Home Secretary Yvette Cooper revoked his travel permission after The Telegraph revealed his upcoming tour of London, Manchester, and Birmingham, titled “Waking the Dead – Returning from the Darkness.” The Home Office concluded his presence was “not conducive to the public good,” citing concerns over public safety and social cohesion.

“Sheikh Farooq will not be permitted to enter the UK,” a Home Office spokesperson confirmed. “Our priority remains maintaining the safety and security of the UK and our communities. We have robust safeguards in place to prevent entry of individuals who seek to sow hatred and division.”

Airlines have reportedly been instructed not to allow Sheikh Farooq to board flights to the UK.

Preacher Under Fire for Comments on Slavery and Women

Sheikh Farooq, who is based in San Diego and affiliated with the One Message Foundation, stirred widespread condemnation after a video surfaced in which he claimed that sexual relations with female slaves captured in war were permissible under Islamic law.

Explaining his view in the video, he said: “Those taken under war as captives… you’re now going to support and keep in your house… they are like a wife… if Allah made it halal, then it’s not sinning, that is not adultery.”

His comments have drawn sharp criticism from human rights advocates, secular organizations, and Muslim community leaders alike.

Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Faith Matters, condemned the preacher’s statements as “abhorrent,” adding, “Saying that sex with slaves is permissible sends a barbaric message to people. We’ve seen what groups like ISIS did to Yazidi women. Such views should not find a platform in the UK.”

Stephen Evans, chief executive of the National Secular Society, said: “Any charity hosting a speaker who condones sexual slavery should have its charitable status seriously reviewed. Promoting misogyny undermines public benefit and social harmony.”

Robert Jenrick, Shadow Justice Secretary, had earlier called on the government to prevent the preacher’s entry. “This man should never step foot on UK soil. His visa must be revoked immediately,” he stated. “Islamists spreading hate and sowing division are not welcome here.”

Sheikh Farooq previously toured parts of the UK last month, delivering lectures that also raised concerns. He has made remarks predicting the Islamization of Europe, the US, and Russia, saying, “The future is ours… every nightmare of a Muslim Europe will come true.” He urged Muslims to “never apologize” or “compromise” their faith.

In another appearance in Leicester, he made comments perceived as anti-Semitic, adding to the backlash.

Sheikh Farooq was set to appear alongside Ustadh Imran ibn Mansur, a social media figure who brands himself a Muslim entrepreneur. Mr. Mansur has shared videos advising Muslim women to create anonymous online content and has made controversial statements about women wearing perfume, calling them “fornicatresses.”

The UK government’s move reflects a broader effort to counter extremist ideologies, particularly those that incite hatred or undermine democratic values. The decision signals zero tolerance for individuals espousing regressive or inflammatory views, regardless of religious affiliation.

The ban underscores Britain’s commitment to ensuring that religious discourse does not become a platform for misogyny, antisemitism, or hate speech cloaked in theological justifications.

This might come as a surprise, maybe even a shock to some, but neither the crescent nor the star has any basis as an Islamic religious symbol.

Ask almost any Pakistani today, or even many Muslims across the world, what the crescent and star on the Pakistani flag mean, and you’ll probably hear a confident answer: “They are Islamic symbols!”

But here’s the truth — they are not.

This might come as a surprise, maybe even a shock to some, but neither the crescent nor the star has any basis as an Islamic religious symbol. Not in the Quran, not in the teachings of Prophet Mohammed, and not even among the early generations of Muslims.

In fact, according to a clear ruling from IslamQA, one of the most respected Saudi fatwa (Islamic ruling) portals, the crescent and star have no roots in Islamic teachings whatsoever.

When someone asked on IslamQA (Question No: 1528): “What is the symbolism behind the Muslim star and crescent?”

The scholars answered clearly: “There is no basis in Shari`ah for taking the crescent or star as a symbol of the Muslims. This was not known at the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), or at the time of the Khulafa Al-Rashidun, or during the Umayyad dynasty.”

They went on to explain that historians disagree on exactly when Muslims started using these symbols. Some say they came from the Persians, others say from the Greeks. What’s certain is that it wasn’t the Muslims who invented it, and it definitely wasn’t something the Prophet Mohammad or his companions endorsed.

A Symbol Borrowed, Not Revealed

So where did the crescent and star actually come from?

Long before Islam even appeared, civilizations like the Greeks, Romans, and Persians were already using the crescent and star in their emblems, coins, and banners. In fact, around 300 BC, the Greek colony of Byzantium (which later became Constantinople, and eventually Istanbul) used the crescent in its city flag. Later, the famous Pontic king Mithridates VI adopted the crescent and star combination as a royal emblem after he took control of Byzantium for a brief period.

Fast forward a few centuries: The Persian Sassanian Empire, long before Islam, minted coins bearing the crescent and star. And when early Muslim rulers conquered Persia, they initially continued using the same coin designs — not out of religious endorsement, but simply because they were replicating existing currency systems.

Later, during the rise of the mighty Ottoman Empire, the crescent and star became closely tied with Muslim identity, not through divine instruction but through politics and imperial symbolism. The Ottoman flag of 1844 — a white crescent and star on a red background — became a powerful emblem of their rule.

