The ongoing conflict over water distribution is likely to intensify as the country is facing a severe water crisis.

The conflict over water distribution in Pakistan has resurfaced. Sindh and Balochistan have registered a strong protest against the Indus River System Authority(IRSA)’s decision to reduce their water share by diverting it to Punjab. IRSA is Pakistan’s main body responsible for “the regulation and distribution of surface waters amongst the provinces according to the allocations and policies spelt out in the Water Accord” 1991.

Sindh’s ongoing water shortage stems from IRSA’s actions, which, by allocating more water to Punjab despite overall scarcity, intensify perceptions of unfairness and fuel the conflict over water distribution. This pattern has sharpened the provincial dispute, positioning Punjab as a consistent beneficiary at Sindh’s expense. 

This is not the first time that the issue of water distribution has been contested between Punjab and Sindh. The country has a long history in which smaller provinces complained against Punjab over the unfair distribution of resources, including water.

In a major development, after years of delay, the Government of Pakistan issued the first National Water Policy (NWP) in 2018. Claimed to be have formed after gaining the consensus of the chief ministers of all four provinces, the NWP, according to the Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Sartaj Aziz, “covered all water-related issues, including water uses and allocation of priorities, integrated planning for development and use of water resources, environmental integrity of the basin, impact of climate change, trans-boundary water sharing, irrigated and rain-fed agriculture.” However, the committee subsequently formed to oversee its implementation could not reconcile the interests of Punjab and Sindh, mainly. 

Sindh is of the view that the policy was formed under coercion, as the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), the party with a strong presence in Punjab, was leading the federal government, forcing the decision upon smaller provinces. Sartaj Aziz, the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, was considered to be close to Nawaz Sharif. So, the reservations of Sindh and Balochistan may not be entirely unfounded. 

In 2021, Sindh raised the issue and demanded a new water-sharing arrangement. The conflict came into the limelight in January 2025 when Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) chairman Bilawal Bhutto and the PML-N-led government in Punjab, led by Nawaz Sharif’s daughter Maryam Nawaz, issued strong statements against each other over a project in Punjab—the Cholistan canal project. 

In February 2025, Chief Minister of Punjab Maryam Nawaz and Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir inaugurated an ambitious project in Cholistan to irrigate barren land under the Green Pakistan Initiative. The project would draw new canals from the Indus River, impacting the lower riparian Sindh Province. 

The decision expectedly led to a reaction from Sindh and protests from the Sindhis. They alleged that allocations were already extensively in Punjab’s favour, and any new such project would cripple Sindh’s irrigation system. Bilawal Bhutto even threatened that if the canal project was not shelved, his party would leave the alliance government in the centre. Unmoved by such threats, Maryam Nawaz said in September 2025 that “If Punjab wants to construct canals for its water, why are you bothered? It is Punjab’s water. It belongs to the people, farmers and fields of Punjab.” To make such a statement would not have been possible without the support of the Army who seen siding with Punjab.

The Cholistan canal project’s inauguration illustrates how Punjab’s dominance in Pakistan’s power structure influences resource allocation. High-profile involvement of the Army leadership in the project reinforces the perception that Punjab’s interests prevail over those of the smaller provinces, exemplifying the central argument that resource disputes are shaped by entrenched political and institutional imbalances.

Second, the project was launched despite the fact that Sindh had strongly protested against it; thus, it showed that Punjab pays the least attention to the concerns of smaller provinces. In the past as well, Sindh and Balochistan have raised the larger question about the water distribution in the country, which they think is not fair and needs renegotiation, but have not received any response from the federation. 

The latest controversy underscores the same attitude of the Punjab Province towards the smaller and weaker provinces of the country. Instead of being mindful of the requirements and demands of Sindh and Balochistan, Punjab’s interests remain preferable for the country’s rulers. 

Former President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, had said that “Anyone who can solve the problems of water will be worthy of two Nobel Prizes—one for peace and one for science.” Kennedy had said these prescient words over sixty years ago. Still, Pakistan has been unable to address one of its core issues—the water scarcity and the distribution of its water resources among the provinces equally. 

