The operative, identified as Mohammed Usman Jatt, also known as “Chinese,” was arrested last month alongside alleged Lashkar militant Abdullah by Srinagar police before the case was transferred to the National Investigation Agency due to what authorities described as its national and international dimensions.

Investigators said Jatt, a resident of Lahore trained by Lashkar-e-Taiba, had infiltrated into Indian territory with instructions to execute attacks and help establish sleeper cells outside Jammu and Kashmir.

During questioning, however, he allegedly said conditions in Kashmir differed significantly from narratives presented during militant training in Pakistan.

According to officials, Jatt said he had struggled with severe hair loss for years, affecting his confidence, and believed advanced hair restoration procedures were available only in Western countries until he learned about such treatment in Srinagar.

Investigators said Jatt was introduced to local contacts, including militants identified as Zargam and Abdullah, while staying in upper areas of Srinagar. Police said information obtained during interrogation helped uncover an alleged network of overground workers operating in Srinagar and northern Kashmir in support of Lashkar activities.

Officials said Jatt told interrogators he met a Srinagar shop owner who had undergone a hair transplant procedure and later persuaded him to arrange similar treatment. He allegedly underwent the procedure at a clinic within the city and occasionally stayed there overnight during recovery.

After the operation, investigators said Jatt traveled with Abdullah by passenger transport to Jammu before boarding a sleeper bus to Punjab en route to Malerkotla, where he reportedly spent time watching Turkish television programs and attempting to learn English.

According to officials, Jatt told interrogators he intended to secure genuine Indian identity documents, including an Aadhaar card, PAN card and eventually a passport, with the aim of leaving India using forged or fraudulently obtained documentation.

Investigators linked his account to another alleged Lashkar operative, Umar, nicknamed “Khargosh,” who authorities say infiltrated India after 2012 and later fled abroad in 2024 using forged travel documents allegedly obtained in Jaipur before eventually reaching a Gulf country through Indonesia.

The case emerged months after Srinagar police dismantled what authorities described as the “Al Falah module” in November 2025, an alleged militant network involving educated professionals accused of supporting extremist activities.

Police alleged one accused in that case, Umer-un Nabi of Al Falah University, drove an explosives-laden vehicle that detonated outside the Red Fort on Nov. 10, killing more than a dozen people, according to investigators.

Until Pakistan matches words with actions, its participation in regional counterterror frameworks will remain a facade.

When Pakistan assumed the chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s permanent anti-terror body, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), last month, the optics were striking: a state sponsor of terrorism now overseeing a regional network tasked with combating it.

The irony is hard to ignore. For Islamabad’s international posture and domestic rhetoric to carry credibility, its territory must no longer serve as a safe haven for groups trained and funded to strike Indian soil. Yet, the evidence suggests this condition remains far from met.

Pakistan’s enduring militant ecosystem aligns closely with the country’s long-standing military doctrine of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts”—a strategy that leverages proxies and covert militants to impose costs on India while avoiding direct conventional conflict. Under this logic, groups like Jaishe-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) serve not merely ideological but strategic purposes. 

If Pakistan is serious about counterterrorism, the persistence of this doctrine is inexplicable. The question remains: why does Islamabad continue to nurture a system that directly contradicts its international obligations and its stated commitment to counterterrorism?

Persistent Militant Ecosystems and Digital Adaptations

Notwithstanding India’s precision strikes on select Pakistani terrorist camps in May 2025, Pakistan’s militant ecosystems remain largely intact. Take the case of Masood Azhar-led JeM, which continues to plan operations, maintain training facilities, and innovate its fundraising mechanisms. Recent investigative reporting reveals that JeM has shifted toward digital-wallet fundraising and is attempting to rebuild as many as 313 terror hubs across Pakistan.

Despite severe losses during Operation Sindoor—which killed more than a dozen members of Azhar’s family and destroyed JeM’s headquarters in Bahawalpur—he remains defiant in his terrorist drive against India.

In a recent speech at a JeM site in Bahawalpur, Azhar announced plans to establish a women’s jihad course, Jamat-ul-Mominat. The 15-day training program reportedly aims to establish female combat units within JeM. If implemented, this can be a critical operational development for JeM, reminiscent of the Islamic State and Boko Haram, both of which have deployed women as suicide bombers and assault operatives.

Further worrying is the public conduct of the sons and successors of designated terror figures. The son of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) chief Hafiz Saeed, for example, has openly defied extradition calls, using public rallies to proclaim that Pakistan will continue to shield his father while praising military operations and urging “jihad.” 

An anti-regime Pakistani journalist recently reported that Talha Saeed has assumed leadership of an LeT-linked mosque in Lahore—signaling a generational shift in the group’s command and control. These are not isolated cases but part of a broader ecosystem in which religious, militant, and political networks overlap with visible impunity. Their continued prominence underscores the depth of Pakistan’s structural complicity and the normalization of militant influence in public life.

The Digital Evolution of Terror Financing

Pakistan’s counterterrorism narrative further collapses under the scrutiny of its financial oversight. While Islamabad touts its cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), militant funding has evolved faster than its regulatory mechanisms. Groups such as JeM have reportedly shifted from traditional banking channels to fintech platforms, mobile wallets, and decentralized e-payment systems within Pakistan to sustain operations.

This digital adaptation is not evidence of militant defeat but proof of resilience. Despite a recent implicit warning from FATF President Elisa de Anda Madrazo that Pakistan’s removal from the Grey List in 2022 was not “bullet-proof” and Pakistan’s own finance minister’s admission of rampant unregulated digital transactions, terrorist financing remains largely unchecked. The shift into digital ecosystems allows militant organizations to operate under the radar, with minimal state interference or consequences.