When Turkey modernized in the 20th century, they kept the crescent-star motif, and many Muslim countries — like Pakistan, Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, Malaysia, Tunisia, Algeria — incorporated it into their national flags too.

Why Some Muslims Think It’s Islamic

Because the Ottoman Empire was seen for centuries as the seat of the Islamic caliphate, the association between their state symbol and Islam grew stronger in people’s minds. Over time, many Muslims — especially during the nationalist and Islamist movements of the 20th century — started embracing the crescent and star as “Islamic.”

But let’s be clear: This connection is cultural, not religious.

Unlike the cross in Christianity — which directly symbolizes Jesus’ crucifixion — there is no divine event, revelation, or command linking Islam with the crescent and star.

It’s just a case of history blending with perception.

Theological Reality: Stars and Moons Are Just Creation

In Islam, celestial bodies like the moon and stars are indeed respected — but as creations of God, not as sacred symbols.

Islamic teachings emphasize that the moon and stars have no power to influence our fate, bring blessings, or cause harm. They are signs of God’s creative power, nothing more. Worship or reverence is strictly reserved for God alone.

Thus, attaching sacred meaning to the crescent and star, treating them as holy, or reacting angrily if someone “disrespects” them, is simply not part of Islamic belief.

So, Is It a Sin to Walk Over a Crescent and Star Symbol?

Absolutely not.

Since neither the crescent nor the star are Islamic symbols, walking over them, wearing them on socks, printing them on T-shirts, or even using them in decorative ways is not a sin or an act of rebellion against God.

If someone feels emotional about it out of patriotism — for instance, feeling hurt if the Pakistani flag is trampled — that’s understandable as a matter of national pride for Pakistanis alone, but it’s not a religious issue for all Muslims.

God has not commanded us to venerate flags or symbols. His command is to worship Him.

A Call for Clear Thinking

In today’s world, where misinformation spreads easily, it’s crucial for Muslims to stay anchored in authentic knowledge rather than cultural myths.

Islam is a faith of clarity, not confusion. Our symbols are not man-made designs but eternal truths: Belief in God and righteous deeds.

So the next time you see a crescent and star, appreciate their beauty, admire their history, recognize their role in culture and heritage — but don’t mistake them for something they’re not.

Our strength as Muslims lies in knowledge, truth, and clear understanding, not in clinging to symbols that history accidentally handed down to us.

True devotion is measured not only by how we pray, but also by how we uphold the dignity of our surroundings

As the crescent moon of Ramzan 2025 fades, we reach the conclusion of a deeply spiritual journey. This is a time of gratitude, renewal, and profound introspection. We have fasted, prayed, given charity, and sought closeness to Allah. But have we also paused to reflect on the unintended impact of our worship on those around us? Have our actions, meant to bring us nearer to God, inadvertently created hardship for others?

Too often, our religious enthusiasm spills into public life in ways that disrupt daily routines. Our devotion should be a source of harmony, not inconvenience. If our prayers, gatherings, and celebrations cause public distress, are we truly embodying the values of Islam?

The Changing Landscape of Ramzan: Congested Mosques and Blocked Roads

During Ramzan, our mosques transform overnight. Once sparsely filled, they overflow with worshippers, forcing many to pray on the streets, blocking traffic, and creating chaos. Hasty parking of bikes and cars worsens the problem, making already narrow lanes impassable. In our eagerness to fulfill religious obligations, do we pause to consider the inconvenience to pedestrians, emergency vehicles, or those simply trying to pass through?

The moments before Iftar should be filled with gratitude and calm. Yet, in many areas, they bring chaos. People rush to buy food, crowding markets and streets. Roadside Iftar parties block pedestrian paths and disrupt traffic. Worse, we often leave behind a trail of discarded plastic plates, cups, and food waste, turning our surroundings into a mess. Is this the discipline and cleanliness Islam teaches?

Taraweeh prayers are among the cherished practices of Ramzan. But when held in public spaces or amplified over loudspeakers, they disturb those seeking rest. In the last ten nights, Qiyam-ul-Layl extends into the early hours, further disrupting neighbors. The Prophet (peace be upon him) instructed us to lower our voices in prayer if it might disturb others. If even Quranic recitation should be quieted for consideration, should we not rethink how we conduct our night prayers?

Ramzan is a time of heightened generosity, with many distributing ration kits, Zakat, and food. Yet, unorganized charity efforts often create overcrowding, long queues, and public disorder. A well-intended act of kindness should not lead to chaos or distress.

Laylatul Qadr is a night of immense spiritual reward, but for some, it has become an excuse for reckless behavior. Youth engaging in dangerous bike stunts force authorities to close flyovers and deploy extra police personnel. What should be a night of devotion instead places an undue burden on law enforcement. Staying awake in worship should not translate into actions that harm public order.

Islamic Teachings on Consideration and Responsibility: Respecting Public Spaces

The Prophet (peace be upon him) explicitly forbade blocking public pathways for prayer. A sahih hadith graded by Albani highlights the importance of keeping pathways clear. Worship should not come at the cost of inconvenience to others.

The Quran instructs us to balance our voices in prayer (Surah Al-Isra 17:110). If even Quranic recitation should be kept moderate, how much more should we be mindful of loudspeakers at night?

The Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “A Muslim is one from whose hands and tongue other Muslims are safe.” (Sahih Bukhari). Our worship should reflect this principle, ensuring that our presence in public spaces does not become a source of hardship for others.

Islam mandates respect for neighbors. Disturbing their sleep with loud prayers is not an act of devotion but of negligence. We must ask ourselves: are we embodying the spirit of Ramzan if our actions cause distress?

Faith and Civic Responsibility

Islam is not just about personal worship but also about our duties to society. Our faith calls us to be disciplined, just, and considerate. This aligns with laws meant to maintain public order, including:

• Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 – Limits loudspeaker use, especially at night.

• Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Prohibits obstructing roads and pathways.

• Section 133 of CrPC – Prevents public nuisance and unauthorized gatherings.

The Quran reminds us:

“O you who have believed, fulfill your contracts.” (Surah Al-Ma’idah 5:1)

This extends to our social contracts—upholding laws that govern noise control, traffic management, and public safety.

Striking a Balance: Worship with Wisdom

Ramzan should deepen our connection with Allah while strengthening our role as responsible members of society. We can fulfill our religious duties without creating disorder. Practical changes include:

• Organized Worship: Mosques should manage crowd control, ensuring that prayers do not spill into streets.

• Eco-Friendly Iftar: Community meals should be planned with waste management in mind, minimizing litter.

• Responsible Taraweeh: Limiting loudspeakers and ensuring prayers do not disrupt neighbors.

• Structured Charity: Distributions should be well-coordinated to avoid unnecessary crowding.

• Discouraging Reckless Behavior: Community leaders must actively address youth engaging in dangerous activities during Laylatul Qadr.

True devotion is measured not only by how we pray, but also by how we uphold the dignity of our surroundings and the well-being of those around us.

As we step beyond Ramzan, let our worship continue—not just through prayer, but through our everyday actions of respect, discipline, and kindness.

Communist party slogans were added to mosque walls, and prayer services now include speeches emphasizing the Communist Party’s legitimacy rather than Quran recitations.

The demolition and alteration of mosques across China have raised concerns about the erosion of religious freedom and cultural assimilation. Protests against the so-called “renovation” of Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan province met with riot police, leaving locals feeling a profound sense of loss.

Similar changes have been observed at Doudian Mosque near Beijing, where architectural features and Islamic motifs have been removed, and surveillance cameras have been installed.

The Chinese government justifies these modifications as part of an effort to modernize and “harmonize” the mosques with Chinese culture.

Inside the mosque, an exhibition located off the main courtyard features a prominent panel encouraging worshippers to “promote unity” and “oppose division”.

The panel draws inspiration from both the Koran and traditional Chinese thinkers. Despite the modifications made to the exterior, passages from the Koran are still visible within the mosque, and the prayer hall remains unaltered.

A local resident describes the mosque as neither completely Chinese nor foreign in appearance, reflecting a unique blend of influences.

However, satellite imagery reveals that over 1,700 mosques have been altered, stripped, or destroyed, particularly in regions with high Muslim populations. In Ningxia and Gansu provinces, more than 80% of mosques with Islamic architecture have had features removed.

The scale and systematic nature of these alterations have been exposed by an investigation by the Financial Times (FT), the first to document the extent of this policy. Newyork-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) has condemned these changes, arguing that they violate the freedom of religion enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

A report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute also revealed the destruction and renovation of mosques in Xinjiang, with two-thirds of them modified since 2017. The Chinese government claims to respect and protect religious freedom, maintaining that renovations aim to protect and meet the religious requirements of worshippers.

China is home to approximately 20 million Muslims, including the Uighurs in Xinjiang and the Hui ethnic group. While the Uighurs have faced severe repression, the Hui Muslims have enjoyed relatively broader religious freedoms due to their perceived adherence to Chinese culture and language.

According to James Leibold, a renowned expert on China’s ethnic policies at La Trobe University in Australia, the Chinese state perceives the Hui Muslims as the “model Muslims”. They are considered “good Muslims” because they speak the Chinese language, adhere to essential aspects of Chinese culture, and are viewed as trustworthy by the authorities.

Hui Muslims are dispersed throughout China and have comparatively more extensive religious freedoms, especially when compared to Muslim communities belonging to Turkic groups like the Uyghurs.

However, Chinese authorities have implemented various restrictions on Islam in Xinjiang over the past two decades, beginning with surveillance and limitations on worship. Over time, the Uyghurs have faced widespread detentions in purpose-built camps, intense surveillance, and travel restrictions, actions that the United Nations has characterized as potential “crimes against humanity”.

Beijing argues that its policies in Xinjiang are necessary to combat terrorism, foster unity, and promote economic development. The promotion of shared cultural values has also been cited as a justification for the removal of non-Chinese elements from mosques in other parts of the country.

However, the sinicisation policy seeks to assimilate non-Chinese groups and religions into what is considered Chinese culture. The removal of mosque features is a visible manifestation of this policy, signaling a redefinition of the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and religion.

Hui Muslims now fear that their religious freedoms will also be curtailed. The sinicisation policy aims to “Han-ify” all Muslims, eradicating Islam from their lives and suppressing prayer and religious study.