For over 70 years of its formation, Pakistan’s colonial hangover continues. Despite all these challenges, the colonial structure has been deployed by the existing military-bureaucratic oligarchy, as the noted political scientist of Pakistan, Hamza Alavi, called it, to favour the powerful province, i.e., Punjab, over other weak provinces of the country. 

Resultantly, in the total share of the country’s water resources, equal distribution is hampered by the existing political system that remains overwhelmingly dominated by the Punjabis. For example, Field Marshall Asim Munir is the fourth successive Punjabi to lead the country’s powerful military, which remains dominated by the Punjabis. Of the last seven prime ministers since 2008, all but Imran Khan have been Punjabis. 

Implications of such a political system in which the largest province has been a dominant and driving force have often led to conflicts, for example, on the distribution of resources. Balochistan’s main complaint has been the exploitation of its resources by the Punjab Province at the cost of the local population: they call it Punjabi colonisation of Balochistan. And Sindh has often raised its concerns about the Punjab’s overuse of water that is meant for its use.

The ongoing conflict over water distribution is likely to intensify as the country is facing a severe water crisis. If Punjab continues its recklessness and prefers its interests over the weaker provinces, local resistance in Sindh and Balochistan will strengthen, forcing the provincial governments to take a stand against the federal government. That can lead to confrontational politics and even the fall of the government, if the PPP withdraws its support, as Bilawal had threatened. 

Overall, the situation remains grimmer than it seems. The military establishment might have forced the PPP to be part of the government, but if the local basic requirements, like water, are not delivered by the PPP-led government in Sindh, it cannot retain the support of the Sindhis, the third largest ethnic group of Pakistan- after Punjabis and Pashtuns. If their resistance revives against the Punjabi domination, the subsequent strengthening of the Sindhudesh movement can expose yet another fault line of Pakistan.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions.

The political unrest witnessed across Pakistan administered Kashmir since 2023 and the parallel grievances emerging in Gilgit-Baltistan represent one of the most significant governance challenges confronting Pakistan in recent years. While public attention has largely focused on the immediate triggers of protests; electricity tariffs, wheat subsidies, inflation and rising costs of living, the underlying causes are far deeper and more structural.

The rise of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has transformed local economic grievances into a broader movement demanding accountability, transparency and political responsiveness. The movement has highlighted growing dissatisfaction regarding governance practices, implementation of government commitments and the perceived disconnect between decision makers and ordinary citizens.

At the same time, recurring protests in Gilgit-Baltistan regarding constitutional status, resource utilisation, development priorities and economic opportunities have exposed similar governance fault lines. Although Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain distinct political entities, both regions demonstrate increasing demands for meaningful participation in decision making and a greater share of economic benefits arising from strategic projects.

The central question confronting Pakistan government is whether existing institutions can adapt to rising public expectations regarding accountability, representation and development.

The mountains of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan have historically been viewed through the lens of geopolitics. However, political developments of the last five years suggest a gradual shift in public priorities.

Increasingly, ordinary citizens are focusing on issues that directly affect their daily lives. The cost of electricity, availability of employment, quality of infrastructure, reliability of public services and effectiveness of governance have become central concerns. These issues have generated a new form of political mobilisation that differs significantly from traditional political movements.

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents perhaps the clearest example of this transformation. Unlike conventional political organisations, JAAC derived its legitimacy not from ideological positions or constitutional debates but from its ability to articulate practical concerns affecting ordinary citizens.

The current unrest should therefore be understood not simply as a reaction to economic hardship but as part of a broader process through which citizens seek greater accountability, responsiveness and participation in governance.

 Rise of  Joint Awami Action Committee

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents one of the most significant political developments in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir in recent years. Unlike traditional political parties, JAAC emerged organically from civil society and grassroots activism. Its origins can be traced to growing public dissatisfaction regarding inflation, rising electricity tariffs and the increasing cost of essential commodities.

Initially, the movement focused on economic concerns. Citizens questioned why regions possessing significant hydropower resources continued to face high electricity costs. Many argued that local populations were not receiving adequate benefits from resources generated within their own territory.

What distinguished JAAC from previous protest movements was its ability to unite diverse segments of society. Traders, transport unions, lawyers, students, labour organisations and civil society groups increasingly coordinated their activities under a common platform.