Paradoxical Cover from the United States

Pakistan’s growing diplomatic and economic proximity to the United States may paradoxically weaken Washington’s leverage over Islamabad’s behavior. Historically, U.S. pressure has occasionally forced Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment to rein in militant proxies. But today, the strategic calculus appears to have shifted. 

As Pakistan portrays itself as a “regional counterterror partner” and a reliable economic hub, Washington remains inclined to prioritize a transactional relationship over accountability. These dynamic risks emboldening Pakistan’s military leadership, led by Field Marshal Asim Munir, to maintain its use of jihadist groups as tools of statecraft. Islamabad’s confidence that its strategic importance shields it from meaningful repercussions only deepens the challenge.

The policy risk for India and its partners is that Pakistan will use its SCO-RATS role to deflect scrutiny while continuing asymmetric operations. If training camps are allowed to be rebuilt, if digital funding networks flourish, and if terrorist rallies continue with active state approval, then Pakistan’s leadership in counterterror structures becomes an exercise in hollow symbolism rather than substantive change.

Pakistan’s claim to regional leadership in counterterrorism rests on fragile ground so long as its own territory hosts—and in many cases, protects—the very networks it purports to combat. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship, increasingly transactional and detached from shared security priorities, risks reinforcing Islamabad’s belief that it can pursue dual policies: cooperation abroad and complicity at home. 

Until Pakistan matches words with actions, its participation in regional counterterror frameworks will remain a facade. The question for the international community is not whether Pakistan can change, but whether it wants to.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The narrative of SIMI as an omnipresent, monolithic underground force is, according to insiders, a distortion.

For the first time in years, voices from inside the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) have broken their silence. Four former members, once part of the group’s underground network after its ban in 2001, agreed to recount their experiences and reflections.

Now middle-aged, between 40 and 60, they carry no criminal cases but spoke only under strict anonymity. Their testimonies—guarded, personal, and often sobering—form the backbone of this account.

Origins and Evolution of SIMI

Founded in 1977 as the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, SIMI initially functioned as a platform for religious education and reformist activism amongst the students primarily through campus based activities. Its early years were marked by vigorous debates over Muslim identity and the preservation of religion.

According to its Constitution, SIMI aimed to achieve Allah’s pleasure through reconstruction of human life in accordance with the principle given by Allah and His messenger.

The Holy Qur’an and Sunnah would guide the organization in all matters. However, by the 1990s—particularly following the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, SIMI shifted its focus from traditional student activism to combatting communal violence, discrimination, and the perceived marginalization of Indian Muslims.

After formally severing ties with Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, SIMI charted an independent course. Throughout the latter half of the 1990s, internal debates intensified regarding the organisation’s tactical and strategic direction in an increasingly hostile sociopolitical environment.

Factional Divides and Tactical Debates

By late 90’s, two distinct factions had emerged within SIMI’s leadership. The then-president advocated avoiding direct confrontation with the state, fearing that such actions would invite repression and eliminate the limited space for public activism.

In contrast, Safdar Nagori pushed for more assertive tactics, rejecting suicide bombings and indiscriminate violence but endorsing targeted killings as a means to force political change and instill fear among perceived enemies.

Nagori’s stance was less about moral opposition to mass attacks and more grounded in political calculation. He argued that suicide bombings would provoke a crackdown, lead to mass arrests, dismantle the organisation, and damage the broader Muslim community’s image.

The president’s faction viewed Nagori’s approach as reckless, while Nagori’s supporters considered the president’s position too conciliatory and ineffective.

This schism created ideological fragmentation. Some members departed to establish smaller, more militant groups. Others, who had joined SIMI out of religious affinity rather than political conviction, became inactive, feeling alienated amid escalating internal debates.

Shahid Badar Falahi, who was the president of SIMI at the time of its ban, was arrested and incarcerated for three years following the ban. During his imprisonment, his views on the organisation, Islamic activism and tactics to bring about an Islamic caliphate underwent a significant transformation.

In his absence, Safdar Nagori assumed the presidency and made decisions that diverged considerably from Falahi’s approach. Upon Falahi’s release, he openly rejected and dissented from the policies implemented under Nagori’s leadership. This ideological and strategic disagreement culminated in a formal split within SIMI in the following the release of Falahi, marking a definitive fracture in the organization’s unity.

Membership Profile and Organisational Structure

Contrary to popular stereotypes portraying Islamic organizations as havens for the uneducated or disenfranchised, SIMI’s membership in the 1990s was highly educated: approximately 90% held bachelor’s degrees, a stark contrast to less than 4.4% of Indian Muslims with such qualifications today. The organization maintained a strict age limit of 30 for active members, meaning those involved before the 2001 ban are now between 40 and 60 years old.

SIMI’s structure was tiered. The core ideological cadre, known as the “Ansar”, underwent rigorous training and guided the organisation’s direction. Most of the individuals arrested in terror cases of SIMI are from this group.

Outside this inner circle was the broader base of general members, called “Ikhwan”, who participated in activities but often lacked deep ideological grounding and were primarily involved in its work for religious reasons.

State Surveillance and Infiltration

Members acknowledged widespread suspicion and firm belief, that Indian intelligence agencies had deeply infiltrated both SIMI’s underground and overground networks, even prior to the official ban in 2001.

The Intelligence Bureau reportedly possessed concrete evidence and detailed knowledge of SIMI’s covert activities. Authorities were aware of how SIMI had reorganized itself, creating and penetrating various organizations to continue its operations despite legal prohibitions.

Disentangling SIMI and Indian Mujahideen

A persistent allegation links SIMI directly to Indian Mujahideen attacks. However, those familiar with SIMI’s internal workings reject this claim outright. 