This cultural transformation has left Hui Muslims despondent and concerned about the increasing similarities between the treatment of Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims. While some believe that the situation will not escalate to the extent seen in the Uighur camps, the mood remains apprehensive.

Najiaying mosque, Yunnan (pictures before after)

Turning Point in China’s Religious Policies

China’s religious landscape has witnessed significant changes in recent decades, particularly affecting the Hui Muslim community.

Over the centuries, Hui Muslims have constructed mosques in diverse architectural styles, reflecting the cultural and temporal contexts of their construction. However, the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s resulted in the destruction of numerous religious buildings, including mosques.

After Mao Zedong’s death, a shift towards Arabic-style structures emerged. During the liberal era of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, there was a surge in mosque construction featuring domed prayer halls and tall minarets, reflecting an admiration for Arabic architectural aesthetics.

Scholars point to Xi Jinping’s ascension to the presidency in 2013 as a turning point in China’s religious policies.

As a leader from the Han Chinese ethnic majority, Xi has expanded the Communist Party’s control over various aspects of daily life, consolidating power to a degree not seen since Mao. His promotion of Han ethnic nationalism in the name of socialism with Chinese characteristics represents a departure from previous Communist party leaders.

In 2014, Xi Jinping emphasized cultural unity at the Central Ethnic Work Conference. The following year, he called for the “sinicisation” of religion in China, considering Islamic architecture and symbolism as threats to ideological purity and cultural security.

Xi’s perspective, according to experts like Leibold, views Islamic elements as dangerous due to their perceived foreign, anti-Han nature.

In 2017, the Islamic Association of China, a government body overseeing Islam, criticized mosques for “copying foreign styles”. Officials denounced the “Arabization” of mosques, citing excessive size and extravagant decoration, accusing them of wasting resources. The meeting emphasized the need for mosque architecture to align with national characteristics.

Two years later, the government formalized these sentiments in the “Five-Year Plan on the Sinicisation of Islam”. The plan aimed to standardize Chinese-style practices in Islamic attire, ceremonies, and architecture. It also called for the development of an Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics. Critics argue that these policies create an impression that Islam can never be “Chinese enough”.

Accounts from Hui individuals, such as Mohammed from Ningxia, recount the demolition of mosque domes despite local farmers’ attempts to protect them.

Communist party slogans were added to mosque walls, and prayer services now include speeches emphasizing the Communist Party’s legitimacy rather than Quran recitations. Procurement documents from local governments corroborate the experiences of Hui Muslim communities.

China’s religious policy shift extends beyond Hui Muslims. The government has targeted other religions as well, removing crosses from Christian churches and demolishing prominent religious sites like the Golden Lampstand Church in Shanxi province in 2018. The destruction of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet began before the implementation of the sinicisation policy.

The alteration of mosque architecture, the insertion of political messages, and the targeting of other religious groups raise concerns about religious freedom and cultural diversity in contemporary China.

Government Influence and Restrictions on Mosques

To control the influence of religion, the government has forbidden online material advocating religions to minors. Some local authorities have circulated notices prohibiting individuals under the age of 18 from entering religious sites or practicing religion altogether.

Additionally, current and retired civil servants have been informed that their benefits may be revoked if they engage in religious activities more than a few times per year. These measures have resulted in reduced attendance at mosques and limited religious participation.

In 2018, the government’s Islamic Association of China mandated that mosques organize patriotic activities, such as raising the national flag, and establish study groups focused on socialist values, the constitution, and traditional Chinese culture. These requirements aim to align religious practices with the government’s ideology and promote cultural unity.

Under the policy of “combining mosque congregations”, local governments have targeted mosques for consolidation and demolition. According to historian Theaker, this consolidation is justified based on the reduced attendance caused by the government’s restrictive policies.

Local government documents reveal that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia are under threat of consolidation, accounting for approximately one-third of all mosques in the province. The demolition of prominent mosques, such as the Weizhou Grand Mosque, has caused distress and sparked resistance among Hui Muslims.

In an effort to diminish Islamic visibility, various regions in China have removed Islamic symbols from public view. Additionally, Chinese state media reports that several regions have abolished halal certification standards, with officials associating the spread of halal markers on goods with religious extremism.

While some Hui Muslims have attempted to resist government actions, their efforts have often been met with suppression. Local protests temporarily delayed changes at the Weizhou Grand Mosque in 2018, and renovations to the Xiguan Mosque in Lanzhou city were postponed.

According to Bitter Winter, an online magazine focusing on religious freedoms in China, the remodelling of the Weizhou Grand Mosque commenced in 2019. Online photos indicate that by November 2023, local authorities in Gansu had removed the dome and minarets of the Xiguan Mosque.

However, the authorities ultimately prevailed, and the remodelling of these mosques began. Instances of protests being forcefully quelled, such as the riot police intervention at Ding’s Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan, highlight the challenges faced by those opposing government actions.

The analysis of 2,312 mosques in China provides valuable insights into the wide-scale modifications that have occurred between 2018 and 2023 as a result of the sinicization policy. The removal of Arabic-style features from 74.3 percent of the examined mosques indicates a significant shift in their architectural identity.

