In contrast, New Delhi has never used such a language against Pakistan, a rival that has constantly carried out sub-conventional warfare and imposed three wars on India.

Pakistan has reacted strongly to India’s decision to put the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in abeyance in May 2025. More importantly, New Delhi has retained its position, which Pakistan seems not to have expected.

The rulers in Pakistan might have thought that the decision taken by New Delhi would be temporary and meant to cool down the public anger over the Pahalgam terror attack in which 26 innocent civilians were gunned down by Pakistan-backed terrorists in April 2025.

India’s position and its strong defence of putting the treaty in abeyance have given a clear message to Islamabad that the IWT was no longer inviolable. India has not only defended its decision strongly but has also offered a legal basis for its decision. In this way, New Delhi has got on the nerves of the military establishment in Pakistan.

The point is not what the rulers and several commentators say about India’s decision; the real issue is what they can do about it. Not much, to be clear.

It is a well-established international practice that the upper riparian states need to be mindful of the needs of the lower riparian states. And India has been overly conscious and considerate about that. Otherwise, besides signing the treaty and allowing Pakistan to use the majority of the waters of the western three rivers—the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum—New Delhi never thought of using the treaty to react to Pakistan’s three unprovocative wars that it imposed on India.

Pakistan has no locus standi to challenge India’s decision. One point that the rulers in Pakistan and several commentators make to question India’s position is the legality of India’s decision to put the IWT in abeyance. First and foremost, there is no precedent and no legal binding that a treaty or agreement is eternal. If that had been the case, there would not have been amendments or clauses in agreements meant to address issues that pop up from time to time. More importantly, what if the situation and the circumstances change? If a treaty favours one signatory at the cost of the other, would that be fair to the essence of an agreement? Of course not.

Furthermore, Pakistan should be thankful that New Delhi has not taken an irrational and reckless position. Like in Pakistan, the provinces are ready to adopt punitive water policies to deprive each other of water. Punjab is accused of using the waters of the Indus River and depriving Balochistan and Sindh of their share. These two provinces are up against Punjab for the latter’s decision to divert water to irrigate barren land, affecting the lower riparian areas.

To quote Chief Minister of Punjab Maryam Nawaz, “If Punjab wants to construct canals for its water, why are you bothered? It is Punjab’s water. It belongs to the people, farmers and fields of Punjab.” Maryam Nawaz is just the chief minister of a province of Pakistan. Still, she minces no words in underlining the reality that Punjab, since it is the most powerful province of the country, can overlook the concerns and reservations of the weak and lower riparian provinces.

In contrast, New Delhi has never used such a language against Pakistan, a rival that has constantly carried out sub-conventional warfare and imposed three wars on India. In fact, India has been considerate about the implications of such a decision and its generosity towards the common people of Pakistan, despite the hostile policy of the country’s military establishment, is well known. Not only did it not disrupt the flow of the water towards Pakistan, but it also diplomatically raised its concerns about the changing circumstances of the IWT and the need for its renegotiation.

That should be enough to refute the claim of Islamabad that the water was being “weaponised”. Had that been the policy, New Delhi could have done that a long time ago. The point is that the behaviour of the military establishment remains detrimental towards India’s security. And having made all sincere efforts to convince Islamabad to refrain from pursuing such a policy, the only option was to remind Islamabad of its vulnerability.

Notwithstanding the hollow claims of several leaders in Pakistan, war is and will be devastating for the country. The rulers in Pakistan may claim that it has nothing to lose, but India is focused on development and progress. It doesn’t want to be dragged into a war, although it can easily win one by making Pakistan pay a heavy price, but a lot of resources will be consumed by such an action.

For Pakistan, on the other hand, conflict and wars have sustained the military establishment in the country. Since the brief conflict in May 2025, the country’s military has overly dominated the country’s domestic and foreign policy. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has been reduced to an honorary position, standing behind Field Marshal Asim Munir to nod his head to the latter’s decisions. Sad, but reality.

Be that as it may. The reality is that New Delhi has made it clear that Pakistan cannot claim normalcy on one front and remain involved in anti-India subversive activities on the other. If internally Punjab can make a claim over the waters that flow through it to the lower areas of Pakistan, why can New Delhi not explore the option of putting the IWT in abeyance to build pressure on Pakistan to take concrete measures against its sponsored groups that have been active in threatening India’s security?