Although SIMI extensively debated the concept of Jihad during the 1990s, equating these ideological discussions with the operational tactics of Indian Mujahideen is misleading. Many spontaneous violent acts by frustrated Muslim youth bore no organizational link to SIMI, yet were often portrayed as part of a grand conspiracy implicating the group.

Comparative Context: SIMI and Lashkar-e-Taiba

While Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan actively engaged in Jihad, while espousing Dawah — the Islamic call towards faith, SIMI’s pattern was the opposite. Jihad was a frequent topic within SIMI’s discourse, but the organization largely confined its practical activities to dawah efforts such as religious outreach, education, and mobilization.

This perspective was widely shared within SIMI’s inner circle and often repeated, becoming a defining narrative among members. The contrast underscores a significant gap between SIMI’s rhetoric and its operational reality.

The brother of a former All-India SIMI leader described the organisation as “treacherous,” arguing it exploited fundamental democratic rights, such as freedom of speech and expression, that guaranteed its own existence, to undermine those very freedoms.

According to him, SIMI’s attempts to sabotage democratic institutions justified the subsequent repression. He emphasized that no movement can legitimately betray the constitutional liberties that enable its operation.

Membership Motivations and the Radicalization Narrative

For many members, continued association with SIMI in the 1990s was less about ideological rigidity and more about a shared sense of Muslim solidarity amid an increasingly perceived hostile environment. Some departed because they found the organization’s approach insufficiently forceful or disagreed with any move towards armed struggle and many other reasons.

The narrative of SIMI as an omnipresent, monolithic underground force is, according to insiders, a distortion. While the organization possessed committed members and a strong ideological core, it was far from the all-encompassing threat often portrayed.

In their view, the primary drivers of radicalization among Muslim youth were not SIMI’s directives but material conditions and personal ideological convictions. But a lot of SIMI members were radicalized not due to material condition but by the sheer privilege of being able to read and educate oneself about Islam.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Pakistan’s hurried outreach to Washington for a ceasefire underscores how severely it was rattled by India’s swift and precise military campaign.

Washington-based Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) on Thursday has declared India as a rising military and political superpower. Authored by Senior Research Fellow Anna Mahjar-Barducci, the report titled “India Has Emerged As A Military And Political Superpower” highlights India’s growing clout in global geopolitics, citing its successful Operation Sindoor as a pivotal moment in asserting its military might and strategic autonomy.

Operation Sindoor: A Turning Point

The report emphasizes that India’s military success during Operation Sindoor, which began on May 7 and paused temporarily on May 10, marked a seismic shift in South Asia’s strategic balance. The operation was launched in response to the Pakistan-sponsored Pahalgam terror attack, which killed dozens of civilians.

“India managed to bring Pakistan to its knees,” the report claims. “In just a few days, India struck 11 Pakistani airbases and destroyed 25 percent of Pakistan’s air force. This is a remarkable feat, especially considering Pakistan’s nuclear capability.”

According to MEMRI, Pakistan’s hurried outreach to Washington for a ceasefire underscores how severely it was rattled by India’s swift and precise military campaign. Despite diplomatic pressure, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi maintained a firm stance.

“We have just suspended our retaliatory action against Pakistan’s terror and military camps,” PM Modi said in a televised address on May 12. “In the coming days we will measure every step of Pakistan on the criterion that what sort of attitude Pakistan will adopt ahead.”

Political Ascendancy: India’s Battle on Multiple Fronts

Beyond the battlefield, India’s political leadership has taken center stage. MEMRI’s report credits New Delhi with successfully leading a multipronged offensive—not just against state-sponsored terrorism but also against geopolitical actors that enable and support it.

India’s stand against Turkey has been particularly noted. Ankara, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is alleged to have provided Pakistan with Asisguard Songar drones during the conflict. This military assistance has fueled a strong backlash in India.

The “Boycott Turkey” movement, once limited to online activism, has now taken on a life of its own. “From marble yards in Udaipur to fruit markets in Pune, Indian traders and consumers are turning away from Turkish goods,” reported Indian media. The movement reflects India’s new approach: aligning economic decisions with national security interests.

India also faced off with Iran, which drew criticism for sending its deputy foreign minister to Islamabad days before the strikes. Indian media condemned the move, viewing it as a tacit endorsement of Pakistan at a volatile time.

Modi’s Doctrine: No Compromise on Terror

MEMRI’s analysis highlights Prime Minister Modi’s doctrinal shift in India’s foreign policy. By linking trade and diplomacy to a country’s stance on terrorism, Modi has signaled that India will not return to the status quo.

“We will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism,” Modi asserted. “Terror and trade cannot go together.” This statement was widely interpreted as a firm response to then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s suggestion that India and Pakistan work out trade deals in exchange for a ceasefire.

According to Mahjar-Barducci, Modi’s unapologetic approach marks a turning point. India has broken free from years of strategic restraint and has adopted a more assertive, self-assured international posture.

A Beacon for the Democratic World

The MEMRI report concludes with a sweeping endorsement of India’s position in the global order. As the world’s largest democracy, India is now seen as a vital counterbalance to authoritarian powers like China and a key player in maintaining regional and global stability.

“All those that believe in liberty and freedom are looking in awe at India,” the report says. “India is the major obstacle to China’s expansionist ambitions in Asia. It is the only country that has openly defied Beijing’s hegemony.”

Mahjar-Barducci argues that India’s rise is not just military or economic, but deeply ideological. It is emerging as the voice of democratic resistance in a time of global uncertainty.

