The strikes hit the village of Jilli on Saturday, with casualty figures varying widely. A UN security report seen by AFP said at least 56 people were killed and 14 injured when Nigerian Air Force fighter jets carried out the operation targeting suspected militants.

Amnesty International said more than 100 people were killed and 35 seriously wounded, while local chief Lawan Zanna Nur estimated total casualties, including injured, at around 200. A market committee member, Bulama Mulima Abbas, said 36 bodies had been counted at the scene, describing the victims as traders.

The Nigerian military said it had conducted a “precision air strike” on a known militant enclave and logistics hub near Jilli, reporting that “scores of terrorists” were killed but making no reference to civilian casualties.

In a separate statement, the air force said it had launched an investigation into reports that the strike may have hit a local market, causing civilian deaths.

Nigeria has faced repeated incidents of civilian casualties during air operations against insurgents, including fighters from Boko Haram and its splinter faction Islamic State West Africa Province, which have waged an insurgency since 2009.

Recent cases include a January 2025 airstrike in Zamfara state that killed at least 16 people after vigilantes were mistaken for armed groups, and a December 2023 strike in Kaduna state that killed at least 85 people when a religious gathering was misidentified as militants.

Violence has intensified in recent months, with more than 100 people killed across northern Nigeria in the past 10 days in attacks attributed to both insurgents and criminal gangs, according to local accounts.The security situation has drawn international scrutiny, including from Donald Trump, whose administration has pressed Nigeria to intensify its campaign against militant groups.

The United States has also deployed about 200 troops to provide technical and training support to Nigerian forces.

Nigeria’s government has stepped up legal action against suspected militants, with Justice Minister Lateef Fagbemi saying authorities had prosecuted 508 cases and secured nearly 386 convictions in mass terrorism trials.

The raids, carried out by criminal groups locally known as bandits, targeted villages in Sokoto State on Thursday, following several days of deadly assaults in the country’s predominantly Muslim north.

Ahmad Yahaya, a community leader in Dan Adua village, said at least 12 people were killed and 43 abducted across Isa and Sabon Birni local government areas during the attacks. He said heavily armed gunmen carried out the raids.

Lawmaker Muhammad Saidu Bargaja, who represents the affected areas, confirmed the violence, reporting similar casualty figures and describing the security situation as “highly devastating.”

The districts are believed to be under the influence of Bello Turji, a notorious gang leader whose network imposes levies on communities and conducts retaliatory raids against those who refuse to comply.

The latest violence comes amid a wider escalation of attacks by both criminal gangs and jihadist groups. Earlier in the week, a senior military officer, Brigadier General Oseni Omoh Braimah, was killed along with several troops during an overnight assault on a military base in northeastern Nigeria, according to local officials and intelligence sources.

Separate attacks in the northwestern states of Kebbi and Niger have also left at least 90 people dead since Sunday, based on figures from local authorities, humanitarian groups and church sources.

The surge underscores ongoing security challenges in northern Nigeria, where armed groups continue to target civilians, security forces and infrastructure despite military operations aimed at curbing the violence.

Civilian fatalities attributed to security forces in Burkina Faso and Mali have exceeded those caused by jihadist groups, according to recent data and rights assessments, raising concerns about the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and their broader implications for regional stability.

Analysts and rights groups say the pattern reflects a troubling escalation in abuses by state forces and allied militias, particularly in areas where governments are battling insurgencies linked to al Qaeda and Islamic State. The findings come at a time when military-led governments in both countries are seeking to consolidate control following coups and recalibrate their international alliances.

Human Rights Watch researcher Ilaria Allegrozzi said Burkina Faso’s security forces and affiliated militias “appear to be more brutal and violent” than militant groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al Qaeda-linked coalition active across the Sahel. Her assessment underscores a shift in the dynamics of violence, where counterinsurgency measures themselves are increasingly contributing to civilian harm.

The data highlights a regional pattern in which government responses to insurgency are marked by alleged extrajudicial killings, collective punishment, and insufficient accountability mechanisms. Allegrozzi said such trends point to broader issues of military indiscipline that risk undermining the effectiveness of security operations.

