Clashes broke out between rival political supporters in the state capital Kolkata after results were announced on Monday, with authorities confirming fatalities on both sides amid escalating tensions.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP secured a sweeping win in the eastern state, capturing 206 of 294 assembly seats and marking its first-ever government in West Bengal, a region of more than 100 million people.

The outcome ends over a decade of rule by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, leader of the All India Trinamool Congress, who has rejected the election results after also losing her own seat.

Party officials reported casualties among their workers, with the BJP stating that two of its members were killed, while the TMC said two of its supporters were beaten to death in separate incidents.

“Two of our workers were killed after results of the elections were announced on Monday,” BJP state leader Samik Bharracharya said, adding that the party remained committed to peace.

The TMC, in a statement, condemned what it described as the “brutal murder” of its grassroots workers, with spokesperson Narendranath Chakraborty alleging that party offices were attacked in multiple areas.

A senior police officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed four deaths linked to the clashes and said one police officer was shot in the leg during the unrest.

Political analysts have described the BJP’s victory as one of its most significant expansions since Modi came to power in 2014, extending its influence beyond its traditional strongholds in northern and central India.

Polling in five states and territories concluded over April and May, and early attention has focused on West Bengal, where the BJP mounted an intensive campaign to unseat Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee of the All India Trinamool Congress, which has governed the state since 2011.

Exit polls released last week suggested a narrow edge for the BJP over the TMC, though such projections have historically proven unreliable in India. Political analyst Biswanath Chakraborty said the outcome in West Bengal could have wider national implications, describing the contest as one that could “tilt the balance of power.”

The campaign was marked by controversy over the removal of millions of names from electoral rolls, a move authorities described as targeting ineligible voters but which critics argued disproportionately affected marginalized and minority communities.

Banerjee expressed confidence ahead of the count, dismissing the BJP’s chances and urging supporters to remain patient. In contrast, West Bengal BJP chief Samik Bhattacharya said the election reflected public demand for change and predicted a defeat for the ruling party.

Elsewhere, in Tamil Nadu, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam led by Chief Minister M. K. Stalin is widely expected to retain power. In Assam, the BJP is projected to maintain control, while in Puducherry, the party remains part of the governing coalition.In Kerala, exit polls indicate a closely contested race, with the Congress-led alliance seen as having an advantage over the incumbent Communist government.

The results are being closely watched as a gauge of Modi’s political standing amid ongoing economic and foreign policy challenges, including high unemployment and negotiations over a trade agreement with the United States.

Voting took place throughout April in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Kerala and the union territory of Puducherry, with attention centered on whether the BJP could expand its footprint in major opposition-held regions ahead of future national political contests.

Exit polls, while often used as early indicators in India, have a mixed record and final outcomes can differ significantly from projections.The most closely watched contest is in West Bengal, where the BJP mounted an aggressive campaign to unseat Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee and her All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), which has governed the state since 2011.

Several exit polls suggested the BJP held a narrow advantage over the TMC, raising the possibility that Modi’s party could take power in the state of more than 100 million people for the first time.Banerjee’s TMC won 213 of the 294 seats in the 2021 assembly election, and the state has a history of electoral violence and intense political rivalry.

This year’s campaign was also marked by controversy over a Special Intensive Revision of voter rolls, a process authorities said was intended to remove ineligible voters, but which critics argued disproportionately affected marginalized and minority communities.

Political activist Yogendra Yadav said there was “no way” the TMC would lose in what he described as a fair election, alleging that the BJP could only prevail through manipulation of voter lists or counting irregularities.The BJP has denied opposition allegations of electoral malpractice.

In Assam and Puducherry, the BJP-led alliance was widely projected to retain power, reinforcing the party’s hold in regions where it already governs.In Tamil Nadu, one of India’s largest industrial states, exit polls indicated the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) led by Chief Minister M. K. Stalin was likely to remain in office.

The polls also suggested actor-turned-politician C. Joseph Vijay, leading the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam party, could emerge as a significant new challenger to the state’s established political parties.In Kerala, India’s only communist-ruled state, projections indicated a closely fought contest, with a Congress-led alliance expected to challenge the ruling Left Democratic Front.

Strong results for the BJP in the state elections would strengthen Modi’s political position as his government navigates economic pressures including high unemployment and negotiations over a pending trade deal with the United States.

