In a video message widely shared on social media, Shaykh Rahmani raised the critical question: “What is the Islamic status of the neighboring country, Pakistan? And given the current situation there, can it truly be said that an Islamic government or Islamic system is functioning?”

He argued that both India and Pakistan operate under similar democratic structures and that Pakistan’s creation in 1947 was driven more by political ambition than by Islamic principles. “Pakistan was not founded on Islamic ideals,” he said. “Those behind the partition were primarily motivated by worldly interests — positions, power, and authority.”

Shaykh Rahmani referenced the position of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a key figure in India’s independence movement and an influential Islamic thinker, who had strongly opposed the partition of British India.

“Maulana Azad clearly stated that India was our homeland — where we were born and where we would die. That vision remains significant even today,” Rahmani noted, adding that for many Indian Muslims, India continues to be a safer and more stable environment than Pakistan.

Highlighting the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan, he expressed concern over the prevalence of extremist violence.

“We are witnessing a troubling frequency of murders — of children, women, the elderly, and religious scholars. The ideology behind many of these acts is similar to that of the historical Kharijites — a radical sect known for their extremism and violence,” he stated.

Shaykh Rahmani also condemned the use of religious institutions in Pakistan for political purposes. “Mosques and madrasas, which should be centers of learning and spiritual guidance, are being used as shields and platforms for political demands. This is not the way of the Muslim Ummah — it is the path of the Kharijites.”

Calling for a more informed and principled approach, he cautioned Muslims around the world not to be swayed by emotional or romanticized views of Pakistan. “Some may think Pakistan is beneficial for Islam or for Muslims. But history tells us otherwise — scholars have been assassinated, and sacred institutions misused.”

He concluded with a prayer: “Such policies can never be classified as Islamic. They mirror the practices of the Kharijites. May God protect us from all forms of evil and chaos.”

Shaykh Rahmani’s remarks are expected to stir conversation among Muslim communities across South Asia and beyond, especially as debates continue about statehood, religious authority, and the role of faith in governance.

Time and again, emotional appeals for street protests have been presented as the only recourse—akin to a one-size-fits-all remedy.

Last week, India’s Parliament passed the Waqf Amendment Bill, a piece of legislation aimed at reforming the management of Islamic charitable endowments known as Waqf properties. This move has sparked significant unease among Muslim organizations, civil society groups, and opposition political parties in the country. Despite appeals to India’s President, Droupadi Murmu, to withhold her approval, the bill has now been enacted into law.

Prominent political figures, including Muslim parliamentarians such as Asaduddin Owaisi of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehad Muslimeen, Mohammed Jawed of the Indian National Congress, and Amanatullah Khan, a Delhi legislator and chairman of the local Waqf Board from the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), have filed legal challenges in India’s Supreme Court, questioning the bill’s alignment with the nation’s constitution.

In contrast, Sanjay Raut, a member of parliament from Shiv Sena (UBT)—a regional political party—has indicated his party’s decision not to oppose the legislation, suggesting a divergence of views even among the government’s critics.

India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led central government defends the bill, asserting it is in the nation’s best interest. Key officials, including Kiren Rijiju, the Minister of Minority Affairs, and Amit Shah, the Minister of Home Affairs, have repeatedly emphasized that the law does not infringe on Muslim rights. Instead, they argue it seeks to improve the efficiency of Waqf Boards—bodies responsible for overseeing these endowments. The government has dismissed opposition claims that the bill undermines constitutional protections as baseless.

Nevertheless, a coalition of Muslim organizations, individuals, and opposition parties continues to argue that the legislation threatens the sanctity of mosques and graveyards managed under Waqf. Labeling it unconstitutional, these groups are mobilizing for nationwide protests, including large-scale sit-ins and street demonstrations, to demand the law’s repeal.

The Historical Context of Waqf Management

Before jumping to support calls for protests, it’s worth exploring the historical management of Waqf properties—endowments established under Islamic law for charitable purposes—since India’s independence in 1947. This moment of controversy offers a chance to reflect on how these assets, meant to serve religious and social welfare, have been handled over decades.

A 2011 report by the Sachar Committee, a government-appointed panel studying the socio-economic conditions of Indian Muslims, alongside data from the Central Waqf Council, revealed that over 50% of Waqf land in India is either encroached upon or tangled in legal disputes—a striking indicator of systemic mismanagement across regions and political regimes.