If the military establishment believes that India cannot do that, then it is living in a fool’s paradise. India has options to force Pakistan to revisit its policy of sponsoring anti-India terrorist groups. New Delhi still prefers diplomatic ways to send a message across the border.

The decision to put the IWT in abeyance is a step towards achieving that goal. And India is fully entitled to abrogate the treaty if Pakistan doesn’t revisit its behaviour or refuses to acknowledge India’s concerns.

If history has anything to teach us, Pakistan is known for making misguided policy decisions. Often, such short-sighted policies have backfired. Whether it’s support to the Islamist radicals like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or the Afghan Taliban, to mention just two. Its support for the TTP has led to military confrontations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. And the situation remains tense, which potentially can deteriorate if better sense does not prevail.

Pakistan is in no position to claim having the upper hand, whether militarily, diplomatically or legally, to challenge India’s decision on the IWT. All it can do is carry out sub-conventional warfare that, in turn, can provide New Delhi with a strong casus belli((a Latin term meaning “cause for war” or “justification for war). Where will that end? Islamabad should know that better. In no way can it inflict harm on India that can be compared to the potential damage that India can unleash on Pakistan.

On the issue of IWT, Pakistan has no case, no clout. It, therefore, is wise and sensible for the country to behave as a responsible state and stop supporting anti-India terrorist groups. That would help it save a lot of money for development. The rulers of Pakistan have the responsibility to act sensibly and in the interests of the people of their country.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The backlash from Kashmiris, combined with international sympathy for India, creates a political environment conducive to a strong Indian response.

On April 22, 2025, a horrific terrorist attack shook the serene Baisaran meadow in Pahalgam, Kashmir, claiming the lives of 26 tourists, predominantly Indian male civilians. The assailants, identified as Islamist extremists, executed their victims at point-blank range after determining their targets based on their inability to recite Islamic verses. This brutal act, attributed initially to The Resistance Front (TRF), a Pakistan-based terrorist group closely linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has escalated tensions between India and Pakistan, prompting expectations of a significant Indian military response.

A recent policy paper by Max Abrahms, a tenured professor of political science at Northeastern University, published by the Pacific Forum in Honolulu on May 2, 2025, provides critical insights into the dynamics of this attack and predicts a robust Indian retaliation.

Abrahms, a leading expert on terrorist group dynamics, begins his analysis by detailing the attack’s immediate aftermath. “Immediately after the mass casualty attack against civilians in Kashmir, the terrorist group known as The Resistance Front (TRF) claimed responsibility on the messaging app Telegram,” he writes. However, TRF later reversed its stance, denying involvement and attributing the initial claim to a “coordinated cyber intrusion” allegedly orchestrated by Indian cyber-intelligence operatives.

This denial, Abrahms argues, aligns with a well-documented pattern among militant groups worldwide. Drawing from his extensive research, he notes, “Many militant groups… have conditioned credit claims on whether the attacks got positive press coverage.” The TRF’s retraction, he suggests, was likely influenced by pressure from Pakistan’s security establishment and widespread protests by Kashmiris condemning the attack.

The TRF, founded in 2019, is described by Abrahms as a “close offshoot—or even just a front—of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),” the notorious group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. An analyst quoted in the paper asserts, “All TRF operations are essentially LeT operations.” This connection underscores the attack’s broader implications for India-Pakistan relations, given LeT’s history of operating with tacit support from elements within Pakistan.

The initial claim and subsequent denial reflect a strategic attempt to mitigate the political fallout from an attack that targeted civilians, a tactic Abrahms has studied extensively. “Statistically, I have found with Justin Conrad that militant groups are significantly more likely to claim organizational responsibility when the targets are military personnel compared [to] civilians like the 26 tourists in Kashmir,” he explains.

Abrahms’ research highlights a global trend where terrorist groups distance themselves from civilian attacks to avoid reputational damage. He cites examples such as the African National Congress’s denial of involvement in 1988 attacks on civilian targets in South Africa, al-Qaeda’s dismissal of civilian casualties in Iraq as “lies concocted by the mainstream media,” and the Taliban’s routine denials of civilian deaths in Afghanistan.

