If finalized, the move would mark the first direct purchases of Iranian crude by major Chinese state refiners since 2019, when PetroChina and Sinopec continued limited imports after the United States reimposed sanctions on Tehran’s energy sector during President Donald Trump’s first administration.

Officials at Chinese state oil companies said PetroChina and Sinopec are reviewing the banking, insurance and shipping arrangements required to restart transactions with Iran. The assessments follow a memorandum of understanding signed last week that ended the recent U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran and led Washington to issue a waiver allowing customers to buy Iranian oil and settle transactions in U.S. dollars.

Industry sources said the refiners remain cautious despite the regulatory opening. Global crude supplies remain plentiful as exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq continue to rise, while shipments through the Strait of Hormuz are expected to recover following the interim peace agreement.

“There is no shortage of crude in the market,” one industry source said, noting that uncertainty remains over financing channels, insurance coverage and Iran’s ability to provide sufficient shipping capacity for large-scale exports.

Neither Sinopec nor PetroChina immediately responded to requests for comment.

Chinese refiners have maintained healthy inventories by securing cargoes from alternative suppliers, including Russia, Brazil and West Africa, during recent disruptions in Middle Eastern supplies. Analysts say those arrangements have reduced the urgency to return to Iranian barrels.

Data from tanker-tracking firm Vortexa showed Iranian crude loadings accelerated sharply between June 19 and June 24, averaging about 1.6 million barrels per day, compared with roughly 340,000 barrels per day during the first 18 days of June and around 370,000 barrels per day in May.

Despite the rebound in exports, state refiners face a challenging domestic market. Weak fuel consumption and softer petrochemical demand have contributed to lower refinery utilization rates and reduced crude import requirements across China.

Independent refiners, commonly known as “teapot” refiners, remain the primary buyers of Iranian crude. These companies typically conduct transactions through intermediary traders and settle purchases in Chinese yuan, allowing them to maintain imports despite sanctions-related restrictions.

Among the major state-owned refiners, Sinopec is viewed as the most likely candidate to resume Iranian purchases. Sources said the company has faced tighter crude supplies in recent months and has drawn down commercial inventories since May, increasing the need to replenish stocks.

According to an industry official familiar with discussions between Sinopec and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Chinese refiner explored potential purchases during a previous 30-day sanctions waiver issued in March but ultimately declined because the timeframe was insufficient to complete a transaction.

NIOC is now preparing for renewed interest from Chinese state refiners and expects inquiries to increase in the coming days, the official said.

Under the waiver framework, NIOC is expected to act as the sole contractual counterparty for crude sales, while Russia’s ESPO blend may serve as a pricing benchmark in future negotiations, according to industry sources.

NIOC did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

In a statement issued on Thursday, Iraq’s Oil Ministry said the country has repeatedly called for a reassessment of production baselines to better reflect the sustainable production capacities of member states and Iraq’s unique security and economic circumstances. The ministry noted that OPEC has already begun a process to review member countries’ production capacities.

The debate comes amid reports suggesting Iraq could consider leaving OPEC if its production quota is not raised. While Iraqi officials rejected claims that a withdrawal decision has been made, Oil Ministry spokesperson Salim Al-Rikabi stated that Iraq expects a fair increase in its quota and warned that the country may ultimately need to decide whether remaining in the organization serves its interests.

“Iraq has no intention of withdrawing from OPEC and remains committed to its mechanisms,” Al-Rikabi said, while adding that the organization must address Iraq’s production concerns.

Iraq, a founding member of OPEC, relies heavily on oil revenues, which account for nearly 90 percent of government income. The recent regional conflict and disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz significantly affected exports and reduced production across the country.

Several Iraqi oil fields were also targeted by drone attacks during the conflict, causing further disruptions to operations. Prior to the outbreak of war in February, Iraq produced approximately four million barrels of oil per day and exported around 3.5 million barrels daily, most of which passed through the Strait of Hormuz.

Following a recent agreement between Washington and Tehran that eased regional tensions and reopened maritime routes, Iraqi authorities hope to restore production to pre-war levels within the next two months.

