In the border village of Barikot, a school complex serving primary to high school students has been heavily damaged, with classrooms littered with debris and abandoned materials after weeks of shelling that residents attributed to Pakistani forces.

Most of the village’s roughly 8,000 residents fled following the outbreak of hostilities in late February.The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said the Barikot facility is among 22 schools in urgent need of reconstruction in Kunar province.

Around 12,000 students affected by the conflict require safe learning spaces or support to resume classes, according to a report issued this month.AFP journalists who visited Barikot after access roads reopened this week described deserted streets and shuttered or destroyed shops.

Residents returning to assess the damage said essential infrastructure, including a medical center, had also been hit.Hundreds of civilians have been killed across Afghanistan amid the cross-border violence, according to the United Nations, before China facilitated talks that largely halted the fighting.

Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of harboring militants responsible for attacks on its territory, an allegation Afghan authorities deny.The conflict has displaced more than 94,000 people, with over a quarter from Kunar province, OCHA data shows.

Many have taken refuge along the Kunar River, living in makeshift shelters with limited access to clean water, sanitation and healthcare.Aid groups say conditions in displacement camps are deteriorating. The Norwegian Refugee Council described the humanitarian situation as “dire,” citing urgent needs for shelter, water and sanitation services, and healthcare.

Local officials say schools in nearby areas are already overcrowded, complicating efforts to absorb displaced students. Authorities are considering relocating families to more structured camps established after a major earthquake last year.

Residents expressed concern over the long-term impact on education. Displaced families reported that children have been unable to attend classes for weeks, with some schools entirely shut due to damage or lack of capacity.

In this military power grab, the role of Pakistan’s major political parties has been one of facilitation.

Pakistan is living through a quiet constitutional gerrymandering whose ramifications are not loud street protests. Rather, there is a slow and a methodical shift being orchestrated by an increasingly assertive military establishment, which is duly enabled by pliant political parties eager to comply. The objective of this change is simply to transform Pakistan into a military-dominated hybrid authoritarian system with a façade of civilian executive.

The chief architect of this new order is Field Marshal Asim Munir, inarguably Pakistan’s most powerful army chiefs ever. Under his tenure, the military has moved beyond the historical pattern of backstage control and intermittent coups. Instead, the goal now appears to be structural dominance embedded into law, bureaucracy, and constitutional text to make military supremacy not an aberration but the core of the state.

This transformation did not happen overnight though. It began with seemingly smaller amendments to Pakistan’s military laws (Army/Air Force/Navy) in 2023, which were endorsed by the political parties without protest both inside and out of the National Assembly. These changes expanded the reach of military courts, allowing civilians to be tried under military jurisdiction.

This followed the violent anti-government protests of May 9, 2023, when protestors targeted dozens of military installations across Pakistani provinces, including Lahore and Peshawar. Besides hundreds of protestors, the most high-profile target of this expanded legal control has been former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who remains imprisoned alongside his wife, Bushra Bibi, facing dozens of cases that critics argue serve political rather than judicial ends.

From there, the military’s influence has migrated deeper into civilian space. Munir’s consolidation included the time-tested policy of parachuting military officers into key civilian institutions such as NADRA, WAPDA, SUPARCO, among others. The appointment of Lt. Gen. Asim Malik, the Director-General of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence service, ISI, and as National Security Adviser marked an unmistakable shift.

This significant civilian post which traditionally functioned as the bridge between civilian governance and military command was no longer a boundary at all. But the most significant restructuring has come through constitutional amendments. The 26th Amendment, passed in late 2024, expanded the tenure of military service chiefs from three to five years, with potential extensions matching those expanded terms.

This effectively allows a single military chief to shape Pakistan’s governance for more than a decade, as is the case with Asim Munir who seems poised to be in office till 2032 at least. In parallel, the amendment broadened the government’s role in judicial affairs, tightening political oversight over judicial appointments and administration. Judiciary was the last bastion where the military establishment could not otherwise influence directly.

The latest the 27th Amendment goes even further. It formalized Munir’s new role as Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), a new title that elevates the Army Chief as the overarching commander of Pakistan’s military forces. It also granted him an enhanced role in the management of the country’s nuclear assets, otherwise overseen by the prime minister led strategic command.