In Telangana, a southern Indian state never governed by the BJP, approximately 75% of Waqf land is reportedly encroached upon, with the figure rising to 82% in its capital, Hyderabad. This underscores that the problem transcends any single political party or central policy. These statistics challenge the narrative that the current uproar is solely a result of the national government’s actions and prompt scrutiny of the role local Waqf Boards and regional leaders played in allowing such widespread losses to occur.

The Gap Between Rhetoric and Results

For decades, the administration of Waqf properties—intended to fund education, healthcare, and welfare initiatives—has failed to deliver on its charitable promise. Despite controlling vast assets, the benefits to India’s Muslim community remain limited. This raises pressing questions about who has truly profited from Waqf properties since India’s independence, who bears responsibility for the encroachments, mismanagement, and misuse of these lands, and how many schools, hospitals, or welfare centers have been established using Waqf resources.

Furthermore, what actions were taken against those who exploited these endowments, and in what measurable ways has Waqf contributed to the economic advancement of Muslims? Calls for accountability and reform in Waqf management should have surfaced long ago. Instead, the same organizations now rallying for protests—many of which oversaw this decline—are accused of stirring emotions for political leverage.

Critics argue these self-proclaimed “guardians” of the Muslim community have historically mismanaged Waqf resources, often prioritizing personal or political gain over communal welfare.

The Myth of Wake-Up Calls

Much has been said about “wake-up calls” to galvanize India’s Muslim community. Yet, the reality suggests that community leaders and Waqf custodians were never dormant—they were simply focused elsewhere.

Many Waqf properties have been illegally occupied, with rents kept artificially low, allowing beneficiaries to exploit them for decades without oversight or adjustment. This pattern of neglect raises doubts about the sincerity of those now decrying the new law.

The Pattern of Response to Legislation

A recurring trend emerges in how certain groups react to laws perceived to affect Muslim interests in India. When the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC) were introduced—policies aimed at streamlining citizenship processes—similar fears were ignited, with claims that Muslims would be stripped of citizenship. Years after the CAA’s implementation, no widespread evidence of such disenfranchisement has emerged.

This history prompts questions about the opposition to the Waqf Amendment Bill: Are objections rooted in genuine threats to religious rights, or do they reflect an automatic resistance that ultimately serves political agendas rather than community well-being?

The Human Cost of Protest Without Protection

Time and again, emotional appeals for street protests have been presented as the only recourse—akin to a one-size-fits-all remedy.

During the CAA-NRC protests, fears of mass citizenship loss fueled widespread unrest. Yet, as Minister Kiren Rijiju noted during the Waqf bill debates, no Muslims have lost citizenship under CAA. Still, the fallout from such movements lingers: young Muslims arrested during protests against CAA, NRC, and earlier laws like the Triple Talaq ban often remain in jail, lacking legal or financial support from the groups that spurred them into action.

In Muzaffarnagar, a city in northern India, 24 Muslim youths faced legal notices simply for wearing black armbands as a symbolic dissent—not even a full protest—each required to post a ₹2 lakh (approximately $2,400 USD) bond. In Ahmedabad, a western Indian city, around 40 people were detained during demonstrations.

These cases highlight the risks to ordinary citizens when protests lack strategic planning, legal backing, or institutional support.

Before heeding new calls to protest, communities deserve to know whether organizers have secured proper permissions from authorities, are prepared to provide legal aid to those arrested, have a legal team in place, will accept responsibility for the outcomes, and will support the families of detainees financially and emotionally.

The Path Forward: Reform and Accountability

The current Waqf management system demands overhaul. Transparency, accountability, and effectiveness must take precedence over political maneuvering. Rather than blanket opposition, India’s Muslim community could benefit from demanding targeted amendments to problematic clauses in the bill instead of outright rejection, proposing governance models that balance religious autonomy with accountability, establishing independent oversight to track how Waqf resources serve the community, creating forums for community input into Waqf decisions, and developing long-term plans to leverage Waqf assets for education, healthcare, and economic growth.

From Reaction to Responsible Engagement

India’s Muslim community faces a pivotal choice. The current approach lacks strategy, unified leadership, negotiation, or internal reform—just a repetitive cycle of politicization until issues reach the courts. Continuing this pattern of protest and division is an option, but so is redirecting energy toward ensuring Waqf properties fulfill their charitable mission. The community must resist further manipulation.

For decades, Waqf assets have been plundered while leaders stood by. Now, as the government pushes for accountability, some of these same figures are accused of misleading the public once more.

