme Security Council and Khamenei and the Ministry of Intelligence to export terrorism and fundamentalism.

Zarif and the foreign ministry have been the body to establish diplomatic facilities to carry out terrorist plots and transfer bombs through diplomatic channels and the abuse of diplomatic immunity for espionage. Without the planning by the regime’s Supreme Security Council under Rouhani and the Foreign Ministry, Khamenei and the IRGC’s Quds Force could never have carried out their evil plans and interventions in the Middle East and their terrorist plots outside Iran against the opposition.

Assadi’s conviction demonstrates the Belgian court’s recognition that the Iranian Foreign Ministry is involved in the export of terrorism, including the transfer of ammunition and weapons to terrorists, money laundering, fabricating travel documents and organized guidance for spies. Between 2016 and 2020, seven regime terrorist diplomats, including an ambassador, were expelled from Europe for their involvement in terrorist plots.

Undoubtedly, the outcome of this court will change the rules of engagement of the international community with the regime and the regime will henceforth be encircled by international conflicts and crises. The fate of the JCPOA and dire sanctions will, it seems certain, change against the regime’s interests and will intensify the wave of protests inside Iran. Prior to the court ruling, the regime did its utmost, through its international supporters of appeasement policy, to save Assadi from the court under the guise of diplomatic immunity, but the court annulled the immunity in the first paragraph of its ruling, which rendered the argument of “diplomatic immunity” from the supporters of appeasement, dead upon arrival and futile!The Belgian court targeted Assadi, but really targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran in its entirety. 

Hassan Mahmoudi is a Europe-based social analyst, researcher, independent observer, and commentator of Middle Eastern and Iranian Politics. He tweets under @hassan_mahmou1. 

Both the regime’s internal and regional power and awe have been shattered…

President Hassan Rouhani, in his angry and obsessive speech about Trump’s policies on Wednesday January 20^th, said: “The one whose government ends today, that is Trump, did not know politics … but those who replaced him today know politics.”

Rouhani, while sending the green light to Biden’s diplomacy, addressed his speech to the internal opponents of the JCPOA, the dominant gang, who believe that the JCPOA is a “body with a damaged brain” or a “rotten corpse” and play the opposition music to negotiations. By this speech he wanted to draw a red line on views that reject negotiation and push them back.  He was happy that he was able to survive, at least temporarily, the overthrow crisis that his regime has faced and said, “They wanted to overthrow our government and our system, they wanted to bring the people to the streets, but all this failed.”.

He also lamented that Qassem Soleimani had been killed and said that Trump had explicitly admitted that he had ordered the assassination of Qassem Soleimani.

In the face of Rouhani’s dreams, The Hill website associated with US congress wrote, “Anthony Blinken, in his confirmation meeting with the US Foreign Relations Committee that lasted 4 hours, in response to committee members questions explained his plans to counter the Iranian regime’s vicious activities, with special attention paid to terrorist financing in the region, ballistic missiles and human rights violations”.

Senator James Risch, a member of the Intelligence Committee and chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee, said, “any new deal with Iran should consider all aspects of their malicious behavior, and any agreement should be submitted to the Senate as a treaty to be confirmed.”

Blinken pledged to start serious talks on Iran with the US Congress and US allies in the region, including the Arab states and Israel.

“Iran continues to be a source of instability in the region and a threat to both US regional allies and US forces stationed in the region,” said General Lloyd Austin, Biden’s defense secretary pick.

Thus, Rouhani once again proved with his hasty speech that the explosive situation of the society or, as he put it, “bringing the people to the streets” is his main concern and he has found the solution in associating with Biden and begging for the survival of the mullahs’ regime. But this main headache and concern does not leave him even for a moment and took away his ability to understand that 2016 conditions will not return and no longer exist.

This can be seen from the statements of Biden administration’s officials and politicians, who are aware of regional and international sensitivities to the Islamic Republic’s missile threats and the consequences of Tehran’s financial and weapons support for the region’s militias. As Biden’s National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan put it, “Iran’s ballistic missile program must be on the table.”

Internally, Iranian society has gone through the uprisings of 2017, 2018 and 2019 during these four years and is currently in an explosive condition. Both the regime’s internal and regional power and awe have been shattered, with its regional capabilities diminishing every day and its strategic depth having suffered major blows. But Rouhani wants to paint a positive perspective for the JCPOA as a breakthrough for lifting sanctions and display it as his trump card.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the economy of the middle east countries that are relying on the oil revenue and comparing their progress to their ruling system, specially covering a variety of topics about Iran.