Addressing the lower house, Modi said the measures, which include increasing the number of legislators, extending quotas for women to state assemblies and redrawing constituency boundaries, would move India in a “new direction.” He said greater representation of women would bring “new strength, fresh thinking, and a greater sense of sensitivity” to governance.

The government said the proposed boundary changes reflect population shifts since constituencies were last fixed following the 1971 census, arguing the reforms are necessary to align representation with demographic realities.

The proposals come from the ruling National Democratic Alliance, which does not hold the two-thirds majority required to pass constitutional amendments in both houses of parliament, and is seeking support from smaller parties and opposition groups ahead of a vote expected this week.

Opposition parties, including the Congress, said they support the principle of women’s reservation but accused the government of attempting to use constituency redrawing to its political advantage. They called for immediate implementation of the quota without linking it to broader structural changes.

The bills propose increasing the strength of the lower house by about 55% to around 850 members, alongside proportional expansion in state legislatures, by the next general election scheduled for 2029.They also aim to operationalise the one-third reservation for women in both parliament and state assemblies by that timeline.

The quota was approved in legislation passed in 2023 but tied to a future census, delaying its implementation beyond the next election cycle.The proposed changes require ratification by at least half of India’s state legislatures before becoming law.

India currently does not reserve seats for women in parliament, despite women comprising nearly half of the country’s 968 million voters.

Women account for about 14% of members in the lower house and 17% in the upper house, while representation in state legislatures stands at roughly 10%.

Leadership in India is ultimately not about who you speak for, but about who listens to you.

India is not a country where leadership is inherited; it is earned. Seven decades of electoral history show that Indian voters consistently reward leaders who speak the language of national aspiration rather than narrow community protection.

From the previous leaders’ developmental nationalism to Narendra Modi’s emphasis on growth and national confidence, successful leaders have framed their politics around collective futures, not sectional anxieties. It is within this political reality that Muslim leadership in India has encountered its most enduring limitation.

The Arithmetic of Democracy

Indian Muslims constitute approximately 14.2 percent of the population, according to Census 2011 data. While this makes them the country’s largest religious minority, it also underlines a fundamental truth of Indian democracy: no national election can be won on the strength of a single community.

Parliamentary majorities are built through cross-community coalitions, broad ideological appeal, and narratives that transcend identity. Leadership, therefore, cannot afford to be sectional by design.

Any political vision perceived as speaking primarily for one community—regardless of how genuine or justified its concerns may be—inevitably encounters a ceiling. This is not a reflection of prejudice alone but of electoral mathematics.

The Indian voter, across caste, class, and religion, has historically gravitated toward leaders who articulate shared aspirations such as economic mobility, dignity, infrastructure, and national pride. Community-specific representation may protect interests, but it rarely generates mass leadership capable of shaping the national imagination.

Representation Versus Statesmanship

Post-independence Muslim political leadership has often positioned itself as the custodian of Muslim concerns rather than as an architect of India’s future. The distinction between representation and statesmanship is subtle but decisive. Representation negotiates safeguards; statesmanship defines direction. One speaks defensively, the other expansively.

Political history illustrates this divide clearly. Leaders who foregrounded poverty alleviation, education, industrial growth, and national self-confidence built constituencies that cut across social lines.

By contrast, leadership that focused primarily on identity, protection, and grievance tended to remain confined to predictable vote banks. This pattern has repeated itself across decades and regions. It is not discrimination; it is how democratic incentives operate.

This approach has also shaped narrative choices. Instead of projecting ambition and confidence, Muslim leadership has often highlighted marginalization and deprivation.

While socio-economic challenges are real—documented extensively by the Sachar Committee Report (2006)—politics that continually emphasizes backwardness can unintentionally lower expectations rather than raise confidence. No community in India has produced national leaders by centering weakness; they have done so by projecting strength.

Economic Contribution Without Political Narrative

One of the most underutilized facts in Indian political discourse is the economic role of Indian Muslims. Data from the National Sample Survey Office and various industry studies show disproportionate Muslim participation in small enterprises, handicrafts, transport, retail trade, and urban informal economies.

From leather and textiles to logistics and street-level commerce, Muslim entrepreneurship forms a vital, if under-recognized, component of India’s economic ecosystem.

Yet political leadership has rarely translated this entrepreneurial presence into a forward-looking economic narrative. Instead of framing Muslims as contributors to growth and innovation, leadership discourse has remained stuck in the language of welfare and compensation.

