The paper, circulated among member states by the EU’s diplomatic service, proposes resuming the bloc’s 1978 cooperation agreement with Syria and initiating a High-Level Political Dialogue with transitional authorities starting May 11. The move signals a departure from years of limited engagement following the country’s prolonged conflict.

The EU also intends to “reframe and adapt” its sanctions regime to retain leverage while engaging Syria’s leadership, focusing restrictions on actors seen as obstructing the political transition. Most Western sanctions were lifted late last year as Damascus sought reintegration into the international system under interim President , who assumed power after the removal of former leader in 2024.

The document outlines plans to expand economic ties through trade and investment frameworks, including mobilising private sector funding and establishing a technical assistance hub to support regulatory and business reforms. The EU also aims to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of refugees, with more than one million Syrians currently residing in Europe, around half of them in Germany.

Brussels is additionally exploring Syria’s integration into regional connectivity initiatives such as the , positioning the country as a potential hub for transport, energy and digital links amid shifting global supply routes.

Syria has gained strategic relevance as an emerging transit corridor following disruptions linked to tensions affecting the . A tanker carrying Iraqi oil recently departed from the Syrian port of Baniyas after overland transport, highlighting evolving logistics patterns.
On security cooperation, the EU is considering support for training Syrian police forces, strengthening institutional capacity within the interior ministry, and coordinating efforts on counterterrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking.

The document also reaffirms EU backing for a political agreement between Damascus and Kurdish-led authorities aimed at integrating northeastern institutions into the state framework and expanding rights for Kurdish populations. Recent steps include the appointment of a senior Kurdish commander to a deputy defence role overseeing eastern territories.

The policy shift reflects a broader recalibration by European governments seeking stability, migration management and economic engagement following more than a decade of conflict and isolation.

In the declaration, Mohammed bin Issa Al-Jaber—founder, chairman and chief executive of the MBI Group, a multinational conglomerate with assets exceeding $10 billion—said decision-making over war and peace in Yemen has shifted away from the state and into the hands of actors aligned with a regional agenda linked to Iran.

Power Fragmentation and Loss of Sovereignty

Al-Jaber argued that Yemen’s institutional framework has effectively collapsed into a dual structure: an internationally recognised government lacking operational authority, and a rival administration in Sanaa dominated by the Houthi movement, which he said imposes military decisions without public consent.

He characterised this imbalance as a “confiscation of national sovereignty,” warning that Yemenis are being drawn into conflicts that do not serve their national interests. His remarks echo broader assessments that Yemen’s war has increasingly become entangled in regional geopolitical competition, particularly involving Iran and Gulf states.

Federalism as a Structural Remedy

Positioning federalism as a viable exit strategy, Al-Jaber called for a decentralised Yemeni state in which regions are granted full administrative and political authority. He argued that such a framework would enable local governance, reduce corruption, and shield communities from externally driven military escalations.

He pointed to developments in Hadramout, where intervention by Saudi Arabia helped stabilise tensions late last year. Saudi Arabia has been a central actor in Yemen since 2015, backing the recognised government against Houthi forces.

Federal restructuring has previously been proposed during Yemen’s National Dialogue process, though implementation has stalled amid ongoing conflict and institutional breakdown.

Tihama and the Self-Determination Debate

Al-Jaber highlighted Tihama as particularly exposed to the consequences of continued instability. Home to more than eight million people and possessing strategic access to the Red Sea, he said the region holds the economic and geographic foundations of a viable state.

He warned that, in the absence of sovereign decision-making and public consent, calls for self-determination could intensify. “When people are forced into wars that do not serve their interests, self-determination becomes a legitimate political option,” he said.

While such claims remain legally and politically contentious, the principle has been invoked in cases where state authority collapses or fails to represent local populations (UN Charter, Article 1).

International Appeals and Escalating Rhetoric

The statement also urged former U.S. President Donald Trump and the international community not to interpret current developments as reflective of the Yemeni population’s will. It called on the United Nations and the UN Security Council to convene urgently and organise elections under international supervision.