Widespread civilian casualties linked to state forces could have significant strategic consequences, analysts said. Beyond the immediate human cost, such incidents may erode public trust in governments and create conditions that enable militant groups to strengthen their narratives and expand recruitment.

Insurgent organisations operating in the Sahel have long sought to portray themselves as alternatives to state authority, particularly in rural and marginalised regions. Reports of abuses by national armies may reinforce these narratives, complicating efforts to restore state legitimacy and control.

The situation also carries implications for international engagement in the region. The United States has signalled interest in improving relations with Sahelian governments, even as Burkina Faso and Mali have distanced themselves from traditional Western partners, including France, following their respective coups.

However, allegations of human rights violations could complicate diplomatic and security cooperation.Both Burkina Faso and Mali have undergone significant political transitions in recent years, with military juntas assuming power amid rising insecurity. These governments have prioritised aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns, often relying on local militias and volunteer forces to supplement national armies.

Rights groups have repeatedly raised concerns about the conduct of these auxiliary forces, which are frequently accused of targeting civilians suspected of supporting or collaborating with jihadist groups. Such accusations are difficult to verify independently in many cases due to restricted access to conflict zones and limited transparency from authorities.

Spokespeople for the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Similarly, neither the Burkinabe government nor the Sharia Committee of JNIM in Burkina Faso responded to inquiries from Human Rights Watch regarding the allegations.

The reported pattern of violence reflects the complexity of the conflict environment in the Sahel, where distinguishing between combatants and civilians is often challenging. Armed groups operate in remote areas with limited state presence, and local populations are frequently caught between competing forces.

Despite these challenges, analysts stress that adherence to international humanitarian law remains essential for maintaining credibility and effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations. Failure to do so, they say, risks perpetuating cycles of violence that ultimately benefit insurgent groups.

The findings add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that military-led approaches alone may be insufficient to address the root causes of instability in the region. Issues such as governance deficits, economic marginalisation, and intercommunal tensions continue to fuel conflict dynamics across the Sahel.

As Burkina Faso and Mali navigate their security challenges, the conduct of their armed forces is likely to remain under scrutiny from international observers and rights organisations.

The balance between combating insurgency and protecting civilian populations is expected to be a key factor shaping both domestic legitimacy and external partnerships.

The assault occurred in Bafwakoa village in Mambasa territory of Ituri province, near the town of Niania, beginning around 7 p.m. local time, according to army statements and local authorities.

The Congolese military said the attackers were members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group active in eastern Congo that has been recognized by Islamic State as an affiliate.

Local official Christian Alimasi said the attackers burned at least 44 houses, killed residents using machetes and fire, and abducted two people during the raid.

Violence linked to the ADF has intensified in recent months in Ituri and neighboring North Kivu province, despite joint military operations launched in 2021 by Congolese and Ugandan forces to counter the group.

Data from Insecurity Insight shows the ADF accounted for roughly a quarter of reported violence against civilians in eastern Congo between 2020 and 2025, underscoring the persistent security challenges in the region.

The attacker was believed to be targeting a nearby police station but struck a civilian residence before reaching the intended site, said Muhammad Sajjad Khan, a local police official. The blast caused significant casualties among residents inside the house, he added.

The death toll was confirmed by Bannu assistant commissioner Ikramullah Khan, who said the injured had been shifted to nearby medical facilities.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. However, suspicion is likely to fall on Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has intensified attacks in the region in recent years, frequently targeting security installations.

Bannu lies in a volatile region bordering areas that were formerly part of Pakistan’s semi-autonomous tribal belt, long affected by militancy and counterinsurgency operations.

Pakistan has repeatedly accused neighboring Afghanistan of failing to eliminate militant sanctuaries used to plan cross-border attacks, an allegation denied by the Taliban authorities in Kabul.

The 69-year-old secured the presidency following a parliamentary vote broadcast live from Naypyitaw, where lawmakers aligned with the army-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party and constitutionally mandated military appointees ensured a decisive outcome.