As demonstrations expanded, the movement’s demands evolved. Economic grievances gradually merged with governance concerns. Protesters began demanding greater transparency, accountability and implementation of previous commitments. Public discourse increasingly focused on whether institutions were capable of responding effectively to citizen concerns.

The rise of JAAC reflects broader regional trends where issue-based movements centered on governance, accountability and public services increasingly challenging the traditional political structures.

Accountability and Crisis of Trust

At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions. Repeated protests indicate growing concern regarding responsiveness, transparency and implementation of commitments. Disputes over agreements reached between protest leaders and authorities have reinforced perceptions that institutions are not adequately accountable. Economic hardship has intensified these concerns, while digital connectivity has enabled citizens to compare governance outcomes across regions and just across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. The resulting crisis is therefore not merely administrative but fundamentally political, centered on legitimacy and public confidence.

POJK and Balochistan: Similar Fault Lines, Different Challenges

Although Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Balochistan differ substantially in history and political context, both reveal recurring debates regarding resource utilisation, local participation and development outcomes. In both regions, citizens frequently question whether the benefits generated from local resources are distributed equitably. Another similarity concerns perceptions of centralised decision making and limited local influence over major policy choices. However, important differences remain. The movement in POJK has largely remained civil and issue based, while Balochistan has experienced a prolonged insurgency alongside political activism. The comparison highlights how governance grievances can evolve into broader political challenges when populations feel excluded from decision making processes.

Lessons from East Pakistan

The history of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 remains a significant lesson in political legitimacy, representation and governance. Historians point to a combination of political exclusion, economic disparities and institutional failures as contributing factors. The contemporary relevance of this experience lies not in drawing direct parallels but in recognising the importance of responsive institutions and public trust. States derive resilience from legitimacy as much as from administrative capacity. The lesson for policymakers is that sustainable stability requires meaningful participation, accountable governance and confidence that institutions represent citizen interests.

Gilgit-Baltistan: Pakistan’s Emerging Strategic Challenge

Gilgit-Baltistan occupies a critical strategic position linking South Asia, Central Asia and China. Its importance has increased significantly with regional connectivity projects and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite this strategic significance, recurring public debates concerning constitutional status, subsidies, electricity shortages, trade restrictions and local participation in development have generated periodic protests. Many residents argue that while the region contributes substantially to national strategic objectives, local communities do not always perceive proportional economic benefits. This tension between strategic priorities and local expectations represents one of the most significant governance challenges facing policymakers.

Comparative Development Across LOC

The digital age has transformed public awareness. Citizens increasingly compare governance outcomes, infrastructure, education, healthcare and economic opportunities across regions mainly in Jammu & Kashmir. Such comparisons influence perceptions of governance effectiveness and political legitimacy. Arguably, comparative narratives has shaped the public expectations and it has placed pressure on Pakistan government to demonstrate tangible development outcomes. Infrastructure, tourism, public services and employment opportunities have become important indicators through which populations evaluate governance performance.

Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma

Pakistan faces a complex challenge in balancing security, development and political responsiveness. Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain strategically important regions. However, democratic protest movements differ fundamentally from conventional security threats. While administrative and security measures may restore temporary stability, long term legitimacy depends upon public confidence, institutional credibility and meaningful participation. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of addressing governance concerns without overt or covert use of Pakistan Army to silence the people by use force or fear of jail.

Future Outlook and Policy Implications

The government of Pakistan immediately needs to restore confidence of the people of the region by increased participation in governance and central institutions. Exploitation of the resources allowed by Pakistan Army and China needs to stop. Failure to address recurring grievances, however, risks perpetuating cycles of protest and mistrust. The broader lesson is that development and governance must progress together. Citizens increasingly expect institutions to be accountable, responsive and capable of delivering measurable improvements in quality of life. Pakistan has to accept the internal challenges first without attributing all its problems to Indian state.

Conclusion

The ongoing protests in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan highlight the growing importance of governance, accountability and public trust in contemporary politics. Economic concerns provided the initial catalyst for mobilisation, but the underlying debate increasingly concerns institutional responsiveness and legitimacy. Sustainable stability will depend not only on strategic considerations but also on the ability of institutions to address citizen expectations through transparent governance, meaningful participation and effective development policies. Pakistan needs to take cue from 1971 on how largescale suppression of homogenous communities can lead to outburst of violent protest. The country needs to look inside rather than involve itself in more that what it can chew.