Despite resistance, Hui Muslims express concerns about the gradual decline of religion among younger generations and the competition between religious and modern lifestyles. The government’s success in suppressing religion raises fears about the future of Islam in China.

The new body will “preside over the religious affairs of the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina,” according to a government statement on state news agency SPA posted on social media platform X.

The council, which replaces a previous one that was under the government’s control rather than the king’s, will likely have more financial and administrative independence.

Mecca’s Grand Mosque and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina are Islam’s two holiest sites. The new council will supervise activities in both, including religious lessons, sermons and calls to prayer, the statement said.

The year before, some 2.5 million Muslims had taken part.

Some 2 million Muslim pilgrims officially began the annual Hajj pilgrimage on Monday, making their way out of Mecca after circling Islam’s holiest site, the Kaaba, and converging on a vast tent camp in the nearby desert for a day and night of prayer.

One of the largest religious gatherings in the world has returned to full capacity this year for the first time since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic three years ago.

The pilgrimage is one of the five pillars of Islam, and all Muslims are required to make the five-day Hajj at least once in their lives if they are physically and financially able to do it.

For pilgrims, it is a deeply moving spiritual experience that absolves sins, brings them closer to God and unites the world’s more than 1.8 billion Muslims. Some spend years saving up money and waiting for a permit to embark on the journey.

Maintaining the holy sites and hosting the annual Hajj is a major source of pride and legitimacy for the Saudi royal family, which captured Mecca in the 1920s. The pilgrimage has occasionally been marred by tragedy, as in 2015, when over 2,400 people died in a stampede and crush of pilgrims.

As the outbreak of the coronavirus led to worldwide lockdowns in 2020, Saudi authorities limited the Hajj to a few thousand citizens and local residents. The year before, some 2.5 million Muslims had taken part.

Pilgrims begin by entering a state of spiritual purity known as “ihram.” Men wear simple, white terrycloth garments and women forgo make-up and cover their hair. The pilgrims circle the black, cube-shaped Kaaba seven times and walk between two hills, all of which are encompassed by Mecca’s Grand Mosque, the world’s largest.

The rituals during Hajj largely commemorate the Quran’s accounts of Ibrahim, his son Ismail and Ismail’s mother Hajar. The walk between the hills, for example, recreates Hajar’s search for water in the desert for Ismail. In Islamic tradition, Ibrahim was ordered by God to sacrifice his son, Ismail, only to have his hand stayed at the last moment. Muslims believe Ibrahim and Ismail later built the Kaaba, which Muslims face during their daily prayers no matter where they are in the world.

In the Christian and Jewish traditions, which refer to him as Abraham, the biblical patriarch is ordered to sacrifice his other son, Isaac.

Pilgrims have been doing the ritual circuit around the Kaaba since arriving in Mecca over recent days. As the last ones performed it Monday, the pilgrims made their way by foot or by bus to Mina, where they will camp in one of the largest tent cities in the world. They will pray throughout the day and night before traveling on Tuesday to Mount Arafat, where the Prophet Muhammad is said to have delivered his final sermon.

The pilgrims will then collect pebbles from a site known as Muzdalifa to be used in the symbolic stoning of pillars representing the devil back in Mina. The final three days of the Hajj coincide with the festive Eid al-Adha holiday, when Muslims around the world slaughter livestock and distribute the meat to the poor.

Dalia Ziada

President El-Sisi has shown unparalleled dedication to improving the status of religious freedom.

“Egyptians are religious by nature;” is one of the common statements used to emphasis one of the most popular stereotypes about the Egyptian people. Indeed! For thousands of years, since the time of ancient Egypt, religion has been integral to the logic Egyptians use to make decisions, including major life-changing choices as well as minor day to day activities.

The Month of April has been a special month of deep revelation and spiritual growth, as Egyptian Muslims and Christians are celebrating a cluster of holy days that carry a very special significance to each of them. While Muslims are fasting for Ramadan, Christians are fasting for the Great Lent. Moreover, next week all Egyptians will be celebrating Sham Elneseem (the Spring Holiday) which has been celebrated since the time of Pharaonic Egypt. All these special occasions are serving as a reminder that Egyptians belong to the same source.

Along their long history, Egyptians were able to keep a perfect balance between being religiously pious on a personal level and being tolerant and open-minded on the wider social level. Only, in the past three or four decades this has changed dramatically, as politicians learnt how to abuse religion to mobilize supporters and gain popularity. In the process they broke this ideal balance and raised a wave of extremism among the grassroots citizens, that has not been cured until this moment, despite sincere efforts by the government and official Islamic institutions, such as Al-Azhar and Dar Al-Ifta.

Two major incidents that took place earlier this month are highlighting this dangerous transformation. On the first week of Ramadan, a Coptic Archbishop in Alexandria got killed by a random man, who stabbed him in the neck. Initially, the perpetrator claimed that he is mentally unstable. But, a few weeks later, investigations found that he is a jihadist who has been arrested when planning for a terrorist attack, in the 1990s, and got released recently by a presidential amnesty because of his age.

On the next week, a Christian woman and her daughter were denied service at a Koshary restaurant, because they wanted to eat before Sunset. After she ordered the food, a waiter in the restaurant came and took the plates away and prevented them from eating. When the woman revealed that she is not fasting for Ramadan because she is not Muslim, he forced her to leave.

