The report, based on interviews with current and former Israeli intelligence and military officials, said Barnea transformed Mossad from an organization focused primarily on targeted clandestine missions into a central operational arm supporting Israel’s broader confrontation with Iran and its regional allies.

Among the report’s most significant claims were new details regarding the September 2024 killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut. According to the newspaper, Lebanese agents recruited by Mossad played a role in gathering intelligence and placing targeting equipment that helped facilitate the Israeli strike that killed Nasrallah and several senior Hezbollah commanders.

The report said some operatives moved through areas recently hit by Israeli bombardment to assess damage and install equipment linked to the operation. It added that Barnea regarded locally recruited agents as among the agency’s most valuable assets and viewed their activities as evidence of a broader shift in how Mossad conducted operations abroad.

The investigation also linked Barnea to intelligence efforts preceding Israel’s military campaign against Iran in 2025. According to Israeli sources cited by the newspaper, officials examined the possibility of supporting Kurdish groups as part of a wider strategy aimed at increasing pressure on Iran’s leadership during the conflict.

The Jerusalem Post reported that Israeli planners envisioned Kurdish forces advancing on the ground with support from Israeli air power. The proposal was ultimately blocked by U.S. President Donald Trump, according to the newspaper, although Israeli officials cited in the report differed on whether opposition originated within the U.S. administration or stemmed partly from concerns raised by Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan.

According to the report, Barnea did not believe military action alone would be sufficient to topple Iran’s leadership but argued that sustained economic, diplomatic and military pressure could gradually weaken the system and create conditions for political change.

The newspaper said Israeli and U.S. officials remain concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, particularly a facility referred to as Pickaxe Mountain, which it described as being buried deeper underground than the Fordow enrichment site targeted during U.S. strikes in 2025. Officials cited by the report expressed concern that the site could provide Iran with a more secure location for sensitive nuclear activities.

The report said Trump opposed deploying American ground forces to seize nuclear material or destroy deeply buried facilities, favoring negotiations aimed at restricting Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

The investigation also revisited plans for a large-scale Mossad operation against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure that were ultimately shelved. According to the newspaper, Israeli leaders concluded in 2024 that the operation carried excessive risks and instead shifted planning toward the aerial campaign launched the following year.

Sources close to Barnea disputed aspects of that assessment, the report said, arguing that Mossad had repeatedly demonstrated an ability to conduct unprecedented operations through local recruits and covert networks operating inside Iran.

The newspaper further reported that some Israeli officials believed recent U.S. intervention to prevent additional Israeli strikes in Beirut reduced pressure on Hezbollah and complicated efforts to secure further concessions from the group. According to those officials, continued military pressure could have strengthened the Lebanese government’s position in discussions over Hezbollah’s future role and possible disarmament.

While sharing concerns about Hezbollah’s recovery, Barnea was reported to be skeptical of maintaining a long-term Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon, arguing that previous such deployments had failed to produce lasting results.

Barnea formally stepped down this week after leading Mossad for five years. Despite publicly opposing the appointment of incoming Mossad chief Roman Gofman during the selection process, the Jerusalem Post reported that Barnea subsequently urged agency personnel to support the new leadership and rejected suggestions of wider internal dissent within the intelligence service.

We’re going after the IRGC,” Netanyahu said during the visit, adding that Israel would pursue its leadership, installations and economic assets.

The missile strike on Arad injured at least 59 people, according to Israeli medics, while nearby Dimona widely believed to be near Israel’s nuclear research facilities also sustained significant damage from a direct hit.

Rescue teams were deployed to affected neighbourhoods, where buildings were partially destroyed and debris scattered across residential areas. Authorities described the incident as a mass casualty event.

Netanyahu urged residents to strictly follow instructions from Israel’s Home Front Command and seek shelter during air raid sirens, describing the current situation as one in which “the entire home front is a frontline.

”He said adherence to safety protocols was critical to preventing casualties during continued missile barrages.

Iranian officials, including parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have described recent strikes as marking a new operational phase in the conflict, as Iranian missiles penetrated Israeli air defences in areas previously considered highly protected.

The exchange of attacks comes amid a wider regional escalation involving Iranian-backed groups, including Hezbollah, and follows strikes on key sites in both countries as the conflict enters its fourth week.

To Dean, the implications are not just unrealistic, but dangerous.