True leadership goes beyond rallying crowds—it requires vision, strategy, and responsibility. By advocating for reforms that bring transparency and efficiency to Waqf management, the community can ensure these resources uplift its most vulnerable members and build enduring institutions for future generations.

The challenge is not merely whether to oppose a law, but how to ensure the sacred trust of Waqf serves its intended purpose: benefiting the community it was created to support.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Communist party slogans were added to mosque walls, and prayer services now include speeches emphasizing the Communist Party’s legitimacy rather than Quran recitations.

The demolition and alteration of mosques across China have raised concerns about the erosion of religious freedom and cultural assimilation. Protests against the so-called “renovation” of Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan province met with riot police, leaving locals feeling a profound sense of loss.

Similar changes have been observed at Doudian Mosque near Beijing, where architectural features and Islamic motifs have been removed, and surveillance cameras have been installed.

The Chinese government justifies these modifications as part of an effort to modernize and “harmonize” the mosques with Chinese culture.

Inside the mosque, an exhibition located off the main courtyard features a prominent panel encouraging worshippers to “promote unity” and “oppose division”.

The panel draws inspiration from both the Koran and traditional Chinese thinkers. Despite the modifications made to the exterior, passages from the Koran are still visible within the mosque, and the prayer hall remains unaltered.

A local resident describes the mosque as neither completely Chinese nor foreign in appearance, reflecting a unique blend of influences.

However, satellite imagery reveals that over 1,700 mosques have been altered, stripped, or destroyed, particularly in regions with high Muslim populations. In Ningxia and Gansu provinces, more than 80% of mosques with Islamic architecture have had features removed.

The scale and systematic nature of these alterations have been exposed by an investigation by the Financial Times (FT), the first to document the extent of this policy. Newyork-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) has condemned these changes, arguing that they violate the freedom of religion enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

A report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute also revealed the destruction and renovation of mosques in Xinjiang, with two-thirds of them modified since 2017. The Chinese government claims to respect and protect religious freedom, maintaining that renovations aim to protect and meet the religious requirements of worshippers.

China is home to approximately 20 million Muslims, including the Uighurs in Xinjiang and the Hui ethnic group. While the Uighurs have faced severe repression, the Hui Muslims have enjoyed relatively broader religious freedoms due to their perceived adherence to Chinese culture and language.

According to James Leibold, a renowned expert on China’s ethnic policies at La Trobe University in Australia, the Chinese state perceives the Hui Muslims as the “model Muslims”. They are considered “good Muslims” because they speak the Chinese language, adhere to essential aspects of Chinese culture, and are viewed as trustworthy by the authorities.

Hui Muslims are dispersed throughout China and have comparatively more extensive religious freedoms, especially when compared to Muslim communities belonging to Turkic groups like the Uyghurs.

However, Chinese authorities have implemented various restrictions on Islam in Xinjiang over the past two decades, beginning with surveillance and limitations on worship. Over time, the Uyghurs have faced widespread detentions in purpose-built camps, intense surveillance, and travel restrictions, actions that the United Nations has characterized as potential “crimes against humanity”.

Beijing argues that its policies in Xinjiang are necessary to combat terrorism, foster unity, and promote economic development. The promotion of shared cultural values has also been cited as a justification for the removal of non-Chinese elements from mosques in other parts of the country.

However, the sinicisation policy seeks to assimilate non-Chinese groups and religions into what is considered Chinese culture. The removal of mosque features is a visible manifestation of this policy, signaling a redefinition of the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and religion.

Hui Muslims now fear that their religious freedoms will also be curtailed. The sinicisation policy aims to “Han-ify” all Muslims, eradicating Islam from their lives and suppressing prayer and religious study.

This cultural transformation has left Hui Muslims despondent and concerned about the increasing similarities between the treatment of Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims. While some believe that the situation will not escalate to the extent seen in the Uighur camps, the mood remains apprehensive.

Najiaying mosque, Yunnan (pictures before after)

Turning Point in China’s Religious Policies

China’s religious landscape has witnessed significant changes in recent decades, particularly affecting the Hui Muslim community.

Over the centuries, Hui Muslims have constructed mosques in diverse architectural styles, reflecting the cultural and temporal contexts of their construction. However, the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s resulted in the destruction of numerous religious buildings, including mosques.

