The research findings were presented by John K. Donohue, former chief of strategic initiatives at the New York City Police Department and senior law enforcement advisor, along with Prasiddha Sudhakar, an analyst with the NCRI, at an advocacy event organized by Coalition of Hindus of North America (CoHNA), at the Capitol Hill, Washington DC on Tuesday.

The study analyzed social media activity related to India and found a significant amount of content that was designed to incite hatred and violence against Hindus.

The research team found that the majority of this content originated from profiles and bots that were traced back to Iran. The content included false information, manipulated images, and misleading headlines, all of which were designed to stoke anti-India sentiment.

Findings

Prasiddha said, “Disseminating Anti-Hindu messages and one of the main messages of these Iranian state sponsored trolls was actually talking about the caste issue and here is actually some sample tweets, that the Iranian state sponsored trolls talked about, basically suggesting that uppercaste Hindus are oppressing all other communities”.

“This messaging was very prevalent with the corpus of about 20,000 feeds”, she added.

Further, she said, “While we investigated state sponsored Iranian trolls, when it comes to discussing this caste issue and affecting real public policies in America today”.

Their analysis of 1 million tweets revealed that Iranian trolls engaged in spreading anti-Hindu stereotypes with the intention of sowing discord. This was identified as part of an influence campaign aimed at accusing Hindus of perpetrating a genocide against minorities in India.

Leftist and Communist Propaganda

Prasiddha said, “Whether it was Professor Dilip Mandal, Jignesh Mevani, or Ambedkar International Center’s Ashok Swain. What is one thing that you notice, about all of these actors that are the most dominant in the conversation on Twitter? You’ll see that only three of these actors are actually based in the United States, and when you took a look at other, open source intelligence, from what these actors have been claiming about Hindus, you see that these are the types of views that they have typically held. So this really raises the concern of what kind of actors are dominating the conversation”.

“Are they really concerned Americans who are passing public policy that affect Americans or is this some kind of a foreign influence operation?”, she added.

The findings of this study are particularly concerning given Iran’s strategic interests in the region and its support for India’s arch-rival, Pakistan.

The NCRI’s research has shed light on the extent of Iran’s involvement in spreading anti-India propaganda and the potential threat it poses to India’s national security.

The NCRI’s findings are likely to have significant implications for India’s foreign policy and its relations with Iran.

Taha tweeted, “Knock, knock! Who’s there? The Biden administration! They’ve got a surprise for you: $3 billion dollars transferred to Iran. But hold your chuckles, folks, because it’s not a joke… apparently. They claim it’s for humanitarian cases. Now, the real punchline?”

“They want the Middle East to trust them, while discouraging us from building relationships with Russia and China. Let’s hope the geopolitical comedy show doesn’t leave us all in stitches”, Taha continued.

There is no doubt that the U.S. has a complicated history with Iran. The two countries have been at odds since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which led to the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran and the establishment of an Islamic Republic. Since then, the U.S. has pursued a policy of economic sanctions and isolation towards Iran, accusing the country of supporting terrorism and pursuing nuclear weapons.

However, the situation in Iran has changed in recent years. The country has been hit hard by economic sanctions, as well as the uprising caused by the custodial death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, which have caused widespread suffering among the Iranian people.

U.S. discourages its allies specially the Saudi Arabia and UAE, from engaging with Iran, Russia, and China. However, with the China-brokered Saudi-Iran deal in March, Saudi Arabia has exuded its autonomous right to execute its choices without American involvement.

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab

If Iran is honest in its intentions toward Saudi Arabia, it would reevaluate its approach toward non-state actors and once-allied Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Houthis and maybe Hezbollah.

The Middle East has recently been rocked with deep political shifts, with longtime arch-foes ending years-and even decades-long standoff. Egypt and Turkey agreed to mend relations and start procedures of exchanging ambassadors. Saudi Arabia and Iran have signed a historic rapprochement deal.

Ironically, Turkey and Iran are backers of the Muslim Brotherhood organization—though at varying degrees. Turkey has sacrificed diplomatic relations with Egypt in exchange for unflinching support for the Muslim Brotherhood over the last decade. For the same reason, Iran has always been at loggerheads with successive Egyptian governments.

However, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been fighting the organization’s ideology for a while now, which has always put Riyadh on the opposing sides of alliances in which Turkey or Iran have been engaged.

The most urgent question now is: How far these rifts and internal cleavages will shape the Muslim Brotherhood’s future given the shifting alliances that put the organization—designated terrorist in Egypt and many major Middle Eastern nations—in an unfavorable position?

The Muslim Brotherhood has forged strong ties with likeminded organizations in the Islamic world—both Sunni and Shiite.