In a compelling commentary that has stirred debate across diplomatic and analytical circles, Aimen Dean — former MI6 operative inside Al-Qaeda, author of Nine Lives, and now a respected political analyst and podcaster — has sounded the alarm over what he describes as Israel’s “Buffer Illusion” in southern Syria. His critique goes beyond routine regional analysis and touches upon a broader, deeply rooted issue: the dangerous confluence of fantasy-driven geopolitics and expansionist ambitions.

Dean, whose insider knowledge of Middle Eastern militancy and intelligence lends weight to his views, draws attention to a strategy being quietly nurtured within Israel’s far-right establishment — the idea of carving out a so-called “Druze Corridor” from southern Syria to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The plan, as he outlines, is riddled with strategic absurdities and moral hazards.

A Strategy of Buffers within Buffers

Dean begins with an explanation of the “buffer zone” concept — a long-standing tool of geopolitical defense. In its classical form, a buffer is a neutral or allied territory intended to serve as a cushion against external threats. But Dean argues that Israel’s ultra-right government has taken the idea to impractical extremes, creating a doctrine in which each buffer demands a buffer of its own, resulting in an endless nesting of expansionist outposts.

He describes this approach as “a game of strategic nesting dolls that soon loses all clarity.” The original objective of safeguarding national security becomes overshadowed by an increasingly untenable geographic ambition — one that defies not only logic but the basic realities of the land and its people.

The Druze Dilemma in Southern Syria

Nowhere is this “Buffer Illusion” more visible than in Israel’s covert interest in Suwayda, a Druze-majority province in southern Syria. With a population of roughly 380,000, Suwayda has historically remained on the fringes of Syria’s broader conflicts, maintaining a cautious distance from both government and opposition forces. Some factions within the Druze community — reportedly with Israeli encouragement — are now flirting with the idea of forming an independent Druze state.

To Dean, the implications are not just unrealistic, but dangerous. He warns that such aspirations are not merely about community self-determination but could be a front for creating a pro-Israel entity that ultimately seeks to physically link up with the Golan Heights — forming what he dubs the “Druze Corridor.”

But standing in the way of that ambition is a significant obstacle: the Sunni Arab-majority province of Daraa. Home to more than 1.3 million people, Daraa lies directly between Suwayda and the Golan, making the dream of a contiguous Druze corridor a demographic and geographic impossibility.

“You cannot simply leapfrog over a million people,” Dean writes, “many of whom are fiercely tied to their ancestral lands.” Any attempt to do so, he warns, would require forced displacement or large-scale violence — a move that could cost tens of thousands of Israeli lives and ignite a region-wide conflagration.

A Strategic Blunder in the Making

Dean sharply criticizes the lack of strategic foresight in entertaining such scenarios. He suggests that Israel’s current political leadership — emboldened by ideological rigidity and military confidence — is toying with plans that defy logic and disregard regional sensitivities.

He questions the endgame of such a policy: “Is it truly about security, or is it about reshaping Syria’s south to Israel’s liking under the guise of minority protection?” If so, he warns, the move could backfire disastrously by inflaming sectarian tensions and undermining Israel’s broader diplomatic standing.

Dean offers a hypothetical but thought-provoking counterstrategy for the Syrian government, now reportedly under President Farouq al-Shara’: grant Suwayda its independence, if that is what its people desire. The catch, however, is clear — such an entity would be landlocked, resource-poor, and wholly dependent on Damascus and Amman for basic sustenance and international recognition.

“If independence is what they demand, let them test the waters of sovereignty,” Dean states. “No blood need be shed. Let them go, not out of weakness, but out of strength and confidence.”

He argues that doing so would strip Israel of any pretext for military intervention and would reveal whether the Druze nationalist push is about genuine autonomy or strategic alignment with Israel.

No Corridor, No Fantasy

Dean’s analysis culminates in a stark warning: “There is no corridor. There never was.” Geography and demographics, he insists, are not variables that can be negotiated away. “No strategic imagination, no military maneuver, no political manipulation can erase geography or overwrite demographics.”

His commentary serves as a sobering reminder that policies rooted in wishful thinking — especially in the volatile Middle East — often lead to unintended consequences. In the case of the Druze Corridor fantasy, the cost of pursuing illusion over reality may prove far greater than any perceived security benefit.

As regional dynamics continue to shift, Dean’s words resonate as a cautionary tale against ideological overreach and the perils of ignoring the immutable truths of land and people.