His elevation follows elections held in December and January that delivered a sweeping victory to the military-backed party, polls widely criticized by Western governments and opposition groups as lacking credibility and designed to entrench military rule under a civilian façade.

Min Aung Hlaing, who has led Myanmar’s armed forces since 2011, recently oversaw a leadership reshuffle within the military, appointing loyalist Ye Win Oo as commander-in-chief after being nominated for the presidency earlier this week. Analysts view the transition as a calculated move to retain influence over both civilian and military institutions while seeking greater international legitimacy.

The general seized power in the February 2021 coup, detaining Suu Kyi and other senior leaders, an event that triggered mass protests and evolved into an entrenched civil war involving pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed groups.

Despite the formal political transition, fighting continues across multiple regions. This week, anti-junta factions, including elements linked to Suu Kyi’s political movement and ethnic militias, announced the formation of a broader alliance aimed at dismantling military rule and establishing a federal democratic system.

Analysts say the consolidation of power under Min Aung Hlaing could lead to intensified military operations against resistance forces, while also prompting regional actors to reassess diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s leadership amid ongoing instability and economic strain.

Senior officials from both countries are participating in the discussions, which are being facilitated by China as part of efforts to broker a negotiated settlement between the neighbours, long linked by security ties but increasingly at odds over militancy and cross-border attacks.

The talks are expected to focus on securing a ceasefire and reopening key border crossings to restore trade and travel flows, according to sources cited in earlier reports, signalling an attempt to stabilise economic and civilian movement disrupted by months of hostilities.

“Our efforts for talks will continue despite the problems that will keep coming,” a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson said during a regular media briefing, underscoring Islamabad’s position that dialogue remains the primary channel for de-escalation.

Pakistan has also acknowledged China’s role in facilitating the engagement, describing Beijing as an important global actor whose diplomatic efforts are complementary to regional stability initiatives.

Tensions between the two countries have escalated sharply since late 2025, with Islamabad accusing the Afghan Taliban authorities of harbouring militants from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an insurgent group it says is responsible for attacks inside Pakistan.

The Afghan Taliban has rejected those allegations, maintaining that militancy within Pakistan is an internal issue and denying any official support or sanctuary for the group.

The two countries share a 2,600-kilometre border that has historically been porous and contested, and recent fighting has marked a significant deterioration in ties that had initially shown signs of alignment following the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021.

The assault occurred late Tuesday in Shanga local government area, where security personnel had been deployed following warnings of an imminent attack, according to state government spokesman Yahaya Sarki.

Several soldiers were also injured when militants opened fire in the village of Giron Masa.

Officials said the attackers struck as troops were mobilizing, leaving multiple casualties and destroying vehicles. Images released by authorities showed burned military equipment along a rural road surrounded by forested terrain.

Kebbi State Governor Nasir Idris visited injured personnel in hospital, describing the incident as a significant loss and pledging support for affected families.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, though residents have pointed to the Islamic State Sahel Province, locally known as Lakurawa, which has become increasingly active in northwestern Nigeria.

Militant groups linked to Islamic State and other networks have expanded operations across border regions in recent years, exploiting limited state presence and porous frontiers.

Worsening security crisisThe attack underscores a broader pattern of violence across northern Nigeria, where security forces and civilians are frequently targeted.

The region has witnessed a surge in militant activity, kidnappings and armed raids, with multiple deadly incidents reported in recent months.

Authorities have not announced immediate retaliatory measures as investigations continue into the Kebbi ambush.

The training provided by the ISI to the JKLF volunteers suggests a concerted effort by the Pakistani government to enhance the capabilities of militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir.

The destabilization of Jammu and Kashmir has long been a contentious issue, and recent claims by Noor Dahri, the executive director of Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism in the UK, have brought attention to a purported pre-planned strategy initiated by the Pakistani government long before the Afghan war.