It has strong ties with all Islamist parties in Turkey—including those opposed to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan such as Felicity Party—with the hope of one day establishing a globalist government in as many major Islamic countries as possible in what is called in the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology as “Mastership of the World”, a principle whose foundations had been laid by the group’s founder Hassan al-Banna. 

The Brotherhood’s rise to power in 2012 in tightly contested elections—in which the Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi narrowly defeated former army general Ahmed Shafik—was a godsend for Erdoğan and his government as well as Iran, whose government embraces an Islamist, globalist ideology deemed the Shiite variant of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. 

The Muslim Brotherhood forged ties with Twelver Shiite Iran before the Sunni Turkey. This is because ‘Islamic’ governance was established in Iran approximately two and a half decades before Turkey. With the victory of the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution, many Muslim Brotherhood senior officials praised the revolution, seeing it as a ray of hope for their long-awaited Islamic project.

The late Muslim Brotherhood figure Kamal al-Hilbawi, who once served as the Muslim Brotherhood’s spokesman, was captured on television praising Iran, its supreme leader, and the Islamic revolutions. He had made numerous visits to the Shiite country.

When he was in power, late Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi made major efforts to “pursue a different strategy” to Iran than any previous Egyptian governments. He hosted former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Cairo, sparking outrage among all of Morsi’s opponents, particularly the Salafis, who saw Twelver Shiism as their archenemy and the most serious threat the country has ever faced.

Notwithstanding their reservations about Morsi’s position on Syria, the Iranians hailed his election and saw him as a huge opportunity to infiltrate the Arab world. They have even provided advice on how the Muslim Brotherhood ‘protect the revolution’, advising them to establish their own version of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. 

Likewise, Turkey’s Erdoğan was boosted by Morsi and the Brotherhood’s rise to power. But Erdoğan’s dream was short-lived. The Muslim Brotherhood’s government was unseated following mass protests that prompted the army to intervene to ‘prevent the country from sliding into chaos and civil strife’. Morsi was ousted, the Brotherhood has lost power and Erdoğan has missed out on the opportunity of having the most powerful Arab country on his side. 

The Muslim Brotherhood’s ouster was immensely shocking to Erdoğan. He initially refused to acknowledge that they had left. He was acting as though it was only a matter of time before they were restored to power. Nonetheless, the Brotherhood has lost strength and clout on the Egyptian street, with the organization’s social, political, and economic clout dwindling to historic lows.

He had embarked on launching scathing attacks on the Egyptian government and El-Sisi personally. After withdrawing Turkey’s ambassador from Egypt, Erdoğan remarked that “he will never respect people who gain power through armed means.” He supported the Brotherhood and its protests, transforming his country into a stronghold for the organization’s anti-regime activities. 

However, because political blunders have been the Muslim Brotherhood’s trademark for the past nine decades, they have failed to hold power. The Egyptian government has managed to nearly wipe out the organization’s clout and their popular incubators. This utter failure—albeit shocking and disappointing—has forced Erdoğan to fundamentally alter his stance and make overtures to the regime he once declared “he does not respect.” 

Not only has the Muslim Brotherhood failed to depose the Egyptian regime and return to power, but it has also lost Erdoğan’s trust. The group’s camp, led by former secretary general Mahmoud Hossein, was claimed to have made overtures to the Felicity Party, which is regarded the Turkish variant of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and has long been at odds with Erdoğan and his AK Party.

Erdoğan was briefed on Felicity Party communications and was incensed by the Egyptian organization’s move. Erdoğan has decided to change alliances and forsake the Brotherhood. It seems that Erdoğan has realized that the Brotherhood has been attempting to stab him in the back. He deemed the move ungrateful and decided to make them pay the price, turning to their arch-foe El-Sisi. Thus, Cairo and Ankara decided to hold talks. The talks were slow and cautious, focusing chiefly on security matters. 

The Muslim Brotherhood has long sold itself as a unified organization with a single leader, single line, and a single hierarchy. However, this has turned out to be a massive deception. Immediately after losing power in 2013, the Brotherhood suffered major splits, primarily over how to confront the political crisis they were faced with and how to respond to their humiliating loss of power.

A faction chose nonviolent protests as a temporary strategy, while others were more daring, deciding to play hardball with Egypt’s government. These schisms have never abated, with the Turkey-based wing, led by Mahmoud Hossein, claiming to be the sole legal representative of the imprisoned supreme guide Mohammed Badie.

A new acting supreme guide was elected after a lengthy period of intense power struggles, internal betrayals, and back-and-forth barter of blame within the organization—over political, administrative, and even financial issues. Salah Abdel-Haq was elected in place of the late Ibrahim Mounir, who was based in London.

As a result, it appears that as time passes, more allies are forsaking the Muslim Brotherhood. Not only has Turkey broken with the Brotherhood, but Iran is also poised to follow likewise. Following the rapprochement agreement with Saudi Arabia, Iran is making bold moves, making great strides, and embarking on unforeseen initiatives.

