Somaliland and specifically the Port of Berbera, offers New Delhi an alternative gateway into the region and the broader African hinterland, including landlocked Ethiopia.

On December 26, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu raise diplomatic tempers in Middle East by unilaterally recognising the Republic of Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia which has been functioning as a de facto state since 1991. This decision goes beyond a diplomatic gesture and signifies a landmark geopolitical move that signals a recalibration of power politics in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean.

Not only did it break a long-standing international taboo against recognising defacto regions, it also injected new momentum into a region which is increasingly defined by strategic choke points, rival maritime visions, and great-power competition.

Located along the southern edge of the Gulf of Aden, bordering Djibouti, and sitting astride the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb, Somaliland has existed in diplomatic limbo for three decades ago. Its decision to exit political union followed the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime and has since built functioning political institutions while Mogadishu remained mired in civil war, insurgency, and foreign intervention.

It has conducted multiple elections, maintained relative internal stability, issued its own currency and passports, and exercised effective territorial control, which constitute core criteria of statehood under international law. And still, recognition eluded Hargeisa, largely because of international deference to the fiction of Somali territorial unity.

But the December 26 recognition by Israel marks the first major breach in this diplomatic wall. Framed within the broader ethos of the Abraham Accords, which seeks to normalise Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement historically significant elevates Somaliland from diplomatic obscurity and signals that geopolitical utility and governance capacity can, under certain conditions, trump inherited postcolonial borders.

Though this precedent alone makes the decision a watershed moment, yet the true importance of this move lies less in symbolism and more in strategy.

This decision must be read against the backdrop of the Red Sea’s growing militarization in recent years. For instance, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait which connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and, by extension, the Suez Canal (which opens into Mediterranean Sea) has emerged as one of the world’s most contested maritime chokepoints.

During the prolonged Gaza war that followed Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attack on Israel, Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen repeatedly targeted Israeli-linked shipping, exposing Israel’s vulnerability along its maritime lifelines.

As such, it cannot be divorced from the Israel’s broader post-Gaza recalibration, where it is prioritizing securing maritime routes, diversifying strategic partnerships, and reducing reliance on fragile regional arrangements.

What Somaliland does is it provide Israel a rare strategic advantage in the region where hostile non-state actors have in recent years emerged a significant irritant to its maritime access. Its Port of Berbera can provide Israeli Defence Force (IDF) with potential logistical depth, maritime awareness, and forward presence in Red Sea region and deny any military advantage to hostile actors like Houthis who sit across on the eastern coast of Gulf of Aden.

Israel has demonstrated its resolve to grow its relations with Somaliland through the January 7 Hargeisa visit by Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, becoming the first high-level international dignitary to visit the country.

More crucially, this decision followed the 10th trilateral summit of December 23 between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in Jerusalem, wherein their leaders —PM Netanyahu, PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis (Greece) and President Nikos Christodoulides (Cyprus)— reaffirmed cooperation on energy, security, and regional stability.

These are the areas where all three states have found themselves increasingly at odds with Turkey’s assertive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Together, these moves, as such, reveal a coherent strategy by Israel to constrain Ankara’s regional ambitions. It is should be noted that Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has pursued an increasingly revisionist foreign policy, blending neo-Ottoman rhetoric with military deployments and proxy relationships stretching from Libya and Syria to the Horn of Africa.

In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s aggressive maritime claims and unilateral actions have antagonized Greece and Cyprus while undermining cooperative energy frameworks in the region.

In the Horn of Africa, Ankara has followed a similar playbook. By becoming the principal external patron of Somalia’s federal government under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, through military training, financial aid, and base access, Turkey has positioned Mogadishu as the cornerstone of its Red Sea strategy.

But this engagement has always been less about Somali stability and more about power projection. It provides Ankara with proximity to Bab el-Mandeb and leverage over one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors through which roughly 12-15 per cent of global trade worth over 1 trillion USD is conducted annually.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, therefore, directly undercuts this strategy. It legitimizes an alternative political entity that Ankara has consistently sought to marginalize and weakens Turkey’s monopoly over Somalia’s external partnerships. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s sharp condemnation and calling the move “illegitimate and unacceptable” betrays Ankara’s anxiety that its Horn of Africa foothold may now face meaningful constraints.

But Turkey’s insistence on Somali “unity and territorial integrity” rings hollow when contrasted with its own record of selective sovereignty advocacy for regions like Northern Cyprus. What Ankara fears is not fragmentation per se, but the erosion of its geopolitical leverage in the Red Sea basin.