“India is now a beacon of hope, projecting its power and determination. It is becoming the leader of the democratic world that is ready to fight for its values,” she writes.

The MEMRI report positions India not merely as a regional power, but as a central pillar of a reshaping world order. Operation Sindoor may have been a military operation, but its ripple effects have traveled far beyond the battlefield—into diplomacy, economics, and the very discourse of global power.

As the report ends on a nationalistic note—“Bharat Mata ki Jai” (Victory to Mother India)—it is clear that India’s moment on the world stage has arrived. What remains to be seen is how the world, particularly the West and China, will recalibrate their strategies in response to this rising giant.

For India, it is a declaration that the era of passive absorption is over. For the world, it’s a test case in modern warfare doctrine.

In a rare public commentary from a senior U.S. military scholar, John Spencer—executive director of the Urban Warfare Institute and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare—has described India’s four-day military campaign, Operation Sindoor, as “a decisive victory in modern warfare.” Writing on Wednesday, Spencer called the operation “a model of limited war with clearly defined ends,” asserting that it could redefine how nations respond to state-sponsored terrorism in the nuclear age.

Operation Sindoor was launched by India on May 7, 2025, in response to a deadly terror attack in the tourist town of Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 22. The massacre, which killed 26 Indian civilians, mostly Hindu pilgrims, was claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), a group widely recognized as a proxy of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and backed by Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Unlike previous Indian responses, this time there was no diplomatic wait-and-see. India struck back with calibrated military action, marking a major departure from its historically cautious approach.

“This was not merely a symbolic gesture,” Spencer wrote. “It was decisive power, clearly applied.”

A New Doctrine Revealed

What makes Operation Sindoor unique, Spencer argued, is the strategic doctrine that underpinned it. While India has not formally declared the operation over, military activity has halted in what officials are calling a “stoppage of firing”—a careful semantic choice that avoids the term “ceasefire” and underscores India’s desire to retain initiative and control.

“The halt in operations is not the end,” Spencer emphasized. “It is a pause. India holds the initiative. If provoked again, it will strike again.”

According to Spencer’s analysis, India achieved four major strategic objectives:

Destroying Terror Infrastructure: Precision strikes targeted key terrorist hubs in Bahawalpur, Muzaffarabad, and Muridke—well beyond the Line of Control.

Demonstrating Military Superiority: India’s ability to launch and defend against retaliatory strikes—including a massive Pakistani drone swarm—highlighted the growing prowess of its domestically developed and internationally supported air defense systems.

Restoring Deterrence: By responding forcefully yet limiting escalation, India signaled to both adversaries and the international community that terror attacks would no longer go unanswered.

Asserting Strategic Independence: India acted without seeking Western mediation or U.N. intervention, a move that signaled its readiness to set and enforce its own red lines.

Four Days That Changed the Region

The timeline of Operation Sindoor was rapid and deliberate:

• May 7: Indian Air Force conducted nine high-precision strikes deep inside Pakistani territory.
• May 8: Pakistan retaliated with a massive swarm drone attack, largely intercepted by Indian air defenses.
• May 9: India escalated with attacks on six Pakistani military airbases and UAV coordination hubs.
• May 10: India declared a halt in operations, maintaining the ability to resume at any moment.

This sequence, Spencer notes, was textbook execution of limited warfare—a campaign designed to achieve political and strategic goals without sliding into open-ended conflict.

“This wasn’t just tactical success,” he wrote. “It was doctrinal execution under live fire.”

Modi Doctrine: “No More Nuclear Blackmail”

The boldness of India’s response also lay in its public messaging. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statements during the operation signaled a sharp turn from the past.

“India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail,” Modi declared. “India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts developing under the cover of nuclear blackmail.”

Spencer interprets this as India laying down a new strategic doctrine—one that separates nuclear deterrence from proxy terrorism, and no longer allows the threat of nuclear escalation to paralyze its counter-terror responses.

Critics of the operation—both domestic and foreign—have raised concerns about potential escalation or destabilization. However, Spencer counters that these critiques overlook the deliberate restraint India displayed.

“India retaliated forcefully but stopped short of full war,” he wrote. “That’s not recklessness—that’s control. It’s the foundation of modern deterrence.”

A Model for Limited War?

Spencer’s praise is significant not just for its content but for its source. As a leading expert on urban warfare and military doctrine, his words will likely be studied in military academies worldwide.

“In an era defined by ‘forever wars’ and cycles of violence without strategic direction, Sindoor stands apart,” Spencer wrote. “It offers a model of limited war with clearly defined ends, matched ways and means, and a state that never relinquished the initiative.”

This could have broader implications for global counter-terrorism strategy. If the international community accepts India’s precedent—that terror attacks emanating from a neighboring state will be treated as acts of war—it could signal a seismic shift in the rules of engagement for statecraft under the nuclear umbrella.

The Next Phase

What happens next remains uncertain. India has not demobilized its forces and retains a high alert status across its western front. Pakistan’s public response has been muted, likely due to the scale of its internal damage and lack of international support. Both countries have avoided crossing nuclear red lines, but the threat of further conflict remains.

Spencer ends his essay with a stark warning—and a call to attention for other democracies facing state-sponsored terrorism:

“India didn’t just respond to an attack. It changed the strategic equation.”

Operation Sindoor, he argues, will not just shape India’s national security policy—it may well influence global strategic thinking about limited war, deterrence, and the role of conventional force in a nuclear world.

For India, it is a declaration that the era of passive absorption is over. For the world, it’s a test case in modern warfare doctrine. And for Pakistan, it’s a reminder that the old playbook may no longer offer protection.

This is not just India’s victory, Spencer concludes. “This is deterrence restored. This is a doctrine revealed. And it should be studied by all nations confronting the scourge of state-sponsored terrorism.”