If Iran is honest in its intentions toward Saudi Arabia, it would reevaluate its approach toward non-state actors and once-allied Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Houthis and maybe Hezbollah. The latter will almost certainly lose its Shiite ally as well. Historically, the organization has performed poorly in power—and it is lousy at power plays. In its relationship with the Brotherhood—and the other non-state actors—Iran is the puppet master; it always pulls the string. And if it determines that its partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer beneficial and obstructs it from carrying out its regional agenda, it will most likely distance itself from the organization. 

On balance, the Muslim Brotherhood is in shambles. It has lost its most strong ally, Turkey, and might easily lose Iran due to current political developments. The new Muslim Brotherhood leadership is still operating in a hazy environment. The organization’s difficulties and disputes remain unresolved, and divisions remain unhealed. There are various varieties of the Muslim Brotherhood, each with its own set of connections and affiliations, all of which serve the interests of its respective wings.

The Muslim Brotherhood has been incredibly successful in one area over the last decade: failure. It failed to maintain its coherent organization, strong leadership, and reliable alliances.  The new leadership takes over at a time when the group is on fragile ground, with no significant bases of support at home or reliable allies outside. The new leadership could be part—or a sign—of the organization’s current and future failures—unless a miracle happens.

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab is the former editorial manager of the English edition of the Baghdad Post. He is focusing on Iraq, Iran and political Islam movements, with articles posted on the Herald Report, Vocal Europe, the Greater Middle East and other platforms.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view. 

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab

A mood of reconciliation is developing throughout the Middle East. Four main regional actors—Saudi Arabia vs. Iran and Egypt vs. Turkey—have agreed to bury the hatchet and start again.

There have been shuttle diplomatic tours over the past period in the Middle East to mend relations between the region’s longtime arch-foes Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Egypt vs Turkey. Egypt and Turkey have been locked in a nearly one-decade feud over Turkey’s sympathy with and support for the Muslim Brotherhood and late President Mohammed Morsi.

The ideological congruence between the Turkish AKP-led government and the Muslim Brotherhood has always aroused sensitivities in Egypt, particularly after ousting the Muslim Brotherhood government in July 2013 following mass protests.

The problem between Egypt and Turkey is essentially one of security. Dissidents of Egypt’s regime are being hosted and protected by Turkey. It also has ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian government’s arch-foe.

Yet, it plays a key supporting role for the Tripoli-based National Accord Government, which competes with the Libyan National Army. This significant Turkish security presence, which appeared to be a thorn in Egypt’s side, necessitated lengthy security talks before beginning any diplomatic meetings in order to test the waters and determine whether there was a prospect of changing the current approach to each other.

Following these meetings between senior security and intelligence officials from both countries, media outlets in both countries were directed to tone down their rhetoric, abstaining from insulting the leaders of both countries.

The Qatar 2022 World Cup opening game was the pinnacle of these efforts, with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Egypt’s president Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shaking hands and declaring the end of a decade-long standoff.

Egypt-Turkey ties have been the subject of lengthy talks at the security levels between the two countries’ competent officials. The signature of a maritime border demarcation agreement with Greece in August 2020, taking into consideration the Turkish navy’s requests, was the first major step toward easing and ending the diplomatic split between the two sides. Yet, in February 2021, Egypt launched a bid for gas exploration, pledging not to infringe on the Turkish continental shelf.

According to analysts, there has always been a desire to strengthen economic relations. Given that there are motivations to toss a stone into the still pond, all indications show that proper conditions were being created to accomplish rapprochement. There’s a Turkish desire to enhance ties with Egypt in energy projects, the experts added, citing the Ukrainian crisis and the concerns it raised about the shortage in gas supplies, not to mention the two countries’ desire to restore ties to cope with the developments on the regional and global arenas.

The Turkish presence in Libya, its support for the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated dissenters and the differences over Mediterranean gas shares were the three main obstacles to restoring the diplomatic relations. Turkey has started doing its part and taking tangible steps to bring to a halt the diplomatic breakup with Egypt and improve the strained ties.

Ankara has restricted the Muslim Brotherhood’s mouthpieces—which have been launching fierce propaganda campaigns against President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s regime, playing on economic grievances—ordering them to shut down.

Over the past two decades, Iran’s role in the Middle East has been expanding—with proxy actors spreading and nearly occupying four Arab capitals—Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Sana. To Iran, Saudi Arabia is on the opposing side. Saudi Arabia is a major Sunni Arab nation and home to Muslims’ two holiest mosques. It never supports militias or non-state actors. It has no troops deployed overseas. It has no IRGC or Qassem Soleimani. Thus, the political agendas adopted by Saudi Arabia and Iran are diametrically opposed.  