The possibility of Iraq reconsidering its OPEC membership has drawn attention because it would represent another setback for the organization following the departure of the United Arab Emirates earlier this year. Baghdad, however, emphasized that all production-related issues should continue to be addressed through OPEC’s established technical and consensus-based mechanisms.

Iraq maintains that its history of wars, sanctions and recent security challenges justifies a higher production allocation and expects member states to take those factors into account when determining future quotas.

In the agricultural district of Al-Mishkhab in Najaf province, farmers are once again flooding fields and sowing rice after severe water shortages forced widespread restrictions on cultivation in recent years.

The turnaround follows heavy rainfall and increased river inflows that have replenished reservoirs and boosted water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates river systems, providing relief to one of the Middle East’s most water-stressed countries.

Farmer Alaa Al-Ibrahimi said he had been unable to cultivate rice last year because of water shortages but has resumed planting this season on approximately 100 dunams of land. Like many growers in the region, he views the improved water situation as an opportunity to restore income and support his family.

The Agriculture Ministry has dramatically expanded approved rice-growing areas this year. According to Deputy Agriculture Minister Mahdi Sahar Al-Jubouri, authorities have authorized cultivation on roughly 362,000 dunams compared with only 200 dunams during the peak of last year’s drought.

Officials attribute the increase to stronger water flows in Iraq’s two main rivers and a substantial improvement in national water reserves.

Water expert Harry Istepanian, founder of the Iraq Climate Change Center, said Iraq’s water storage capacity has risen from approximately 4.5 billion cubic meters in 2025 to around 30 billion cubic meters in 2026, marking one of the most significant annual recoveries in recent years.

The improved conditions are expected to boost domestic rice production to around 300,000 metric tons this season, according to government estimates. Last year’s harvest was negligible after authorities curtailed cultivation because of the water crisis.

Most of the harvest will be purchased by the government for distribution through Iraq’s food ration program, which supplies subsidized staples to millions of households. Despite the increase in local production, Iraq is still expected to import approximately 800,000 metric tons of rice to satisfy domestic demand.

Farmers are also adjusting planting strategies to maximize returns. While the aromatic Anbar variety remains highly valued in Iraqi markets, many producers have shifted toward jasmine rice, which offers higher yields and stronger commercial returns.

The recovery comes amid broader concerns about Iraq’s long-term environmental outlook. The United Nations ranks Iraq among the countries most vulnerable to climate-related risks, with rising temperatures, declining rainfall and increasing pressure on water resources threatening agricultural productivity.

Experts caution that this year’s improvement reflects favorable weather conditions rather than a structural solution to the country’s water challenges.

“The recovery is real, but it is not yet sustainable,” Istepanian said, warning that a single dry season could reverse recent gains.

Iraq’s water security is further complicated by its dependence on cross-border river systems. The country receives a significant share of its water from rivers originating in neighboring Türkiye and Iran, where dam construction and water management policies have long affected downstream flows.

This year’s increase in river volumes was aided by heavy rainfall and snowmelt in upstream countries, which filled reservoirs and resulted in additional releases into shared waterways.

Analysts say sustaining agricultural growth will require continued regional cooperation on water management, investments in irrigation efficiency and reforms aimed at reducing waste in one of the region’s most water-intensive farming sectors.

For farmers across Iraq’s rice-growing heartland, however, the immediate priority remains making the most of a season many feared would never return after years of drought and uncertainty.

The move expands an emergency arrangement under which Iraq has already been exporting fuel oil through Syria’s port of Baniyas following the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime corridor through which the vast majority of Iraqi crude exports traditionally pass.

Iraqi officials said the strategy will remain in place even after maritime traffic through Hormuz normalizes, reflecting a broader government effort to diversify export routes and reduce dependence on a single corridor.

“The Iraqi government and the oil ministry attach the highest importance to diversifying crude export routes, particularly through Syrian territory,” Iraqi Oil Ministry spokesman Saleem Al-Rikabi told Reuters.

