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	<title>Iraqi politics &#8211; The Milli Chronicle</title>
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		<title>Iran’s Bite Weakens: How Iraq Just Chewed Up Tehran’s PMF Ambitions</title>
		<link>https://millichronicle.com/2025/09/55703.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2025 05:47:02 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[The PMF bill’s withdrawal reflects the interplay between military realities, domestic politics, and international pressure. The recent withdrawal of Iraq’s]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wp-block-post-author"><div class="wp-block-post-author__avatar"><img alt='' src='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/22d3eb2b1b380c246ec43035c65dd0c2?s=48&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g' srcset='https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/22d3eb2b1b380c246ec43035c65dd0c2?s=96&#038;d=mm&#038;r=g 2x' class='avatar avatar-48 photo' height='48' width='48' loading='lazy' decoding='async'/></div><div class="wp-block-post-author__content"><p class="wp-block-post-author__name">Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab</p></div></div>


<blockquote class="wp-block-quote">
<p>The PMF bill’s withdrawal reflects the interplay between military realities, domestic politics, and international pressure. </p>
</blockquote>



<p>The recent withdrawal of Iraq’s draft law to restructure the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has illuminated a striking reality: Iran, once a formidable force in shaping Iraqi politics and regional militias, is showing signs of vulnerability. Intended to mirror the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in power, autonomy, and influence, the bill sought to cement Tehran’s dominance in Iraq through its Shiite allies. Yet internal Iraqi divisions, Sunni and Kurdish resistance, and external pressures from the United States revealed the limits of Iran’s reach. </p>



<p>The episode follows closely on the heels of the 12-day war with Israel, which exposed strategic weaknesses in Tehran’s regional posture, making the PMF bill politically untenable.</p>



<p><strong>A Proxy Plan Stalled: The PMF Bill’s Ambitions</strong></p>



<p>The PMF draft law was designed to be transformative. Its provisions granted the organization sweeping powers: the ability to arm itself, train personnel independently, expand its logistical and construction enterprises, and establish its leadership with ministerial authority over military and administrative affairs. Essentially, it envisioned an Iraqi IRGC—an institution capable of shaping state security while consolidating Shiite political dominance.</p>



<p>The legislation included the creation of a PMF Academy, issuing degrees in military sciences, and a General Engineering and Contracting Company to manage infrastructure projects—replicating Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya model. Senior commanders would enjoy ministerial rank, effectively superseding the Defense Minister in overseeing PMF operations. Provisions allowed senior fighters past normal retirement age to remain in command, while the term “mujahid” underscored an ideological, Tehran-aligned identity. This institutionalization would have given Iran a durable foothold in Iraq’s military and political systems, potentially reshaping regional dynamics in its favor.</p>



<p>Yet the bill faced insurmountable hurdles. Sunni and Kurdish blocs united in absolute opposition, seeing the legislation as a direct threat to national balance and sovereignty. Internal Shiite divisions further complicated matters: hardliners pushed aggressively for passage, moderates opposed it, and others took a cautious, wait-and-see approach, reflecting the uncertainty following the recent conflict with Israel. The 12-day war had exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s military posture, casting doubt on Tehran’s ability to project power and coordinate its proxies effectively.</p>



<p>External pressures compounded these challenges. The United States vocally opposed the legislation, warning that it would strengthen Iran’s influence and undermine Iraq’s sovereignty. Congressional initiatives such as the “Iraq Liberation Act” threatened sanctions and curbs on trade and investment if the law passed. U.S. leverage, combined with Iran’s perceived military weakening after the Israeli confrontation, tipped the scales in favor of withdrawal. The episode demonstrates that even Tehran’s carefully orchestrated proxy strategies can be constrained by a combination of local resistance and external intervention.</p>



<p><strong>Tehran on the Back Foot: Lessons from a Toothless Moment</strong></p>



<p>The PMF bill’s withdrawal is a telling reflection of Iran’s declining influence in the region. The recent 12-day war with Israel highlighted both operational and strategic shortcomings, eroding confidence in Tehran’s ability to impose its agenda. Its proxies, previously thought reliable and dominant, proved vulnerable, and their political instruments—like the PMF draft—could no longer advance unchecked.</p>



<p>This moment underscores a broader regional recalibration. Iraq’s institutions, in resisting the PMF bill, have asserted national sovereignty and signaled that external attempts to institutionalize proxy dominance will face both internal and international pushback. Tehran’s silence during the withdrawal, despite having shaped the draft law, signals a tactical retreat rather than a strategic victory. The lesson is clear: Iran’s influence, while still significant, is increasingly subject to the realities of political contestation, military setbacks, and global scrutiny.</p>



<p>For Iraq, the episode offers both a caution and an opportunity. It demonstrates that coalition politics can check foreign-aligned ambitions, and it hints at the potential for a more balanced national security apparatus. For Tehran, it is a rare reminder that its regional maneuvers are not omnipotent: the 12-day war with Israel and the failure of the PMF bill illustrate the limitations of coercive influence, highlighting vulnerabilities in both perception and capability.</p>