For India, this decision by Israel carries quiet but significant implications, particularly for the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The project which has been conceived as a multimodal trade and connectivity initiative linking India to Europe via the Middle East, was disrupted by the Gaza war and this recalibration could ring positively for realising its implementation.

Moreover, Somaliland, and specifically the Port of Berbera, offers New Delhi an alternative gateway into the region and the broader African hinterland, including landlocked Ethiopia. While New Delhi, due to its express commitment to norms based international relations, may be constrained by its adherence to UN norms and is unlikely to formally recognize Somaliland in the near term, Israel’s move expands its strategic options without requiring overt diplomatic commitments.

Equally important is what this means vis-à-vis Turkey. Ankara has consistently positioned itself as an alternative economic and political hub for the Muslim world, often at odds with India’s interests. By weakening Turkey’s strategic depth near the Red Sea, Israel’s move indirectly aligns with India’s interest in a more plural, less Ankara-dominated regional order.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is, at its core, a bet: that regional stability will increasingly favor functional governance over inherited legitimacy, maritime strategy over rhetorical solidarity, and coalitions of the willing over paralyzed multilateralism. It challenges Turkey’s negative and destabilizing role in multiple theaters, signals resolve in the face of maritime coercion, and opens new possibilities for partners like India.

While this decision offers Somaliland its long-delayed validation and Israel the strategic depth, it represents a rare diplomatic setback for Turkey. Whether others follow Israel’s lead remains uncertain. But one thing is clear that the Red Sea is no longer a peripheral theatre and this development makes it a focal point of geopolitics in the years ahead.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The HOCC, a Sanaa-based body set up to coordinate between Houthi forces and commercial shipping operators, said the sanctions are intended to encourage responsible corporate conduct and promote positive behavioral change rather than disrupt global oil markets.

Analysts noted that the sanctions appear largely symbolic. “This looks like a media-focused move to signal accountability and reassure domestic audiences, while leaving room for negotiation and cooperation with international partners,” said Mohammed Albasha, founder of Risk Advisory Basha Report.

The announcement follows a truce agreement brokered with the Trump administration, under which the Houthis agreed to limit attacks on U.S.-linked vessels. Observers said the impact on global energy supply is likely to be limited. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that U.S. imports of crude and condensate from Gulf countries represent only a small fraction of total consumption, with domestic production and Canadian imports accounting for the majority.

The Houthis have carried out occasional attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since 2023, targeting ships they link to regional conflicts. However, analysts say these operations have had minimal impact on vital shipping lanes, including the Strait of Hormuz.

HOCC emphasized that the sanctions are meant to influence corporate behavior positively. “The ultimate goal is not punishment but encouraging compliance and constructive engagement,” the statement said.

Energy experts highlighted that measured actions like these can create dialogue opportunities between regional actors and multinational firms. “By clearly communicating their position, the Houthis are opening a channel for negotiation and promoting safer maritime operations,” said Albasha.

The sanctions also attracted attention because of the companies involved and the broader context of regional security. Observers noted that the Houthis’ move aligns with emerging trends in conflict resolution, signaling a preference for diplomacy and behavioral reform over punitive measures.

Overall, the latest development reflects ongoing regional dynamics and demonstrates the Houthis’ willingness to engage with international stakeholders through targeted measures, while minimizing disruption to the global oil market.

This approach maintains India’s credibility as a neutral actor, preserves its regional relationships, and avoids entanglement in ideological militancy or Iranian proxy politics.

The Red Sea tragedy involving the sinking of the vessel Eternity C on July 10, 2025, which endangered the life of an Indian national, has understandably stirred geopolitical anxieties. Yet, it should not be used as a launchpad for flawed diplomatic prescriptions.

In his recent opinion piece published by Firstpost, American analyst Michael Rubin proposes that India take a diplomatic lead in Yemen by supporting separatism in the south. Rubin’s thesis is not only historically inconsistent but strategically unwise—and risks aligning India’s image with the destabilizing agendas of Iran and its proxy militias.

Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, laments the so-called failure of Western diplomacy in Yemen, proposing that India should replace it by supporting the secession of South Yemen. His argument is built on three questionable premises: that unity has failed, that separatism would bring stability, and that India’s legacy and interests are best served through interventionist diplomacy in the Arabian Peninsula.

A Misreading of History and Strategy

Rubin’s narrative cherry-picks Yemeni history to justify separatism. It is true that Yemen’s unification in 1990 brought its own challenges. But portraying this union as the sole driver of instability is historically myopic. Yemen’s strife is primarily the result of decades of corruption, political exclusion, and, most critically, Iranian-backed insurgency through the Houthi militia.