In the case of TRF, Abrahms argues, “The Resistance Front appears to have engaged in a public relations strategy that I have dubbed as ‘Denial of Organizational’ to mitigate the political fallout from the controversial attack.” The group’s attempt to pin blame on Indian operatives mirrors tactics used by other militant organizations to deflect responsibility.

The Pahalgam attack’s civilian toll—26 unarmed tourists—makes a forceful Indian response almost inevitable, according to Abrahms’ analysis. “Civilian attacks depress the likelihood of a credit claim for a simple reason—they tend to backfire both politically and organizationally on the perpetrators,” he writes. His statistical studies reveal that governments are “over four-times as likely to employ lethal violence against a group when it attacks civilians compared to military targets.” This pattern suggests that India, already reeling from the loss of its citizens, will not limit its response to diplomatic measures.

Indeed, India has already taken significant steps in retaliation. Abrahms notes that the government has expelled Pakistani nationals, suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, shut down airspace, and engaged in cross-border firing along the Line of Control. However, he predicts a more substantial military operation, drawing a comparison to the 2019 Pulwama attack, which targeted Indian security personnel.

Following Pulwama, India launched Operation Bandar, a precision airstrike on a terrorist camp in Balakot, Pakistan, just 12 days later. “This time the Indian military response will be even more extensive given the target selection of the Islamist extremists regardless of whether they stand behind their heinous attacks,” Abrahms asserts.

The international community has expressed solidarity with India, with widespread condemnation of the attack amplifying pressure on New Delhi to act decisively. The targeting of civilians, coupled with the attackers’ reported use of religious tests, has drawn parallels to other Islamist extremist operations, further isolating Pakistan diplomatically.

Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, commented on X that the lack of “clarity about the culprit” might temper India’s response. However, Abrahms counters this view, arguing that his research “leaves little doubt that the attack was indeed carried out by the Islamist group that originally claimed organizational credit.”

The Pahalgam attack also reignites concerns about the volatile India-Pakistan relationship, particularly in the context of Kashmir, a long-standing flashpoint. The region has seen intermittent violence, with militant groups exploiting local grievances to justify their actions. TRF’s claim of representing “Kashmir resistance” was undermined by the massive protests across the Valley, which Abrahms attributes to the attack’s indiscriminate nature.

The backlash from Kashmiris, combined with international sympathy for India, creates a political environment conducive to a strong Indian response.

Abrahms’ paper underscores the broader strategic implications of civilian-targeted terrorism. “Compared to attacks against government targets, civilian attacks significantly reduce the odds of government concessions while increasing the odds of the target country employing military force—often, in devastating fashion,” he writes.

This dynamic has been evident in India’s past responses to terrorism, including the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, both of which prompted significant policy shifts and military posturing.

As India weighs its options, the specter of escalation looms large. A military strike, while satisfying domestic calls for justice, risks further destabilizing the region. Pakistan’s response to India’s actions—particularly the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and airspace restrictions—will be critical. Abrahms’ research suggests that India’s response will be calibrated to signal resolve without triggering a full-scale conflict, though the scale of the Pahalgam attack may push New Delhi toward a more aggressive posture.

In conclusion, the Pahalgam attack represents a tragic escalation in the cycle of violence in Kashmir, with far-reaching consequences for India-Pakistan relations. Max Abrahms’ analysis, grounded in rigorous political science research, offers a sobering prediction: India’s response will be forceful, driven by the civilian nature of the attack and the need to deter future atrocities. As the world watches, the coming days will test India’s strategic calculus and the fragile stability of South Asia.

Reports quickly circulated across social media, fueled by open-source intelligence (OSINT) trackers, that the aircraft had flown over the Arabian Sea before landing in Pakistan. Some Indian media outlets went further, alleging that as many as six Turkish C-130Es had landed, suggesting an urgent shipment of arms and ammunition.

The claims, amplified on platforms like X (formerly Twitter), sparked widespread concern among Indian military analysts, academics, and geopolitical observers. The idea that a NATO ally could be reinforcing Pakistan’s military at a time of heightened regional volatility seemed, to many, a troubling sign.