After Mao Zedong’s death, a shift towards Arabic-style structures emerged. During the liberal era of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, there was a surge in mosque construction featuring domed prayer halls and tall minarets, reflecting an admiration for Arabic architectural aesthetics.

Scholars point to Xi Jinping’s ascension to the presidency in 2013 as a turning point in China’s religious policies.

As a leader from the Han Chinese ethnic majority, Xi has expanded the Communist Party’s control over various aspects of daily life, consolidating power to a degree not seen since Mao. His promotion of Han ethnic nationalism in the name of socialism with Chinese characteristics represents a departure from previous Communist party leaders.

In 2014, Xi Jinping emphasized cultural unity at the Central Ethnic Work Conference. The following year, he called for the “sinicisation” of religion in China, considering Islamic architecture and symbolism as threats to ideological purity and cultural security.

Xi’s perspective, according to experts like Leibold, views Islamic elements as dangerous due to their perceived foreign, anti-Han nature.

In 2017, the Islamic Association of China, a government body overseeing Islam, criticized mosques for “copying foreign styles”. Officials denounced the “Arabization” of mosques, citing excessive size and extravagant decoration, accusing them of wasting resources. The meeting emphasized the need for mosque architecture to align with national characteristics.

Two years later, the government formalized these sentiments in the “Five-Year Plan on the Sinicisation of Islam”. The plan aimed to standardize Chinese-style practices in Islamic attire, ceremonies, and architecture. It also called for the development of an Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics. Critics argue that these policies create an impression that Islam can never be “Chinese enough”.

Accounts from Hui individuals, such as Mohammed from Ningxia, recount the demolition of mosque domes despite local farmers’ attempts to protect them.

Communist party slogans were added to mosque walls, and prayer services now include speeches emphasizing the Communist Party’s legitimacy rather than Quran recitations. Procurement documents from local governments corroborate the experiences of Hui Muslim communities.

China’s religious policy shift extends beyond Hui Muslims. The government has targeted other religions as well, removing crosses from Christian churches and demolishing prominent religious sites like the Golden Lampstand Church in Shanxi province in 2018. The destruction of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet began before the implementation of the sinicisation policy.

The alteration of mosque architecture, the insertion of political messages, and the targeting of other religious groups raise concerns about religious freedom and cultural diversity in contemporary China.

Government Influence and Restrictions on Mosques

To control the influence of religion, the government has forbidden online material advocating religions to minors. Some local authorities have circulated notices prohibiting individuals under the age of 18 from entering religious sites or practicing religion altogether.

Additionally, current and retired civil servants have been informed that their benefits may be revoked if they engage in religious activities more than a few times per year. These measures have resulted in reduced attendance at mosques and limited religious participation.

In 2018, the government’s Islamic Association of China mandated that mosques organize patriotic activities, such as raising the national flag, and establish study groups focused on socialist values, the constitution, and traditional Chinese culture. These requirements aim to align religious practices with the government’s ideology and promote cultural unity.

Under the policy of “combining mosque congregations”, local governments have targeted mosques for consolidation and demolition. According to historian Theaker, this consolidation is justified based on the reduced attendance caused by the government’s restrictive policies.

Local government documents reveal that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia are under threat of consolidation, accounting for approximately one-third of all mosques in the province. The demolition of prominent mosques, such as the Weizhou Grand Mosque, has caused distress and sparked resistance among Hui Muslims.

In an effort to diminish Islamic visibility, various regions in China have removed Islamic symbols from public view. Additionally, Chinese state media reports that several regions have abolished halal certification standards, with officials associating the spread of halal markers on goods with religious extremism.

While some Hui Muslims have attempted to resist government actions, their efforts have often been met with suppression. Local protests temporarily delayed changes at the Weizhou Grand Mosque in 2018, and renovations to the Xiguan Mosque in Lanzhou city were postponed.

According to Bitter Winter, an online magazine focusing on religious freedoms in China, the remodelling of the Weizhou Grand Mosque commenced in 2019. Online photos indicate that by November 2023, local authorities in Gansu had removed the dome and minarets of the Xiguan Mosque.

However, the authorities ultimately prevailed, and the remodelling of these mosques began. Instances of protests being forcefully quelled, such as the riot police intervention at Ding’s Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan, highlight the challenges faced by those opposing government actions.

The analysis of 2,312 mosques in China provides valuable insights into the wide-scale modifications that have occurred between 2018 and 2023 as a result of the sinicization policy. The removal of Arabic-style features from 74.3 percent of the examined mosques indicates a significant shift in their architectural identity.

