The IMF and World Bank are still assessing whether the Oct. 9-15 meetings can be safely held in Marrakech, just 45 miles (72 kilometres) from the site of the 6.8-magnitude quake that killed more than 2,900 people last Friday.

The meetings would bring 10,000 to 15,000 people to the tourist hub, which suffered some damage to its ancient medina quarter and is the main conduit for relief efforts to areas worst-hit by the quake in the High Atlas Mountains.

Officials at the IMF and World Bank are assessing whether the meetings would inhibit recovery efforts, the sources said on condition of anonymity because the deliberations are private.

Other considerations are security and lodging safety and whether Marrakech’s infrastructure, including water and power systems and hospitals can handle the influx of people without straining the country’s resources.

Morocco’s central bank governor, Abdellatif Jouahri, told a “Road to Marrakech” central banking conference on Thursday that the meetings would take place as planned, in one of the first official government comments on the matter. The conference was being held in preparation for the meetings, he said.

A spokesperson for Morocco’s embassy in Washington also told Reuters in an email: “I am pleased to inform you that the government of Morocco will go ahead with the annual meeting as scheduled despite the earthquake.”

Pressing For An Answer

The comments showed strong pressure from the North African country for the IMF and World Bank to forge ahead with meetings that would bring significant revenue to Morocco and shine a global spotlight on its resilience and strong economic policies.

The institutions have traditionally held their annual meetings every third year in a member country, and the Marrakech meetings have already been delayed two years in a row due to COVID-19.

Spokespeople for the World Bank and IMF declined to comment on the institutions’ deliberations over the meetings, referring reporters to a Sept. 10 joint statement expressing solidarity with and financial support for Morocco and a “willingness to support Morocco in the best way possible.”

An IMF spokesperson said however, that past annual meetings abroad, including in Bali in 2018, provided a boost to host country tourism and local business owners, with the tourism impact alone “estimated in the tens of millions of dollars.”

The sources familiar with the deliberations said the site for the Marrakech meetings, a campus of temporary structures and large tents on the outskirts, was undamaged and functioning.

One of the sources said the Bank and Fund were considering how the structures could be repurposed later for relief efforts and how the meeting agenda could focus on aid.

The monarch’s hospital visit, reported by state media, demonstrated his commitment to offering support and solidarity to those affected by the tragedy. During his visit to Marrakesh University Hospital, King Mohammed VI inquired about the well-being of the injured and made a blood donation to further contribute to relief efforts.

According to the official MAP news agency, King Mohammed VI arrived at Marrakesh University Hospital to meet with survivors and hospital staff. The visit aimed to express the King’s concern for the victims and to gain firsthand knowledge of their conditions. By personally engaging with those affected by the earthquake, the monarch conveyed his compassion and support to the individuals and families grappling with the aftermath of the disaster.

During his time at the hospital, King Mohammed VI took the opportunity to inquire about the state of health of the injured, demonstrating his sincere interest in their well-being and recovery. The monarch’s presence and encouragement undoubtedly provided solace and reassurance to the victims, their families, and the medical professionals working tirelessly to provide care.

In a display of solidarity, King Mohammed VI also made a blood donation during his visit. This act not only highlighted the importance of blood donations in times of crisis but also served as an example to inspire others to contribute to relief efforts. The King’s personal donation aimed to encourage citizens to support their fellow countrymen and help alleviate the suffering caused by the earthquake.

The devastating earthquake that struck Morocco last week has left a profound impact on the nation. The visit of King Mohammed VI to the hospital reaffirms his commitment to the well-being of his people and his determination to provide support in times of crisis. The monarch’s presence serves as a source of strength and unity, fostering a sense of resilience and hope in the face of adversity.

The Moroccan government, along with international aid organizations, has been working tirelessly to provide assistance to those affected by the earthquake. The visit of King Mohammed VI underscores the collective effort to offer immediate relief, medical care, and essential supplies to those in need. It also highlights the importance of a compassionate and hands-on leadership approach in times of national emergencies.