If anything, the present nexus between the military establishment and the toothless civilian leadership has shown that it is difficult to have a fair space for criticism and dissent in Pakistan.

In yet another flummoxing display, Pakistan has charged the opposition leader in the National Assembly with treason. Mehmood Khan Achakzai, Chairman of the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), has been booked and charged with treason for his remarks at a public meeting in Balochistan. Achakzai is the president of Tehreek Tahaffuz Ayeen-i-Pakistan (TTAP), a multi-party opposition alliance formed to protect the Constitution of Pakistan, which, according to the opposition, is under attack from the military establishment, with the support of the government.

Although a long practice in the country, using the draconian law to silence critics of the military establishment/government has picked up in recent years. One reason for that is the nature of the present ruling administration.

It is interesting to see that the scope of these laws has expanded; now the political opponents of the existing “hybrid model” of government in Pakistan, as Defence Minister Khawaja Asif calls it, have borne the brunt of the sedition laws for their criticism of the government, or the hybrid regime, to put it in its truest description. The civilian leadership is forced to mitigate the adverse effects of the model simply because it cannot be in government or run functions if it were to break ties with the military establishment. That being the case, the civilian part of the model is subservient to the military establishment. How can that be called even a “hybrid model”?   

The civilian leaders act as intermediaries, while the military establishment pulls the strings on every decision. No wonder that in the last couple of years, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, and others have been currying favour with the country’s security forces, even on the economy. Prime Minister Sharif, known for his unhinged use of praise to extract favours from powerful personnel, went beyond even his own previous injudicious acts and said on an occasion recently that “History will always remember the wise and courageous leadership of the field marshal (Asim Munir) in golden words.”

Such flattering words from the Prime Minister tell a lot about the nature of the current model of governance in Pakistan: the civilian leaders will act on behalf of or for the military generals, and critics will bear the brunt.   

Achakzai’s case is not the only one. On a similar pattern, in yet another high-profile case, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was charged with treason for a rather bizarre accusation. Several activists and political opponents have been sent to jail after being charged with the draconian law.

All these cases are nothing but a mockery of such a serious penal law. While Imran Khan was accused of wrongfully dissolving parliament in 2022, Achakzai’s case is more interesting: he is charged with treason because he questioned the law and order situation in Balochistan and said that the government had failed to provide security to the people. There is no shortage of reports, even statements from the military establishment and the government on the situation in Balochistan that would mean the same, but it coming from the opposition leader is chargeable with the harshest possible penal code in the country, underscoring the strict policy of the current administration towards its opponents.   

More importantly, the case against the Opposition Leader in the National Assembly exposes the nature of politics in Pakistan. Essentially, the crux of the issue is that the military establishment is domineering in the present ruling political system, and any criticism of an issue points towards the failures of the military establishment. And given the stakes of Field Marshal Asim Munir in the system, the Army is unlikely to tolerate that. Therefore, conformity is sought in every case, at every possible cost.

It also shows that Pakistan’s perennial political crisis has taken a life of its own. There is no sign of it getting resolved. The Pakistani State has taken a clarion call: everyone must conform to the current administration, i.e., the military establishment, the deep state and its coterie in the civilian power circles.    

Historically, the military has dominated the country’s politics. Its domestic and foreign policies have been shaped by the generals. Even domestically, it is well documented that the military has “groomed” and “appointed” leaders in the country.

In politics, it is said that nation and state function as synonyms; in Pakistan, the military establishment and the state function as synonyms. So, any criticism against the military means the state is criticised. Such criticism therefore begets a strong punitive and legal response, including the charges of sedition. 

The story does not end here. Given that the military establishment is deeply involved in the government, any criticism, therefore, against the government is interpreted as a criticism against the military, and thus against the state. And there is a long list of such cases in Pakistan. Some of these include the cases of Baloch and Pashtun activists. In such cases, the people who have questioned the government policies towards Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have been accused of treason and put behind bars.  