Al-Jaber further issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Houthi leadership to cease claiming representation of the Yemeni people and to issue an apology, warning that failure to do so could trigger widespread public mobilisation across regions from Mahra to Saada and from Aden to Medie.

He concluded that Yemen should only engage in war in self-defence, stressing that long-term stability depends on political consensus and national interest rather than what he described as “reckless military adventurism.”

The ministry issued a heavy worded statement praising the life and legacy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, framing his political and religious role as central to the country’s independence and resistance to foreign influence.

In the statement, the ministry said Khamenei “lived a pious life, loved Iran, secured Iran’s independence, opposed foreign domination, and worked tirelessly for our country’s resilience and fortitude,” language that echoes long-standing official narratives promoted by the Islamic Republic since the 1979 revolution.

A statement heavy with symbolism

The ministry’s message went further, using highly symbolic and emotive language to describe what it called the “last phase” of Khamenei’s life, portraying his death as “honorable and dignified” and describing it as martyrdom occurring “on the 10th day of Ramadan.”

It alleged he was killed “at the hands of the most corrupt and criminal individuals on earth,” without naming those responsible or providing evidence.

Such language reflects the Islamic Republic’s deep-rooted political culture, in which martyrdom holds powerful religious and national significance, particularly in the context of confrontation with perceived external enemies.

Analysts say official references to martyrdom are often used to reinforce internal unity and frame geopolitical conflict in moral and existential terms.

Independence, resistance and legitimacy

By emphasizing themes of independence and resistance to foreign domination, the Foreign Ministry’s statement reinforces a core pillar of Iran’s state ideology: the portrayal of its leadership as guardians of sovereignty against outside interference.

This narrative has been a constant feature of official discourse amid decades of sanctions, regional rivalries and strained relations with Western powers.

The ministry said Khamenei would remain “a living nightmare for his killers forever,” a confrontational tone Tehran frequently adopts when addressing its adversaries, particularly during periods of heightened regional tension.

Domestic and regional implications

While the statement does not outline any immediate policy steps, its rhetoric is likely to resonate with hardline constituencies inside Iran and among allied groups across the region. Observers note that such messaging can serve multiple purposes: consolidating domestic support, signaling defiance abroad and framing ongoing conflicts as part of a broader historical struggle.

No independent confirmation of the ministry’s claims was immediately available, and the statement offered no further details beyond its symbolic and ideological assertions.

Two decades on, Al Jaber’s assessment of Iraq is notably unsentimental. He acknowledges failure, but rejects futility.

In a region where political rhetoric often masks commercial calculation, Sheikh Mohammed bin Issa Al Jaber represents an uncomfortable anomaly. His engagement with Iraq, stretching across more than two decades, defies the familiar arc of Middle Eastern power politics: invest, influence, extract, exit.

Instead, his involvement followed a far less forgiving path—one shaped by conviction, sustained by personal capital, and concluded without tangible reward. It was not an error of judgment, but a conscious wager on the idea that Iraq’s survival as a sovereign state mattered more than profit or prestige.

That wager began in the late 1990s, when Iraq existed in a state of imposed paralysis. Saddam Hussein’s regime remained entrenched, while the population endured the cumulative effects of comprehensive international sanctions. The UN Oil-for-Food Programme, often described as a humanitarian compromise, in practice locked Iraq into a system of managed dependency.

Infrastructure repairs required external approval, food and medicine were distributed at subsistence levels, and public health indicators deteriorated sharply. UN agencies and humanitarian organizations documented rising malnutrition and preventable disease, particularly among children (UNICEF, 1999; FAO, 2000).

What set Al Jaber apart was not merely his criticism of this system, but the moment at which he voiced it. In 1998, when most Arab political and business leaders chose caution or silence, he publicly argued that Iraq was undergoing the slow liquidation of a nation.