As Morocco continues to recover and rebuild in the aftermath of the earthquake, the visit of King Mohammed VI to the hospital serves as a source of inspiration and solidarity. The King’s personal engagement and support send a powerful message of unity and resilience, demonstrating that the nation stands together in the face of adversity.

The announcement confirmed a statement earlier from Morocco’s royal palace, which said Israel’s position had been expressed in a letter to King Mohammed VI from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israel was considering opening a consulate in Dakhla, the statement said.

Morocco considers Western Sahara its own territory, but the Algerian-backed Polisario Front wants an independent state there. In 2020, then-U.S. President Donald Trump recognised Morocco’s claim to the territory in return for Morocco’s resumption of diplomatic ties with Israel.

The Israeli position “will be sent to the United Nations, regional and international organisations”, the statement from Morocco’s royal palace quotes the letter as saying.

Twenty-eight other countries – mostly African and Arab – have opened consulates in Dakhla or the city of Laayoune, in what Morocco sees as tangible support for its Western Saharan rule.

Israel’s position on Western Sahara was “clear-cut” and adds to the momentum in Morocco’s favour, after Washington and Madrid, in addition to other European capitals, supported its plan for the territory, a senior Moroccan government official told Reuters.

The Israeli recognition would not affect Morocco’s “principles” in defending the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he added.

Morocco expects the decision to encourage Israeli investments in the territory, he said. As an indication of warming ties, the Israeli military earlier on Monday appointed a colonel as defence attaché to Morocco.

Since the resumption of ties, Morocco and Israel have signed cooperation agreements, including a defence pact.

Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen said the announcement by the prime minister would “strengthen the relations between the countries and between the peoples and the continuation of cooperation to deepen regional peace and stability”.

Events in the Arab world, and in particular the fall of the Libyan regime of Gaddafi, have only reinforced the security vacuum in the Sahel-Saharan zone. The crisis in Mali will ease the security risks due to terrorist networks. At the same time, foreign military interventions in the region (Serval, Sangaris) demonstrate the priority that European states give to security risks in the region.

The chief among them has been France, which in 2013 launched Operation Serval to push back a terrorist incursion in the North. This was followed by other such counterterrorist and security support operations in 2014 and mid-July 2020, in the weeks leading up to the coup. Combat operations in the Sahel to repel the sprawling terrorist infrastructure continued in the years leading up to these events, with the United States joining the fray alongside France in Niger and other areas of operation.

While the Operation Barhkhane launched in 2014 continued for the years to come and the bulk of it was handled by troops, other governments such as Denmark, United Kingdom, and Estonia contributed helicopters and various air lift equipment and troops to the effort. Despite the involvement of at least ten European countries, support by various international institutions, the involvement of NATO, and US backing, however, the challenges remained great for a number of reasons.

First is the issue of the logistical integration of these forces. Quite simply, despite the dedication of the French and other troops, and the contribution of sophisticated equipment, running such operations in a hostile environment is a challenge, and even joint training exercises elsewhere are not a substitute for dealing day in and out with complex asymmetrical challenges.

Second, is the corruption of weak local government, which have spent a great deal of the money dedicated towards counterinsurgency elsewhere, to the point that European countries have decided to reallocate this funding towards direct involvement on the ground. Corrupt and weak governments are not well position to provide the logistical support, intelligence, and manpower needed to address these challenges.

Third refers to conflicting visions for the future of Sahel. European states and their US partners are not operating in an isolated environment but rather rely on the goodwill and interests of neighboring states. However, other African countries have their interests and agendas, and perhaps, have a different perspective on the security challenges and the proliferation of jihadist groups. Competing intelligence groups and defense mechanisms contribute to the proliferation of issues, and create additional political tensions. Both the financial and the human resources dedicated to  these operations, without a doubt, have been substantial and to some degree successful; hundreds of terrorists have been liquidated by France alone.

This did not prevent the coup d’etat in Mali. The reasons are known, the main one being the corruption of the regime. However, as others point, out the problems in Mali are deep-rooted; the political corruption permeates the system and the political culture, getting rid of the head of state will not change these issues overnight.