As for Iran and Saudi Arabia, the way the shift happened wasn’t so much different from that of Egypt and Turkey. Saudi Arabia and Iran have always been at loggerheads—but the tensions on the surface have always been a tip of the iceberg. The breaking point came when Iranian protesters had breached the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Najaf following Riyadh’s execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr in 2016, a point at which the relationship between the two countries was severed. This diplomatic breakup was followed by a streak of estrangement and proxy war.

Negotiations were resumed in April 2021 in Baghdad. The two sides held unannounced meetings in Baghdad’s Green Zone. They held five rounds of talks, the last of which was held in April 2022. These rounds of talks yielded limited results.

These rounds of talks were characterized by secretiveness. According to Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh, an agreement with Saudi Arabia stipulates that the details of the talks should never be revealed. There has been deep divergence between the two sides. This was indicated by the slow and prolonged talks between the two sides—with the intervals between the rounds of talks—particularly the fourth and fifth rounds—extending to seven months.

The internal and regional developments that accompanied these talks weren’t stable. In Iran, President Ebrahim Raisi took power following a controversial presidential contest marked by voter apathy. The reign of Mostafa al-Kadhimi ended and his successor Mohammed Shaya al-Sudani took office and took over the coordination of the talks. Some even argue that the Saudi-Iranian rapport’s seed was soon in Iraq, as there has been rapprochement between Riyadh and Baghdad since al-Kadhimi took power.

Thus, there are similarities shared by the talks between Egypt and Turkey on the one hand and Iran and Saudi Arabia on the other. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are concerned with the security issues, since Iran and Turkey have been nurturing an increasing deployment in the Middle East and beyond, using non-state actors and ideology-infused groups. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology—globalist Islam, establishing the caliphate and, to some extent, restoring the now-fading Ottoman glory—is Turkey’s asset. Meanwhile, Iran’s asset is militias indoctrinated by the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih who seek to establish the Shiite version of the globalist Islam. Ironically, Iran has strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, too.

Another similarity is the climb-down, or concessions made by Turkey and Iran in order to mend relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. To promote its political project, Iran has traditionally relied on militancy and proxy actors. Despite sanctions and severe pressures, it has continued with this political project. However, when the sanctions hurt the country’s economy and the regime’s legitimacy at home as well as its credibility among Shiites, the regime was forced to back down, taking several steps back and sitting down with its archrival Saudi Arabia to end the decades-long rivalry. Similarly, Turkey’s Erdoan has always opposed normalizing relations with Egypt’s regime, claiming that he would never shake hands with someone like El-Sisi—but he climbed down and did it.

The bottom line: A mood of reconciliation is developing throughout the Middle East. Four main regional actors—Saudi Arabia vs. Iran and Egypt vs. Turkey—have agreed to bury the hatchet and start again. The talks were slow and laborious. Concerns about security have taken precedence over political issues. There are stronger parties and those that have made concessions. Yet, the newly reconciled nations haven’t fully restored ties, allowing each other time to test their intentions and see if each side would follow through on what was agreed upon. As a result, a significant step has been accomplished, yet there is still a mountain to climb.

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab is the former editorial manager of the English edition of the Baghdad Post. He is focusing on Iraq, Iran and political Islam movements, with articles posted on the Herald Report, Vocal Europe, the Greater Middle East and other platforms.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

“There are a lot of opportunities for Saudi investments in Iran. We don’t see impediments as long as the terms of any agreement would be respected,” al-Jadaan said during the Financial Sector Conference in Riyadh.

Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed on Friday to re-establish relations after years of hostility that had threatened stability and security in the Gulf and helped fuel conflicts in the Middle East from Yemen to Syria.

Tehran and Riyadh agreed to resume diplomatic relations and re-open embassies within two months, according to a statement issued by Iran, Saudi Arabia and China, which brokered the deal.

“To focus on your economic development and focus on providing for the people in your country, you need stability, and they (Iran) need both,” al-Jadaan said in Riyadh.

He said there are a lot of opportunities in Iran and that Saudi Arabia also provides a lot of opportunities for them.

The statement by Iran’s judiciary head Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehi offered for the first time a glimpse of the full scope of the government’s crackdown that followed the demonstrations over the September death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who had been detained by the country’s morality police.

It also suggests that Iran’s theocracy now feels secure enough to admit the scale of the unrest, which represented one of the most-serious challenges to the establishment since the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Tens of thousands also were detained in the purges that followed the revolution.

However, anger still remains in the country as it struggles through the collapse of the nation’s currency, the rial, economic woes, and uncertainty over its ties to the wider world after the collapse of Tehran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers.

The state-run IRNA news agency quoted Ejehi as announcing the figure Monday. Iranian state media had previously suggested Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could pardon that many people swept up in the demonstrations, ahead of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, when the pious fast from dawn to dusk. Ramadan starts later next week.

