The three men, taken to Syria by their parents at the age of 11 or 12, were allegedly forced to participate in propaganda activities, policing duties and combat roles under Islamic State, according to legal filings submitted in France.

A source familiar with the case said the detainees are seeking recognition as victims of a war crime due to their recruitment as minors.Their lawyers, Marie Dose and Matthieu Bagard, said in a joint statement that the French authorities were failing to uphold obligations under international conventions prohibiting the use of child soldiers.

They argued that the men’s transfer to Iraq and continued detention amounted to inhumane treatment rather than victim protection.The detainees are among approximately 5,700 suspected Islamic State fighters of multiple nationalities transferred from Syria to Iraqi custody earlier this year, following shifts in territorial control in northern Syria.

France has opened investigations into the three men for alleged terrorism-related offenses committed during their time in Syria.The lawyers contend that, instead of pursuing prosecution, French authorities should prioritize repatriation and rehabilitation, citing the circumstances under which the individuals were recruited and their age at the time.

Hundreds of French citizens joined the Islamic State after it seized large areas of Iraq and Syria in 2014 and declared a so-called caliphate. Iraqi authorities, supported by a U.S.-led coalition, declared victory over the group in 2017, while Kurdish-led forces in Syria defeated its remaining strongholds in 2019.

Since then, thousands of suspected fighters and their families have been held in detention facilities across Syria and Iraq. Kurdish authorities in Syria have repeatedly called on foreign governments to repatriate their nationals, but most Western countries, including France, have proceeded cautiously, often handling returns on a case-by-case basis.

The recent transfer of detainees to Iraq has renewed scrutiny over their legal status and future, particularly in cases involving individuals recruited as minors.

The attack occurred early on Saturday, with security sources confirming that the residence of Barzani was targeted. No immediate details were provided on casualties or damage.

Air defense systems also intercepted and shot down another drone near a base used by Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Duhok province, the sources added.

Sudani condemned the incident and held a phone call with Barzani following the attack, according to a statement from his office. He directed the formation of a joint federal and Kurdistan regional security and technical team to investigate the strikes and identify those responsible.

The move reflects Baghdad’s effort to manage growing instability in the north, where overlapping security jurisdictions between federal and regional authorities complicate response mechanisms.

The incident comes amid a surge in attacks involving Iran-aligned militias and Kurdish forces, as the broader US–Israel war against Iran increasingly spills into Iraqi territory.

Airstrikes in recent weeks have targeted positions associated with the Popular Mobilization Forces as well as Kurdish Peshmerga units in the Kurdistan Region.

Iraq’s military has accused the United States and Israel of conducting some of these strikes.In parallel, Tehran-backed armed groups have launched attacks on U.S. military installations in Iraq and on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, underscoring the widening scope of the confrontation.

The deal centered on Kurdish forces redeploying to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, creating a clear frontline between government troops and Kurdish units. This step was framed as a goodwill gesture aimed at reducing friction and opening space for political dialogue rather than armed confrontation.

The situation deteriorated when Syrian troops continued advancing beyond areas covered by the agreement, triggering clashes in several towns and near strategically important oil facilities. Both sides accused each other of violating the terms, exposing the fragility of the understanding and the depth of mutual suspicion.

In Arab majority towns such as Deir Hafer, the arrival of Syrian troops was met with visible relief among residents. Many locals described the moment as an end to uncertainty, hoping that the return of state control would restore stability after years of shifting authorities.

Some civilians who had fled earlier returned through humanitarian corridors, while others who stayed celebrated openly. Residents spoke of war fatigue and emphasized that ordinary people no longer wanted to be trapped between rival armed groups.

Kurdish fighters moved east toward Tabqa, a town that quickly emerged as the next major flashpoint. When Syrian military officials indicated plans to advance toward Tabqa, Kurdish leaders objected strongly, stating that the town was not included in the withdrawal arrangement.