For the countries of North Africa, including Morocco (which we cite as a practical example), the developments in the Sahelo-Saharan zone (which range from banditry to jihadist Salafism, including separatism and power conflicts as well as drought, desertification and the food crisis) have become one of their toughest challenges in terms of security policy. These concerns must be tackled alongside the interests of the EU and other European countries involved in the operation and in agreement with them.

The case of Morocco
Morocco and South-South Cooperation

Morocco has made its choice: south-south cooperation.
King Mohamed VI has placed Morocco at the heart of South-South cooperation and at the service of Africa, committing both financially and politically to African development.

For their part, Moroccan entrepreneurs include an African component in their strategy in several forms: subsidiaries, partnerships, hubs, co-development, etc. All of these joint ventures are blossoming all over the continent, thanks to Morocco’s overall foreign policy direction, which also guides the focus of business efforts. Moroccans see the African pivot as an opportunity to invest into promising rising entrepreneurial hubs, evading continuous dependency on EU, which is also facing economic challenges. For some, this direction also carries the promise of leaving the yoke of colonialist baggage behind.

Expertise fueling these growing efforts has been acquired over time through Morocco’s strategic partnership with Europe. This partnership has been upgraded and boosted with cash infusions in 2019 with regards to various forms of cooperation, including on security and development.

Morocco-Africa: Royal diplomacy

The pivotal moment for Morocco’s strategic policy reorientation can be inferred from the founding speech of King Mohammed VI for South-South cooperation on February 24, 2014. Since then, Morocco has been moving away from identifying itself with the Middle East and had increasingly sought to integrate into the African Union and to realign its political and cultural priorities accordingly.

What are the Challenges?

The stakes are high: Morocco can take advantage of its geographical location and its strategic relations with its European, American, Gulf and Mediterranean trading partners to position itself as an economic and financial hub towards the African continent.

Royal diplomacy has never been at the heart of the news, due to the exceptional visibility of King Mohamed VI in Africa. In other words, the diplomats who would otherwise be carrying out various implementation task related to the strategic fulfillment of this mission relied on King Mohammed VI’s high level involvement with heads of states to put in motion high level policies which would then trickle down to be executed by officials. But the ironing out of specific diplomatic details ended up being neglected in the process.

Goals

The objective of the programs seemed clear and sufficiently beneficial: Serving as a bulwark against extremism and religious terrorism, exploring business opportunities on a promising continent, strengthening Moroccan regional leadership. However, as a result of diplomatic non-involvement and failure to negotiate good deals on a practical level beyond high level agreements, which were supposed to serve as a lodestar, not a substitute for professional diplomacy. Morocco has paid dearly for this competition at the level of the former colonies of France. The return on these diplomatic efforts has been at the risk of cancellation through foreign backed meddling, such as the recent coup in Mali. This could partly explain the media campaign led by Paris against Rabat.

Religious cooperation: A competition between Morocco and Mali

Moroccan Islam described as “Islam of the golden mean”

Former Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta and King Mohammed VI signed a Memorandum of Understanding on September 20, 2013 on the training of imams which enabled the establishment of a training program for 500 imams over a period of two years. This training, carried out in 2 years, devoted mainly to the study of the Malikite rite and the moral doctrine which rejects any form of excommunication. We have had an opportunity to visit the imam training center in Morocco and to witness in person the type of curriculum such imams would be exposed to and take back to their countries. It is a diverse and enriching program, which also teaches about other religions, and gives the trainees access to obtaining practical skills in addition to theological grounding.

Between Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar and Mali (and also the region)

Saudi Arabia and Iran: Both countries had funded religious missions and charitable activities to spread their Salafist and Shiite beliefs respectively and exert ideological and religious influence in the region. This was particular concerning before 2017, when Saudi Arabia had moved to enforce the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood influence over Islam in the Kingdom and curtailed any activities which could be perceived as extremist. Much of its humanitarian and theological outreach in Africa is now being handled through the Muslim World League (MWL), which has dedicated its mission to promoting tolerance in its own manner.