Despite resistance, Hui Muslims express concerns about the gradual decline of religion among younger generations and the competition between religious and modern lifestyles. The government’s success in suppressing religion raises fears about the future of Islam in China.

The announcement of this abrupt disengagement sounded like a bomb.

Under the leadership of the new head of the World Islamic League, Mohammed Bin Abdulkarim Al-Issa, a close to the crown prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia announced in January that it would separate from the mosques it control in the West.

But five months later, Riyadh did not find takers. And this Saudi disengagement raises fears of a takeover of these mosques by even more radical actors. The mosques in question are coveted by some disreputable states, such as Erdogan’s Turkey, and by non-state groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist movements.

Last January 19, the Saudi Arabian Mohammed Bin Abdulkarim Al-Issa, passing by on the shores of Lake Geneva, declared in Le Matin dimanche, a Sunday newspaper published in Lausanne, that the Muslim World League (MWL), the religious arm of the kingdom, was disengaging from the Geneva’s Grand Mosque. And that the same arrangements will be made in the West. Saudi Arabia will no longer finance and manage places of worship.

“Everywhere, there will be a local board of directors, set up in coordination with the national authorities. Notably for security reasons,” says the former Saudi Minister of Justice, who is close to Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. The choice of Geneva is not innocent.

In 1961 he opened the Islamic Centre of Geneva (CIG), in the Eaux-Vives district. The following year, Said Ramadan, spokesman of the Brotherhood in Europe, participated in the creation of the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Alam el-Islami) in Mecca in 1962. But in the 1970s, for obscure reasons, the rupture was effective between the Muslim World League and Said Ramadan. Not only did the Saudis cut him completely off, but they also created a competing place of worship, at Petit-Saconnex, in the neighborhood of the international organizations and the European headquarters of the UN.

A large white marble mosque, inaugurated with pomp and circumstance in 1978 by King Khaled Bin Abdelaziz, in the presence of the President of the Confederation. A prestigious building, endowed with significant financial resources, which has never ceased to marginalize the Islamic Centre of Geneva, now run by Hani Ramadan, one of Said Ramadan’s sons. Mohammed Bin Abdulkarim Al-Issa, elected in 2016 as Secretary General of the MWL, has also headed the Islamic Cultural Foundation of Geneva, which manages the Grand Mosque.

A year later, during his meeting with Pope Francis, the former Saudi Minister of Justice announced that “the true message of Islam in the world is a message of peace, love and respect, and notably the respect, by Muslims, of the laws and institutions of the countries and territories where they live”. In Geneva, he immediately cleaned up the mess, dismissing the director of the Grand Mosque, two imams and the head of security, who were on the “S” list in France.

“It is time to entrust the Geneva Mosque to a representative Swiss board of directors, with an elected president,” says the secretary general of the Muslim World League. He mentions a consultation of local Muslims “with the help of the Swiss authorities”, adding that for security reasons “we must ensure that the mosques are placed in safe hands, obviously. Then we will not intervene anymore”.

The announcement of this abrupt disengagement sounded like a bomb. But the enthusiasm soon faded away. Especially with the coronavirus outbreak and the lockdown. How could the Muslims take charge of the often prestigious places of worship from one day to the next? Geneva’s Grand Mosque employs 17 people. It is not only a place of prayer. It has a library, a school, a sports hall, a morgue.

And how can we prevent other countries or radical movements from trying to take control of all these mosques? Hasni Abidi, Director of the Centre for Studies and Research on the Arab and Mediterranean World, was quick to react, confident in the Swiss press: “Several states have views on the mosque and are following its development, such as Morocco, Turkey and Bosnia. If the withdrawal of the MWL was like offering a gift to another state, it would be a poisoned gift”.

Funding problems are not unique to Geneva, they occur in the same way in other mosques in Europe, in Brussels, Copenhagen, Madrid, Mantes-la-Jolie, Sarajevo. As for France, a secular country, it simply does not have the power to intervene in the constitution of a board of directors that could take over from the Muslim World League in the mosques that the League had controlled until then.

Since the announcement made on January, Mohammed Bin Abdulkarim Al-Issa himself admitted that he has not found any takers. But he would not go back on his decision: Saudi Arabia still intends to disengage. The question is how.

Piece first appeared on Global Watch Analysis.