Welfare has its place, but welfare politics alone rarely produces transformational leaders. As survey data from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies repeatedly indicates, Indian youth voters are increasingly driven by aspirations of mobility, skills, and opportunity rather than entitlement alone.

Silence and the Cost of Invisibility

Another uncomfortable reality is the relative absence of Muslim political voices from major national debates on economic reform, technological change, national security, climate policy, or India’s global role. When leadership intervenes only on identity-linked issues, it risks being perceived as reactive rather than visionary. In Indian politics, silence is not neutrality; it is invisibility.

The core truth is straightforward. India has never rejected a leader because of religion. It has rejected leaders who fail to expand their vision beyond religion.

A Muslim leader who champions education over appeasement, growth over dependency, constitutional values over communal rhetoric, and confidence over victimhood will not be seen merely as a Muslim leader. They will be seen as an Indian leader.

Leadership in India is ultimately not about who you speak for, but about who listens to you. When Muslim political leadership begins to speak in a language in which every Indian can locate their future, the question will no longer be why such leaders have not emerged—but why it took so long.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

India’s third most populous state and also one of its poorest, Bihar is ruled by Modi’s National Democratic Alliance and is scheduled to hold an election to its state assembly in the coming weeks.

Women voters have turned out in greater numbers in the past decade, reversing a trend of men easily outnumbering women at the polls, and political parties have competed to attract them.

Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party lost its outright majority in the federal parliament in last year’s national election, forcing him to rely on support from regional allies to form a government after facing a resurgent opposition, and he is currently navigating one of the most challenging stretches of his 11 years in office.

Addressing women gathered in multiple locations in the state, Modi said via video link: “I see millions of women on the screen, and their blessings are a great source of strength for all of us.

“The (women’s employment plan) is being launched today. So far, 7.5 million women have joined this scheme, and an amount of 10,000 rupees has been transferred to the bank accounts of all these women,” he said.

The plan is envisaged as giving support to women to enable their employment in small-scale ventures such as agriculture, handicrafts and other sectors, the Prime Minister’s Office said. Beneficiaries can also avail of additional financial support of up to 200,000 rupees in subsequent phases of the plan.

Modi’s ruling NDA will face the opposition Congress and its allies in Bihar, which is considered a bellwether state, along with neighbouring Uttar Pradesh and the western state of Maharashtra. ($1 = 88.7080 Indian rupees)

Far from empowering Muslims, Akbaruddin’s rhetoric is downright foolish.

In the complex and often combustible landscape of Indian politics, few figures have stirred as much controversy as Akbaruddin Owaisi—the younger brother of Asaduddin Owaisi, head of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), a Muslim-centric political party with influence in southern and parts of northern India.

Akbaruddin became a national—and international—talking point in 2012 when a provocative excerpt from one of his public speeches in Nirmal, Telangana, went viral. In the clip, he is seen declaring: “If the police are removed for 15 minutes, we are 250 million and you are 1 billion. We will show you who is more powerful, who has balls.”

The statement was a blatant threat wrapped in communal arithmetic, referencing the Muslim and Hindu populations of India. The crowd erupted in applause. Shortly afterward, Owaisi was arrested on charges of hate speech, released on bail, and ultimately acquitted in 2022.

But revisiting this case solely as a legal episode misses the point. It is a revealing lens into the enduring toxicity of communal rhetoric in Indian politics—particularly within some segments of the Muslim leadership—where hate is no longer an outlier but a weaponized tool, used across the spectrum to polarize and provoke.

Hate Speech Is Not a One-Way Street

Akbaruddin’s speech stands as one of the clearest examples of hate speech by a Muslim politician in India. It was not vague or symbolic rhetoric aimed at resisting “Muslim oppression,” but a direct provocation against an entire (albeit imaginary) community—articulated through communal arithmetic: 25 crore versus 100 crore.

Ironically, the speech played right into the hands of those it ostensibly opposed. It gave the Hindu Right a moral and political tool: “If Muslim leaders can openly threaten us, why shouldn’t we respond in kind?” In that sense, Owaisi’s speech, like many instances where the idea of Muslim empowerment morphs into rabid communalism, deepened the communal fissures that the ruling dispensation now capitalizes on with its own stream of hate speeches.

Yet, here lies a deeper hypocrisy within sections of the Indian Muslim community. Many Muslims, in private conversations, while disagreeing with AIMIM’s political opportunism, tend to justify Akbaruddin’s words as a symbolic show of resistance—an assertion that “we will not take oppression lying down.” But symbolic resistance through hate speech is a double-edged sword. It only reinforces existing suspicions and increases hostility.