However, Qatar (Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood), and its counterpart in African outreach, Turkey, have not undergone any form of reform or liberalization, and on the country had doubled down on investing into Islamist institutions and ideology in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, they are pandering to certain constituencies by critiquing the Moroccan programming and Saudi reforms as forms of heresy.

Failure of Moroccan intelligence services in Mali

Like other countries, including mainly France, Morocco has done everything to strengthen its importance as a state capable of contributing to the securing, stabilization and development of the Sahelo-Saharan region. These contributions would develop in an exceptional way on the basis of its intelligence services, deemed competent according to a certain Moroccan press and the testimonies of certain officers. But this effort failed, for reasons which remain an enigma. Our sources murmur one of the reasons: a certain purge at the level of foreign affairs, in particular. Some diplomats, who dream of taking the place of the technocrat Nasser Bourita (the Foreign Minister), whom they deem “non-political and …”, spend more time publishing “Tribunes” (and other outlets of that sort) than performing the more challenging and less visibly rewarding tasks of that profession. Other services are made conspicuous by their absence.

But King Mohamed VI has a winning card

According to our sources, this card demonstrated, despite its bitterness and its problems with the Makhzen (the Moroccan system), its availability, through nationalism to use its moral authority and its networks in Mali and elsewhere, in the service of Morocco.
We cannot disclose the identity of this personality at his request. “Security obliges”. However, we can share that this individual is the most influential and respected leader still alive since Youssoufi.

Irina Tsukerman is a New-York based Human Rights Lawyer, and National Security Analyst. She tweets under @irinatsukerman.

D. Blumann is a New York based international serial entrepreneur, Geo-Strategist and National Security Analyst.

Introduction

The “Digital Citizenship” association has taken note of the AI report published on June 22, 2020 relating to allegations concerning attacks on Omar Radi’s phone.

The association consulted several experts

• Citizen Lab (University of Toronto Laboratory): contacted on July 22, relaunched on August 04, this organization did not respond to our request.

• Homodigitalis (Greek NGO specializing in digital rights): contacted on August 04, our request was not answered.

• M.O. Jones (journalist and social media specialist): Contacted on twitter on July 16, he did not respond to our request.

• Access Now (NGO specialized in the digital protection of human rights defenders): This NGO replied: “Unfortunately this type of requests is not something our Helpline can assist you with as we don’t have the needed experience with state sponsored malware to provide accurate answers on your questions “.

• Tsukerman (Human rights defender, lawyer and researcher in digital rights): Her expertise is set out below.

Expertise

Amnesty International produced findings from its investigations which appear to pointed to repeated penetrations of O R’s phone.

However, several factors call these findings into question:

First, no independent examination of this device has been conducted. Amnesty International expects the world to rely on its technical expertise but its own record calls this into question.

For instance, NY Times has withdrawn a Reuters article containing this report. It has apparently sent a known hacker to correspond with the Moroccan authorities in light of its investigation. A recent Tel Aviv court decision related to Amnesty complaint about NSO likewise faulted Amnesty for lack of technical evidence. Furthermore, cybersecurity experts interviewed from a range of countries with respect to this and related complaints, ranging from Eastern European, Australian, and Indian, to American and Israeli (including those interviewed directly by me on matters related to NSO and human rights), have all concluded that contrary to Amnesty claims, tracing Pegasus is practically, if not completely, impossible, nor does it operate through Whatsapp messaging as Jeff Bezos, Facebook, and Amnesty have all claimed.

American Middle East and cybersecurity expert Benjamin Minick vociferously called on Amnesty to release the technical data used to compile this result so that he and others could could conduct an examination, adding that all of the evidence provided is dubious. Specifically, he explained that the report, rather than unveiling any previous attacks, actually instructs would-be hackers how to conduct one, and is useless in terms of understanding whether or not any penetration has been conducted, given that there is no way to technically examine an Apple product. Merely knowing the names of the files provided does not actually shed light on any relevant security information.

(Apple has been in the center of controversy related to the demand for backdoor options by various governments). He confirmed that the the files provided could be manipulated by people conducting the investigation.