Of course, the government and Al-Azhar institution has already condemned both incidents and took all necessary legal actions to protect the affected citizens and punish the perpetrators. Yet, the dangerous factor in the two incidents is that they were committed by ordinary people against their fellow citizens, believing that by assaulting them they are doing a service to Allah and Islam.

For decades, the Coptic Christian citizens, who compromise more than 15% of the Egyptian population, had suffered marginalization and discrimination, as a result of corrupt state practices, unfair laws, and the quick rise of extremist Islamists, especially in rural cities.

Freedom of belief is guaranteed by constitution, but has never been respected by the society or politicians. Former presidents used to abuse religion to upscale their political game or oppress opposition. President Nasser discriminated against Egyptian Jews because he was involved in war with Israel, on behalf of the Arabs. President Sadat empowered Islamic extremists to rid him of the communist Nasserists. Ironically, he got assassinated by those Islamic extremists later when he made a peace treaty with Israel. President Mubarak politically muted Coptic Christians by manipulating the heads of the Egyptian church and showing tolerance towards sectarian discrimination practices.

In absolute contrast, President El-Sisi has shown unparalleled dedication to improving the status of religious freedom, as a tool to combat violent extremism and restore peace, security, and stability in the country. President El-Sisi came to power during a period of extreme chaos and insecurity purposefully ordained by the Muslim Brotherhood to avenge their removal from power, in June 2013. He never hesitated to take shocking steps towards reviving the Jewish and Christian heritage of Egypt, and pressuring Al-Azhar for renovating the Islamic extremist rhetoric.

Yet, that is not enough! More effort is needed to be exerted on the grassroots level, where extremists are still powerful. Either through media or civil society organizations, there has to be a way to re-awaken the public mindset of religious and cultural tolerance that defined the Egyptian character for thousands of years. Egyptians need to be brought back to their moderate and balanced religious nature.

Article first published on Sada El-Bilad Egypt.

Guests

1 – Irina Tsukerman. She is a New York-based Human Rights Lawyer and National Security Analyst. She is also a Media and Security consultant. Irina writes and speaks on human rights voilations of the Iran-backed Houthi militias in Yemen. She extensively speaks on Iranian mullah regime’s catasrophic agenda in the MiddleEast.

2 – Sharon Collins. She is a Florida-based Independent Political Analyst and Researcher, mainly focused on Middle East Affairs. She also visited Saudi Arabia and stayed in the Kingdom.

3 – Rabbi Enchanan Poupko. He is a New York-based Jewish Rabbi or Scholar. He is also a TEDx speaker. He participates in interfaith discussions to bride gap between the Muslims and Jews.

4 – Mohammed Abbasi. He is a London-based coach, speaker and writer. He is director of Association of British Muslims. He works for Football for Peace. He is a great fan of Sun Tzu, and in fact he teaches the art of war.

Moderator

Zahack is a Saudi-based Non Resident Indian (NRI). He founded The Milli Chronicle in September 2018, which mainly focuses on MENA affairs. Zahack has been working on a non-commercial basis to publish the works of notable researchers and Think-Tank groups.

YouTube Link.

Judaism and Islam are forever bound together as sister religions.

The holiday of Rosh Hashana is a time for introspection. It is an important time to reflect on the achievements in Muslim-Jewish dialogue and the opportunities to further strengthen our bonds for the coming year.

There is much that unites us, including our shared values and traditions. Muslims and Jews working hand in hand is what will ultimately lead to the success of our region. As we usher in the Jewish new year on Monday evening, we must commit ourselves to furthering our relationship and dialogue.

The great Mahatma Gandhi once noted: “If we are to respect others’ religions as we would have them respect our own, a friendly study of the world’s religions is a sacred duty.”

As religious leaders, our responsibility is to find a path toward peaceful coexistence between all religions and all people, especially the world’s three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Over the past year, we have seen many achievements in this area. In Dubai, a group of dynamic young Emiratis arranged a joint iftar-Lag B’Omer celebration and invited Muslims and Jews to celebrate the holidays together. Our organization has arranged Shabbat meals in both Bahrain and Dubai, bringing together diplomats, Emiratis and Bahrainis — both Muslim and Jewish — to break bread and talk about our commonalities. Friday is a special day for both religions and we celebrate together.

Just a couple of weeks ago, a bar mitzvah was held in Bahrain for the first time in 16 years. In attendance were Muslims and Jews.

A few months back, Muslim and Jewish ambassadors participated in a joint panel discussion about the role of interfaith relations and how they are propelling the region forward.

Abdulla Rashed Al-Khalifa, Bahrain’s ambassador to the US; Yousef Al-Otaiba, the UAE ambassador to the US; Houda Nonoo, former Bahraini ambassador to the US; and Marc Sievers, former US ambassador to Oman, all spoke about why interfaith dialogue is critical for the region.

For 1,400 years, Judaism and Islam were inextricably linked in the Arabian Peninsula, the Middle East and in medieval Spain. Each had a common ancestry, similar values and holy scriptures.

We are enjoined by our faiths to find a path toward peaceful coexistence between all religions and all people. Therefore, in order to establish a channel of communication and cooperation between Jews and Muslims, between Judaism and Islam, the following steps are necessary.