By advocating a fragmented Yemen, Rubin ironically finds himself echoing Tehran’s strategic wishlist. As Saudi political analyst Salman Al-Ansari rightly noted in response, “The Houthis and Iran are actually very grateful for the actions of the separatists.”

That’s because separatism fractures the already strained national military, dilutes the central government’s authority, and distracts from the core task of defeating the Iranian-backed Houthi insurgency.

Rubin’s promotion of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist faction with limited legitimacy and narrow geographic influence, overlooks the broader political, tribal, and demographic complexities of Yemen.

It ignores the voice of Hadramout—a massive, resource-rich governorate in the south that remains largely resistant to STC’s ideology. Hadramout has consistently demanded greater autonomy within a federal framework, not secession. To paint all of South Yemen with the STC brush is analytically lazy and politically dangerous.

Iran’s Strategy: Divide and Conquer

Rubin suggests that dividing Yemen will curb Iranian influence. But the opposite is true. Tehran’s strategy in the Arab world has always thrived on institutional collapse, factionalism, and governance vacuums—be it in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon. Splintering Yemen into northern and southern states would only legitimize the Houthi coup in Sana’a and give Iran formal control over a puppet state in the north, while maneuvering to extend its tentacles into the south via co-opted militias.

Salman Al-Ansari highlighted a chilling but telling remark from Ali Larijani, former Iranian Speaker of Parliament, “We want a state loyal to us in the north, and another friendly state in the south.”

That alone should send alarm bells ringing for Indian strategists. Supporting the breakup of Yemen would play directly into Iran’s long game in the region—pitting tribes, provinces, and ideologies against one another to prolong chaos and weaken the regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

India’s Role: Stability, Not Subversion

Rubin also appeals to India’s historical ties with Aden and its anti-colonial legacy. While it is true that Indians once had a vibrant presence in southern Yemen during the British period, invoking this colonial history to advocate for Indian-backed secessionism today is both insensitive and ill-conceived.

India’s current posture in the region is one of non-intervention, stability, and multilateral diplomacy. As the fourth largest economy and a strategic stakeholder in the Indian Ocean basin, India gains from freedom of navigation, secure shipping lanes, and a united front against piracy and Iranian militarism.

Championing the disintegration of a sovereign Arab nation would mark a dramatic and unwelcome shift in India’s foreign policy ethos, alienating long-time allies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt—nations who view Yemeni unity as essential to regional security.

Moreover, Indian diplomats have successfully walked a tightrope in Middle East politics, maintaining relations with Iran while deepening strategic cooperation with Gulf Arab states and Israel. Rubin’s advice risks compromising this delicate balance.

Separatism Is Not a Silver Bullet

Rubin’s comparison of Yemen to Kosovo or Moldova is deeply flawed. Both Kosovo and Moldova were born of violent disintegration of multiethnic empires, not voluntary national unions like Yemen’s. Additionally, unlike Kosovo, South Yemen does not have unified political institutions, coherent leadership, or international recognition.

The Southern Transitional Council remains a militia-backed entity that has clashed violently with other Yemeni factions and has yet to present a credible vision for inclusive governance.

In fact, many Yemenis see the STC as a proxy force themselves—backed by competing foreign agendas that don’t necessarily align with the welfare of Yemenis at large.

What India Should Actually Do

India’s best move is to remain a force for balance, humanitarian engagement, and economic rebuilding in Yemen. Rather than choosing sides in a domestic power struggle, New Delhi should increase its engagement with the UN-led peace efforts and offer logistical and humanitarian support in Aden and other liberated cities. It must work closely with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure maritime routes and deter Houthi aggression in the Red Sea.

At the same time, India can support federalism and decentralization within a united Yemen—an approach that respects the aspirations of southern regions without compromising national sovereignty.

This approach maintains India’s credibility as a neutral actor, preserves its regional relationships, and avoids entanglement in ideological militancy or Iranian proxy politics.

Michael Rubin’s op-ed exemplifies a recurring pattern in Western commentary—well-articulated and perhaps well-meaning, but ultimately detached from on-the-ground realities. His argument overlooks the complex regional dynamics at play, misjudges the priorities of key stakeholders, and unintentionally echoes the agendas of actors like Iran and the Houthis who thrive on instability.

India, with its growing diplomatic weight and deep regional ties, should resist being drawn into such flawed narratives.

Salman Al-Ansari’s rebuttal serves as a timely reminder that durable peace in Yemen will come not from fragmentation, but from inclusive governance, national unity, and regional cooperation. India must stay the course—supporting stability over secession, diplomacy over division.