Other red flags casting doubt on the veracity of this claim:

Omar Radi himself has been part of this investigation, which calls into question the authenticity of evidence provided to investigators. In a similar vein, many, if not all of all past reports of NSO/Pegasus applications, Amnesty have put out in the past have likewise relied heavily on the testimony of activists involved, including those with a clear political agenda such as Omar Abdulaziz, Jamal Khashoggi’s former business partner. In other instances, activists called to testify regarding hacked devices, never had physical access to said devices, such as in the instance of Jeff Bezos and his “security team”. Bezos allegations were likewise widely dismissed by technical experts and eventually retracted even by Washington Post itself.The claims and technical reports in these cases have been substantially similar. (see the internal links in the Bezos report for links to the technical analysis of those claims).

Furthermore, Amnesty links to a screenshot allegedly taken by Omar Radi, but taking a screenshot in the seconds required for the described operation is physically impossible unless the operation itself was set up in advance and Radi had prepared software for that precise moment. We do not have any evidence that the particular screenshot had originated with Radi’s device at all.

It is telling that Amnesty chose not to focus on damning evidence pointing to the possibility that Radi could be a legitimate security threat to Moroccan government and that he likely has a political agenda in pursuing even a spurious claim against the authorities.

The Amnesty Report, for instance, fails to note, by his own admission, prior to his arrest, had been visiting Algeria, which has tensions with Morocco and is among several foreign states with a political interests in the Rif issue. It also fails to address the fact that Radi is under a formal investigation on suspicions of being a paid foreign agent by Moroccan authorities. Amnesty relied on Radi’s own comments (why wasn’t he arrested already?) in dismissing this matter, but in fact, the reasons are fairly obvious. Given the international scrutiny, including by Amnesty, Morocco is not in a rush to arrest public figures like Radi without conclusive evidence, and in the event of a wider intelligence probe, have valid reasons not to make immediate arrests. Notably out of  all the activists and journalists in Morocco who have claimed to be hacked, surveilled, or oppressed by Moroccan government, Amnesty has chosen to focus on a few, who all operate in a particular political sphere.has shifte

For instance, Maati Manjib’s NGO Freedom Now, focused on the fate of “political prisoners”, such as one Mohammed Al-Bambaary, with a record of allegations against Morocco’s activities in Sahara, which are more likely than not grossly exaggerated if not outright fabrications. Indeed, Morocco has had a challenging record in that region in the 1970s, but since then has shifted its position politically and has invested heavily into that area. The so-called human rights activists generally associated with this issue tend to be affiliates of the local separatist group Polisario and are generally heavily backed by Algeria. I have interviewed former Polisario members and prisoners in that region, and have determined that the political context of the Sahara issue has been hijacked by foreign interests, that there is a lack of unbiased coverage for the human rights situation, and that Polisario and its defenders present legitimate human rights and security concerns.  

I further had an opportunity to tour that area (in late 2018), following which I myself ended up becoming surveilled by Algerian intelligence, including some members operating under journalist cover. Furthermore, as a result of my research at that time, I learned that other local Sahrawi organizations operating in the area had submitted cases of forced disappearances by Polisario on Algerian territory to Amnesty and had been either systematically ignored by Amnesty, or in some cases Amnesty’s perfunctory investigations have been based entirely on responses provided by Algerian government. As a result of this research I have concluded a level of bias by Amnesty with issues concerning human rights and Morocco that makes exclusive reliance on their testimony dangerous for the cause of human rights.  While prison conditions in general are a legitimate cause for concern, the focus on this particular individual raises questions about the goals of the NGO and the level of its familiarity with the human rights claims and security challenges involved.