Contemporary reporting noted that he was among the few Arab figures to state openly that Iraq required liberation from both dictatorship and siege (Washington Times, 1998).

The position carried real risks. Publicly endorsing external intervention—even on humanitarian grounds—invited social ostracism and commercial retaliation across the region. Al Jaber accepted those costs, framing his stance not as allegiance to Western power, but as a moral response to collective punishment.

Liberation as Sovereignty, Not Spectacle

Al Jaber’s understanding of liberation differed sharply from the dominant Western narrative that preceded 2003. While Washington concentrated on weapons inspections and regime removal, he argued that Iraq was trapped by a threefold constraint: authoritarian rule, international trusteeship, and an unsustainable debt burden.

Iraqi financial data from the late 1990s placed sovereign and war-related debt near $860 billion, a figure acknowledged in IMF briefings at the time (IMF, 1999). Without structural political change, he warned, compound interest and lost production would turn that liability into a generational deadlock.

This perspective explains his support for the 2003 intervention without embracing the triumphalism that followed. War, in his view, was not a solution in itself but the only available mechanism to dismantle a system that had stripped Iraq of agency.

In later interviews, he argued that sovereignty without economic viability was an illusion, and that lifting sanctions without political change would merely prolong decay. The position was uncomfortable for both anti-war activists and interventionist strategists, leaving him isolated but consistent.

The Reconstruction That Never Was

The real cost of Al Jaber’s convictions became apparent after the fall of Baghdad. Rather than disengage, he advanced an ambitious postwar reconstruction framework often referred to as the MBI Plan.

Valued at more than $300 billion, it proposed rebuilding Iraq’s economic backbone: ports, airports, power generation, transport corridors, and industrial zones capable of reintegrating the country into regional and global trade. The design echoed postwar recovery models studied in Western development institutions, inviting comparisons with the Marshall Plan.

The seriousness of the proposal was reflected in the range of figures who reviewed or discussed it, including General David Petraeus, former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, and President Barham Salih. At the time, officials in the administration of George W. Bush publicly emphasized the role of private capital in Iraqi recovery, a message echoed by Dick Cheney.

By 2007, however, the plan had collapsed. Insurgent violence, regional instability, and the strategic interests of neighboring states hostile to a revived Iraq combined to drain momentum.

Analysts pointed to the destabilizing role of the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad, which feared the precedent of a functioning, pluralistic Iraq (International Crisis Group, 2007). The accelerated drawdown of US forces further eroded the security guarantees required for large-scale investment. Al Jaber absorbed billions in unrecoverable costs. No compensatory concessions followed—an outcome virtually unheard of in international deal-making.

Failure Without Futility

Two decades on, Al Jaber’s assessment of Iraq is notably unsentimental. He acknowledges failure, but rejects futility. Iraq has held six national elections since 2003, formed successive governments, and avoided permanent territorial fragmentation despite years of violence.

Comparative political science research suggests that transitions of this scale often take half a century to stabilize; Iraq has compressed that process into roughly twenty years (Carothers, 2018).

Economic indicators reinforce his cautious optimism. Oil production has risen from under two million barrels per day in 2003 to more than six million today, with the International Energy Agency projecting potential capacity of eight million by 2030 (IEA, 2023).

Debt restructuring agreements in the mid-2000s prevented default and preserved fiscal space for future growth (Paris Club, 2004). For Al Jaber, these outcomes validate an early conviction: Iraq’s collapse was reversible once sovereignty was restored.

Mohammed bin Issa Al Jaber did not emerge from Iraq wealthier. He emerged with his thesis intact. In a region where conviction is routinely traded for convenience, that may be the most expensive position of all—and the rarest.

The reopening follows prolonged diplomatic discussions and comes under strict conditions, allowing only limited civilian movement rather than the flow of aid or commercial goods.

According to official statements, the crossing will permit the return of Gaza residents who had previously left for Egypt during the course of the war.