Ejehi said a total of 82,656 prisoners and those facing charges had been pardoned. Of those, some 22,628 had been arrested amid the demonstrations, he said. Those pardoned had not committed theft or violent crimes, he added. His comments suggest that the true total of those detained in the demonstrations is even greater.

In February, Iran had acknowledged “tens of thousands” had been detained in the protests. Monday’s acknowledgment from Ejehi offered an even higher than what activists had previously cited. However, there’s been no mass release of prisoners documented in recent days by Iranian media reports or activists.

More than 19,700 people have been arrested during the protests, according to Human Rights Activists in Iran, a group that’s been tracking the crackdown. At least 530 people have been killed as authorities violently suppressed demonstrations, the group said. Iran has not offered a death toll for months.

“From day one there was no transparent accounting of who was arrested and imprisoned — before or after the mass protests these past months — which is why there’s no way to verify how many are being released now,” said Jasmin Ramsey, the deputy director of the U.S.-based Center for Human Rights in Iran.

“We also know that more than five months after the death of … Mahsa Amini in state custody, not a single Iranian official has been held accountable for the mass killings of street protesters, nor the arbitrary imprisonments of tens of thousands.”

The judiciary’s announcement also came ahead of next week’s celebration of Nowruz, the Persian New Year. On Tuesday, some in Iran also mark nearly 4,000-year-old Persian tradition known as the Festival of Fire that’s linked to the Zoroastrian religion. Hard-liners discourage such celebrations, viewing them as pagan holdovers.

There had been calls for anti-government protests around both events. While mass demonstrations have cooled in recent weeks, nightly chants against Iran’s theocracy can still be heard in some neighborhoods of Iran’s capital, Tehran.

The announcement followed a major development last week, when Iran and Saudi Arabia said on Friday that with China’s mediation, they agreed to reestablish diplomatic ties and reopen embassies after a seven-year freeze in relations. That agreement could help aid an end to the yearslong war in Yemen, which sees a Saudi-led coalition battle the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels who hold its capital, Sanaa. It has also helped boost the rial in recent days against the dollar.

Meanwhile, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited Tehran and met Monday with his Iranian counterpart, Ebrahim Raisi. Iran has been supplying the bomb-carrying drones that Russia now uses in its war on Ukraine. Lukashenko, the authoritarian leader of Belarus, remains close to Russia, which used Belarusian territory to launch Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Lukashenko said his country and Iran would sign an unspecified set of deals valued at $100 million.

Iran “opposes external pressure, attempts to impose someone else’s will,” Lukashenko said, addressing his hosts. “And how, in spite of everything, you develop modern technologies and nuclear energy. And, as we decided today with the president of Iran, we can be very useful to each other if we truly unite our efforts.”

I genuinely hope this is an opportunity for the Iranian regime to focus on building its economy and looking after its people, just as our leadership does with us here in the Kingdom

The Saudi-Iranian agreement achieved with Chinese mediation is a significant development in regional geopolitics, containing an unprecedented commitment from the Iranian side of respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and restoring security cooperation.

If Tehran keeps its end of the bargain this could be a true game-changer, heralding an era of regional peace and prosperity not seen in decades.

Of course, these are early days; there needs to be a trust-building period, and actions on the ground to cement the agreement. Some may be skeptical of Saudi intentions, or indeed call this a U-turn; they are clearly not up to date with the Kingdom’s declared policy.

Friday’s agreement is in line with what Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told The Atlantic magazine a year ago — that we see Iran as a neighbor. It was in both parties’ interests to resolve matters, the crown prince said, but the Kingdom’s security concerns must be addressed first.

I genuinely hope this is an opportunity for the Iranian regime to focus on building its economy and looking after its people, just as our leadership does with us here in the Kingdom. If both countries are thriving and we achieve peace and prosperity, that would be good not just for Saudi Arabia but for the whole region, and indeed the world.

Saudi officials will continue to be on high alert, absolutely clear-eyed that what is agreed with Iranian foreign policy officials may not be in alignment with the Revolutionary Guards. In the Kingdom we know that throughout this conflict we have been always reasonable and offered an olive branch. Previous attempts have failed; let us hope for everyone’s sake that this one succeeds.

Inevitably, armchair experts in the US and Europe will miss the bigger picture, focus on China’s role, and question why the US was excluded. I don’t believe that exclusion was indicative of a lack of trust; America remains the most important and steadfast of Saudi strategic allies. Rather it is in the nature of these negotiations that to succeed they must be shrouded in secrecy and conducted through mediators accepted by both parties as fair, without bias or conflict of interest.