First, we must lead by example and communicate to our own congregations that peace is a basic human right. We must stand together should any of our communities suffer harassment or attacks.

And we must overcome some of the misrepresentation, demonization, stereotyping, prejudice and lack of awareness in the world through an ongoing educational process that teaches peace and respect for each religion.

Second, as each of us takes enormous pride in our own religion’s history, culture and tradition, so too must we pride ourselves on our level of understanding and tolerance of each other’s religion. Just as we encourage our own people’s pride in our own religions, we must castigate those who show intolerance and ignorance of other religions and cultures.

Third, it is our responsibility to guide our people toward looking for the inestimable value of peace, and not in the “importance” of religious conflict. Yes, the world is made up of different races, colors, ethnicities, religions, and political ideologies.

However, the seeds of peace begin to grow when people of all faiths and backgrounds are encouraged to communicate, tolerate, accept, respect, and ultimately trust one another.

As the Jewish new year approaches, let us reflect on the wise words included in the UN manifesto on the Culture of Peace, which states: “We must learn to use one another’s religious belief as ways to connect — not as reasons for conflict.” May these words serve as a guiding light for everybody in this region for the coming year.

Judaism and Islam are forever bound together as sister religions. We are intertwined in our faith, liturgy, history and culture. It behooves us to maintain an open dialogue and cherish our similarities and our differences with respect, acceptance, coexistence and love for each other. We owe it to our communities, to our people and to our common father Abraham.

Piece first published in Arab News.

Rabbi Dr. Elie Abadie is the rabbi of the Association of Gulf Jewish Communities and the senior rabbi of the Jewish Council of the Emirates. He tweets under @RabbiElieAbadie.

Featured Image courtesy Lovin Dubai.

Sectarian identity became incompatible with Saudi Arabia’s 2030 Vision, while Iran shored up its sectarian identity because changing it would mean the collapse of the system.

Many analysts oversimplify the political conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia as one driven by sectarianism or Shi’a-Sunni tensions that has shaped the two states’ outlook and actions in the Middle East. However, their political differences are actually much more complex and deeper rooted.

One of the main differences is that the Saudi monarchy is not a theocratic regime like Iran, but rather a monarchy with a hybrid structure, neither wholly secular nor wholly religious. The Saudi sectarian movement was a reactionary response to the threats posed by the 1979 Revolution in Iran and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s regime. In contrast, sectarianism is the main component of the revolutionary Khomeini regime and it is magnified in its constitution to assert its own hegemonic geopolitical ambitions. Therefore, when sectarian identity became incompatible with Saudi Arabia’s 2030 Vision and its development, the country embraced Saudi nationalism instead, while Iran shored up its sectarian identity because changing it would mean the collapse of the system.

To better understand the sectarian differences in both countries, it is important to first shed some light on the historical context as well as investigate the ideological and political differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s ideological strategy

After the 1979 Revolution, the Khomeini regime turned Iran from a secular state into a fundamentalist theocracy, setting the scene for a dark historical period in the region that centered on magnifying sectarian differences. What distinguished the regime, and this is often missed by more sympathetic observers in the West, is that Iran under the Khomeini regime was an Islamic Revolution first, and an Islamic Republic second. The revolution did and does not exist to perfect the state; the state — the republic — is simply a means to support and perfect the revolution. As a result, the revolution is prioritized.

The supreme leader is the leader of the revolution, not of the republic, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is sworn to defend the purity of the revolution from enemies both within and without. Therefore, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the regime has sought to export its revolutionary ideology in an effort to establish Iranian hegemony across the Islamic world. This has prompted the American diplomat Henry Kissinger to remark on several occasions that Iran needs to decide “whether it wants to be a nation or a cause.”

So, the principal theme that unifies Iran’s revolutionary ideology is the rejection of foreign dominion over Iran, especially the influence of the United States. The most popular slogans are Anti-American and anti-imperialist ones that assert Iran’s desire to strike a politically and ideologically independent path — “neither East nor West.” In order to resist American hegemonic power, it sees its duty as supporting vulnerable people, and Iran views the Shiites in Arab countries and the Palestinians as falling into this category.

Thus, there are two pillars of Iran’s foreign policy: Sectarianism and an “Arab Street” strategy that emphasizes Iran’s commitment to the Palestinian cause and opposes Western imperialism — mainly Washington’s hegemonic schemes in the region — although ironically it does so to assert its own hegemonic geopolitical ambitions. Putting its foreign policy into practice, Iran has pursued a two-pronged approach, employing both hard and soft power strategies.

In terms of hard power, Iran has offered financial, ideological, and material support to non-state groups to help promote its strategic interests, notably Shi’a armed militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and also Sunni groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. As for its soft power, it uses its media empire, universities, charitable organizations, government-sponsored initiatives, and international revolutionary activities. The aim of this is to promulgate Khomeinist and anti-Western ideology at home and abroad in order to compel the masses to rise up in support of Khomeinist revolutionary ideology and against what are considered to be “illegitimate” forms of government.