Each individual will be required to undergo prior security clearance, underscoring the highly controlled nature of the reopening and the continued security concerns surrounding the enclave.

The border crossing had been closed since May 2024, after Israeli forces took control of the area amid escalating conflict.

Since then, Gaza’s population of over two million people has faced extreme isolation, with movement in and out of the territory almost entirely blocked.

Officials have not disclosed how many people will be allowed to cross per day, leaving uncertainty for families waiting on either side of the border.

Sources familiar with the matter suggest that discussions are still ongoing, with proposals indicating that only a small number of people may be permitted daily.

One of the key points of contention is Israel’s reported intention to limit the number of Palestinians returning to Gaza. The aim, according to earlier reports, is to ensure that more people exit the territory than enter, a condition that Egypt has not formally accepted.

Despite these unresolved issues, the reopening is expected to proceed, reflecting broader political commitments tied to ceasefire arrangements. The move was also linked to conditions set earlier, including developments related to hostages taken during the conflict.

While the reopening has been welcomed as a symbolic step, humanitarian organizations stress that it does little to address Gaza’s dire needs. The crossing will remain closed to aid deliveries, fuel, construction materials, and commercial supplies, all of which are urgently required.

Large parts of Gaza remain in ruins after nearly two years of sustained military operations. Entire neighborhoods have been flattened, basic services have collapsed, and most residents continue to live in temporary shelters or damaged buildings.

Humanitarian groups warn that winter conditions have worsened an already catastrophic situation. Many families lack adequate shelter, clean water, heating, and medical care, making daily survival an ongoing struggle.

International relief agencies have repeatedly called for broader access to allow the repair of essential infrastructure. Items such as water pipes, electricity generators, and sanitation equipment are considered critical for restoring basic living conditions.

However, long-standing inspection policies continue to restrict materials classified as having potential dual civilian and military use. These controls, in place well before the current war, have significantly slowed reconstruction and recovery efforts.

For Gaza’s residents, the partial reopening of Rafah offers limited relief but little certainty. Thousands remain stranded, separated from relatives, medical treatment, or educational opportunities outside the territory.

The situation highlights the gap between political agreements and humanitarian realities on the ground. While diplomatic steps may ease specific restrictions, the broader crisis facing Gaza remains unresolved and deeply entrenched.

As Sunday approaches, attention will focus on how the reopening is implemented and whether conditions may eventually expand.

For now, the Rafah crossing stands as a narrow opening in an otherwise sealed environment, offering movement to a few while millions continue to wait.

The appeal reflects Ankara’s growing concern that any breakdown in the truce could create opportunities for militant regrouping or trigger violence in northern and eastern Syria. Officials believe that a stable security environment is critical when dealing with high-risk prisoner movements involving extremist groups.

Turkey’s foreign minister stated that the ceasefire between Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces plays a crucial role in ensuring safe coordination during the transfer of detainees. Without a functioning truce, clashes or disruptions could undermine efforts to control Islamic State remnants.

The presence of thousands of Islamic State prisoners in Syria has long posed a challenge for regional and international security. Many detainees are held in facilities guarded by local forces that face limited resources and constant threats of escape attempts or coordinated attacks.

Turkey argues that transferring detainees to Iraq could help reduce pressure on Syrian detention facilities, but only if the process is handled carefully. Any instability during transfers could allow militant cells to exploit gaps in security, increasing the risk of violence across borders.

Northern and eastern Syria remain politically and militarily complex, with multiple actors operating in close proximity. A ceasefire helps prevent misunderstandings and accidental confrontations, especially at a time when attention is focused on logistical and security coordination.

Turkish officials emphasised that disruptions to the truce could trigger broader consequences beyond Syria’s borders. Ankara fears that renewed fighting could fuel refugee movements, embolden extremist networks, and threaten regional trade and energy routes.