While Pakistan has long been a nuclear-armed state under tight military control, the legal codification of this role marks a decisive break from earlier ambiguity. As such, the civilian oversight, which was anyway already weak, is now further downgraded.

It is true that power consolidation by military leaders is not new in Pakistan. From Ayub Khan to Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, all have reshaped the political system in their favor but only after military coups. However, what distinguishes the current phenomenon is how seamlessly key civilian institutions, particularly political parties, have not only accepted this shift but overtly and covertly facilitated this power grab.

Moreover, the 27^th Amendment practically split Pakistan’s highest judicial institution of Supreme Court into two by creating a new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) while significantly reducing the Supreme Court’s discretionary powers such as suo moto. The amendment’s timing and intent are unmistakable as this restructuring limits the SC’s ability to overview the military-driven changes now being encoded into law.

As such, the judiciary, which was once seen as an unpredictable check on military authority, is now practically subdued. This has made Pakistan’s courts being increasingly viewed not as arbiters of the constitution but as instruments to legitimize the very forces reshaping it.

In this military power grab, the role of Pakistan’s major political parties has been one of facilitation. Far from resisting creeping military dominance in civilian affairs of the state, they appear to be competing for its approval, demonstrating how civilian leadership remained conditional on military favor.

Take the role of Sharif family’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The party ostensibly became the biggest beneficiary of the military-backed removal of Imran Khan’s government in 2022. Shehbaz Sharif became prime minister for the remainder of the National Assembly’s tenure. Interestingly, it was during this period that the PML-N government appointed Asim Munir as Army Chief bypassing several of his senior officers.

But its reward came soon when the party received the dividends of military’s electoral engineering during the controversial 2024 general elections positioning Shehbaz Sharif to form the government once again. Likewise, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), once the standard-bearer of civilian resistance to military authoritarianism, is willingly playing an equal accomplice to PML-N in facilitating the military’s entrenchment.

What has consequently emerged is a political landscape where parties no longer seek to govern through popular mandate, institutional accountability, or democratic legitimacy, if at all there is any, but through proximity to the military. While the façade of democracy is still visible, but the center of gravity has shifted decisively towards military.

What this translates into is a form of managed system where rituals may remain but the outcomes are predetermined. And the consequences of this system will be far-reaching. It is true that Pakistan has long struggled with the balance between civilian authority and military dominance. But what distinguishes the current phenomenon is how its political class is willingly facilitating the establishment’s creeping dominance and how the military is shedding the façade of its backstage control.

As such, democracy in Pakistan, however fragile it was, is not fading with a dramatic collapse but is being dismantled through amendments, appointments, legal reforms, and political bargains; all in piece by piece.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

This clause would mark the first time in Pakistan’s history that the entire military chain of command is legally and constitutionally subordinated to a single officer.

Since his appointment in November 2022, Field Marshal Asim Munir has proved a master practitioner of power consolidation, outpacing even Pakistan’s most notorious military strongmen such as Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf. His latest gambit, the proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment, cements that legacy and threatens to formalize Pakistan’s drift into an overt military state.

At its core, the 27th Amendment rewrites Article 243 of Pakistan’s Constitution which details the governing framework of the command of the armed forces (Chapter 2). While, it may appear to be a technical legal change, however, it is, in fact, a crude structural reordering of the Pakistani state in favor of the military establishment that has anyway calling the shots for decades.

Nevertheless, one of the most consequential provisions (clause 5) is the proposed creation of a new office of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). Under this clause, the Army Chief will automatically assume the role of CDF role, which effectively merges the tri-service command of the army, navy, and air force into one uniformed post. The existing Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), a forum meant to balance inter-service authority, will be abolished.

In practical terms, this means all branches of Pakistan’s armed forces will answer to one man, that is Asim Munir. It also conveniently sidelines General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the senior-most general whom the Shehbaz Sharif government bypassed when appointing Munir in 2022.

This clause would mark the first time in Pakistan’s history that the entire military chain of command is legally and constitutionally subordinated to a single officer.

Another major clause (6) under Article 243 transfers effective control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to the Army Chief. The Prime Minister would nominally appoint the Commander of the National Strategic Command (the custodian of nuclear weapons), but only from among “members of the Pakistan Army” and solely on the “recommendation of the Chief of Army Staff concurrently serving as Chief of Defence Forces.”