Khamenei has resorted to various tricks and tactics…

The presidential elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran will take place on June 18, 2021.

The presidency has already turned into a war between the factions of Khamenei and Rouhani with two different strategies for the survival of the mullahs’ regime.

Khamenei, by appointing Raisi as head of the judiciary and Qalibaf as head of the legislature has taken two steps towards gaining total control and is now taking the next step by putting the engineering for the head of the executive branch, the President, on the agenda of organizations and institutions affiliated with him.

Fear of upcoming uprisings and protests puts Khamenei under pressure to carry out these plans, having concluded with the IRGC that the best strategy is to close all the gaps at the top of the power pyramid to facilitate swift and decisive response to future uprisings by eliminating regime factional infighting.

To achieve this, Khamenei has resorted to various tricks and tactics. For example, under the pretext of “meetings with artists and cultural and social experts,” a documentary called “Unofficial” was broadcast on TV and social media on December 25, 2020. The clips show brief meetings throughout recent years between the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and a number of cultural, artistic, and scientific activists.

The purpose of publishing these clips in this situation is to show the friendship and closeness of the leader with the people. In these films, the artists criticize the dictator without any worries or fears and Khamenei is shown responding with complete equanimity.

One contemporary historian says dictators usually win elections by force or fraud, but the next problem is how to retain power. Maintaining power is not possible by intimidation, arrest, and execution alone. The dictator must deceive the people in various ways with a charismatic personality and a vision of the promised utopia. They are especially interested in foreign journalists and intellectuals presenting a pleasant image of them as popular, different, and profound leaders abroad.

Khamenei also pursues his objective of election engineering with these scenes. In one clip, a young man described as a “jihadi activist” criticized the government for neglect of the youth and the appointment of older people to all the important jobs in the country, to which Khamenei replies: “For your intended young people to take on significant managerial responsibilities, the government must be formed by a young person.”

Khamenei says by advising that this problem is not getting solved “God willing, we will put youth to manage top positions. Our hearts want this to happen.”

“The solution to the country’s problems is the young Hezbollah government of the young believer,” Khamenei said on May 17, 2020.

These clips are shown while the economic crisis and the living conditions of the people are catastrophic and financial and administrative corruption has spread throughout the country. The protests of December 2018 and November 2019 left no legitimacy for the regime and the greater slump than ever before of the parliamentary elections in February 2020 is lurking in the shadows for next year’s presidential election.

More importantly, the awe of the regime has collapsed after three strategic blows, namely the assassinations of Qassem Soleimani and Fakhrizadeh and the trial of the diplomat terrorist Assadollah Assadi in Belgium!

Khamenei needs his bag of tricks to advance his plans!

Hassan Mahmoudi is a Europe-based social analyst, researcher, independent observer, and commentator of Middle Eastern and Iranian Politics. He tweets under @hassan_mahmou1. 

The order of decision-making institutions in Iran is not clear, and this has long led to a dispute over authority between leaders of the regime…

Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, understanding the structure of the ruling system in Iran and the decision-making mechanism, at times, has sometimes been challenging and difficult to understand and analyze.

Although the “Vali-Faghih or the Supreme Leader” is at the top of the system’s pyramid of power, the president holds the executive power. Still, the order of decision-making institutions in Iran is not clear, and this has long led to a dispute over authority between leaders of the regime who are at the center of its influence and controls its decisions.

On December 21, 2020, Hassan Rouhani, who will be in power for just a few more months, sharply criticized the regime’s institutions for interfering in the executive branch’s work and trying to limit its powers. Rouhani complained about the Guardian Council’s manner of the presidency, accusing it of using a different interpretation of the constitution to reduce the president’s powers.

“Some MPs say we should monitor the work of ministers, but this is an incomplete interpretation of the constitution,” he said. “Deputies have the right to question ministers and the government, but it is not the job of parliament to oversee the work of ministers. It is the job of the president,” he continued.
Rouhani’s remarks about his reforms and criticisms of government institutions reflect the drastic differences between the regime’s leaders to influence the decision-making mechanism, especially when viewed from the perspective of the post-Khamenei transition phase. This issue becomes more apparent in relation to the differing views between the two rival factions on negotiations with the United States.

Last week, after Ali Khamenei’s speech on the occasion of Qassem Soleimani’s anniversary, stating, “If we can lift the sanctions, we should not delay it even an hour,” each side interpreted his remarks according to its own interests. This led to a political confrontation between the conservative and reformist factions and turned into mutual criticism.