The issue also highlights the broader challenge of dealing with Islamic State detainees years after the group’s territorial defeat. While the organisation no longer controls territory, its ideology and networks continue to pose a threat to regional stability.

Turkey has repeatedly warned that prison breaks or poorly managed transfers could reverse hard-won gains against extremist groups. Officials stress that cooperation among regional actors is essential to prevent militants from exploiting political or military gaps.

The ceasefire is seen as a practical tool rather than a political settlement, aimed at managing immediate risks rather than resolving deeper conflicts. Turkish leaders argue that even temporary stability can significantly reduce the likelihood of violent incidents during sensitive operations.

Observers note that prisoner transfers involve not only physical security but also intelligence sharing and coordination between governments. A breakdown in trust or communication could undermine the entire process.

Turkey’s stance reflects a broader regional desire to prevent Syria from becoming a renewed hub for extremist activity. Maintaining calm during transfers is viewed as a necessary step toward containing long-term security threats.

The situation underscores how unresolved conflicts continue to complicate counterterrorism efforts across the Middle East. Even routine security operations can carry high risks in contested and unstable environments.

As transfers proceed, the durability of the ceasefire will be closely watched by regional governments and security analysts.

Any escalation could have consequences far beyond Syria’s borders.

The deal centered on Kurdish forces redeploying to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, creating a clear frontline between government troops and Kurdish units. This step was framed as a goodwill gesture aimed at reducing friction and opening space for political dialogue rather than armed confrontation.

The situation deteriorated when Syrian troops continued advancing beyond areas covered by the agreement, triggering clashes in several towns and near strategically important oil facilities. Both sides accused each other of violating the terms, exposing the fragility of the understanding and the depth of mutual suspicion.

In Arab majority towns such as Deir Hafer, the arrival of Syrian troops was met with visible relief among residents. Many locals described the moment as an end to uncertainty, hoping that the return of state control would restore stability after years of shifting authorities.

Some civilians who had fled earlier returned through humanitarian corridors, while others who stayed celebrated openly. Residents spoke of war fatigue and emphasized that ordinary people no longer wanted to be trapped between rival armed groups.

Kurdish fighters moved east toward Tabqa, a town that quickly emerged as the next major flashpoint. When Syrian military officials indicated plans to advance toward Tabqa, Kurdish leaders objected strongly, stating that the town was not included in the withdrawal arrangement.

Tabqa’s importance goes beyond geography, as nearby oil and gas fields make it economically and strategically valuable. Control over these resources remains one of the core drivers of confrontation and leverage in negotiations between Damascus and Kurdish authorities.

Casualties were reported on both sides, with confirmed deaths among Syrian soldiers and Kurdish fighters, though exact figures were not disclosed. Coalition aircraft flying overhead served as a reminder of international concern over the risk of further escalation.

Efforts to contain the fighting included diplomatic engagement, with a United States envoy traveling to Erbil to meet Kurdish leaders. These talks highlighted continued external involvement in trying to prevent the conflict from expanding further.

The renewed clashes underline deeper political divisions following stalled talks on integrating Kurdish military and civilian structures into Syrian state institutions. Missed deadlines and unmet commitments have steadily weakened confidence in a negotiated solution.

Arab tribal leaders in Kurdish controlled areas have warned they may align with government forces if instructed, adding another unpredictable element to the conflict. Their stance suggests that local alliances could quickly reshape the battlefield.

Memories of earlier sectarian violence in other regions of Syria continue to fuel Kurdish fears and resistance. These unresolved grievances complicate reconciliation and cast uncertainty over future stability.

Tensions remain high. The situation continues to evolve.

Somaliland and specifically the Port of Berbera, offers New Delhi an alternative gateway into the region and the broader African hinterland, including landlocked Ethiopia.

On December 26, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu raise diplomatic tempers in Middle East by unilaterally recognising the Republic of Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia which has been functioning as a de facto state since 1991. This decision goes beyond a diplomatic gesture and signifies a landmark geopolitical move that signals a recalibration of power politics in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean.