Operation Sindoor wasn’t merely a military response—it was a strategic communication to the world.

In the aftermath of the deadly Pahalgam terror attack that claimed the lives of 26 civilians—many of them Indian and foreign tourists—India responded with a calibrated and precise military operation that has since come to be known as Operation Sindoor. The strikes were not random, nor a knee-jerk retaliation. They were part of a broader message: India will not tolerate terrorism emanating from across its borders.

The Indian Army’s statement, released at 1:44 a.m., stressed that the operation was carefully executed with “considerable restraint in the selection of targets and method of execution.” Importantly, the strikes avoided any Pakistani military installations, targeting only confirmed terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). This selectivity reflects both strategic maturity and a desire to minimize escalation.

What caught international attention, however, was the advanced nature of the weaponry used—especially the SCALP cruise missiles and HAMMER precision-guided munitions, both launched from India’s cutting-edge Rafale fighter jets.

What is the SCALP Missile?

Known in the UK as Storm Shadow, the SCALP (an acronym for Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée) is a long-range, air-launched cruise missile developed by European defense consortium MBDA. With a range of over 250 kilometers and equipped with stealth features, it is designed to strike high-value, well-protected targets deep within enemy territory.

What makes SCALP particularly formidable is its precision navigation system—a sophisticated blend of Inertial Navigation System (INS), GPS guidance, and terrain referencing. Upon launch, the missile descends to a low “terrain-hugging” altitude, making it difficult to detect by radar. As it nears the target, an onboard infrared seeker scans and matches the live image with pre-programmed target visuals. This final stage is what ensures remarkable accuracy, dramatically reducing the risk of collateral damage.

Its all-weather capability, minimal radar signature, and autonomous strike technology make SCALP one of the most lethal cruise missiles currently in service globally.

Why Was SCALP Chosen?

The decision to use SCALP for Operation Sindoor was rooted in both strategic and technical reasoning. India’s targets were deep inside Pakistan—many in hardened, underground facilities believed to host the leadership and logistical support of terror groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. These are not simple camps, but fortified compounds with reinforced bunkers and command centers.

In such scenarios, long-range precision and the ability to penetrate hardened structures without a large military footprint are critical. SCALP was the ideal fit—capable of reaching distant targets with surgical accuracy, while minimizing the chances of escalation through unwanted collateral damage.

What is the HAMMER Munition?

Alongside SCALP, the Indian Air Force deployed HAMMER (Highly Agile Modular Munition Extended Range) bombs—precision-guided air-to-ground munitions also of French origin. Manufactured by SAFRAN, HAMMER is what’s known as a “glide bomb.” Unlike traditional gravity bombs, it can be launched from low altitudes and still travel distances up to 70 kilometers, guided by GPS, inertial systems, laser, or infrared technologies.

One of HAMMER’s standout features is its modularity—it can be equipped with various guidance and warhead kits depending on the mission. It’s also resistant to electronic jamming, making it a potent choice in contested airspaces.

Why HAMMER Was Effective

While SCALP was used for deeper and more fortified targets, HAMMER served a complementary role, particularly against medium-range targets where agility and adaptability were key. Some of the terror infrastructure in PoK consisted of safe houses, weapons storage, and training compounds spread across mountainous terrain. For these targets, HAMMER’s high precision and jamming resistance made it a natural choice.

Moreover, the terrain in PoK is notoriously challenging—high altitudes, narrow valleys, and poor visibility. HAMMER’s ability to be launched from low altitude over rough terrain helped the Indian Air Force carry out the strikes without crossing into Pakistani airspace or exposing pilots to unnecessary risk.

A Message Beyond the Missiles

Operation Sindoor wasn’t merely a military response—it was a strategic communication to the world. India showcased its capability to strike surgically and ethically, respecting the international norms of engagement. Unlike conventional bombing campaigns that risk civilian casualties, India’s usage of SCALP and HAMMER highlighted its intent to degrade terror infrastructure without drawing civilian blood.

In contrast, Pakistan’s response—shelling of the Indian border town of Poonch, resulting in the deaths of multiple civilians including children—exposed the stark difference in military conduct between the two neighbors. While India carefully chose advanced precision weapons to avoid collateral damage, Pakistan resorted to indiscriminate shelling.

The Larger Implication

This operation marks a significant evolution in India’s defense posture. The acquisition of Rafale jets, and the integration of SCALP and HAMMER munitions into its arsenal, has provided India with the ability to conduct high-impact, low-footprint operations far beyond its borders. It also signals a clear departure from past restraint where terror attacks went unanswered diplomatically but not militarily.

Importantly, this shift does not indicate a desire for prolonged conflict. In its official communication, India reaffirmed its commitment to peace and regional stability—but underscored that it will not hesitate to act decisively against terrorism.

As tensions remain high, the focus now shifts to diplomatic efforts. But one thing is clear: the rules of engagement in South Asia have changed. With tools like SCALP and HAMMER, India now possesses the ability to respond to asymmetric threats with unmatched precision.

The logistics of Modi’s schedule further weaken Kharge’s claim. Organizing a high-profile international trip like the Saudi visit requires weeks of preparation, leaving little room for a last-minute Kashmir visit.

In a startling accusation, Mallikarjun Kharge, president of India’s opposition Congress Party, recently claimed that Prime Minister Narendra Modi canceled a planned visit to Kashmir after receiving an intelligence warning three days before the devastating Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025.

The attack, which killed 26 people, mostly tourists, in the scenic Kashmir valley, sent shockwaves across India and beyond, intensifying regional tensions. Kharge’s allegation, widely shared on platforms like IndiaToday and Beatroot, has ignited controversy, with critics calling it a politically motivated fabrication.