Al-Rikabi said state oil marketer SOMO was continuing discussions with Syrian authorities aimed at expanding energy exports through Iraq’s western neighbor.

Iraq typically exports around 3.6 million barrels of crude oil per day, with approximately 3.4 million barrels previously shipped through southern terminals near Basra before the conflict disrupted Gulf trade routes.

The closure of Hormuz forced Baghdad to seek alternative export channels as storage facilities filled and outbound shipments became constrained.

An interim solution introduced in April involved transporting Iraqi fuel oil by tanker truck across Syria to Baniyas for re-export through the Mediterranean.

Syrian officials said preparations are underway to expand the arrangement. Mohammed Al-Ahdab, head of the media office at the Syrian Petroleum Company, said operations at Baniyas were continuing despite expectations that the strait could reopen.

A Syrian Energy Ministry official said two additional unloading areas and supporting facilities would become operational within a week to accommodate Iraqi crude oil and naphtha shipments.

According to Iraqi oil officials, crude exports through Syria could initially reach around 50,000 barrels per day once loading infrastructure is completed. Tanker-truck shipments are expected to begin in early July, while SOMO plans to establish offices in Baniyas to support operations.

The expansion represents a significant opportunity for Syria, which is seeking to rebuild its economy and reconnect with regional markets after years of conflict and international isolation.

Officials said Syria is earning transit-related income from the movement of Iraqi fuel products, although details of the financial arrangements have not been disclosed.

Shipping data cited by industry sources indicate that Iraqi fuel oil exported through Syria has already reached destinations in Africa and Europe, including a tanker that arrived in Alexandria, Egypt, earlier this month.

The overland route faces logistical and security challenges. Roads linking Iraq and Syria have suffered extensive war-related damage, while fuel transport operations have encountered accidents and occasional disruptions from local protests.

At Baniyas, Iraqi fuel oil is being unloaded into storage facilities connected to marine export infrastructure rather than processed domestically, according to a source familiar with the operations.

Syrian authorities are also exploring longer-term solutions, including the rehabilitation of damaged pipeline infrastructure. Officials said the Iraq-Syria pipeline network has the capacity to transport up to 300,000 barrels per day if restored to operational status.

The initiative underscores how the disruption of Hormuz has accelerated efforts by regional producers to develop alternative export routes and strengthen resilience against future geopolitical shocks affecting global energy markets.

The conflict exposed the vulnerability of Middle Eastern energy exporters to disruptions in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passes, became the focal point of market instability after Iran imposed a blockade that disrupted energy flows across the Gulf.

The closure stranded roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG supplies, forcing producers to curtail approximately 11 million barrels per day of oil output while disrupting refinery operations and liquefied natural gas facilities throughout the region.

Although Washington and Tehran have since agreed to pursue negotiations toward a permanent peace arrangement, energy producers and policymakers are increasingly treating future disruptions as a recurring strategic risk rather than a remote possibility.

As a result, Gulf governments are prioritizing investments in pipelines, export terminals and overseas assets to reduce dependence on Hormuz and strengthen resilience against future crises.

Saudi Arabia is widely viewed as the region’s strongest example of successful diversification. Long before the recent conflict, state-owned Saudi Aramco developed a 1,200-kilometer pipeline linking oil fields in the Gulf to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The infrastructure enabled the kingdom to redirect a substantial portion of its exports away from Hormuz during the crisis.

The economic benefits of that strategy became evident as Saudi Arabia experienced a comparatively limited impact from the disruption. According to International Monetary Fund projections cited in the analysis, the Saudi economy is expected to grow by 3.1 percent in 2026, representing a relatively modest downgrade from pre-war forecasts.

The United Arab Emirates also benefited from existing infrastructure. The country continued exporting significant volumes of crude through the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman, despite disruptions caused by military activity. Abu Dhabi is now accelerating plans to expand export capacity through a second pipeline to Fujairah, with completion targeted for 2027.

Iraq faces a more complicated challenge because much of its production is concentrated in the south and remains heavily dependent on Gulf shipping routes. Iraqi authorities and energy companies are examining possibilities for expanding northern export corridors through Turkiye and Syria, though political instability and security concerns continue to complicate such plans.