Almost the entire leadership of Baloch Yekjehti Committee (BYC), a non-violent Baloch organisation mainly comprised of the Baloch whose relatives have been victims of enforced disappearances, is in jail. So is the former member of the National Assembly and Pashtun activist, Ali Wazir. Wazir has been behind bars for a long time on treason charges for questioning the policy of the military operations and their impact on the common Pashtun in KP. Ali Wazir has spent a good share of his life in jail. He was arrested a few hours after he was released on bail on 26 March. The cases against Wazir are various sedition cases.  

Likewise, Mahrang Baloch, a Baloch and doctor by profession, along with others, is facing multiple cases of sedition. Even if she gets some relief or bail in one case, other cases are invoked to keep her behind bars. The same method is used against the people who support or defend activists in the courts of the country. Imaan Mazari and Hadi Chattha, advocates who are fighting cases of several victims of state violence, have been booked, charged and sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment for social media posts that were critical of the country’s security institutions.  

If anything, the present nexus between the military establishment and the toothless civilian leadership has shown that it is difficult to have a fair space for criticism and dissent in Pakistan. Now, since the military establishment has increasingly taken control of the country into its hands, any civilian leadership or government is symbolic. Naturally, any criticism directed at the government will be seen as criticism of the military establishment. Therefore, in all likelihood, draconian laws like treason and others will be employed more to frighten and curb dissenting voices in Pakistan. 

In its efforts to woo foreign investment and overhaul its image, Pakistan is trying to sell the natural resources of Balochistan to the world.

The Government of Pakistan has imposed a series of restrictions to maintain law and order in Balochistan, the largest and most troubled province of the country. Issuing a notice on 17 May, the Government imposed Section 144 across Balochistan for a period of one month. The notification put restrictions on all public gatherings, including rallies and processions involving five or more people. Covering of faces in public places is also prohibited.

Imposition of restrictive measures in Balochistan vindicates the failure of the Pakistan Military, Federal Government, and the Provincial Government led by Chief Minister Sarfaraz Bugti to bring the armed struggle of Baloch rebels under control. Pakistan security forces have been incurring huge losses at the hands Baloch militants. On 12 May, in the latest case, a search operation team came under heavy fire from the Baloch militants in Barkhan District, killing five Pakistani military personnel.  

Pakistan’s Balochistan problem has lingered for eight decades. The ruling elite has failed to come up with a mutually acceptable solution to the problem that has led to four Baloch insurgencies in the short history of the country: 1948, 1958, 1973, and 2003. The latest insurgency intensified with the alleged rape of a Baloch doctor, from the Bugti Tribe, by a colonel of the Pakistan Army in 2005. 

The rape took place at Sui, Dera Bugti, in the heavily guarded government-owned natural gas plant. The colonel was never held accountable; instead, the doctor was held captive and threatened to stay silent. This not only provoked the Baloch but also united various tribes to seek justice for a Baloch woman, intensifying attacks on the Pakistan Army. In response, instead of addressing the heinous crime and punishing the colonel, Pakistani forces killed the prominent Bugti tribe leader, Akbar Bugti, in August 2006. 

Naturally, the killing stoked up anger, strengthening Baloch nationalist sentiment and escalating the conflict. Since then, the situation has been compounded further with huge human rights violations, with the adoption of the brutal “kill and dump” policy of the Pakistani State. 

In 2011, a senior vice-president of the Balochistan High Court Bar Association (BHCBA) had warned that if the “kill and dump” policy was not stopped, the situation in Balochistan could go out of control. Over 15 years later, the situation in Balochistan has only worsened further. Even the people who raise their voice on human rights violations of the Baloch people, like the leadership of Baloch Yekjehti Committee (BYC) and their supporters, are sent behind bars. 

The ruling elite remain deluded by the notion that the country’s strong military can help it to end the conflict in Balochistan. That is a grossly miscalculated assumption. Internal reports have time and again underlined the reality in Balochistan. Calling its 2025 report on Balochistan Balochistan’s Crisis of Trust, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) had said in its press release that “The mission’s findings reveal a disturbing pattern of continued enforced disappearances, shrinking civic space, erosion of provincial autonomy and unchecked impunity—conditions that continue to fuel public alienation and political instability.” 