This wording is not incidental. It ensures that the nuclear command, which has traditionally been supervised by a civilian-led National Command Authority, will now operate entirely under military discretion. Pakistan’s already fragile notion of civilian oversight is being reduced to fiction. With this, Asim Munir not only commands Pakistan’s conventional military forces but also gains exclusive control of its nuclear deterrent. 

Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the 27th Amendment lies in its provisions for legal protection. Given that the amendment proposes lifetime immunity to the Field Marshal (clauses 7,8,9,10 &11), it practically equates his legal status with that of the President as the Head of the State of Pakistan. In effect, Asim Munir, who was conferred the title of Field Marshal earlier this year, cannot be prosecuted, investigated, or held accountable by any court or parliamentary body for decisions made during or after his tenure.

This is a historic and most consequential departure from Pakistan’s constitutional tradition. Even military rulers like Zia and Musharraf, both of whom seized power through coups, lacked explicit lifetime impunity under constitutional law. However, Munir has, by securing this clause, effectively insulated himself against future civilian pushback or judicial scrutiny, ensuring that any transition of power will not endanger his position or legacy.

Though Pakistan’s history has seen several military rulers institutionalizing their dominance through legal means like Ayub Khan’s rewriting of the 1962 Constitution or Zia-ul-Haq giving the military a permanent political veto by amending Article 58(2)(b), Asim Munir’s strategy is more sophisticated and inarguably more durable. Unlike his predecessors, who relied on overt coups, Munir is using constitutional procedure and parliamentary approval to codify military supremacy. As such, Munir seems to be outdoing the likes of Ayub, Zia, and Musharraf not through coups but by rewriting laws in his own favor.

The Shehbaz Sharif government’s cooperation in pushing this amendment through parliament reveals how deeply Pakistan’s civilian leadership has become dependent on the military’s favor. The Asim Munir-led military establishment has leveraged this vulnerability and extended its control over domestic politics, the economy, and even foreign policy. 

By institutionalizing this control through the 27th Amendment, the military no longer needs to rely on backroom manipulation as it can now rule openly, with parliamentary consent.

The conferment of the title “Field Marshal” on Munir earlier this year, following India’s “Operation Sindoor” was the clearest signal of his elevation to the highest power status in the country. It very well echoed self-promotion of Ayub Khan to Field Marshal in the 1960s, when he justified his authority was essential to the country’s national defense.

Munir would do well to remember that Pakistan’s streets which are restless, politically volatile, and steeped in resentment against military domination, though it may dormant now, have a way of humbling even the most entrenched generals. Equally, it is interesting how the country’s political elite, particularly Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party who currently backs Munir seem to have forgotten how such curry favouring of generals have bitten them in the past.

The 27th Amendment marks not just another chapter in Pakistan’s cycle of military dominance but a turning point of the transformation of military supremacy from an unwritten reality into a constitutional fact. Field Marshal Asim Munir may believe he has achieved what his predecessors could not: absolute power with absolute legitimacy. But Pakistan’s history suggests that even the thickest face and the blackest heart cannot shield a ruler from the reckoning that follows hubris.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Pakistan’s pattern of dependence—on U.S. security guarantees, Chinese investment, Iranian goodwill—makes it a client state, not a sovereign actor on the world stage.

Amid the fiery conflict between Israel and Iran, Pakistan’s military finds itself walking a geopolitical tightrope: publicly aligning with Iran, even hinting at nuclear retaliation against Israel, while simultaneously clinging to U.S. military favor in its campaign against Iranian nuclear assets.

This schizophrenic stance underscores a decades‑long pattern: Pakistan’s “deep state” and its military‑intel establishment have repeatedly sold the nation’s sovereignty to whichever patron offers the greatest leverage. The result? An arrested development and chronic underachievement.

Last week, Iran’s IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed on state television that “Pakistan has told us that if Israel uses nuclear missiles, we will also attack it with nuclear weapons”. Pakistan neither publicly confirmed nor denied the claim. Yet within days, its foreign ministry condemned U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear sites—Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan—calling them “gravely concerning” and flagging possible regional escalation.