Not only did it break a long-standing international taboo against recognising defacto regions, it also injected new momentum into a region which is increasingly defined by strategic choke points, rival maritime visions, and great-power competition.

Located along the southern edge of the Gulf of Aden, bordering Djibouti, and sitting astride the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb, Somaliland has existed in diplomatic limbo for three decades ago. Its decision to exit political union followed the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime and has since built functioning political institutions while Mogadishu remained mired in civil war, insurgency, and foreign intervention.

It has conducted multiple elections, maintained relative internal stability, issued its own currency and passports, and exercised effective territorial control, which constitute core criteria of statehood under international law. And still, recognition eluded Hargeisa, largely because of international deference to the fiction of Somali territorial unity.

But the December 26 recognition by Israel marks the first major breach in this diplomatic wall. Framed within the broader ethos of the Abraham Accords, which seeks to normalise Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement historically significant elevates Somaliland from diplomatic obscurity and signals that geopolitical utility and governance capacity can, under certain conditions, trump inherited postcolonial borders.

Though this precedent alone makes the decision a watershed moment, yet the true importance of this move lies less in symbolism and more in strategy.

This decision must be read against the backdrop of the Red Sea’s growing militarization in recent years. For instance, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait which connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and, by extension, the Suez Canal (which opens into Mediterranean Sea) has emerged as one of the world’s most contested maritime chokepoints.

During the prolonged Gaza war that followed Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attack on Israel, Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen repeatedly targeted Israeli-linked shipping, exposing Israel’s vulnerability along its maritime lifelines.

As such, it cannot be divorced from the Israel’s broader post-Gaza recalibration, where it is prioritizing securing maritime routes, diversifying strategic partnerships, and reducing reliance on fragile regional arrangements.

What Somaliland does is it provide Israel a rare strategic advantage in the region where hostile non-state actors have in recent years emerged a significant irritant to its maritime access. Its Port of Berbera can provide Israeli Defence Force (IDF) with potential logistical depth, maritime awareness, and forward presence in Red Sea region and deny any military advantage to hostile actors like Houthis who sit across on the eastern coast of Gulf of Aden.

Israel has demonstrated its resolve to grow its relations with Somaliland through the January 7 Hargeisa visit by Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, becoming the first high-level international dignitary to visit the country.

More crucially, this decision followed the 10th trilateral summit of December 23 between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in Jerusalem, wherein their leaders —PM Netanyahu, PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis (Greece) and President Nikos Christodoulides (Cyprus)— reaffirmed cooperation on energy, security, and regional stability.

These are the areas where all three states have found themselves increasingly at odds with Turkey’s assertive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Together, these moves, as such, reveal a coherent strategy by Israel to constrain Ankara’s regional ambitions. It is should be noted that Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has pursued an increasingly revisionist foreign policy, blending neo-Ottoman rhetoric with military deployments and proxy relationships stretching from Libya and Syria to the Horn of Africa.

In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s aggressive maritime claims and unilateral actions have antagonized Greece and Cyprus while undermining cooperative energy frameworks in the region.

In the Horn of Africa, Ankara has followed a similar playbook. By becoming the principal external patron of Somalia’s federal government under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, through military training, financial aid, and base access, Turkey has positioned Mogadishu as the cornerstone of its Red Sea strategy.

But this engagement has always been less about Somali stability and more about power projection. It provides Ankara with proximity to Bab el-Mandeb and leverage over one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors through which roughly 12-15 per cent of global trade worth over 1 trillion USD is conducted annually.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, therefore, directly undercuts this strategy. It legitimizes an alternative political entity that Ankara has consistently sought to marginalize and weakens Turkey’s monopoly over Somalia’s external partnerships. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s sharp condemnation and calling the move “illegitimate and unacceptable” betrays Ankara’s anxiety that its Horn of Africa foothold may now face meaningful constraints.