Pro-government media highlighted sections on “lifting sanctions” from Khamenei’s speech.
Senior Rouhani administration officials also accused their opponents of seeking to complicate the negotiation process with the United States and delay achieving positive results until after next year’s presidential election in Iran, according to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.

In this regard, Javad Zarif stated that “some friends” are oriented towards the United States “that you can work better with us” and that the Rouhani government “does not stay in power” and should not be negotiated with this government.

The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, also attacked the parliament and the Guardian Council. He expressed surprise at the plan approved by lawmakers to increase Uranium enrichment, saying that Iran did not have the financial resources to install and operate 1,000 sixth-generation centrifuges. Deputies do not pay attention to it.

On December 14, 2020, Hassan Rouhani also stressed that he would not allow some individuals to “delay the end of sanctions.”

In his speech, Rouhani referred to Khamenei’s speech, who said that if you can lift the sanctions through negotiations, do not delay even for an hour. However, Khamenei said shortly afterward: “I agree with the government officials as long as they adhere to the goals of the people.” Lifting sanctions is in the hands of the enemy, but it is up to us to make the sanctions ineffective, and therefore we must focus more on making the sanctions ineffective than focusing on lifting them.”

In practice, however, Rouhani sought to use Khamenei’s words to regain the initiative in future negotiations with the United States and gain the upper hand over his opponents, which has expressed distrust of the United States opposed negotiations. It seems that he intends to decrease the power of his opponents by making changes in the constitution before the end of his presidency. For this purpose, one more time, he raised the issue of a referendum for changes in the constitution.

But the hardline faction, which in fact is affiliated with Khamenei’s, accused the reformist faction of distorting Khamenei’s remarks.
Vatan-e-Amruz, a government-critical media outlet, reacted to this report on Saturday (December 19), calling it a “mercenary of falsification.”
Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, also tweeted that a “coordinated and purposeful move” had been made to “distort” the Islamic Republic Supreme Leader’s views on “lifting sanctions.”

In short, this kind of reaction from the conservative faction of the Iranian regime leads to a decrease in the chances of Rouhani and the reformists to reach an acceptable agreement between Iran and the United States. At a time when Iran desperately needs the lifting of sanctions to rebuild its shattered economy and at a time when the Corona crisis has heightened popular discontent, this power struggle between the two ruling factions is in full swing as everyone awaits Khamenei’s death. Next year is going to be more intense than ever behind the scenes.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries in general and Iran in particular.

Against Khamenei’s strategy, Rouhani raised a multi-party system and a referendum…

Rouhani stressed the role of his position as president in the constitution at a meeting on constitutional rights and citizenship on Monday, December 21, 2020. He said, “Article 134 of Constitution clearly states, the policymaking, and planning are the responsibility of President.”

Rouhani tailored his speech in response to Khamenei’s speech on December 20^th and made every effort to theorize his strategy for the survival of the mullahs’ regime against Khamenei’s strategy. Because Khamenei, in his speech in the face-off with Rouhani on dealing with sanctions, emphasized a strategy of resistance and neutralizing them and by relying on contraction policy, he had previously emphasized the formation of a “young Hezbollahi government”.

Against Khamenei’s strategy, Rouhani raised a multi-party system and a referendum. He also hastily tried to send his foreign minister, Zarif, to Europe to discuss JCPOA.

The question is, what is the main dispute between these two gangs and why did they turn to this dispute at the height of coronavirus outbreak?

The fact is, the regime is about to be overthrown in its entirety, and this dispute is not due to the quiddity of these two gangs at the head of the mullah’s regime, but the difference in their approach and strategy for mullahs’ regime survival. An old proverb says, “When the land hardens, the bulls gore each other.” Yes, now the regime leaders are seeking a solution for the incurable societal crisis they have created and impasse of their system in two antagonistic strategies for survival.

Rouhani says that the survival of the regime depends on the presidency and if it were not for the republic, the regime could not survive. He beats the drum of negotiations with United States to lift the sanctions. Khamenei says that lifting the sanctions is in the hand of the enemy and beats the drums of neutralizing the sanctions and resistance economy. Rouhani is talking about a multi-party system, and Khamenei’s gang is talking about the candidacy of IRGC commanders for the next presidential election, ultimately considering the IRGC as the regime’s survival organ and magic stick.

With these two strategies as indicators, we could read the hands of these two gangs in all areas. These two strategies in essence are an internal war to seize the levers of plunder, looting and export of terrorism under the guise of diplomats and to take foreign nationals hostage, to kidnap Iranian activists and execute them, which Zarif wants to pave the path for, and negotiate under the pretext of JCPOA. The revelation of terrorist nature and inner working of regime’s diplomatic machine in the trial of Assadollah Assadi in city of Antwerp in Belgium was an example among dozens.