According to Dahri, a four-way strategy was devised in the 1980s, with implementation commencing after the Afghan War. He explores the alleged phases of this strategy and their impact on the region.

Phase 1: Training of JKLF Volunteers (1987)

According to Dahri, in 1987, volunteers from the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) underwent training conducted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in four abandoned Afghan camps. After completing their training, these trained volunteers were then sent back to Kashmir.

The training provided by the ISI to the JKLF volunteers suggests a concerted effort by the Pakistani government to enhance the capabilities of militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir. By equipping and training these volunteers, the aim was to strengthen their capacity to carry out insurgent activities, including attacks against Indian security forces and infrastructure.

Phase 2: Systematic Islamization of Militancy (1989)

The second phase of the strategy was implemented in 1989 and aimed at the systematic Islamization of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. This phase purportedly involved the active involvement of Jamaat-run madrasahs (Islamic schools) in the region. Students from over 500 madrasahs were reportedly recruited and inducted into the conflict, sidelining the JKLF and promoting the hardline Islamist group known as Hizbul Mujahideen, which had backing from Pakistan.

The involvement of Jamaat-run madrasahs in the alleged strategy suggests a concerted effort to imbue the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir with an Islamist character. By recruiting students from these madrasahs, the aim was to indoctrinate them with an ideology that fused religious fervor with the cause of separatism. This approach sought to galvanize a new generation of militants who were driven by religious motivations and a desire to establish an Islamic state in the region.

Phase 3: Internationalization of the Kashmir Issue (1991)

The strategy’s third phase, initiated in 1991, focused on the internationalization of the Kashmir issue. The Pakistani government aimed to draw global attention to the situation in Kashmir and sought to highlight what it claimed were human rights violations and the right to self-determination of the people in the region. This phase involved diplomatic efforts to garner international support for Pakistan’s stance, thereby increasing tensions between India and Pakistan.

During this phase, Pakistan aimed to portray itself as a champion of the Kashmiri cause and sought to gain sympathy and support from the international community. Diplomatic channels were utilized to raise awareness about the alleged human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir, including reports of excessive use of force, disappearances, and restrictions on civil liberties. Pakistan sought to present the conflict as a matter of self-determination and as a disputed territory requiring international intervention.

By internationalizing the Kashmir issue, Pakistan aimed to put pressure on India and garner support for its position. It sought to portray India as an oppressor and violator of human rights in the region, while positioning itself as a responsible advocate for the Kashmiri people.

Phase 4: Extending Religiously Motivated Militancy (1992)

Dahri asserts that the strategy’s final phase, initiated in 1992, aimed to extend religiously motivated militancy among the Muslim population in India. This phase allegedly involved spreading the influence of militancy beyond Jammu and Kashmir and into major Indian cities, including Mumbai, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Aligarh, Ahmedabad, Bhagalpur, among others. The objective of this phase was to create a broader network of support for the separatist cause and to further destabilize the region.

If these claims are accurate, the extension of militancy beyond Jammu and Kashmir into other parts of India would mark a significant escalation in the conflict. By expanding the reach of militancy to major cities with sizable Muslim populations, the alleged strategy aimed to create a broader base of support for the separatist cause and potentially incite unrest and violence in these areas.

The selection of cities like Mumbai, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Aligarh, Ahmedabad, and Bhagalpur suggests a deliberate targeting of locations with economic, political, or strategic significance. These cities are major centers of commerce, industry, education, and administration, and their destabilization could have far-reaching consequences for India’s stability and security.

The alleged objective of creating a broader network of support for the separatist cause indicates a desire to mobilize sympathizers and create a sense of solidarity among Muslims across India. By leveraging religious sentiments and grievances, the aim was to fuel discontent and amplify the separatist narrative, potentially leading to further violence and unrest.

Going Ahead

It is important to note that these claims made by Dahri present a specific perspective and should be subject to further verification and analysis. The situation in India, like any country, is complex, with multiple factors contributing to social and political dynamics. The Indian government has consistently taken measures to address security challenges and counter extremist ideologies, including those associated with separatist movements.