Furthermore, I found the involvement of Agnes Callamard, the UN rapporteur whose report on Khashoggi’s death was reportedly funded by a member state, rather than by the UN body, and who has had a controversial record of weighing in on the Jeff Bezos hacking claims with a technically flimsy reporting that has been criticized by experts, who has been heavily involved in the Saudi issues, while not having a similar record of criticizing Turkey, Qatar, China, or Russia over their mass surveillance and imprisonment of journalists, who had expressed outrage at the liquidation of Qassem Soleimani, while remaining mum on the fate of political oppression in Iran, curious and questionable at the same time. Callamard seems to be linked to the NSO issue, but lacks the technical expertise to evaluate these claims. Her connection various “free speech” NGOs with a record of leaving out serious national security concerns of the activists they defend call into question the leanings of this particular human rights body and the experts on whose testimony Amnesty relies time after time.

In other words, while it is certainly possible that Omar Radi’s device had been hacked by one or more parties at times suggested, the evidence in the report provided is insufficient to make a conclusive determination, and in fact calls into question its likelihood. Based on the reports submitted by Amnesty itself, not only is independent evaluation by multiple international experts is warranted, but the selective context and history of Amnesty’s involvement in this issue should be examined in the process of evaluating these claims.

Amnesty’s representations point in that direction, but the technical evidence is not only inconclusive but highly doubtful.

By Amnesty’s own admission, NSO software is nearly impossible to trace, which is supported by testimonies of various technical experts consulted on this and other related cases of the alleged usage of the software. It is noteworthy that other major human rights NGOs have not had the opportunity to examine the evidence and to present their findings.

Amnesty International claims it based its report on strong, material evidence, but the technical content within the report contradicts this assertion.The NGO outlines how Pegasus spyware infects a device, citing “forensic data” to allege Moroccan security services hacked Radi’s cell phone through network injections. The report describes two procedures for such hacking, confirming that “it is unclear which of these two options have been used against Omar.”

The report also admits that the spyware is “notoriously difficult to spot” and leaves few traces.

Despite the ambiguity in Amnesty International’s own words, the report pulls no punches in asserting a strong, conclusive claim: Moroccan authorities used NSO’s Pegasus spyware to monitor journalist Omar Radi.

The report claims that only the Moroccan government could be behind the attack because network injections require “either physical proximity to the targets or access over mobile networks in the country which only a government could authorize.”

Technical experts have argued that the assumption is far from straightforward. The process of tracking and identifying the use of Pegasus software leaves room for inaccuracy. Expert insight into the matter indicates that Amnesty International’s claim is unsubstantiated. Other experts have essentially stated that tracking the software is nearly impossible.

The report does not reference Morocco’s lack of diplomatic relations with Israel, which would severely complicate such a contract, nor does it detail better-evidenced allegations against some other countries. (The record of allegations of Saudi Arabia, which is even less open towards security-related transactions with Israel than Morocco calls into question these reports in general)

A 2018 report by researchers from the University of Ontario in Canada shows that the malware was in active use in 45 countries across the globe, including Western countries such as the UK, the US, and France.

This research further claims that the NSO spyware was in heavy use in Gulf countries, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, no independent evidence is provided in any of these cases of this spyware, should it even exist, being used specifically against journalists, much less against those who are not a security threat.

The Amnesty International report briefly mentioned these countries in its report on Morocco. However, it has produced no country-specific reports for use of the spyware by these states, where allegations of its use are backed by third-party investigations.

Independent entities have also published reports highlighting questionable funding practices, namely funding from governments to which AI applies a less critical lens.

In the Radi case, Amnesty uses the same methodology as in the other two cases involving alleged use of Pegasus to surveil Moroccan activists.

“By inspecting Maati Monjib’s Safari browsing history we found visits to suspicious links that did not originate from SMS or WhatsApp messages. Safari records its entire browsing history in a SQLite database stored on the device (and exportable through an iTunes backup procedure). This database not only keeps individual records of particular links being visited, but it also records the origin and destination of each visit. This allows us to reconstruct redirections and the chronology of web requests”. — this is from Amnesty’s own previous report on this issue, which is cited as part of the latest report. HOwever, according to the plain text of this evidence, all this browsing history shows (even assuming that it is presented accurately with no tampering by Amnesty, Monjib himself, or any third parties),  is that Monjib has had issues with malware unrelated to phone-specific usage. This undermines Amnesty’s claim that these suspicious links most likely came via Pegasus, given that in other parts of this and other reports, Amnesty has maintained that Whatsapp and SMS are the most common way of penetration.