The situation is particularly difficult for Qatar and Kuwait, both of which lack substantial alternative export routes outside the Strait of Hormuz.

For Qatar, one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas, bypassing Hormuz would likely require cooperation with neighboring states through pipeline networks crossing the United Arab Emirates, Oman or Saudi Arabia. Such projects would involve major financial investments and could increase Doha’s dependence on regional partners, introducing new strategic considerations.

Kuwait faces a similar predicament, with future diversification efforts likely to require deeper energy integration with Saudi Arabia and potentially broader regional infrastructure cooperation.

Beyond pipeline development, Gulf energy producers are increasingly pursuing geographic diversification through overseas investments. National energy companies have expanded portfolios across international oil, gas, refining, storage and renewable energy projects to create revenue streams less exposed to regional geopolitical risks.

Companies including QatarEnergy and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company have already established significant international footprints, and analysts expect such investments to accelerate as governments seek greater protection from future disruptions in Gulf shipping lanes.

The shift reflects a broader reassessment of energy security across the region. Infrastructure once viewed as supplementary is increasingly being treated as essential, while export diversification has moved from a long-term strategic objective to an immediate economic priority.

As Gulf producers recover from the effects of the Iran conflict, decisions on pipelines, transport corridors and overseas investments are expected to influence trade patterns, diplomatic relationships and energy markets well beyond the Middle East, redefining regional economic architecture in the years ahead.

A new documentary premiering at the Tribeca Film Festival explores the lives of personal chefs who worked for some of the world’s most feared authoritarian leaders, offering a rare perspective on the intersection of power, privilege and survival inside dictatorial regimes.

“How to Feed a Dictator,” directed by filmmaker Andrew Neel and based on a 2020 book by Polish journalist Witold Szabłowski, examines the experiences of five chefs who prepared meals for leaders including Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, Pol Pot and Kim Jong-il. Through their accounts, the 95-minute documentary investigates how ordinary professions can become intertwined with systems of repression and political violence.

The film focuses on individuals who occupied unusual positions within authoritarian governments. While not political figures themselves, the chefs enjoyed close access to rulers whose decisions shaped the lives of millions. Their stories reveal both the privileges and risks associated with serving at the highest levels of power.

Neel said the project was partly inspired by the contrast between the familiarity of food and the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the men who consumed it.

According to the director, everyday activities such as eating take on a different significance within authoritarian systems. Meals become not only private moments but also expressions of power, status and control, creating unique pressures for those responsible for preparing them.

The documentary presents a range of experiences and attitudes among its subjects. Some continue to express admiration for the leaders they served, while others describe deep personal regret over their involvement.

One of the most striking accounts comes from Keo Samoun, who worked for Cambodian leader Pol Pot. The film depicts her visiting his gravesite and presenting offerings of food, including fish, fruit and rice. According to the documentary, she continues to regard Pol Pot with reverence years after his death.

The perspective contrasts sharply with that of Italian pizza maker Ermanno Furlanis, who was recruited to prepare pizzas for North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Furlanis describes an environment characterized by intense surveillance and strict oversight.

According to his account, government officials closely monitored his activities, controlled his travel documents and supervised aspects of food preparation. One incident recalled in the film involved an official entering the kitchen to inspect the placement of olives on a pizza intended for Kim.

The documentary suggests that such episodes reflected broader systems of control operating within authoritarian states, where even routine tasks could become subject to political scrutiny.

Among the film’s participants, Ugandan chef Charles Otonde Odera provides one of the most detailed reflections on the personal compromises involved in serving a dictator. Odera worked for former Ugandan ruler Idi Amin during a period marked by political repression and widespread human rights abuses.

He describes how his appointment dramatically transformed his life. According to his account, he moved from poverty into a position of significant privilege, receiving financial benefits and access to a lifestyle unavailable to most citizens.

The film portrays this transformation as emblematic of a broader dynamic in which authoritarian governments rewarded loyalty and service with material advantages. For many individuals, those benefits created incentives to overlook or ignore the actions of the regimes they served.