Tabqa’s importance goes beyond geography, as nearby oil and gas fields make it economically and strategically valuable. Control over these resources remains one of the core drivers of confrontation and leverage in negotiations between Damascus and Kurdish authorities.

Casualties were reported on both sides, with confirmed deaths among Syrian soldiers and Kurdish fighters, though exact figures were not disclosed. Coalition aircraft flying overhead served as a reminder of international concern over the risk of further escalation.

Efforts to contain the fighting included diplomatic engagement, with a United States envoy traveling to Erbil to meet Kurdish leaders. These talks highlighted continued external involvement in trying to prevent the conflict from expanding further.

The renewed clashes underline deeper political divisions following stalled talks on integrating Kurdish military and civilian structures into Syrian state institutions. Missed deadlines and unmet commitments have steadily weakened confidence in a negotiated solution.

Arab tribal leaders in Kurdish controlled areas have warned they may align with government forces if instructed, adding another unpredictable element to the conflict. Their stance suggests that local alliances could quickly reshape the battlefield.

Memories of earlier sectarian violence in other regions of Syria continue to fuel Kurdish fears and resistance. These unresolved grievances complicate reconciliation and cast uncertainty over future stability.

Tensions remain high. The situation continues to evolve.

The announcement, made Monday by the Syrian presidency, marks a breakthrough in efforts to reunite the country after more than 13 years of civil war and internal fragmentation. The deal signals the beginning of the end of parallel administrations in Syria’s north and east and reasserts central authority over critical regions long outside Damascus’ direct control.

A statement published by the presidency emphasized that “all civilian and military institutions in the northeast, including border posts, airports, and oil and gas fields, will now be integrated under the administration of the Syrian state.”

State media also released a photograph of President Sharaa shaking hands with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, underlining the significance of the agreement. The document declared that “the Kurdish community is an essential component of the Syrian state” and reaffirmed its rights to full citizenship and constitutional protections.

End of Division?

The agreement comes just days after severe violence erupted in Syria’s coastal Alawite heartland — the community from which former president Bashar al-Assad hailed. This outbreak, sparked by attacks from Assad loyalists, represented the most serious internal security challenge since Assad was ousted in December.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, over 1,000 civilians—primarily Alawites—were killed in a brutal crackdown by new government forces. Additionally, 231 security personnel and 250 pro-Assad fighters lost their lives during the clashes.

Despite the bloodshed, the government declared the operation concluded on Monday and shifted its focus to stabilizing the country through national integration. The timing of the SDF agreement suggests a strategic pivot toward unity, following the decapitation of Assad-era loyalist resistance.

SDF’s Strategic Role

The SDF, which emerged during the civil war as a U.S.-backed force, had established a de facto autonomous administration across much of northern and eastern Syria, including areas rich in oil and gas — resources critical to Syria’s post-war reconstruction.

The group, led largely by Kurdish forces, was instrumental in defeating ISIS in its final territorial stronghold in 2019. However, the SDF’s refusal to disarm had led to their exclusion from a recent national dialogue conference hosted by Syria’s new authorities.

The current agreement, however, offers a compromise: recognition and inclusion in exchange for institutional integration. The document also stresses support from the SDF in the government’s campaign against “remnants of Assad’s forces and all threats to Syria’s unity and security.”

A Reversal of History

For decades under the Assad regime, Syria’s Kurdish population was systematically marginalized. Many were denied citizenship, barred from using their language, and forbidden from celebrating their cultural identity.

The tide turned during the civil war, when the Syrian military’s withdrawal from the north enabled Kurdish groups to establish local governance. Yet, their ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU—complicated relations with regional and international powers.

Despite Ankara’s concerns, the SDF insists it operates independently of the PKK. However, its backbone—the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)—is widely considered by Turkey to be an extension of the PKK. Turkish forces have routinely targeted Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria and supported proxy militias against them.

The agreement with Syria’s new authorities, who have established close ties with Turkey since Assad’s fall, could reduce Ankara’s justification for continued military action—provided the SDF’s integration is fully realized and verified.

A Step Toward Peace?