But Turkey’s insistence on Somali “unity and territorial integrity” rings hollow when contrasted with its own record of selective sovereignty advocacy for regions like Northern Cyprus. What Ankara fears is not fragmentation per se, but the erosion of its geopolitical leverage in the Red Sea basin.

For India, this decision by Israel carries quiet but significant implications, particularly for the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The project which has been conceived as a multimodal trade and connectivity initiative linking India to Europe via the Middle East, was disrupted by the Gaza war and this recalibration could ring positively for realising its implementation.

Moreover, Somaliland, and specifically the Port of Berbera, offers New Delhi an alternative gateway into the region and the broader African hinterland, including landlocked Ethiopia. While New Delhi, due to its express commitment to norms based international relations, may be constrained by its adherence to UN norms and is unlikely to formally recognize Somaliland in the near term, Israel’s move expands its strategic options without requiring overt diplomatic commitments.

Equally important is what this means vis-à-vis Turkey. Ankara has consistently positioned itself as an alternative economic and political hub for the Muslim world, often at odds with India’s interests. By weakening Turkey’s strategic depth near the Red Sea, Israel’s move indirectly aligns with India’s interest in a more plural, less Ankara-dominated regional order.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is, at its core, a bet: that regional stability will increasingly favor functional governance over inherited legitimacy, maritime strategy over rhetorical solidarity, and coalitions of the willing over paralyzed multilateralism. It challenges Turkey’s negative and destabilizing role in multiple theaters, signals resolve in the face of maritime coercion, and opens new possibilities for partners like India.

While this decision offers Somaliland its long-delayed validation and Israel the strategic depth, it represents a rare diplomatic setback for Turkey. Whether others follow Israel’s lead remains uncertain. But one thing is clear that the Red Sea is no longer a peripheral theatre and this development makes it a focal point of geopolitics in the years ahead.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The recent capture of Venezuela’s long-time leader Nicolas Maduro by U.S. forces has sent shockwaves through Tehran, reinforcing anxieties about Washington’s willingness to directly intervene against governments it deems hostile.

For Iranian leaders already struggling to contain protests driven by economic hardship and political frustration, the episode has sharpened concerns that external pressure could escalate at a volatile moment.

Demonstrations that began in late December over rising prices and declining living standards have spread beyond Tehran into several cities, reflecting anger over inflation, corruption, and long-term mismanagement.

Although the protests remain smaller than the mass unrest seen in 2022 and 2023, their rapid expansion into openly political slogans has unsettled the authorities.

Chants calling for an end to clerical rule and targeting the country’s top leadership signal a deeper challenge to the system rather than isolated economic grievances.

The government’s response has been shaped by overlapping crises, including a battered economy and heightened geopolitical tensions with the United States and Israel.

Iran’s economy has been under strain for years due to sanctions, but the situation worsened after last year’s military strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities.

Those attacks, which killed senior security figures and scientists, disrupted already fragile negotiations with Washington over Iran’s nuclear program.

Within this context, statements from U.S. President Donald Trump warning that Washington would intervene if protesters were violently suppressed have amplified unease in Tehran.

Officials privately acknowledge that the swift U.S. action in Venezuela has narrowed Iran’s room for manoeuvre and increased the perceived risks of a heavy-handed crackdown.

Some within the Iranian establishment fear their country could become the next target of an aggressive U.S. foreign policy that prioritizes decisive action over diplomatic restraint.

Iran’s leadership has long viewed Venezuela as a kindred partner, united by shared opposition to U.S. sanctions and pressure.

Tehran has condemned Washington’s move in Caracas as a violation of sovereignty and an example of dangerous interventionism.

At the same time, officials are wary that the message sent by Maduro’s capture could embolden protesters or weaken confidence among Iran’s security forces.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has responded by accusing foreign enemies of exploiting economic grievances to destabilize the country.

While authorities have attempted to distinguish between peaceful economic protests and what they describe as violent unrest, clashes with security forces have already resulted in fatalities.