Neel said that the notion of a “great job” emerged repeatedly throughout his conversations with former regime insiders. The director noted that personal rewards often played a central role in how individuals justified their participation in authoritarian systems.

The documentary cites examples of substantial perks enjoyed by those working close to political leaders. According to Neel, Saddam Hussein’s chef received a new vehicle annually as part of his position.

Yet the film also examines the psychological consequences of such arrangements. For Odera, the turning point came after the death of Kay Amin, one of Idi Amin’s wives. According to the documentary, reports and rumors surrounding her death prompted him to reconsider the value of the privileges he had received.

Odera recalls reaching a point where he preferred the financial hardships of his earlier life to the moral burden associated with serving the regime. His testimony forms one of the documentary’s clearest explorations of personal conflict and ethical compromise.

The film also devotes significant attention to the chef who served Saddam Hussein. Unlike other participants, the former Iraqi leader’s cook appears anonymously, speaking under a pseudonym and presented visually as a black silhouette.

Neel said extensive measures were taken to protect the individual’s identity. The director explained that concerns centered not on Saddam Hussein’s remaining associates but on potential hostility from others who might object to the chef’s continued expressions of loyalty toward the former Iraqi president.

According to the documentary, the chef remains emotionally attached to Saddam Hussein and speaks about his execution in deeply personal terms. The film portrays this loyalty as evidence of the lasting psychological impact that proximity to power can exert on individuals, even years after a regime has collapsed.

Neel said the decision to conceal the chef’s appearance was also intended to symbolize the personal costs associated with his experience. The visual presentation, he said, reflected the idea that the individual’s former relationship with Saddam had effectively separated him from normal public life.

Throughout the documentary, the chefs’ accounts raise broader questions about responsibility within authoritarian systems. Rather than focusing solely on political leaders, the film examines the roles played by ordinary people who help sustain governments through their daily work.

The documentary suggests that dictators rely not only on military, political and security structures but also on countless individuals performing routine functions. Chefs, drivers, aides and other staff members become part of the machinery that enables authoritarian leaders to maintain their lifestyles and authority.

Neel said this concept formed the central theme of the project. The film argues that understanding authoritarian rule requires examining not only the actions of dictators themselves but also the choices made by those around them.

The director briefly considered including a segment involving a chef who had worked for former U.S. President Donald Trump before his election. However, Neel said the individual ultimately declined to participate after Trump entered politics.

According to Neel, the chef stopped responding to requests for interviews, a development the director attributed to concerns about professional consequences.

While Neel explicitly stated that Trump is not a dictator, he said the abandoned interview highlighted one of the documentary’s recurring themes: the extent to which individuals may remain silent or avoid criticism when professional opportunities and personal interests are at stake.

By examining the experiences of chefs who operated behind the scenes of some of the twentieth century’s most notorious regimes, “How to Feed a Dictator” offers a portrait of how power functions through everyday relationships, and how ordinary people navigate the moral complexities of serving extraordinary leaders.

The crash occurred on Sunday afternoon in Thi Qar province as the bus traveled from the holy Shiite city of Najaf to the southern port city of Basra, according to Ahmad Saleem, spokesperson for the Thi Qar provincial council.

Saleem said 14 of the victims were burned beyond recognition, complicating identification efforts. Two Iranian nationals are believed to be among the dead, although authorities had not yet confirmed their identities.

Twenty people were injured in the accident, including two Iranian passengers who were transferred to Iran on Monday morning through coordination with the Iranian Consulate in Basra, Saleem said.

Local officials attributed the crash to poor road conditions. Saleem said provincial authorities had previously raised concerns about the condition of the roadway where the accident occurred, which lies between Thi Qar and Diwaniyah provinces.

He also said a severe shortage of ambulances in Thi Qar province hindered emergency response efforts following the crash.

The accident is the latest in a series of deadly road incidents in Iraq, where decades of conflict, corruption and underinvestment have strained infrastructure development and maintenance. Poorly maintained highways, aging vehicle fleets and weak enforcement of traffic regulations have contributed to a high rate of road fatalities across the country.