Mullahs’ regime by pursuing both strategies have committed terrorist acts in Europe and parts of the world and will carry on with more intensity in its final stage. Mr. Sikorski, a member of the European Parliament and former Polish foreign minister said meeting Zarif a smiling Ribbentrop (Hitler’s foreign minister) by European foreign ministers, according to Churchill, is feeding crocodiles and against peace and democracy and religious fascism sees it as a green light for execution and assassination.

Now, the international community, and especially Europe, which for 41 years by pursuing appeasement policy has enabled the mullahs’ regime to continue hostage-taking, extortion, terrorist acts, incitement to violence and war in the world, oppression, and imprisonment and torture at home, must stand firm against the Iranian regime. Receiving and meeting with the Minister of Terrorism and fundamentalism of Iran is giving permission and green light to their terrorists in Iran, Middle East, and Europe. Everything became clear in the court of Antwerp, Belgium, and it cannot be ignored, otherwise, the mullahs’ regime will become emboldened.

Hassan Mahmoudi is a Europe-based social analyst, researcher, independent observer, and commentator of Middle Eastern and Iranian Politics. He tweets under @hassan_mahmou1. 

Khamenei can engineer elections and practically shape the institutions of power…

In the structure of any democratic system, there is an institution to oversee the implementation of the constitution. The main task of this institution is to preserve and protect the principles of that constitution.

After the anti-monarchist revolution in 1979 in Iran, the drafters of the new constitution proposed the Guardian Council as the institution tasked with protecting the constitution.

The Guardian Council began its activities on July 16, 1989. Among its actual duties was to direct and engineer the bills passed by parliament, political forces, and institutions within the system, and to eliminate the opposition.

In the early post-revolution elections, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini used the Guardian Council as a tool to completely remove most of his serious opposition, the Marxist left, the People’s Mojahedin Organization, and the National Religious movement (liberals), from the political scene. But the decision-makers of the clerical state were not satisfied and gradually decided to completely filter-out their opposition and unify their own forces. This was done to close all the existing gaps and to create the current theocracy.

The Guardian Council totally changed after Khomeini’s death in June 1989 and during the leadership of his successor Ali Khamenei. After his appointment as supreme leader, Khamenei knew he had to control the elected members of the various governing bodies including the parliament, various councils, and the Assembly of Experts more effectively than his predecessor. Khamenei’s full control of the Guardian Council was a means for him to gradually select and appoint the members of elective institutions such as the parliament and even the government.

The Guardian Council has 12 members, six senior clerical members, who are directly appointed by Khamenei, and six jurists, nominated by the head of the judiciary, who is appointed by the Supreme Leader (Khamenei). Finally, the parliament, whose members must be certified and confirmed by the same jurists, vote for the Council members.

In fact, the architects of the Islamic Republic’s system devised a circle in which the undisputed decision-maker is none other than Khamenei. Through this circle, Khamenei can engineer elections and practically shape the institutions of power according to his desires.

The Guardian Council serves Ali Khamenei in many ways. The council’s oversight role over a parliament whose members all pass the Guardian Council’s filtering has effectively become a control tool in the hands of the Supreme Leader. With this tool, Khamenei can stop any bills being passed that would limit his powers or that of any institutions of power under his command.

Over the last two decades, the council has gradually evolved into an institution and a means of guarding the supreme power of the Supreme Leader.

Next year, a sham presidential election is scheduled to take place in an atmosphere of public revulsion and discontent.

As early as now, Khamenei, through the Guardian Council intends to announce his candidate for the presidency. The appointment of Ahmad Khatami, known for his hardline and controversial speeches against Khamenei’s opponents to the Guardian Council, serves to strengthen Khamenei’s front in this regard.

Ahmad Khatami, 62, who is now one of the youngest members of the Guardian Council, was the first extremist and unknown cleric to gradually enter politics in the ‘90s with Khamenei’s volition and entered the Assembly of Experts in 1997 from the Kerman constituency. He has now become one of Khamenei’s most trusted clerics. Ahmad Khatami’s joining of the Guardian Council gives the regime’s Supreme Leader more leeway to pull his preferred candidate out of the ballot box.

The outlook for the upcoming Presidential election in Iran will be far worse than the situation of the engineered parliamentary elections held on February 21, 2020.

To warm up his February 21 show, Khamenei, in addition to manipulating the electoral lists, also hid news of the coronavirus outbreak until the day before elections. But his desire for a high turnout was shunned when most Iranians boycotted the elections.