The Dangerous Myth of Communal Arithmetic

The core of Akbaruddin’s speech rests on a fundamentally flawed idea: that Muslims are a monolithic, homogeneous bloc of 25–30 crore standing against 100 crore Hindus.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The Muslim community in India is deeply diverse and internally fractured—across sects, castes, regions, and languages.

Sunni–Shia, Deobandi–Barelvi, and Ashraf–Ajlaf–Arzal divisions are an open secret. The imagined “25 crore Muslims” myth collapses the moment these internal differences are acknowledged—which, in the age of Hindutva, seems conveniently forgotten.

Likewise, the notion of “100 crore Hindus” is equally imaginary. Caste, regional, and linguistic divides among Hindus remain sharp and visible, only temporarily papered over by the Hindutva project. Communalism gives life to these mythical numbers because communal politics thrives on binaries—usually imaginary, always forced.

When Akbaruddin says “15 minutes without police,” he frames the state—particularly the police—as the central oppressor during pogroms. There is some truth to this. The history of riots, from Nellie (1983) to Delhi (2020), shows police complicity or selective inaction. But his imagined scenario is suicidal. If the police disappear and the battle is framed as 30 crore versus 100 crore, it effectively calls for Muslims to engage in self-annihilation.

Three Hindus for every one Muslim—Owaisi’s way of calling for suicide reminds one of the now-famous meme: “Marwana ka tareeqa thoda casual hai.”

Far from empowering Muslims, Akbaruddin’s rhetoric is downright foolish.

The Responsibility to Condemn Across the Board

Akbaruddin Owaisi has made many such remarks, including derogatory statements about Hindu gods—calling them “manhoos” (inauspicious). Imagine if any Hindu politician had used even mildly similar language for Allah or the Prophet—the reaction from Muslims and the media would have been explosive. This asymmetry in moral outrage is dangerous.

It is also telling that his elder brother, Asaduddin Owaisi—otherwise vocal in dissecting Hindu right-wing hate speech—has never meaningfully condemned his brother’s 2012 remarks. This selective silence undermines the moral standing of anyone claiming to fight hate.

If Muslims wish to oppose Hindutva hate speech with credibility, they must also hold their own leaders accountable. Tacit approval or silence emboldens hate-mongers from within, leaving ordinary Muslims to face the consequences of fires lit by their ‘leaders.’

Communalism Is a Two-Edged Sword

The truth is stark: speeches like Akbaruddin Owaisi’s do not protect Muslims. They further communalize Hindus, provide ammunition to the ruling party, and push India’s already fragile social fabric closer to collapse.

Muslims must therefore develop a politics rooted not in reaction, but in principled opposition to all forms of hate. That essentially means condemning both Hindu and Muslim hate speech—without excuses, without bias.

The flames of hate consume the weakest first. Those who light them rarely burn. Let us never forget: hate can never be fought with hate.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Recognizing caste within the Muslim population isn’t a threat to unity; it’s a path toward justice.

In a landmark shift, India’s central government has decided to include caste data in the upcoming national census—the first time such a detailed caste count will take place since 1931. On paper, it’s a technical change. But for millions of India’s most invisible citizens, it’s potentially transformative.

Among those who stand to gain the most are Pasmanda Muslims—a broad umbrella term that includes Dalit, Adivasi, and other backward-class Muslim communities. Despite being the numerical majority among India’s Muslims, Pasmandas have long lived in the shadows of policy, politics, and even community representation.

A recent caste survey in Telangana revealed something telling: nearly 80% of the state’s Muslims belong to Pasmanda backgrounds. It was a statistic that didn’t surprise social scientists or grassroots activists—but it was a rare moment of clarity in a country where Muslim identity is often painted with one broad brushstroke.

That simplification has done real harm. The Indian Muslim is frequently seen as a singular, undivided bloc—one minority, one vote bank, one voice. But that narrative erases the deep social hierarchies and caste divisions within the community itself. And Pasmandas, who bear the brunt of poverty, discrimination, and social exclusion, are the ones who disappear from view.

Within the community, elite Muslim groups—those traditionally seen as Ashraf or upper caste—have dominated platforms of power: political parties, religious boards, cultural institutions, and media narratives. Meanwhile, Pasmandas have remained underrepresented, often struggling with lower literacy rates, poorer healthcare, and fewer job opportunities.