China fits that bill perfectly; it has good relations with both countries, and unlike the US and most of Europe has no history of regional aggression or colonialism. Indeed, as Saudi Arabia’s leading oil customer (1.75 million barrels a day), China has an interest in ensuring the safe flow of energy by seeing this agreement through.

While Saudi-Iranian tensions are far from over, this agreement could be the beginning of the end of a decades-long and bloody chapter.

Faisal J Abbas is the Editor of Arab News.

Article first published on Arab News.

Saudi Arabia’s decision to engage with its regional rival has left Israel largely alone as it leads the charge for diplomatic isolation of Iran and threats of a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

News of the rapprochement between long-time regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran sent shock waves through the Middle East on Saturday and dealt a symbolic blow to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has made the threat posed by Tehran a public diplomacy priority and personal crusade.

The breakthrough — a culmination of more than a year of negotiations in Baghdad and more recent talks in China — also became ensnared in Israel’s internal politics, reflecting the country’s divisions at a moment of national turmoil.

The agreement, which gives Iran and Saudi Arabia two months to reopen their respective embassies and re-establish ties after seven years of rupture, more broadly represents one of the most striking shifts in Middle Eastern diplomacy over recent years. In countries like Yemen and Syria, long caught between the Sunni kingdom and the Shiite powerhouse, the announcement stirred cautious optimism.

In Israel, it caused disappointment — along with finger-pointing.

One of Netanyahu’s greatest foreign policy triumphs remains Israel’s U.S.-brokered normalization deals in 2020 with four Arab states, including Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. They were part of a wider push to isolate and oppose Iran in the region.

He has portrayed himself as the only politician capable of protecting Israel from Tehran’s rapidly accelerating nuclear program and regional proxies, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Israel and Iran have also waged a regional shadow war that has led to suspected Iranian drone strikes on Israeli-linked ships ferrying goods in the Persian Gulf, among other attacks.

A normalization deal with Saudi Arabia, the most powerful and wealthy Arab state, would fulfill Netanyahu’s prized goal, reshaping the region and boosting Israel’s standing in historic ways. Even as backdoor relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia have grown, the kingdom has said it won’t officially recognize Israel before a resolution to the decadeslong Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Since returning to office late last year, Netanyahu and his allies have hinted that a deal with the kingdom could be approaching. In a speech to American Jewish leaders last month, Netanyahu described a peace agreement as “a goal that we are working on in parallel with the goal of stopping Iran.”

But experts say the Saudi-Iran deal that announced Friday has thrown cold water on those ambitions. Saudi Arabia’s decision to engage with its regional rival has left Israel largely alone as it leads the charge for diplomatic isolation of Iran and threats of a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The UAE also resumed formal relations with Iran last year.

“It’s a blow to Israel’s notion and efforts in recent years to try to form an anti-Iran bloc in the region,” said Yoel Guzansky, an expert on the Persian Gulf at the Institute for National Security Studies, an Israeli think tank. “If you see the Middle East as a zero-sum game, which Israel and Iran do, a diplomatic win for Iran is very bad news for Israel.”

Even Danny Danon, a Netanyahu ally and former Israeli ambassador to the U.N. who recently predicted a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2023, seemed disconcerted.

“This is not supporting our efforts,” he said, when asked about whether the rapprochement hurt chances for the kingdom’s recognition of Israel.

In Yemen, where the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out with the most destructive consequences, both warring parties were guarded, but hopeful.

A Saudi-led military coalition intervened in Yemen’s conflict in 2015, months after the Iran-backed Houthi militias seized the capital of Sanaa in 2014, forcing the internationally recognized government into exile in Saudi Arabia.

The Houthi rebels welcomed the agreement as a modest but positive step.

“The region needs the return of normal relations between its countries, through which the Islamic society can regain security lost from foreign interventions,” said Houthi spokesman and chief negotiator Mohamed Abdulsalam.

The Saudi-backed Yemeni government expressed some optimism — and caveats.

“The Yemeni government’s position depends on actions and practices not words and claims,” it said, adding it would proceed cautiously “until observing a true change in (Iranian) behavior.”

Analysts did not expect an immediate settlement to the conflict, but said direct talks and better relations could create momentum for a separate agreement that may offer both countries an exit from a disastrous war.

“The ball now is in the court of the Yemeni domestic warring parties to prioritize Yemen’s national interest in reaching a peace deal and be inspired by this initial positive step,” said Afrah Nasser, a non-resident fellow at the Washington-based Arab Center.

Anna Jacobs, senior Gulf analyst with the International Crisis Group, said she believed the deal was tied to a de-escalation in Yemen.

“It is difficult to imagine a Saudi-Iran agreement to resume diplomatic relations and re-open embassies within a two-month period without some assurances from Iran to more seriously support conflict resolution efforts in Yemen,” she said.