However, Turkish authorities swiftly sought to quash the rumors. In an official statement, Turkey’s Directorate of Communications clarified that the aircraft had stopped only for refueling purposes and had subsequently continued its journey. “Speculative news made outside of the statements of authorized persons and institutions should not be relied upon,” the statement emphasized.

Still, in the current climate, clarifications have done little to dispel suspicions.

A Region on Edge

The controversy comes against the backdrop of a deadly terror attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, which reignited long-standing animosities between India and Pakistan. In the aftermath, Pakistan’s military was reported to be on high alert, wary of potential retaliatory strikes similar to those India launched after the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks.

Open-source visuals posted on social media appear to show Pakistan repositioning military assets within the Kashmir region and activating key air bases at Pensi, Skardu, and Swat. Observers view these moves as preparations for potential escalations.

Adding to the complexity, there are also unconfirmed reports suggesting that China, Pakistan’s other key ally, may be supplying the long-range PL-15 missile to Islamabad — a development that Beijing has yet to address publicly.

A Bond Forged Over Decades

The defense relationship between Pakistan and Turkey is not new; it is deep-rooted and resilient. The two nations have strengthened military ties over decades, often viewing each other as indispensable partners in a turbulent neighborhood.

In 2021, a formal defense agreement between the two countries expanded cooperation into new arenas, including joint arms production. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Turkey directed roughly 10 percent of its total arms exports to Pakistan between 2020 and 2024, underscoring the breadth of this partnership.

Drones Take Center Stage

A major pillar of Pakistan-Turkey defense collaboration lies in drone warfare. Turkey’s rise as a powerhouse in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology — notably the combat-proven Bayraktar TB2 drones — has transformed Pakistan’s military capabilities.

The Bayraktar TB2 first gained international fame during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Azerbaijan leveraged the drones to overwhelming effect against Armenian forces. Pakistan, seeking similar advantages, acquired both the TB2 and the more sophisticated Bayraktar Akinci drones.

By 2023, Islamabad had received its first batch of Akinci UAVs — high-altitude, long-endurance drones equipped with an array of precision munitions. These systems have allowed Pakistan to expand its strike capabilities across domestic and regional theaters, including operations against militants along its borders with Afghanistan.

Combat Aircraft and New Horizons

The Turkey-Pakistan relationship extends beyond drones into the realm of manned aviation. The two countries are collaborating on the KAAN fifth-generation stealth fighter program, with Pakistan expressing strong interest in procuring — and possibly even co-producing — the new jet.

This ambition builds on an earlier collaboration: Turkey’s role in upgrading Pakistan’s fleet of F-16s. Under a 2009 contract, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) modernized 41 Pakistani F-16s, significantly extending their lifespan and boosting avionics and systems capabilities.

Ankara’s support hasn’t been limited to fighters. Discussions are also underway on co-developing new helicopter models, highlighting the broadening scope of the two countries’ military-industrial ties.

Advanced Weaponry and Naval Strength

Beyond the skies, Pakistan’s defense procurement from Turkey spans munitions and naval assets. Islamabad has reportedly acquired Turkish anti-tank guided weapons and cutting-edge cruise missiles like the AI-enabled Kemankeş, designed to pair seamlessly with its new drone fleet.

Naval cooperation has been equally robust. In August 2023, Pakistan took delivery of its fourth and final MILGEM-class corvette, the PNS Tariq, a product of Turkish design and engineering. These sophisticated warships bolster Pakistan’s surface fleet at a time when maritime competition is growing across the Indian Ocean.

Turkey has also played a key role in modernizing Pakistan’s Agosta 90B-class submarines, upgrading critical systems such as sonar, radar, and combat controls. Meanwhile, the PNS Moawin — Pakistan’s largest naval ship — stands as a testament to Turkish-Pakistani industrial collaboration, designed by Turkey’s STM and built locally in Karachi.

A Fragile Moment

Whether or not the Turkish cargo plane was carrying arms — and Turkey’s denial suggests it was not — the incident highlights how quickly rumors can inflame an already volatile situation.

With both India and Pakistan maintaining substantial nuclear arsenals and a long history of conflict, the stakes could not be higher. Any miscalculation or misunderstanding, especially involving external powers like Turkey or China, risks spiraling into a broader confrontation.

For now, the international community watches and waits, hoping that clarifications, not escalations, define the coming days.