The last significant spotlight on Muslim marginalization came nearly two decades ago, through the Sachar Committee Report in 2006. Its findings were damning: many Muslim groups, especially those from Pasmanda backgrounds, fared worse than Scheduled Castes in key development indicators. Yet the lack of caste-disaggregated data meant that policies based on these findings were broad and ineffective. Everyone got lumped together. And as usual, those at the bottom lost out.

That’s why this new caste census matters. It could offer, for the first time in independent India, a full picture of caste realities within the Muslim community. It could provide a foundation for smarter, more targeted policies—ones that don’t just benefit “Muslims” in general, but specifically uplift those most in need.

It also corrects a historical oversight. During British rule, caste among Muslims was acknowledged and documented. The 1901 and 1931 censuses classified Muslims into categories like Ashraf (nobles), Ajlaf (backward), and Arzal (Dalit or “untouchable”). These categories were crude, but they at least reflected a social truth. After independence, however, India adopted a more homogenized view of its minorities—particularly Muslims—and quietly dropped caste from the conversation.

This erasure wasn’t just bureaucratic. It had real consequences. In 1950, Dalit Muslims lost their eligibility for Scheduled Caste (SC) reservations. To this day, they are denied affirmative action on the basis of caste, despite experiencing the same structural discrimination as their Hindu Dalit counterparts.

Welfare schemes and affirmative policies, designed without acknowledging these internal hierarchies, have repeatedly missed their mark. Upper-caste Muslims—though a minority within the minority—have often been the primary beneficiaries. Pasmandas remain at the margins.

For the upcoming census to make a difference, it must be handled transparently and without political interference. The data should be released in full. No filters. No spin. Only then can it serve as a blueprint for real change.

This isn’t about dividing communities—it’s about understanding them. Recognizing caste within the Muslim population isn’t a threat to unity; it’s a path toward justice. It gives voice to those who have long been ignored and lays the groundwork for more inclusive policies.

For Pasmanda Muslims, this census isn’t just a count. It’s a chance to be seen.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The logistics of Modi’s schedule further weaken Kharge’s claim. Organizing a high-profile international trip like the Saudi visit requires weeks of preparation, leaving little room for a last-minute Kashmir visit.

In a startling accusation, Mallikarjun Kharge, president of India’s opposition Congress Party, recently claimed that Prime Minister Narendra Modi canceled a planned visit to Kashmir after receiving an intelligence warning three days before the devastating Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025.

The attack, which killed 26 people, mostly tourists, in the scenic Kashmir valley, sent shockwaves across India and beyond, intensifying regional tensions. Kharge’s allegation, widely shared on platforms like IndiaToday and Beatroot, has ignited controversy, with critics calling it a politically motivated fabrication.

For an international audience seeking clarity, a closer look at the timeline, Modi’s schedule, and the complexities of India’s security landscape reveals a claim that lacks evidence and struggles to hold up.

The Pahalgam Attack: A Brutal Blow

The Pahalgam attack ranks among the deadliest in Jammu and Kashmir in nearly two decades. On April 22, 2025, at 2:30 PM local time, gunmen targeted Hindu tourists in Baisaran meadow, a picturesque spot in the Kashmir valley. The Resistance Front (TRF), a militant group linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility before retracting its statement due to public backlash.

India accused Pakistan of orchestrating the attack, further straining already tense relations between the nuclear-armed neighbors. The tragedy not only highlighted the fragility of security in Kashmir—a disputed region claimed by both India and Pakistan—but also raised questions about intelligence failures.

Kharge’s claim centers on a specific assertion: Modi received an intelligence report on April 19, 2025, warning of the attack and promptly canceled a planned Kashmir visit to avoid danger. The accusation paints Modi as prioritizing personal safety over leadership in a crisis. But when examined against verifiable facts, the narrative begins to crumble.

Modi’s Schedule: No Trace of a Kashmir Trip

First, let’s consider Modi’s itinerary. On April 19, 2025—the day Kharge alleges Modi was warned—India’s Ministry of External Affairs announced Modi’s upcoming visit to Saudi Arabia, scheduled for April 22–23. Modi arrived in Jeddah on April 22, where he was set to co-chair the second India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council meeting, a key diplomatic engagement to strengthen bilateral ties.