Since the revolutionary ideology of the Khomeini regime is anti-monarchical, Iran uses its foreign policy to cause unrest and topple Arab Gulf monarchies, but its main focus has been to challenge and undermine Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. Saudi Arabia has responded in various ways over the years in the face of these threats.

Saudi’s response and the rise of Sunni fundamentalism

The Khomeini regime did not only upset Saudi Arabia when it criticized and embarrassed its rulers — the country that includes the two holy mosques, in Mecca and Medina — by suggesting they were not sufficiently virtuous to act as the custodians of Islam’s holiest sites, but Iran’s revolutionary message also contributed to an Islamic uprising across the Arabian Peninsula. Khomeini’s call for the abolition of the ruling House of Saud grew ever louder and the Saudi leadership began to fear they would suffer the same fate as the shah.

The siege at the Grand Mosque confirmed the fears among the Saudi elite about the challenges they faced. On Nov. 20, 1979, only 10 months after the revolution in Iran, a Sunni Islamist insurgent or Ikhwan uprising led by Juhaiman al-Utaibi seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca in a direct challenge to the House of Saud’s leadership in the Holy Land. The seizure was motivated by a desire to depose the Saudi monarchs and restore Islamic rule over the birthplace of the Prophet. Utaibi and his men berated the al-Saud family for being corrupt and influenced by the West. To combat this challenge, Islamist fundamentalism was aggressively reinforced in Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, Riyadh also sponsored the production of an expansive array of anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian tracts, designed to highlight the sectarian aspirations of the Khomeinist regime and mitigate its more universal appeal throughout the region and the world. Saudi Arabia wanted to debunk Khomeini’s vision of Islam by underscoring its Shi’a identity. In addition, Saudi-funded educational institutions and mosques connected Riyadh to religious scholars across the world, from Nigeria to Indonesia. Rather than countering the extremism emanating from Iran’s Islamic Revolution with a moderate brand of Islam, Saudi Arabia decided to beat Khomeini at his own game — a decision the current Saudi leadership has since said was a mistake.

The Saudi monarchy is not a theocratic regime like Iran but a hybrid structure, neither wholly secular nor wholly religious. The state is in charge of the political arena and the religious establishment oversees culture, society, and religion. Saudi Arabia has taken on different identities over the years and the changes have been driven by political narratives. Firstly, religious nationalism was established after the creation of the state in 1932. Secondly, beginning in the 1960s a pan-Islamic transnational identity was promoted in the context of the Cold War with Gamal Abd al-Nasser espousing a pan-Arab platform. Thirdly, in the aftermath of the Khomeini revolution, the 1980s were dominated by the Sahwa (Islamic Awakening) movement, part of a kind of sectarian bidding war against Iran, strengthened by the importance of Saudi Arabia as the birthplace of the religion and the host of its two most holy sites. Lastly, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (better known as MbS) there has been a retreat into Saudi nationalism to make it compatible with the leadership’s 2030 Vision.

Nationalism vs. sectarianism

Since the sectarianist Sahwa movement, which flourished in the 1980s due to the threat of the Khomeini regime, was reactionary, it did not last. This is because Saudi Arabia is a Muslim state, not an Islamist revolution, and religion is there to sustain the legitimacy and stability of the country. Saudi Arabia’s priority is the state and nation and when sectarian identity became incompatible with the kingdom’s 2030 Vision and its development, it embraced Saudi nationalism, which has unified the country. “Saudi First” foreign policy puts the interests of the state and nation first and means the nation is no longer held hostage to political events and regional ideologies.

In contrast, because Iran is first and foremost an Islamic Revolution and the state is a means to support and perfect the revolution, it has remained sectarian. The recent ascent of Ebrahim Raisi to the presidency is evidence that the state exists to perfect the revolution. From the outset, it was clear that Raisi did not run for the presidency, rather he was supported by the supreme leader to defend the revolution from both its internal and external enemies.

Raisi’s qualifications are compatible with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s requirements not only for being president, but also as a potential successor. His commitment to the revolution is clear. Raisi worked in Iran’s judicial system as a prosecutor in the early 1980s and oversaw the deaths of thousands of political prisoners. He was also elected to the Assembly of Experts in 2009, a clerical body tasked with monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. In 2016, Raisi was appointed head of Astane Qods Razavi, Iran’s economic conglomerate that manages the investments of the Mashaad-based Imam Reza Shrine — holding this position shows that he was trusted by Khamenei.

It is important to note that Raisi, like Khamenei, embodies the principal theme that has unified Iran’s revolutionary ideology, which is the rejection of foreign dominion over Iran, especially the influence of the United States. This is reflected in his statement that “relationships with the West or the East must not be a priority for a future government, but a pragmatic move to preserve the national interest.” This also shows that revolutionary ideology is used for nationalist ends.

The great shift in Saudi identity from sectarianism to Saudi nationalism, contrasted with Iran’s hardening of its adherence to the principles of the 1979 revolution, proves that political systems can change depending on the requirements of the time, while ideological systems never do. On the contrary, they become more entrenched because change means the end of the system.

Article first published on Washington-based Middle East Institute.

Najat Al-Saeed is a UAE-based Researcher, and political commentator. She is a columnist for different newspapers. She authored Screens of Influence, and she holds Ph.D. in Media Studies. She tweets under @Najat_AlSaeed.