In 2023, a bus carrying pilgrims bound for the Iraqi city of Karbala crashed north of Baghdad, killing 18 people.

Authorities have not released further details on the cause of Sunday’s crash as identification efforts and investigations continue.

Syria’s Ministry of Awqaf said two aircraft carrying nearly 700 Syrian pilgrims from Madinah were diverted to Amman after airspace disruptions linked to the latest exchange of attacks between Iran and Israel.

The ministry said the passengers were transferred by bus from Jordan to Syria, with each vehicle carrying between 35 and 40 pilgrims destined for Damascus and Aleppo.

The disruption followed temporary airspace closures by both Syria and Iraq after Iran launched missiles toward Israel and Israel responded with airstrikes overnight. Iraqi authorities initially announced a 72-hour closure of national airspace on Sunday before later reopening it. Despite the reopening, several commercial flights across the region remained canceled.

The delays underscore the continuing impact of the regional conflict on civilian aviation networks across the Middle East, where airlines have repeatedly altered routes or suspended services because of security concerns.

Syrian authorities said approximately 24,500 Syrians participated in this year’s Hajj pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah, which concluded in late May.

The first group of returning pilgrims arrived in Damascus last week aboard a Syrian Airlines flight from Jeddah carrying 134 passengers, according to the Syrian Arab News Agency.

The conflict involving Iran, Israel and the United States has increasingly affected regional transportation and aviation infrastructure, forcing airlines and authorities to adjust operations amid recurring missile, drone and airstrike activity across the Middle East.

Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi faces eight charges, including conspiracy to provide material support to Kata’ib Hezbollah, which Washington designates as a terrorist organization.

Speaking through an interpreter, Al-Saadi told the court, “I am not guilty and we are in a war situation,” while also referencing children allegedly killed in a strike in Iran earlier this year.

U.S. prosecutors allege Al-Saadi helped plan around 18 attacks targeting American interests in Europe and was involved in plotting attacks in the United States, including against a synagogue in New York.

Al-Saadi was taken into U.S. custody in Türkiye last month. The case comes amid heightened tensions between Washington and Iran-backed groups across the Middle East and beyond.

The statement by Kataeb Hezbollah security chief Abu Mujahid Al-Assaf comes amid heightened tensions following the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in late February, a conflict that triggered a series of drone and rocket attacks by factions operating under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq against U.S. interests in the country.

Washington responded with strikes on facilities and bases linked to the groups, including Kataeb Hezbollah, killing dozens of fighters, according to the organization and regional media reports.

Since assuming office in mid-May, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has pledged to ensure that weapons remain exclusively in the hands of the state, a longstanding objective of successive Iraqi governments seeking to strengthen state authority and limit the influence of armed non-state actors.

In a statement issued on Saturday, Al-Assaf said “militant action is today a collective duty, and we will carry it out on behalf of the brothers who have decided to abandon it,” signaling that the group intends to continue its activities even as some allied factions move toward closer cooperation with state institutions.

While several Iran-backed factions have reportedly agreed to operate under official structures, Kataeb Hezbollah remains among the groups rejecting discussions on disarmament under what it characterizes as U.S. pressure.

Al-Assaf indicated that the organization was prepared to coordinate with other factions that no longer wished to maintain independent arsenals. He said Kataeb Hezbollah could supervise the transfer and storage of weapons and receive specialized systems, including cruise missiles, arguing that state agencies lacked personnel with the necessary expertise to manage such equipment.

The group has consistently linked any discussion of its weapons to the continued presence of foreign troops in Iraq. Kataeb Hezbollah maintains that it will not consider disarmament while international forces remain deployed in Iraq’s northern Kurdistan region as part of the U.S.-led coalition established in 2014 to combat Islamic State militants.

The coalition is scheduled to conclude its mission in the Kurdistan region by September, a timeline that has become a key reference point in Iraq’s debate over the future role of armed factions and the country’s security architecture.