When news of the Pahalgam attack broke, Modi cut his visit short, skipping a formal dinner, and returned to New Delhi on April 23 to convene an emergency meeting with top officials, including Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. This timeline, corroborated by global media outlets like The Hindu, shows Modi’s focus was on international diplomacy, not a domestic trip to Kashmir.

No evidence suggests a Kashmir visit was ever planned. Modi’s trips to volatile regions like Kashmir are often unannounced for security reasons, but no government statements, media reports, or credible social media sources indicate a scheduled visit in April 2025.

Modi’s last major Kashmir trip was in January 2025, to the resort town of Sonamarg where he inaugurated the 6.5-kilometer tunnel. Kharge’s claim of a cancellation implies a visit was on the table, but without documentation, it appears speculative. Open-source intelligence platforms, found no mention of a planned Kashmir trip in the days before the attack, undermining Kharge’s narrative.

The Intelligence Puzzle

Kharge’s allegation also hinges on the existence of a specific intelligence report warning of the Pahalgam attack. India’s intelligence agencies, such as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), routinely monitor threats in Kashmir, where militancy remains a persistent challenge.

These reports are highly classified, and specific warnings are rarely made public. This suggests that while general intelligence on militant activity likely existed, a precise warning about the April 22 attack may not have been issued—or was not actionable.

Kharge provides no evidence to support his claim of a specific report. As an opposition leader, his access to classified intelligence would likely come from unofficial channels or leaking buckets, casting doubt on the reliability of his statement. Without corroboration, the claim risks fueling misinformation in a region already fraught with competing narratives.

Modi’s Response: Crisis Management, Not Evasion

Modi’s actions after the attack contrast sharply with Kharge’s portrayal. Upon returning to Delhi, Modi chaired an emergency meeting, condemned the attack as “cowardly,” and vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice, as reported by The Hindu.

His government launched a sweeping response, detaining over 1,500 suspects, demolishing homes of alleged militants, and suspending the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan—a 1960 agreement governing shared river resources. Modi even rerouted his return flight to avoid Pakistani airspace, signaling a hardline stance. These measures reflect a leader grappling with a national crisis, not one dodging responsibility by canceling a visit.

The Political Context

To understand Kharge’s claim, it’s crucial to consider India’s domestic politics. The Congress Party has long criticized Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government over its Kashmir policy, particularly the 2019 decision to revoke Article 370, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. The BJP touted this move as a path to stability, but the Pahalgam attack challenged that narrative, giving the opposition an opening to question Modi’s leadership.

Kharge’s allegation aligns with this strategy, aiming to portray Modi as detached or negligent. However, without evidence, the claim has drawn backlash, with social media posts on X labeling it “venomous” and accusing Kharge of inadvertently bolstering Pakistan’s narrative—a risky move for Congress’s credibility.

Logistical Realities

The logistics of Modi’s schedule further weaken Kharge’s claim. Organizing a high-profile international trip like the Saudi visit requires weeks of preparation, leaving little room for a last-minute Kashmir visit.

Why It Matters

The Pahalgam attack underscores the enduring volatility of Jammu and Kashmir, a region at the heart of India-Pakistan tensions for decades. Beyond the human toll, the tragedy highlights the challenges of securing a conflict-prone area while navigating geopolitical rivalries. Kharge’s claim, while attention-grabbing, lacks the evidence needed to hold up under scrutiny.

Modi’s documented schedule, the absence of a confirmed Kashmir visit, and the speculative nature of the intelligence report all point to a narrative driven more by political point-scoring than by facts.

For the international community, this episode serves as a reminder of the complexities of India’s internal and external challenges. The focus should remain on addressing the root causes of violence in Kashmir—enhancing security, fostering dialogue, and ensuring justice for victims.

Unsubstantiated claims like Kharge’s, while sparking debate, risk diverting attention from these critical priorities. In a region where truth is often obscured by competing narratives, facts must guide the path forward.

Mossad’s internal communications described Gandhi as a “bitter dynast” allegedly involved in “coordinated efforts” to damage Adani and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

In an explosive revelation with far-reaching geopolitical implications, sources have told Sputnik India that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally ordered the country’s spy agency, Mossad, to counter an alleged international campaign aimed at tarnishing the reputation of Indian billionaire Gautam Adani.

This unprecedented operation, codenamed Operation Zeppelin, reportedly included hacking into the personal servers of Indian political strategist and Indian Overseas Congress (IOC) head Sam Pitroda.