Rights groups report that at least 17 people have been killed, while the government says members of the security services have also died and dozens have been injured.

The leadership is trying to preserve a sense of national unity that briefly emerged after last year’s military confrontation with Israel and the United States.

However, sustaining that unity has proven difficult as daily economic pressures continue to erode public patience.

Inflation remains high, the national currency has lost significant value, and wages have failed to keep pace with rising living costs.

Even state media have acknowledged the role of corruption, inequality, and policy failures in driving popular anger.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has called for dialogue and promised reforms aimed at stabilizing the financial system and protecting purchasing power.

The government has announced limited relief measures, including electronic food credits for households, offering modest support to lower-income families.

For many Iranians, these steps provide some relief but fall short of addressing deeper structural problems.

On the streets, heavy security deployments signal the leadership’s determination to prevent protests from spiraling out of control.

Yet the broader challenge remains unresolved: balancing domestic stability with the risk of provoking external intervention.

As Iran’s leaders navigate unrest at home and uncertainty abroad, the combination of economic strain, political dissent, and geopolitical pressure has created one of the most complex tests the Islamic Republic has faced in recent years.

Officials warned they would take all necessary measures to restore access and authority, signaling that the dispute remains volatile despite renewed talk of dialogue.

The accusations were directed at the Southern Transitional Council, a UAE-backed group that controls significant areas in southern Yemen and has long sought autonomy.

Government representatives said the alleged restrictions effectively cut off Aden, Yemen’s temporary capital and its most important southern port.

They also claimed to have received reports of arrests taking place within the city, further raising concerns about civilian movement and safety.

The Southern Transitional Council strongly denied the allegations, insisting that movement in and out of Aden remained normal and that the city was stable.

Separatist officials described the government’s claims as a distortion of facts and rejected suggestions that checkpoints were being used to restrict civilians.

Despite these denials, residents in areas surrounding Aden reported the presence of armed checkpoints operated by separatist fighters.

The renewed accusations come just days after government forces said they had regained control of Mukalla in Hadramout province, a strategic eastern region.

That advance followed clashes that have reignited an internal power struggle within the coalition formed to fight the Iran-aligned Houthi movement.

The feud has exposed deep divisions between regional backers, with Saudi Arabia supporting the internationally recognised government and the UAE backing southern separatists.

Yemen has remained divided since 2014, when Houthi forces seized the capital Sanaa, prompting a Gulf-led intervention the following year.

Since then, the country has been split into zones of control, with Aden serving as the main seat of government outside Houthi-held territory.

Government leaders, however, left Aden earlier last month after separatist forces took control of the city, relocating to Saudi Arabia.

A senior government official said any dialogue with the separatists would only begin once Aden was fully secured under state authority.

This position reflects lingering distrust despite regional efforts to promote negotiations as a way to end the latest round of fighting.

Complicating matters further, Aden airport was closed last week following a dispute over flights between the city and the United Arab Emirates.

Both the government and the separatists accused each other of responsibility for halting air traffic, highlighting the depth of the standoff.

Flights were partially resumed on Sunday, according to travelers and airport officials, offering limited relief to stranded passengers.

The situation also drew international attention after reports emerged of flights being redirected to Yemen’s island of Socotra.

The internationally recognised government has called on Saudi Arabia to host a forum aimed at resolving the southern issue.

Riyadh agreed to host the talks and extended invitations to various southern factions in a bid to ease tensions.

The Southern Transitional Council welcomed the initiative, suggesting that negotiations may ultimately be unavoidable.

Analysts say the brief but intense conflict has underscored the fragility of alliances in Yemen’s long-running war.

Government forces, supported by Saudi air power, have continued operations in eastern Yemen, consolidating recent territorial gains.

As diplomatic efforts proceed, the situation in Aden remains a key test of whether dialogue can overcome years of mistrust and competing ambitions.