At a time when Islamabad is trying to promote an image of being a regional stabilising force and making efforts to bring the two warring factions in the US-led war against Iran to the negotiation table, the persisting internal instability and Islamabad’s approach towards Balochistan and the Baloch people expose its efforts to portray the country in a positive light. 

Shorn of any credibility that it could utilise to overhaul the country’s image by overlooking conflict in Balochistan and security issues in general, the country’s leadership resorts to the practice of externalising the blame and accusing others of damaging its image. 

In a recent statement, Pakistani Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting Attaullah Tarar issued a long statement on X: “We understand quite clearly that behind such stories are certain elements, mainly the detractors of peace, who are unable to come to terms with Pakistan’s role for peace in the region as well as Pakistan’s continued and successful fight against foreign-sponsored and abetted terrorism.” Tarar stated that it seems some elements could not digest the fact that Pakistan was playing a role in regional stability and making progress in eliminating terrorism. 

Measures like the ones taken in Balochistan are a self-evident acknowledgement that the real situation in the province is worrying. Reality is that Balochistan remains Pakistan’s most deprived and poor province despite being rich in natural resources and having a long coastline. The poverty in Balochistan increased from 41.8 per cent in 2019 to 47 per cent in the Financial Year 2025, way high above the national poverty rate of over 29 per cent.

In its efforts to woo foreign investment and overhaul its image, Pakistan is trying to sell the natural resources of Balochistan to the world. Lately, it has tried to woo the US to invest in the critical minerals of Balochistan, including copper. When Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshall Asim Munir presented rare earth minerals to President Donald Trump while on a visit to the US in October 2025, the Chief Secretary of Balochistan said in a statement in December that “American and other companies are interested in investment in this mineral (antimony, among others), which is more precious than gold and copper.” 

While the government is making ambitious efforts to entice foreign countries to invest and dig minerals from Balochistan, regional parties like the Balochistan National Party (BNP) have raised questions on the laws that allow the extraction of Balochistan’s resources. 

The hard reality is that situation in Balochistan remains abysmal: use of force, threatening and arresting people like Mahrang Baloch and others. This will not resolve the Baloch problem; nor will it divert attention from the issue. The country needs concrete steps, acceptable to the Baloch people, to resolve the issue of continued Baloch resistance.

But the brutal use of force by the Pakistani state against the poorest province of Pakistan is unlikely to change in a country where the military’s domineering presence in politics remains strong. This will keep fuelling public apathy and disaffection in Balochistan and in the absence of any genuine and sincere approach by the state if Pakistan to resolve the issue of Baloch alienation, the situation in likely to aggravate further in the days to come.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

What Pakistan has surrendered in return is the institutional balance that once provided guardrails against rash escalation.

In Islamabad, history did not turn with a coup or a populist uprising — it changed quietly, with the stroke of a pen. When Pakistan passed its 27th Constitutional Amendment, there were no tanks in the streets, no suspended parliament broadcasts, no dramatic late-night speeches. The move was subtle, almost procedural. Yet, behind its legal language lies the most significant expansion of military authority in the country’s modern history.

While framed as a necessary reform to strengthen national security, the amendment fundamentally restructures Pakistan’s governance model by granting Field Marshal Asim Munir unprecedented authority over the state, the military, and—most critically—Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

The legal elevation of Pakistan’s de facto ruler into a constitutionally untouchable position marks a turning point for a country whose political system has long been undermined by military dominance. Now, that dominance is not just entrenched—it is formalized.

The Amendment That Institutionalizes Military Rule

The 27th Amendment establishes a new position, the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF), which consolidates command over the Army, Navy, and Air Force under Munir’s sole leadership. In doing so, it effectively eliminates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the single institution responsible for balancing power across Pakistan’s tri-services.

Even more consequentially, the amendment grants lifetime immunity to five-star officers, placing Munir and future CDFs beyond legal accountability for both military and political decisions. Whereas past military rulers seized power through coups, Munir now commands Pakistan through the constitution itself.

Civilian leaders may occupy government buildings, but the reins of the state security, foreign policy, and strategic decision-making firmly rest with Pakistan’s most powerful general. Seizing power through the 27^th Amendment serves two purposes for Munir. He gets to be the de facto leader of Pakistan’s civil-military regime under law, a privilege previous military dictators did not have, and secondly, Munir gets to save his face, standing up to the reputation of a “legitimate” leader, with whom foreign leaders would not hesitate to engage directly. 