Ian Hamel is the correspondent for French magazine LePoint, in Switzerland. After studying journalism in Strasbourg, he worked for several media in South America and then in Africa.

It’s the blind and superstitious belief which neither conforms to Islamic jurisprudence nor does science approve it

To contain the spread of novel coronavirus, Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz announced that curfew to be imposed for 21 days from 7 pm until 6 am starting from the evening of 23^rd March — a step Saudi Arabia has taken to forcefully implement “social distancing” which is the only suggestion scientific communities have given as of now.

The first step Kingdom took in order to contain coronavirus, was to lock-down the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah on 27^th February, and on 17^th March the authorities suspended prayers in all the mosques.

Is it a sign of “weak-faith” to lock-down Makkah and Madinah?

A lot of fanatical Muslim groups have raised objections to these precautionary steps by calling it as a sign of “weak faith”.

Muslims in some of the Asian countries still visit the mosques to attend the daily prayers calling it as “spirit of faith” to fight the coronavirus. They are badly brainwashed to believe that social distancing and the closure of mosques is the sign of weak faith, hence Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations are weak in their faith.

I was indeed surprised to watch a Hindu reporter asking an Indian Moulana recently in a televised interview about why they still choose to attend Friday prayers despite a lot of Muslim countries have suspended it.

The response of the Moulana was hilarious. He said, “they don’t know Islam, had they known Islam, they wouldn’t have done it”.

It’s the blind and superstitious belief which neither conforms to Islamic jurisprudence nor does science approve it.

Indeed blind-faith has caused a great deal loss to Iran. Despite the news of coronavirus outbreak, regime followers were even seen licking the gates of Imam Ali Reza shrine and made videos promoting this maniacal attitude.

And a few days later, coronavirus has claimed lives of over 1800 Iranian citizens and even top regime officials, while more than 23,000 are badly infected.

It’s because of such people Islam and Muslims become a mere laughing stock for the world.

On the other hand, the steps Saudi Arabia has taken from the day one are applauded by analysts and other international communities, despite these steps has had impacted revenue sectors.

How second Caliph of Islam dealt with the pandemic outbreak?

While I was doing an Urdu talk-show last week with a UK-based Muslim thinker Shoaib Hussain on the topic of Coronavirus outbreak and the Muslim response.

He called Saudi Arabia’s response as a “matured step” and then he cited a couple of incidents from the life of second caliph of Islam Umar bin al-Khattab.

The incidents are quite interesting and they fit exactly under the current situation.

The incident is documented in the Hadith of Muwatta al-Malik (Book 45, Hadith 1621).

It states that, Umar bin al-Khattab set out for Syria and when he was at a place called as Sargh near Tabuk, the commanders of the army Abu Ubayda bin Jarrah and his companions met him and told him that the plague had broken out in Syria.

Al-Khattab called his advisors to understand if leaving for Syria would be better. They advised, “We think that you should withdraw the people and not send them towards the plague.”

Al-Khattab finally decided to return and cancelled the plan for Syria.

However, one of his companions asked “Is it flight from the decree of Allah?” 

Al-Khattab’s response was something that needs to be written with golden ink. He said, “Yes. We flee from the decree of Allah to the decree of Allah”.

He explained his statement with a parable, “What would you think if these camels had gone down into a valley which had two slopes, one of them fertile, and the other barren. If you pastured in the fertile part, wouldn’t you pasture them by the decree of Allah? If you pastured them in the barren part, wouldn’t you pasture them by the decree of Allah?”

Imam Ibn Katheer quoted Prophet Muhammad saying, “Do not put a sick one with a healthy one.” “Flee from the leper as you would flee from a lion.”

Shoaib Hussain added, “likewise when the companions of the Prophet faced the plague of Al-Amwaas their commander ordered them with social distancing and God saved them from the plague by that”.

Conclusion

It’s illogical of these fanatical Muslim groups to oppose what is mentioned in the Prophetic traditions and the modern scientific discoveries. The time is still on and the coronavirus clock has not yet ticked the Asian countries like it did to Iran and Italy.

So, take the social distancing seriously, and comply with the governments’ decisions.

Remember, if ignorance is a threat then delusion of being knowledgeable is a life-taking threat.

Better to be safe than sorry.

Zahack Tanvir is a Computer Engineer based in Saudi Arabia. He holds Diploma in Journalism from London School of Journalism. He regularly writes for MilliChronicle on socio-political issues. He tweets under @ZahackTanvir.