For an international audience seeking clarity, a closer look at the timeline, Modi’s schedule, and the complexities of India’s security landscape reveals a claim that lacks evidence and struggles to hold up.

The Pahalgam Attack: A Brutal Blow

The Pahalgam attack ranks among the deadliest in Jammu and Kashmir in nearly two decades. On April 22, 2025, at 2:30 PM local time, gunmen targeted Hindu tourists in Baisaran meadow, a picturesque spot in the Kashmir valley. The Resistance Front (TRF), a militant group linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility before retracting its statement due to public backlash.

India accused Pakistan of orchestrating the attack, further straining already tense relations between the nuclear-armed neighbors. The tragedy not only highlighted the fragility of security in Kashmir—a disputed region claimed by both India and Pakistan—but also raised questions about intelligence failures.

Kharge’s claim centers on a specific assertion: Modi received an intelligence report on April 19, 2025, warning of the attack and promptly canceled a planned Kashmir visit to avoid danger. The accusation paints Modi as prioritizing personal safety over leadership in a crisis. But when examined against verifiable facts, the narrative begins to crumble.

Modi’s Schedule: No Trace of a Kashmir Trip

First, let’s consider Modi’s itinerary. On April 19, 2025—the day Kharge alleges Modi was warned—India’s Ministry of External Affairs announced Modi’s upcoming visit to Saudi Arabia, scheduled for April 22–23. Modi arrived in Jeddah on April 22, where he was set to co-chair the second India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council meeting, a key diplomatic engagement to strengthen bilateral ties.

When news of the Pahalgam attack broke, Modi cut his visit short, skipping a formal dinner, and returned to New Delhi on April 23 to convene an emergency meeting with top officials, including Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. This timeline, corroborated by global media outlets like The Hindu, shows Modi’s focus was on international diplomacy, not a domestic trip to Kashmir.

No evidence suggests a Kashmir visit was ever planned. Modi’s trips to volatile regions like Kashmir are often unannounced for security reasons, but no government statements, media reports, or credible social media sources indicate a scheduled visit in April 2025.

Modi’s last major Kashmir trip was in January 2025, to the resort town of Sonamarg where he inaugurated the 6.5-kilometer tunnel. Kharge’s claim of a cancellation implies a visit was on the table, but without documentation, it appears speculative. Open-source intelligence platforms, found no mention of a planned Kashmir trip in the days before the attack, undermining Kharge’s narrative.

The Intelligence Puzzle

Kharge’s allegation also hinges on the existence of a specific intelligence report warning of the Pahalgam attack. India’s intelligence agencies, such as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), routinely monitor threats in Kashmir, where militancy remains a persistent challenge.

These reports are highly classified, and specific warnings are rarely made public. This suggests that while general intelligence on militant activity likely existed, a precise warning about the April 22 attack may not have been issued—or was not actionable.

Kharge provides no evidence to support his claim of a specific report. As an opposition leader, his access to classified intelligence would likely come from unofficial channels or leaking buckets, casting doubt on the reliability of his statement. Without corroboration, the claim risks fueling misinformation in a region already fraught with competing narratives.

Modi’s Response: Crisis Management, Not Evasion

Modi’s actions after the attack contrast sharply with Kharge’s portrayal. Upon returning to Delhi, Modi chaired an emergency meeting, condemned the attack as “cowardly,” and vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice, as reported by The Hindu.

His government launched a sweeping response, detaining over 1,500 suspects, demolishing homes of alleged militants, and suspending the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan—a 1960 agreement governing shared river resources. Modi even rerouted his return flight to avoid Pakistani airspace, signaling a hardline stance. These measures reflect a leader grappling with a national crisis, not one dodging responsibility by canceling a visit.

The Political Context

To understand Kharge’s claim, it’s crucial to consider India’s domestic politics. The Congress Party has long criticized Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government over its Kashmir policy, particularly the 2019 decision to revoke Article 370, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. The BJP touted this move as a path to stability, but the Pahalgam attack challenged that narrative, giving the opposition an opening to question Modi’s leadership.

Kharge’s allegation aligns with this strategy, aiming to portray Modi as detached or negligent. However, without evidence, the claim has drawn backlash, with social media posts on X labeling it “venomous” and accusing Kharge of inadvertently bolstering Pakistan’s narrative—a risky move for Congress’s credibility.

Logistical Realities

The logistics of Modi’s schedule further weaken Kharge’s claim. Organizing a high-profile international trip like the Saudi visit requires weeks of preparation, leaving little room for a last-minute Kashmir visit.

Why It Matters

The Pahalgam attack underscores the enduring volatility of Jammu and Kashmir, a region at the heart of India-Pakistan tensions for decades. Beyond the human toll, the tragedy highlights the challenges of securing a conflict-prone area while navigating geopolitical rivalries. Kharge’s claim, while attention-grabbing, lacks the evidence needed to hold up under scrutiny.

Modi’s documented schedule, the absence of a confirmed Kashmir visit, and the speculative nature of the intelligence report all point to a narrative driven more by political point-scoring than by facts.

For the international community, this episode serves as a reminder of the complexities of India’s internal and external challenges. The focus should remain on addressing the root causes of violence in Kashmir—enhancing security, fostering dialogue, and ensuring justice for victims.

Unsubstantiated claims like Kharge’s, while sparking debate, risk diverting attention from these critical priorities. In a region where truth is often obscured by competing narratives, facts must guide the path forward.

The backlash from Kashmiris, combined with international sympathy for India, creates a political environment conducive to a strong Indian response.