War-scarred Syria similarly welcomed the agreement as a move toward easing tensions that have exacerbated the country’s conflict. Iran has been a main backer of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government, while Saudi Arabia opposed it.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry called it an “important step that will lead to strengthening security and stability in the region.”

In Israel, bitterly divided and gripped by mass protests over plans by Netanyahu’s far-right government to overhaul the judiciary, politicians seized on the rapprochement between the kingdom and Israel’s archenemy as an opportunity to criticize Netanyahu, accusing him of focusing on his personal agenda at the expense of Israel’s international relations.

Yair Lapid, the former prime minister and head of Israel’s opposition, denounced the agreement between Riyadh and Tehran as “a full and dangerous failure of the Israeli government’s foreign policy.”

“This is what happens when you deal with legal madness all day instead of doing the job with Iran and strengthening relations with the U.S.,” he wrote on Twitter. Even Yuli Edelstein from Netanyahu’s Likud party blamed Israel’s “power struggles and head-butting” for distracting the country from its more pressing threats.

Another opposition lawmaker, Gideon Saar, mocked Netanyahu’s goal of formal ties with the kingdom. “Netanyahu promised peace with Saudi Arabia,” he wrote on social media. “In the end (Saudi Arabia) did it … with Iran.”

Netanyahu, on an official visit to Italy, declined a request for comment and issued no statement on the matter. But quotes to Israeli media by an anonymous senior official in the delegation sought to put blame on the previous government that ruled for a year and a half before Netanyahu returned to office. “It happened because of the impression that Israel and the U.S. were weak,” said the senior official, according to the Haaretz daily, which hinted that Netanyahu was the official.

Despite the fallout for Netanyahu’s reputation, experts doubted a detente would harm Israel. Saudi Arabia and Iran will remain regional rivals, even if they open embassies in each other’s capitals, said Guzansky. And like the UAE, Saudi Arabia could deepen relations with Israel even while maintaining a transactional relationship with Iran.

“The low-key arrangement that the Saudis have with Israel will continue,” said Umar Karim, an expert on Saudi politics at the University of Birmingham, noting that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank remained more of a barrier to Saudi recognition than differences over Iran. “The Saudi leadership is engaging in more than one way to secure its national security.”

The two sides agreed to respect state sovereignty, not to interfere in internal matters, and to activate a security cooperation agreement signed in 2001, the statement said.

In the joint statement, Iran and the Saudi Arabia have expressed gratitude to Iraq and Oman for hosting negotiations in 2021 and 2022 and to China for hosting the most recent round of talks.

Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran are expected to hold a meeting to carry out the new decision and facilitate the exchange of ambassadors.

Representatives of Saudi Arabia and Iran have held several rounds of talks in Iraq for the past one year. 

Both governments have also agreed to resume trade, economy and investment agreement signed in 1998.

Joint Trilateral Statement

In response to the noble initiative of His Excellency President Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, of China’s support for developing good neighborly relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

And based on the agreement between His Excellency President Xi Jinping and the leaderships in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, whereby the People’s Republic of China would host and sponsor talks between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Proceeding from their shared desire to resolve the disagreements between them through dialogue and diplomacy, and in light of their brotherly ties.

Adhering to the principles and objectives of Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and International conventions and norms.

The delegations from the two countries held talks during the period 10-06-March 2023 in Beijing – the delegation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia headed by His Excellency Dr. Musaad bin Mohammed Al-Aiban, Minister of State, Member of the Council of Ministers, and National Security Advisor, and the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran headed by His Excellency Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Saudi and Iranian sides expressed their appreciation and gratitude to the Republic of Iraq and the Sultanate of Oman for hosting rounds of dialogue that took place between both sides during the years 2022-2021. The two sides also expressed their appreciation and gratitude to the leadership and government of the People’s Republic of China for hosting and sponsoring the talks, and the efforts it placed towards its success.

The three countries announce that an agreement has been reached between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, that includes an agreement to resume diplomatic relations between them and re-open their embassies and missions within a period not exceeding two months, and the agreement includes their affirmation of the respect for the sovereignty of states and the non-interference in internal affairs of states.

They also agreed that the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries shall meet to implement this, arrange for the return of their ambassadors, and discuss means of enhancing bilateral relations.

They also agreed to implement the Security Cooperation Agreement between them, which was signed on 1422/1/22 (H), corresponding to 2001/4/17, and the General Agreement for Cooperation in the fields of Economy, Trade, Investment, Technology, Science, Culture, Sports, and Youth, which was signed on 1419/2/2 (H), corresponding to 1998/5/27.

The three countries expressed their keenness to exert all efforts towards enhancing regional and international peace and security.

The Iranian resistance’s alternative is now in a position to advance

The end of Iran’s aberrant religious regime seems at last in sight. The cries of the long-suffering Iranian people are being heard, and the world community has plenty of ways to assist the people retake their own country, end its pariah status, and re-enter the community of nations.