As admitted by many Iranian regime officials, brutal suppression and the execution of dissidents, reduction in the oil price, reduction of exchange reserves, governmental corruption, and the government’s mismanagement regarding the spread of Covid-19 with more than 106,000 deaths at this time, has brought Iran to the point of a potentially unprecedented socio-political revolt around the anniversary of the November 2019 uprising.

Analyst Hasan Bayadi, from Iran, expressed how much the regime fears new revolts. On August 30, 2020, he told the state-run Entekhab website: “There is a possibility of unprecedented socio-political events before the end of December. Due to the government’s mismanagement, people believe in no political current. They are discontent and former dialogues have borne no fruit. So we must rigorously analyze the existing problems.”

Mardomsalari state-run daily wrote on August 31, “The way out of a dead-end is using offensive tools… The protest movements of December 2017 and November 2019 and the wrong response to them was not a good example. It is clear that violent acts can have very negative consequences.”

MP Hashem Harisi said on June 29, 2020, “The current situation of Iran’s society is not tolerable. Each day the gap between the people and the government widens. The situation is too fragile. We cannot sit and wait for the problems to solve themselves.”

Under such circumstances, the regime is planning preventive measures as before. According to reports obtained from inside Iran, on Monday, September 14, Mohammad Yazdi, commander of the ‘Mohammad Rasool-allah’ corps of Tehran announced that a plan called ‘Neighborhood Security’ would be carried out. This plan will use the capacity of the Basij paramilitary bases and will form ‘hit squads’ in different regions of Tehran to, as he puts it, provide the security of all the capital’s neighborhoods. He said that these squads are tasked with confronting ‘thugs, thieves and security disruptors’ but the regime is actually getting ready to confront the danger of any popular uprising, ready to erupt at any moment. Other than that, addressing petty crime such as theft has always been a police task.

So far, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as the main apparatus of the mullahs’ rule, has always come up with the security and anti-humane plans for suppressing people’s protests. It disguises this under the pretext of ‘giving a hand to the police force’. In 2008 and then during the controversial elections of 2009, the IRGC carried out the plan of having Security Patrols in groups of five in 1000 points of various cities throughout the country.

The regime knew that after the outcome of a predetermined election in which Ahmadinejad would once again become the president, protests would erupt. In the late fall of 2017, a month before the January 2018 uprising and while there were severe economic crises due to the return of the sanctions, another security plan was carried out using IRGC patrols, called “the epic of security and service” by which the regime committed the crime it did in the killings of that month.

With the current state of Iranian society, when the coronavirus pandemic and the regime’s inaction leaving more than 106,000 deaths are added to the economic crisis, poverty and hunger, the regime is clinging to the plan of ‘Neighborhood Security’ and forming the ‘hit squads’, spoken of for a long time. These squads are the force of suppression, spreading fear and horror throughout the cities.

A month ago, Mohammad Yazdi announced: “Reinforcement of Neighborhood Basij bases is one of our main priorities in the current year. These bases have become weak but as the honorable leadership has ordered (Basij must be present in all the neighborhoods) we are trying to carry out this order the best way we can.”

“The enemy has plans to take advantage of the improper economic condition and provoke people to confront the Nezam (Islamic Republic regime) and provoke riots,” he had formerly said.

‌But the people of Iran both know and have experienced in all these years that what Khamenei and other regime officials, as well as its security apparatus, have done in planning for the suppression of nationwide protests radiates from the nightmare that has shadowed them all. Khamenei and other regime officials know that it is not only the regime’s Basij force and its bases that have weakened, which they confess to, but the regime in its entirety is trembling in fear of popular revolt.

The people of Iran now want the UN and especially the UN Security Council (UNSC) to trigger the sanctions stated in six resolutions against this regime in response to its executions and mass killings; if not Khamenei will continue with more of the same because this is the tool of his regime’s survival. Khamenei well knows that the instant he stops execution and suppression nothing will be left of his regime.

Navid Afkari’s execution has revived a new wave of revolt amongst the youths of Iran. Protest and uprising have found an opportunity to show itself.

The poor, the army of hungry people, and an army of mourning people hurt by this regime throughout the 41 years of its rule will find the appropriate moment. When that moment comes, none of all these suppressive plans, nor its IRGC or its security apparatus will be able to stop the flood of this army that will erase this regime from the face of Iran.

Hassan Mahmoudi is a Europe-based social analyst, researcher, independent observer, and commentator of Middle Eastern and Iranian Politics. He tweets under @hassan_mahmou1.