This denunciation came just after Pakistan endorsed President Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize over his de‑escalation efforts with India. In barely a 48‑hour span, Islamabad praised Trump for stabilizing South Asia and then rebuked his bombs.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was in Washington for a lavish White House lunch—where Trump publicly lauded Pakistani restraint after the India‑Pakistan missile flare‑up in May. This whitewashing of Islamabad’s contradictions—welcoming Pakistani nuclear diplomacy while supporting the strikes—reveals much about the transactional nature of this partnership.

Deep State by Design

Pakistan’s military establishment, colloquially “the deep state,” has never seen itself as servant, but rather as master. Since 1947, it has orchestrated coups, mediated foreign policy, and directed economic as well as strategic priorities. Civilian governance remains a veneer. Power accrues through Pakistan’s full‑spectrum nuclear deterrence doctrine—designed less for defense than for bargaining over India, the U.S., and other regional powers.

The economic cost of this grandstanding is steep. Decades of diverting scarce resources into military programs—sometimes backed by Chinese or U.S. aid, sometimes clandestinely through nuclear proliferation networks like A.Q. Khan’s—have starved Pakistan of investment in education, health, infrastructure, and industry. Its economy limps under chronic debt; urban centers are choked; public services are threadbare.

Selling the Nation to the Highest Bidder

This Faustian bargain continues. Pakistan courts the U.S. when it needs military hardware, diplomatic cover, and economic relief. As soon as Washington turns, Islamabad pivots to Iran—or China, or Russia. Recent Indian‑express analysis notes Islamabad’s “delicate balancing act” shaped by anxieties over India and a need for U.S. patronage. But the result is strategic incoherence and international mistrust.

The core of the problem is corruption at the top. The deep state uses its clout to capture resources. Elite groups extract rents from development budgets, shield militant proxies, and arrogate foreign policy. Civil society and democracy exist in name only; real power resides with generals who see the nation as a chessboard. As a result, growth stalls, inequality deepens, and Pakistan’s potential remains unrealized.

The Nuclear Catch‑22

Pakistan’s flirtation with nuclear brinkmanship—hinting at retaliation for Israel, pointing B‑2 bombers at Iran—exposes the inherent contradiction: nukes are for deterrence, not diplomacy. Instead of a mature nuclear strategy aimed at securing peace and economic stability, the military uses nuclear ambiguity for maximum geopolitical returns. That has brought fleeting headlines and foreign funds, but no sustainable development.

Pakistan must ask itself: is it raising its geopolitical profile, or holding itself back through strategic schizophrenia? Its pattern of dependence—on U.S. security guarantees, Chinese investment, Iranian goodwill—makes it a client state, not a sovereign actor on the world stage.

A Way Forward: Decouple the Deep State

For Pakistan to unlock its potential, it must dismantle the deep‑state’s monopoly. Demilitarize foreign policy, entrust civilian leadership with economic and diplomatic agendas. Cut off free rides to jihadi proxies that generate short‑term geopolitical cachet but long‑term global isolation. Redirect resources from nuclear brinkmanship into clean energy, literacy, and healthcare.

Otherwise, Pakistan’s “balancing act” is nothing but a balancing of bids: play the U.S. for aid, Iran for regional rapprochement, China for infrastructure—until the next pivot. But each shift deepens instability and stifles growth. The people, not the generals, suffer.

In the end, only a break from this militarized cycle—an embrace of genuine democracy and domestic investment—can free Pakistan from being the world’s perpetual geopolitical rentier. Anything less is selling its soul, again.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The classified assessment, first reported by The New Indian in an exclusive by Emaad Makhdoomi, reveals that this nexus was formalized during a high-level rally held in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) on February 5, 2025.

The rally, provocatively titled the “Kashmir Solidarity and Hamas Operation Al-Aqsa Flood Conference”, took place at Shaheed Sabir Stadium in PoK. Sources confirm that operatives involved in planning the Pahalgam attack were present at the event.

In a declaration that shocked security circles, a Jaish operative reportedly thundered from the stage: “The fighters of Palestine and Kashmir now march as one. Blood will be spilled in Delhi, and Kashmir shall be torn from India.”

Among those in attendance were top-ranking commanders: Talha Saif, brother of JeM chief Masood Azhar; senior field commanders Asghar Khan Kashmiri and Masood Ilyas; and key Lashkar-e-Taiba figures.