This is why outlining the characteristics of a democratic, alternative government is essential. These characteristics correlate to the historical, political, and social realities of Iran, and will ensure that the emerging government bears no resemblance to the monstrous, bloodthirsty tyranny erected by the mullahs.

 Some of the most significant attributes that a new, viable alternative government needs to have are:

1. Structure and organization

2. Domestic and international support

3. Competent leadership and a clear plan of action for the future

4. Pluralism

5. Rejection of all forms of dictatorship

There is only one organization that is prepared to do these five things: the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). For decades, they have worked to educate thousands of political figures, parliaments, former government officials and many allied groups about the existing political, social and economic realities in Iran. The NCRI also has presented their 10-point plan that is the best hope for a new, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous Iran.

Regarding structure and organization, for instance, NCRI leaders have shown that they can organize large gatherings and social-change efforts, despite terrorist threats, deadly reprisals, and government suppression. The NCRI has many supporters hidden in Iran, and they are convincing many Iranians to reject the theocracy and seek change.

Also, as the principal organization within the NCRI, the MEK stands out for its network and its resistance units inside Iran. The current uprising in Iran cannot be separated from its 40 years of government protests and opposition in every sphere, political, social, publicity, military, etc. The MEK has been at the forefront of these campaigns.

A political alternative is not something that can be spontaneously created overnight. As a viable alternative, the NCRI has grown deep roots during an arduous and long battle against the ruling religious tyranny. The NCRI coalition has defied religious fascism, developed a structure and organization, created a plan, and paid the price for resistance, day after day.

During these tumultuous years, the NCRI’s commitment and perseverance have strengthened, even in the face of severe persecution, imprisonment and executions. Instead, it has stayed loyal to its values, especially rejection of any power, past and present, “Shah or Shaikh” that is authoritarian and dictatorial.

NCRI has remained wholly dedicated to democratic and freedom-loving principles, protecting these ideals from assaults waged by the enemy. The ruling regime, on the other hand, is struggling to keep its allies in line even as it spins out of control, both in rhetoric and in action.

Recently, the deputy of the regime’s judiciary revealed that there is not a single meeting with European countries in which Tehran doesn’t complain about the MEK and the Iranian resistance. The mullahs have waged a massive psychological war and demonization campaign across the world against this movement. More than a thousand books, and hundreds of movies and TV series have been produced to defame the NCRI and its alternative.

Moreover, during the last 40 years, the slogans of “Death to the Hypocrites [MEK]” have never stopped echoing in the official meetings of the Iranian regime, its Friday prayers all over the country, or its parliamentary sessions. The regime doesn’t spend even a small percentage of such propaganda against any other movement.

 If it were not for the dogged determination of the NCRI coalition and its allies to stand up to religious fascism at any cost in all cultural, social, and political aspects, the fate of the Iranian people today would be radically worse.

Without great resistance, Iran’s tyrannical regime might have secured its dominance for hundreds of years. The NCRI and its brave men, women, and allies are standing against such an ugly future.

The NCRI resistance movement’s history is full of critical chapters and high-risk and consequential decisions. Today, it  has brought the regime to a vulnerable and shaky crossroad, defined by desperation in the face of an uprising and a viable government alternative that will secure the regime’s demise and a democratic future for the Iranian people.

The Iranian resistance’s alternative is now in a position to advance. The proven capabilities and competencies of the NCRI during its battle against the mullahs’ regime, as well as its success in preserving the culture of struggle and liberty, means the people and the revolution have their solution in this alternative.

The NCRI alternative will lead to peace, stability, unity, and territorial integrity of the country, and establish the fundamental rights and liberties of the Iranian people. Such unity and its promise can already be seen in the slogans chanted by the Iranian people, including “From Zahedan to Tehran, I sacrifice my life for Iran” or “From Kurdistan to Tehran, I sacrifice my life for Iran.”

The murder of hundreds of women, men, and children across Iran, and the arrests of tens of thousands of others, have sealed the fate of the religious tyranny. It will never be the same, and it will not survive. Brutal repression by a desperate regime has only hardened public determination to overthrow the oppressors and achieve the goal of a democratic and secular Iran.

It is now imperative that the West understand the dynamics and historic implications of the unfolding revolution, that it can be summarized in the slogan of protester “No to Shah” “No to Shaik” confirming the rejection of symbols of any form of tyranny. In recent months men and women from every walk of life, every class, every nationality—and transcends religious boundaries are united. Iran is standing at its moment for regime change, and the NCRI is the catalyst for the movement that will usher Iran into a new paradigm of freedom that is in sight.

Article first published on The Levant News.

Saeed Abed is a Member of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee, Expert on Iran, and the Middle East.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.