On April 22, 2025, a horrific terrorist attack shook the serene Baisaran meadow in Pahalgam, Kashmir, claiming the lives of 26 tourists, predominantly Indian male civilians. The assailants, identified as Islamist extremists, executed their victims at point-blank range after determining their targets based on their inability to recite Islamic verses. This brutal act, attributed initially to The Resistance Front (TRF), a Pakistan-based terrorist group closely linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has escalated tensions between India and Pakistan, prompting expectations of a significant Indian military response.

A recent policy paper by Max Abrahms, a tenured professor of political science at Northeastern University, published by the Pacific Forum in Honolulu on May 2, 2025, provides critical insights into the dynamics of this attack and predicts a robust Indian retaliation.

Abrahms, a leading expert on terrorist group dynamics, begins his analysis by detailing the attack’s immediate aftermath. “Immediately after the mass casualty attack against civilians in Kashmir, the terrorist group known as The Resistance Front (TRF) claimed responsibility on the messaging app Telegram,” he writes. However, TRF later reversed its stance, denying involvement and attributing the initial claim to a “coordinated cyber intrusion” allegedly orchestrated by Indian cyber-intelligence operatives.

This denial, Abrahms argues, aligns with a well-documented pattern among militant groups worldwide. Drawing from his extensive research, he notes, “Many militant groups… have conditioned credit claims on whether the attacks got positive press coverage.” The TRF’s retraction, he suggests, was likely influenced by pressure from Pakistan’s security establishment and widespread protests by Kashmiris condemning the attack.

The TRF, founded in 2019, is described by Abrahms as a “close offshoot—or even just a front—of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),” the notorious group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. An analyst quoted in the paper asserts, “All TRF operations are essentially LeT operations.” This connection underscores the attack’s broader implications for India-Pakistan relations, given LeT’s history of operating with tacit support from elements within Pakistan.

The initial claim and subsequent denial reflect a strategic attempt to mitigate the political fallout from an attack that targeted civilians, a tactic Abrahms has studied extensively. “Statistically, I have found with Justin Conrad that militant groups are significantly more likely to claim organizational responsibility when the targets are military personnel compared [to] civilians like the 26 tourists in Kashmir,” he explains.

Abrahms’ research highlights a global trend where terrorist groups distance themselves from civilian attacks to avoid reputational damage. He cites examples such as the African National Congress’s denial of involvement in 1988 attacks on civilian targets in South Africa, al-Qaeda’s dismissal of civilian casualties in Iraq as “lies concocted by the mainstream media,” and the Taliban’s routine denials of civilian deaths in Afghanistan.

In the case of TRF, Abrahms argues, “The Resistance Front appears to have engaged in a public relations strategy that I have dubbed as ‘Denial of Organizational’ to mitigate the political fallout from the controversial attack.” The group’s attempt to pin blame on Indian operatives mirrors tactics used by other militant organizations to deflect responsibility.

The Pahalgam attack’s civilian toll—26 unarmed tourists—makes a forceful Indian response almost inevitable, according to Abrahms’ analysis. “Civilian attacks depress the likelihood of a credit claim for a simple reason—they tend to backfire both politically and organizationally on the perpetrators,” he writes. His statistical studies reveal that governments are “over four-times as likely to employ lethal violence against a group when it attacks civilians compared to military targets.” This pattern suggests that India, already reeling from the loss of its citizens, will not limit its response to diplomatic measures.

Indeed, India has already taken significant steps in retaliation. Abrahms notes that the government has expelled Pakistani nationals, suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, shut down airspace, and engaged in cross-border firing along the Line of Control. However, he predicts a more substantial military operation, drawing a comparison to the 2019 Pulwama attack, which targeted Indian security personnel.

Following Pulwama, India launched Operation Bandar, a precision airstrike on a terrorist camp in Balakot, Pakistan, just 12 days later. “This time the Indian military response will be even more extensive given the target selection of the Islamist extremists regardless of whether they stand behind their heinous attacks,” Abrahms asserts.

The international community has expressed solidarity with India, with widespread condemnation of the attack amplifying pressure on New Delhi to act decisively. The targeting of civilians, coupled with the attackers’ reported use of religious tests, has drawn parallels to other Islamist extremist operations, further isolating Pakistan diplomatically.

Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, commented on X that the lack of “clarity about the culprit” might temper India’s response. However, Abrahms counters this view, arguing that his research “leaves little doubt that the attack was indeed carried out by the Islamist group that originally claimed organizational credit.”

The Pahalgam attack also reignites concerns about the volatile India-Pakistan relationship, particularly in the context of Kashmir, a long-standing flashpoint. The region has seen intermittent violence, with militant groups exploiting local grievances to justify their actions. TRF’s claim of representing “Kashmir resistance” was undermined by the massive protests across the Valley, which Abrahms attributes to the attack’s indiscriminate nature.

The backlash from Kashmiris, combined with international sympathy for India, creates a political environment conducive to a strong Indian response.

Abrahms’ paper underscores the broader strategic implications of civilian-targeted terrorism. “Compared to attacks against government targets, civilian attacks significantly reduce the odds of government concessions while increasing the odds of the target country employing military force—often, in devastating fashion,” he writes.

This dynamic has been evident in India’s past responses to terrorism, including the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, both of which prompted significant policy shifts and military posturing.

As India weighs its options, the specter of escalation looms large. A military strike, while satisfying domestic calls for justice, risks further destabilizing the region. Pakistan’s response to India’s actions—particularly the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and airspace restrictions—will be critical. Abrahms’ research suggests that India’s response will be calibrated to signal resolve without triggering a full-scale conflict, though the scale of the Pahalgam attack may push New Delhi toward a more aggressive posture.