<p>In sum, the PMF bill’s withdrawal reflects the interplay between military realities, domestic politics, and international pressure. It represents a moment in which Iran’s ambitions collided with structural constraints, exposing the diminishing returns of its assertive regional posture. The episode is less a permanent defeat than a stark reminder that Tehran’s influence is not immutable, and that under current circumstances, its power has limits—making it a rare instance of regional recalibration that reinforces Iraqi agency and highlights the strategic leverage of both domestic actors and international stakeholders.</p>
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		<title>Iraqi MPs to meet in new bid to elect president, end deadlock</title>
		<link>https://millichronicle.com/2022/10/iraqi-mps-to-meet-in-new-bid-to-elect-president-end-deadlock.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Millichronicle]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Oct 2022 16:40:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Moqtada al-Sadr]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mustafa al-Kadhimi]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[sunni]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.millichronicle.com/?p=30732</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Baghdad (AFP) — Lawmakers in crisis-hit Iraq are set to meet Thursday for their fourth attempt this year to elect]]></description>
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<p><strong>Baghdad (AFP) —</strong> Lawmakers in crisis-hit Iraq are set to meet Thursday for their fourth attempt this year to elect a new state president and break political gridlock that has sparked protests and deadly violence.</p>
<div>
<p>Over a year since its last general elections, Iraq is yet to form a new government to tackle the problems facing the oil-rich country plagued by unemployment, decaying infrastructure and corruption.</p>
<p>This week the United Nations mission warned that &#8220;the protracted crisis is breeding further instability&#8221; in the war-scarred country, and that the divisive politics are &#8220;generating bitter public disillusion&#8221;.</p>
<p>Parliament is due to convene from 11:00 am (0800 GMT) in Baghdad&#8217;s Green Zone, the capital&#8217;s fortified government and diplomatic district that was recently the site of large protest camps set up by rival factions.</p>
<p>If MPs elect a new president, a post now held by Barham Saleh, the new head of state would be expected to quickly nominate a prime minister who would seek to form a government to replace caretaker premier Mustafa al-Kadhemi.</p>
<p>Security was tight on Thursday, with police checkpoints and two bridges in Baghdad closed, creating traffic jams.</p>
<p>Lawmakers made three previous attempts to elect a new head of state, in February and March, but failed to even reach the required two-thirds threshold &#8212; 220 out of 329 lawmakers &#8212; for a quorum.</p>
<p>Two small opposition parties, totalling 15 MPs, have said they will boycott the vote Thursday.</p>
<p>Democratic institutions built in Iraq since the 2003 US-led invasion that toppled dictator Saddam Hussein remain fragile, and neighbouring Iran wields major influence.</p>
<p>For the past year, Iraq has not only been without a new government, but also without a state budget, locking up billions in oil revenues and obstructing much-needed reforms and infrastructure projects.</p>
<p>Under Iraq&#8217;s power-sharing system, meant to avoid sectarian conflict, the state president by convention is Kurdish, its prime minister is a Shiite Muslim and the parliament speaker a Sunni.</p>
<p><strong>30 candidates, three frontrunners</strong></p>
<p>Iraq&#8217;s rival Shiite Muslim political factions have been vying for influence and the right to select a new premier and form a government.</p>
<p>On one hand is the fiery cleric Moqtada Sadr, who wants parliament dissolved and new elections.</p>
<p>On the other sits the Coordination Framework &#8212; an alliance of pro-Iran Shiite factions, including the former paramilitary Hashed al-Shaabi &#8212; that wants a new government before fresh elections are held.</p>
<p>The standoff has seen both sides set up protest camps in recent months. Tensions boiled over on August 29 when more than 30 Sadr supporters were killed in battles between Iran-backed factions and the army.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how Sadr will react: on Thursday, he posted a message on Twitter merely encouraging children on the start of the school year.</p>
<p>The largely honorific post of Iraqi president generally goes to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), while the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) keeps control over the affairs of autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq.</p>
<p>However, the KDP is also eyeing the presidency and could present its own candidate.</p>
<p>&#8220;It is still not clear that the Kurdish parties have come to an agreement on a president,&#8221; said Hamzeh Hadad, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank.</p>
<p>Among the 30 candidates, top contenders include the incumbent, Saleh of the PUK, aged 61, and current Kurdistan Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed of the KDP, aged 54.</p>
<p>Abdel Latif Rashid, 78, a former water resources minister and PUK leader, is running as an independent.</p>
<p>Next step, new PM</p>
<p>Once elected, the president will nominate a prime minister who needs the backing of the largest bloc in parliament and who then begins arduous negotiations to choose a cabinet.</p>
<p>&#8220;What is expected is that whoever is chosen will designate a prime minister right away to form a government,&#8221; said Hadad.</p>
<p>Key runners for prime minister include the Coordination Framework&#8217;s candidate, former minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, 52.</p>
<p>Hadad believes Sudani is the most likely to be premier, but noted that &#8220;anything can change in Iraqi politics till the last minute&#8221;.</p>
<p>The pro-Iran Coordination Framework draws together the Fatah alliance and lawmakers from the party of Sadr&#8217;s longtime foe, former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki.</p>
<p>When Sudani was proposed in July, it sparked mass protests by outraged Sadr supporters, who breached the Green Zone and stormed parliament.</p>
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