According to highly placed sources, Mossad’s intervention was triggered days after the now-infamous Hindenburg Research report released on January 24, 2023, which accused Adani of orchestrating “the largest con in corporate history.” The bombshell wiped off approximately $150 billion from Adani Group’s valuation and led to one of India’s most severe stock market crashes.

Haifa Deal and Israel’s Strategic Concerns

The timing of the Hindenburg report raised alarms in Tel Aviv, occurring just days before Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone (APSEZ) closed a landmark $1.2 billion deal to acquire Haifa Port—Israel’s largest and most strategic shipping hub. Sources told Sputnik India that Netanyahu, present during the finalization of the Haifa deal, raised the issue directly with Adani in a high-level closed-door meeting.

“This report… it is a serious threat to your business, isn’t it?” Netanyahu reportedly asked Adani, who was alone representing his group at the time. Present alongside Netanyahu were key aides, including Eshel Armoni, former Mossad operative and then-chairman of Haifa Port.

Adani’s calm rebuttal—“Not at all. It’s all lies.”—did little to ease Israeli concerns.

Netanyahu, citing the strategic nature of the India-Israel relationship, is believed to have told Adani, “Even if you see no threat, we have to be concerned. If it weakens you, it could sabotage not just this port deal but everything we have worked to build with India.”

According to sources, he described the Hindenburg charges as an “indirect attack” on Israel and assured Adani: “Israel believes in protecting its friends.”

Mossad Launches Operation Zeppelin

Within days, Mossad launched Operation Zeppelin, activating its elite Tzomet (Human Intelligence) and Keshet (Cyber Operations) units. The operation aimed to uncover what Israeli intelligence perceived as a coordinated global effort to derail the Haifa deal and undermine India’s standing.

Targets reportedly included Hindenburg Research’s New York headquarters and its founder Nathan Anderson, who were put under direct surveillance. The operation expanded to monitor hedge funds, activist lawyers, journalists, and political figures allegedly linked to the U.S. Deep State and billionaire George Soros.

One of the most startling aspects of the operation was the cyber intrusion into the Illinois-based residence of Sam Pitroda. Sources claimed that Mossad successfully accessed encrypted chatrooms and backchannel communications allegedly linking senior Indian opposition figures, including Congress MP Rahul Gandhi, to Anderson’s team.

Citing these findings, sources said Mossad’s internal communications described Gandhi as a “bitter dynast” allegedly involved in “coordinated efforts” to damage Adani and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Global Surveillance and Western Media

Mossad’s operations reportedly spanned multiple geographies—ranging from the U.S. and Canada to Europe and Australia. One decrypted email from Anderson, dated September 2023, allegedly confirmed a broader plan: “Nate’s report was just the beginning. More’s coming.”

By January 2024, Adani was privately briefed on the Zeppelin findings by Israeli intelligence operatives in Switzerland. The resulting dossier—spanning 353 pages—accused Western media outlets, USAID, and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) of amplifying anti-Adani narratives.

According to sources, USAID played a “central role” in disseminating disinformation through media channels.

In November 2024, intermediaries linked to Mossad reportedly leaked segments of the dossier to Reuters, Bloomberg, and The Guardian. Only French investigative outlet Mediapart published a report. “Most buried the story,” the sources noted.

Legal Blowback and Political Fallout

The dossier’s release coincided with legal actions against Adani by U.S. agencies, reportedly influenced by Biden administration officials. However, these cases collapsed under scrutiny, and sources say they led to the resignation of U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Breon Peace.

In December 2024, Adani’s legal team—led by powerhouse firm Quinn Emanuel—sent a seven-page legal threat to Hindenburg Research. A month later, Nathan Anderson allegedly agreed to dissolve Hindenburg in exchange for immunity, which was revoked after Donald Trump assumed office in January 2025.

Congress Responds

India’s main opposition party, Congress, has categorically denied any links to Hindenburg or foreign entities. In a statement, it called the allegations a diversionary tactic to shift attention away from the serious issues raised by the Hindenburg report.

“This is nothing but a smokescreen to protect the ruling party’s corporate allies,” a Congress spokesperson told local media.

If confirmed, the revelations about Operation Zeppelin mark an extraordinary case of transnational intelligence operations being deployed in the defense of private economic interests. It underscores the evolving nexus between geopolitics, corporate interests, and cyber-espionage.

As of now, neither the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office nor Mossad has commented on the allegations. Gautam Adani’s office has also declined to respond to queries from Sputnik India.

This story is developing.