In conclusion, the Pahalgam attack represents a tragic escalation in the cycle of violence in Kashmir, with far-reaching consequences for India-Pakistan relations. Max Abrahms’ analysis, grounded in rigorous political science research, offers a sobering prediction: India’s response will be forceful, driven by the civilian nature of the attack and the need to deter future atrocities. As the world watches, the coming days will test India’s strategic calculus and the fragile stability of South Asia.

The classified assessment, first reported by The New Indian in an exclusive by Emaad Makhdoomi, reveals that this nexus was formalized during a high-level rally held in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) on February 5, 2025.

The rally, provocatively titled the “Kashmir Solidarity and Hamas Operation Al-Aqsa Flood Conference”, took place at Shaheed Sabir Stadium in PoK. Sources confirm that operatives involved in planning the Pahalgam attack were present at the event.

In a declaration that shocked security circles, a Jaish operative reportedly thundered from the stage: “The fighters of Palestine and Kashmir now march as one. Blood will be spilled in Delhi, and Kashmir shall be torn from India.”

Among those in attendance were top-ranking commanders: Talha Saif, brother of JeM chief Masood Azhar; senior field commanders Asghar Khan Kashmiri and Masood Ilyas; and key Lashkar-e-Taiba figures.

Most notably, Hamas made its first known formal appearance in PoK, represented by Dr. Khalid Al-Qadoumi, its Iran-based envoy. Several Palestinian figures were also seen aligning ideologically and logistically with Pakistani terror outfits.

According to intelligence analysts, this summit marked more than just rhetoric—it established a collaborative framework for future joint operations, modeled on Hamas’s asymmetric warfare tactics in Gaza.

“Pakistan-backed terrorist outfits are now consciously emulating Hamas’s blueprint,” a senior Indian intelligence official told The New Indian. “These groups are manipulating religious ideologies to provoke violence and foster deep-seated communal discord within Jammu and Kashmir.”

A Multimedia Propaganda Surge

Days ahead of the February summit, a provocative eight-minute propaganda video was circulated by the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League, glorifying Islamist separatists such as Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yasin Malik, and Masrat Alam Bhat. The video lauded slain terrorists including Burhan Wani and Manan Wani, showing funeral footage while drawing incendiary parallels between Gaza and Kashmir.

“Pak ki Azadi, Kashmir ki Azadi” blared throughout the production, openly inciting Kashmiri youth to rebel against Indian sovereignty.

Security experts warn that this blend of emotional imagery and militant messaging represents a dangerous evolution in hybrid propaganda, designed to radicalize young minds and fuel communal tensions.

“The aim is to internationalize the Kashmir issue by tying it to the globally resonant Palestine-Israel conflict,” said a counterterrorism analyst. “It’s a strategic pivot designed to rally global sympathy while accelerating internal destabilization.”

Pahalgam Attack: Pre-Meditated and Communally Driven

On March 24, the idyllic town of Pahalgam—a hub for tourists and Hindu pilgrims—was shattered by a brutal terrorist ambush. Sources have confirmed the attack was orchestrated from across the Line of Control (LoC) by banned outfits including Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jammu and Kashmir United Mujahideen (JKUM). The strike bore the hallmarks of meticulous premeditation, with execution carried out by highly trained Pakistani terrorists.

Three key individuals have been identified as the architects of the attack:

• Saifullah Kasuri (aka Saifullah Khalid), a senior LeT commander with close ties to LeT founder Hafiz Saeed. Designated by the U.S. Treasury Department, Kasuri has served as LeT’s Peshawar operations head and was instrumental in mobilizing the political front Milli Muslim League (MML), widely seen as a civilian mask for LeT’s agenda.
• Abu Musa (aka Musa Kashmiri), formerly affiliated with ISIS, is known for plotting attacks against foreign nationals in India. He was found with jihadist literature and reportedly attempted lone-wolf attacks before realigning with LeT to target non-locals and Indian security personnel.
• Rizwan Hanif, a senior JKUM operative based in Rawalakot, PoK. Intelligence sources say Hanif oversaw the logistics of the Pahalgam strike, including infiltration routes and arms procurement.

Perhaps most disturbing was the revelation that the attackers reportedly interrogated victims about their religion before executing them—pointing to a targeted communal intent. “This wasn’t just a terror attack—it was a message,” said a senior Indian intelligence official. “It signals a dangerous shift from generalized violence to targeted, faith-based executions.”

ISI and Military Involvement

The role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its military in coordinating this growing alliance is under sharp scrutiny. According to multiple sources, the ISI is driving efforts to reposition Kashmir on the global stage by deliberately echoing the Palestine narrative, hoping to energize pan-Islamist sentiments and draw international scrutiny toward India’s internal affairs.

“The ISI is effectively weaponizing the Palestinian cause to export jihad to South Asia,” said a former Indian military officer. “Their goal is twofold: to globalize the Kashmir issue and to create a new generation of radicalized youth who see themselves not just as Kashmiris, but as soldiers in a broader global jihad.”

A Cross-Continental Threat Matrix

This emerging Hamas-LeT nexus signals a dangerous cross-continental collaboration that may reshape the operational dynamics of Islamist terrorism in the region. Indian officials believe this could mark the beginning of a new era of hybrid warfare—fusing militant Islamist ideology with advanced propaganda and asymmetric guerrilla tactics.

As India grapples with the fallout of the Pahalgam massacre, and as global attention continues to focus on the Middle East, security experts are calling for a recalibration of counterterrorism strategies. “We’re witnessing the globalization of local conflicts,” said an Indian intelligence official. “And that’s a warning the world can’t afford to ignore.”