The timing of this deal is also significant in light of a recent call from jailed PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, urging the group to disband and abandon armed struggle. If realized, the dissolution of the PKK could signal a new era of regional stability, and the SDF’s absorption into Syrian state structures may mark a move away from militia rule toward centralized governance.

While challenges remain, including Turkish military presence and latent sectarian divisions, the agreement could serve as the first genuine blueprint for Syria’s reunification — built not on military might, but on negotiation and mutual recognition.

Michael Arizanti

Qazi Muhammad pointed out: “The success of any people is caused by, unity and support of their whole nation, any nation that does not have unity will forever be under its enemies’ rule”.

It was the Kurdish Peshmerga that destroyed the myth of ISIS being a invicible fighting force, already in 2014, and became famous worldwide for their heroism. But it also showed the weakness of the Peshmerga forces, the lack of unity.

During the winter of 2014 Kurdish peshmerga forces linked to the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) advanced upon ISIS terrorists in Kharabut, in the historic Kurdish area of Kirkuk. The Peshmergas even managed to take over the city, even though only temporarily. It didn’t take long before the Peshmerga forces faced a very aggressive ISIS counterattack, and for tactical reasons the Peshmerga forces decided to retreat.

During this event, another Peshmerga force linked to political party Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in blindness of the situation prepared to advance on Kharabut themselves, totally unaware of the amassed ISIS fighters.

The lack of communication, unity and cooperation between KDP and PUK Peshmerga resulted in the death of at least 11 Peshmerga soldiers. They didn’t have to die, if the Peshmerga wasn’t so disorganized and disconnected to each other. The lack of unification between Peshmerga forces, the lack of a national Kurdish army creates a lot of problems, and it’s probably the Kurds biggest weakness and obstacle for a future autonomous Kurdistan.

The Peshmerga “those who face death” are the Kurdish fighting forces. Many regard them as one of the most effective ground forces in the modern history, and the most effective force in the fight against ISIS.

Today western (Syria Kurdistan), southern (Kurdistan Region of Iraq) and eastern Kurdistan (Kurdistan Iran) have Peshmerga forces. Kurdistan Region Peshmerga together with support of Peshmerga forces from Iran occupied Kurdistan, they claimed key victories in Kurdistan Region and Iraq against ISIS, in spite of the lack of an independent state, lack of Kurdish unity, their troubles with Baghdad, lack of arms, and lack of support from the world community.

The victory over ISIS also shows what fantastic opportunities there are, if the Peshmerga reforms become a reality, not only as an important cornerstone for a future autonomous Kurdistan, but also as an important factor for stability and security for the whole region.

In the Kurdish documentary “No friends but the mountains” by prominent filmmaker Kae Bahar, from 2017, General Yazdapana from the Parti Azadi Kurdistan said something very interesting: “The Kurdish unity is flawed. Kurdish unity exists at grassroots level but not at the top. The Kurdish leaders are not yet politically united to liberate Kurdistan. There is no agreement on how to move forward and unite all the Kurds. These divisions are caused by political leaders. Political allegiances are as destructive as the enemies who want to keep us divided”.

This is the same problem and opportunities immortal Kurdish leader Qazi Mohammad pointed out in his last speech: “The success of any people is caused by unity and support of their whole nation, any nation that does not have unity will forever be under its enemies’ rule”.

You as Kurds are no less than other free nations.

On the contrary you are in many ways more ready than other nations that freed themselves before from cruelty.

But those who freed themselves had unity among them.

For you to be free you have to stop fighting among yourselves, stop keeping jealousy for each other, stop selling yourselves to the enemy. Only then you can be free and live in a free country.

The Peshmerga is Kurd regional force in Kurdistan. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the force is authorized under the Iraqi Constitution (article 121/5).

When it comes to the Peshmerga reforms, and the unification of the Peshmerga. It should be noted that the Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) are free of external political influence under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affair and elected civilian governance. It should be noted that on the 16th of October 2017, 8 out of 14 brigades split along KDP and PUK lines, they remain splitted.