The Facebook lawsuit against NSO likewise maintains that Pegasus has penetrated thousands of Whatsapp users, and Bezos had claimed that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia used his personal Whatsapp account to hack Bezos’s phone. The technical experts, however, contradict that Whatsapp could be used by Pegasus in this manner, which begs the question of how Amnesty expects anyone to find its contradictory technical analysis credible.

Amnesty presents Monjib’s case as part of establishing a pattern of bad behavior and abuses of Pegasus, by the Moroccan authorities in the Radi case, but admits that it could not conclusively establish causation in Monjib’s case, which is the precedent and supposed part of the burden of accusatory evidence in the instant matter:

“Currently, we do not have sufficient information to conclusively attribute these suspected network injection attacks to NSO Group’s products or services. However considering the technical similarities to other Pegasus infections, the fact that Monjib has already been targeted with NSO Group’s software and the fact that NSO Group advertise the network injection capability we suspect was used in this attack, there is reason to believe that NSO Group’s tools may also have been used in this attack.

We confirmed Maati Monjib had already been targeted with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware via malicious SMS messages. The links contained in such messages closely resemble the URLs involved in the network injection attacks.” Once again, anyone with technical knowledge and experience would be instantly put on alert by the language used here. “Links closely resembling URLS involved in the network injection attacks” are a far cry from “establishing” that Pegasus was used, much less by Moroccan authorities. Pegasus is not the only type of spyware that MAY use network injection attacks, which is the first problem with this analysis.

Second, saying that links closely resembling something that may be used in a particular type of attack in fact is saying that not only was Amnesty unable to establish that it was a Pegasus attack but that it could not in fact confirm it was a network injection attack at all. “Suspicions of use” because a particular company advertises a particular general type of attack is hardly incontrovertible proof of usage.

As with the Monjib case, Amnesty did not produce any concrete evidence that this type of attack, much less linked to Pegasus, was used to penetrate Radi’s phone, if indeed, it had been hacked at all.

“Amnesty International’s Security Lab performed a forensic analysis of Omar Radi’s phone and found traces suggesting he was subjected to the same network injection attacks we first observed against Maati Monjib and described in our earlier report. Through our investigation we were able to confirm that his phone was targeted and put under surveillance during the same period he was prosecuted. This illustrates how human rights defenders (HRDs) may often have to deal with the twin challenges of digital surveillance alongside other tactics of criminalisation at the hands of Moroccan authorities leading to a shrinking space for dissent.”

As I have noted above, Amnesty had not in fact established that Monjib was subjected to network injection attack. The Radi report therefore does not meet the burden of proof to claim that these attacks were in any way the same, much less network injection attacks.

Another point worth noting is that contrary to Amnesty’s claims, the report did not at all establish that the surveillance of Radi phone, if it existed, came to be as a result of Moroccan authorities. Any number of state actors could have engaged in the same type of attacks for various reasons – especially since it is not known that Pegasus was used for that purpose. For instance, Radi may have become a subject of surveillance by Algerian government during his visit to that state. Alternatively, if Radi is an asset of British or other Western government, as suggested by the Moroccan press, his handlers may have installed spyware. It could have also been installed by a member of another country’s intelligence agency operating on Moroccan soil for entirely unrelated reasons. In short, there are many ways in which various parties could have gotten physically close to Radi’s device, without being either in Morocco, being Moroccan authorities, or controlling Moroccan phone operators.

“The lack of transparency around the surveillance industry makes it difficult to know what tools are being used, sold, purchased and abused, and therefore for victims and watchdogs to seek accountability. Despite this, our research so far has shed light on how NSO’s technologies have evolved. Until early 2018, NSO Group’s customers were found primarily using SMS and WhatsApp messages in order to trick targets into opening a malicious link, which would result in exploitation and infection of their mobile devices. As we documented in our October 2019 report, Amnesty International first observed attackers adopting new techniques to more stealthily and effectively deliver the malware. Using what we describe as “network injections”, attackers are now capable of installing the spyware without requiring any interaction by the target.”