Most notably, Hamas made its first known formal appearance in PoK, represented by Dr. Khalid Al-Qadoumi, its Iran-based envoy. Several Palestinian figures were also seen aligning ideologically and logistically with Pakistani terror outfits.

According to intelligence analysts, this summit marked more than just rhetoric—it established a collaborative framework for future joint operations, modeled on Hamas’s asymmetric warfare tactics in Gaza.

“Pakistan-backed terrorist outfits are now consciously emulating Hamas’s blueprint,” a senior Indian intelligence official told The New Indian. “These groups are manipulating religious ideologies to provoke violence and foster deep-seated communal discord within Jammu and Kashmir.”

A Multimedia Propaganda Surge

Days ahead of the February summit, a provocative eight-minute propaganda video was circulated by the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League, glorifying Islamist separatists such as Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yasin Malik, and Masrat Alam Bhat. The video lauded slain terrorists including Burhan Wani and Manan Wani, showing funeral footage while drawing incendiary parallels between Gaza and Kashmir.

“Pak ki Azadi, Kashmir ki Azadi” blared throughout the production, openly inciting Kashmiri youth to rebel against Indian sovereignty.

Security experts warn that this blend of emotional imagery and militant messaging represents a dangerous evolution in hybrid propaganda, designed to radicalize young minds and fuel communal tensions.

“The aim is to internationalize the Kashmir issue by tying it to the globally resonant Palestine-Israel conflict,” said a counterterrorism analyst. “It’s a strategic pivot designed to rally global sympathy while accelerating internal destabilization.”

Pahalgam Attack: Pre-Meditated and Communally Driven

On March 24, the idyllic town of Pahalgam—a hub for tourists and Hindu pilgrims—was shattered by a brutal terrorist ambush. Sources have confirmed the attack was orchestrated from across the Line of Control (LoC) by banned outfits including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jammu and Kashmir United Mujahideen (JKUM). The strike bore the hallmarks of meticulous premeditation, with execution carried out by highly trained Pakistani terrorists.

Three key individuals have been identified as the architects of the attack:

• Saifullah Kasuri (aka Saifullah Khalid), a senior LeT commander with close ties to LeT founder Hafiz Saeed. Designated by the U.S. Treasury Department, Kasuri has served as LeT’s Peshawar operations head and was instrumental in mobilizing the political front Milli Muslim League (MML), widely seen as a civilian mask for LeT’s agenda.
• Abu Musa (aka Musa Kashmiri), formerly affiliated with ISIS, is known for plotting attacks against foreign nationals in India. He was found with jihadist literature and reportedly attempted lone-wolf attacks before realigning with LeT to target non-locals and Indian security personnel.
• Rizwan Hanif, a senior JKUM operative based in Rawalakot, PoK. Intelligence sources say Hanif oversaw the logistics of the Pahalgam strike, including infiltration routes and arms procurement.

Perhaps most disturbing was the revelation that the attackers reportedly interrogated victims about their religion before executing them—pointing to a targeted communal intent. “This wasn’t just a terror attack—it was a message,” said a senior Indian intelligence official. “It signals a dangerous shift from generalized violence to targeted, faith-based executions.”

ISI and Military Involvement

The role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its military in coordinating this growing alliance is under sharp scrutiny. According to multiple sources, the ISI is driving efforts to reposition Kashmir on the global stage by deliberately echoing the Palestine narrative, hoping to energize pan-Islamist sentiments and draw international scrutiny toward India’s internal affairs.

“The ISI is effectively weaponizing the Palestinian cause to export jihad to South Asia,” said a former Indian military officer. “Their goal is twofold: to globalize the Kashmir issue and to create a new generation of radicalized youth who see themselves not just as Kashmiris, but as soldiers in a broader global jihad.”

A Cross-Continental Threat Matrix

This emerging Hamas-LeT nexus signals a dangerous cross-continental collaboration that may reshape the operational dynamics of Islamist terrorism in the region. Indian officials believe this could mark the beginning of a new era of hybrid warfare—fusing militant Islamist ideology with advanced propaganda and asymmetric guerrilla tactics.

As India grapples with the fallout of the Pahalgam massacre, and as global attention continues to focus on the Middle East, security experts are calling for a recalibration of counterterrorism strategies. “We’re witnessing the globalization of local conflicts,” said an Indian intelligence official. “And that’s a warning the world can’t afford to ignore.”