A New Nuclear Command: First country to have a military leader in command of nuclear weapons

Perhaps the most profound shift concerns nuclear oversight. The amendment introduces the position of Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), a role directly under the CDF and responsible for all operational control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Previously, the nuclear launch authority sat within the National Command Authority, where both civilian and military leadership helped maintain a system of shared judgment.

Now, Munir commands the only finger on the button that matters.

This change shortens the chain of command in nuclear decision-making—something Pakistan justifies as necessary for deterrence against India. But a faster chain of command also reduces the time available for deliberation during crises, magnifying the risk of miscalculation. Moreover, placing nuclear authority solely under the Army eliminates institutional checks that are vital in a region marked by frequent militarized crises.

Such a move makes Pakistan the only nuclear country in the world where the sole command to authorize a strike rests with a military officer. Experts have historically warned that centralizing nuclear authority to a single military office poses serious dangers of weakened political oversight and increased risk of misperception and escalation. 

Can Military Centralization Fix Domestic Instability?

Supporters argue that stronger centralized command is essential to confront Pakistan’s rapidly deteriorating internal security environment. Over 1,000 Pakistanis have been killed in terrorist incidents this year, as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), among other militant organizations, regain operational reach and recruits.

Simultaneously, Baloch separatists have intensified attacks against Chinese personnel and critical infrastructure—a trend that threatens Pakistan’s major economic partnerships. Munir’s response has focused not on reforming intelligence agencies or reforming counterinsurgency policies but on kinetic pressure: cross-border missile strikes into Afghanistan, collective punishment in tribal districts, and crackdowns on political dissent framed as counterterrorism.

These operations have failed to reduce militant capabilities. Instead, they have deepened local resentment and produced blowback in the form of increased militant recruitment.

The 27th Amendment gives Munir even more control over internal security, but it does not equip Pakistan with the governance tools needed to address the political grievances driving these insurgencies. Military rule may offer speed and force, but it cannot deliver legitimacy—or peace—on its own.

India’s Deterrence Calculus Has Already Shifted

For decades, Pakistan’s nuclear signaling deterred India from responding militarily to Pakistan-based militant attacks. That strategic reality has changed as India’s ground and air operations over the past decade demonstrate a willingness to escalate even under the shadow of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan’s low-threshold nuclear doctrine—threatening early first use if India attempts even limited operations—has therefore lost credibility in New Delhi.

Munir’s control over nuclear forces may accelerate crisis escalation rather than prevent it. With fewer voices involved in decision-making and a nuclear doctrine that encourages rapid activation, India may find itself forced to preempt or retaliate quickly in a future confrontation.

And in a region where crises often begin with terrorist attacks, Pakistan claims no responsibility for; the risk of miscalculation is not theoretical—it is imminent. As I have recently warned in my analysis for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a terror strike in New Delhi or Kashmir could rapidly transform into a conventional conflict fought under nuclear constraints, which neither state has truly tested.

Conclusion: The Strategic Cost of Militarized Stability

Pakistan’s leaders may believe that empowering the military is the only path to stability, especially amid political turbulence and economic crisis. But this amendment represents a paradox: a move justified in the name of security that may, in practice, make Pakistan—and the region—less secure.

Civilian authority is weakened, nuclear oversight is narrowed, internal grievances are unaddressed, and India’s evolving military posture further undermines Pakistan’s deterrent signaling. Munir now has the authority he has long operated with in practice. What Pakistan has surrendered in return is the institutional balance that once provided guardrails against rash escalation.

Pakistan is now a nuclear-armed country confronted by resurgent insurgencies, political instability, and hostile borders—yet governed by a security model that empowers one military commander with unchecked authority. The 27th Amendment does not strengthen Pakistan’s democracy or make nuclear war less likely. It does the opposite: it increases the speed of decision-making while decreasing the diversity of voices shaping those decisions.

As Pakistan enters this new era of legally sanctioned military supremacy, regional stability hinges on the judgment of a single leader commanding a nuclear arsenal built on a doctrine of early use. For a country defined by volatility, the future now balances on the narrowest margin imaginable.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.