Amnesty essentially confessed here that a) it has no way to establish any relevant technical or transactional information to draw any conclusions or determinations relevant to the Radi matter b) the entire report is speculative and all of Amnesty’s actions have been designed to fish for information and to draw attention to particular parties, without any real evidence of wrongdoing on their part c) the ulterior motive here is to expose Israel’s government potentially clandestine relatioships with Arab and Muslim majority states, which would necessarily make these states vulnerable to propaganda attacks by various activists, movements, other states, and agendas. 

Amnesty has tried to explain the discrepancy in its own reporting but claiming that NSO has changed strategy; however given that most experts claim that that method was never used to begin with, theses comments only cast further shade on the quality of the report. Furthermore, Jeff Bezos and many of the Facebook users supposedly surveilled using Pegasus technology claimed that the surveillance through Whatsapp continued long after “early 2018”.

“However, NSO Group’s network injection capabilities were briefly described in a document named “Pegasus – Product Description” – apparently written by NSO Group – that was found in the 2015 leak of the competing Italian spyware vendor, Hacking Team. Specifically, in January 2020, Business Insider reported about mobile interception technology NSO Group exhibited during Milipol, an event and trade show on homeland security held in Paris in November 2019.”

The most troubling aspect of Amnesty’s report is its willingness to rely on unverified information, rumors and hearsay, and self-serving reports from competing companies.

Amnesty appears to have done no due diligence in investigating Hacking team’s claims; if that information is available, I would have liked to examine it to make further determination of the reliability of these reports.

What comes to mind at first glance, however, is that it is in Hacking Team’s best interests to cast aspersions on NSO, to undermine their business competitor, and to attract customers. It is also worth noting that Hacking Team may have the same capabilities as NSO, and could itself be the source of at least some if not all attacks attributed to its rival, if any had taken place at all.

Of note, Amnesty dismissed NSO’s human rights reporting out of hand, without explaining what issues it has faced, nor providing specific demands consistent with NSo’s own technical capabilities to provide them, as well as with legal realities of this business.

As NSO explained, it is under confidentiality agreement preventing it from confirming or denying such information, nor would any state government confirm or deny access to such information. Short of engaging in hacking and espionage, there is no real way to obtain that information at the moment, which is what Amnesty has tried to do, operating less as a human rights organization than an intelligence gathering tool for NSO’s rivals, and assorted other third parties with interests and agendas in obtaining this information.

However, it is worth pointing out that

1. Most Muslim majority states accused of using NSO would find it significantly easier to obtain equivalent software from other countries with which they have diplomatic relations

2. Any use of surveillance software is legitimate if the target presents a legitimate national security threat to the country

3. Short of eliminating all intelligence gathering against foreign assets, Amnesty cannot possibly prevent state actors from surveilling suspects; therefore, the likely reason for these reports is not a human rights concern, but a publicity/media campaign to attract negative attention to a particular country.

4. Amnesty has repeatedly failed to respond, provide clarifications, or additional technical evidence to Moroccan authorities, the Israeli court which examined its complaint, NSO, and other parties. Since the burden of proof is on the accuser, it is worth asking questions why an NGO focused on transparency is not itself transparent when the campaigns started against Morocco, NSO, and others can have a detrimental effect on innocent parties without any real benefit to the field of human rights. It is exceptional vital to provide without shadow of a doubt and with specificity when a software that can help eliminate deadly threats is being abused in a malicious way; failure to provide such evidence ultimately discredits human rights monitoring mechanisms, undermines attempts to help real victims, and plays into the hands of perpetrators.

Magy Benhaim is a board member of Digital Citizenship. Lawyer and Expert in Internet Security.

Digital Citizenship is an NGO based in Geneva that works on digital rights and human rights in the Internet sphere. It was founded in 2018 by volunteers and has representatives in Switzerland, Spain, Egypt and Morocco.

Featured Image credits: Amnesty.org