It should also be noted that all attempts to unify the Peshmerga under government control have failed since the 1990s, but have had positive progress the last few years. Per date PUK and KDP retain their own Pershmerga.

The PUK and KDP also retain their own Peshmerga, separate from the RGBs.

These are called the 70s and 80s Forces respectively. The Netherlands, the US, the UK and Germany have formed the world unique Multi National Advisory Group (MNAG) that enthusiastically supports the Kurdistan Region with their Peshmerga reforms.

As a result of MNAG effort and support, Kurdish leaders earlier this year put heavy support units of the KDPs 80th Unit and the PUKs 70th Unit under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. If KRG and Kurds want a unified effective, modern Peshmerga force – these are important steps that are going very slow (started 2015), but of huge importance.

Kurdistan Regional Government commitment to the Peshmerga reforms: In order to strengthen Kurdistan Region defense capability, counter risks and enhance the security of the Kurdistan Region, KRG will review the current mechanisms for re-organizing and unifying the Peshmerga forces and internal security forces, in coordination with the Kurdistan Region presidency. They will do this with the help of local and international experts. We will also elevate the professional and military capability of our forces.

From a friend of Kurds in Europe

I have been involved in the Kurdish issue in various ways for over 15 years now. I have great respect for the fact that Kurdish parties are trying to learn from their historical mistakes, especially when it comes to letting different destructive forces make Kurds fight against each other.

I am very well acquainted with the painful civil war in the 90s, what happened in Kirkuk 2017, and more. I am also relatively knowledgeable in modern Kurdish history. I see why the formation of a Kurdish state failed in Red Kurdistan, the Republic of Ararat, the Republic of Mahabad and other attempts.

The biggest problem has been the lack of Kurdish national unity. After the Ottoman’s fall, there was really nothing that could have stopped the formation of a Kurdish nation-state if all the Kurds had been one.

Instead, there were different clans, dynasties and more that fought against occupying powers, as Qazi Muhammad pointed out: “The success of any people is caused by, unity and support of their whole nation, any nation that does not have unity will forever be under its enemies’ rule”.

We all saw that while the Iraqi army with high-tech modern weapons ran from ISIS, the Peshmerga ran towards ISIS to fight them – with old worn out AK47s. 

We all saw how difficult it was for the Kurdistan Region to receive weapons from the West in the war against ISIS during the first years, when these weapons were sent via Baghdad (which kept most of them).

However, that did not stop the heroic Peshmerga from crushing ISIS wherever they found them. Eventually, the coalition also realized that it was better to invest in the Peshmerga than the Iraqi army, and began to arm them. From then on it didn’t take long before ISIS was defeated in Iraq and Kurdistan Region.

So what’s the Peshmerga’s biggest strength?

Their fighting spirit, popular support, reliability, mass, and an unique intelligence network.

For the west the Peshmerga reforms are about creating an accountable, capable and affordable regional force operating as an effective element of the Iraqi Security Forces, for a more secure and stable Kurdistan Region within Iraq. 

That should not be the Kurdish government objective. The objective of the Kurdistan Region Government should be to use the Peshmerga reforms as a cornerstone to build a future independent Kurdish state. Security, safety, and stability are the cornerstones of a sovereign nation state.

If we look at the history of Israel, we quickly see how strong one can become through a united national army, even when one is threatened. Even when the nation is newly formed. Israel’s army was built by various militias joining forces. Kurdistan is different but still in a fairly similar situation as Israel in the late 40s.

Kurdistan is historically a tribal society, and historically the Peshmerga have also been loyal to different tribes, the local community, or political parties. In connection with the democratic development in the Kurdistan Region, there will be a lot of challenges, such as the Peshmerga becoming one national army, which will also create enormous opportunities for the future Kurdish independent state. 

Whatever the future has to bring, one thing is a curtain: The increasing importance of Kurds and Kurdistan for the future of the Middle East as international politics. That is in the Kurdistan regional government’s favor!

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.