The broker gets the headline. Whether the broker shapes the outcome is a different matter entirely.

Every few years, usually after some dramatic diplomatic moment, a version of the same argument resurfaces in Western policy circles: Pakistan, despite being economically fragile and institutionally troubled, keeps showing up at the table. India, despite being the region’s dominant economy and a democracy with global ambitions, somehow doesn’t. The implication is usually that India is doing something wrong, or that Pakistan has figured out a trick India refuses to learn. This reading is understandable. It is also, on closer inspection, considerably overstated.

What Pakistan Actually Does — and What It Costs

Let’s be clear about what Pakistan’s diplomatic record actually consists of. It has, at various points, served as a conduit between parties that could not talk to each other directly. In 1971, it facilitated the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China. Through the 1980s, it managed the American and Saudi pipeline to the Afghan mujahideen. Most recently, in early 2026, it apparently relayed a fifteen-point American peace proposal to Tehran as Washington and Iran traded strikes across the Middle East.

These are real accomplishments. The structural explanation for them is also fairly persuasive: Pakistan is nuclear-armed, so India cannot simply overwhelm it; it is perpetually broke, so it needs patrons and is therefore always in the market for a useful role to play; and it sits at a geographic crossroads that makes it hard for any outside power with regional ambitions to simply ignore. A state that needs patrons to survive is a supplicant. A state that needs patrons for everything except survival has leverage.

But this picture has a shadow side that tends to get glossed over. The same army that makes Pakistan useful as a broker also spent two decades as the Taliban’s primary patron and ran the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, which is perhaps the most consequential act of nuclear irresponsibility since the Cold War. The Saudi-Pakistani defence pact signed in September 2025 — widely celebrated as evidence of Pakistani strategic genius — places Islamabad in the position of simultaneously acting as Sunni military guarantor to Riyadh and back-channel to Tehran, while managing a domestic population that includes forty million Shia Muslims. That is not strategic elegance. That is a set of contradictions held together by willpower and ambiguity, and ambiguity eventually runs out.

As for the 2026 Iran ceasefire — the centrepiece of Pakistan’s current claim to indispensability — what has it actually produced? A communication channel, some announcements, a few deadlines that came and went, and a running commentary on Truth Social that has alternately declared peace imminent and threatened renewed bombardment, sometimes within the same week. Pakistan relayed a message. That is nothing. But it is a long way from a settlement, and attributing structural significance to a back channel whose existence owes something to a crypto deal signed in January 2026 between Pakistan’s army chief and the Trump family’s business venture requires a certain generosity of interpretation.

India’s Forgotten Record

The standard critique of Indian foreign policy — that it is all relationships and no obligations, all presence and no commitment — proceeds as though India’s diplomatic history began sometime around 2014. It didn’t.

During the Korean War, it was India’s V.K. Krishna Menon who broke the armistice deadlock that had stalled negotiations for over a year. The specific problem was prisoner-of-war repatriation — neither side could accept the other’s terms, and the talks had collapsed. India proposed voluntary repatriation overseen by a neutral commission. The formula was adopted in the 1953 Armistice, and India chaired the commission that implemented it. This is precisely the kind of creative, trust-based mediation that gets attributed exclusively to Pakistan in contemporary analysis. It happened, it worked, and it has been largely forgotten.

In Cyprus, from 1964 onward, India contributed meaningfully to the UN peacekeeping force at a moment when Greek and Turkish Cypriot violence was threatening to pull NATO members into direct confrontation. Again, not a passive gesture — load-bearing participation in a genuinely difficult situation.

In South Asia itself, India built SAARC in 1985 as a regional integration framework, and the diagnosis of its failure matters enormously. SAARC did not fail because India lost interest or refused to make commitments. It failed because Pakistan consistently used it as a platform for bilateral grievance rather than regional cooperation — most visibly when the 2016 Islamabad Summit was cancelled after Pakistan-based militants attacked an Indian Army base at Uri. When an institution you helped build gets repeatedly blocked by one of its members, the conclusion to draw is not that you should have built more institutions.

The Gulf: A Different Kind of Presence

The argument that India has no real presence in West Asia because it has no defence pacts or troops stationed in Gulf states reflects a fairly narrow idea of what presence means. Over nine million Indian nationals live and work across the Gulf. Their remittances — exceeding forty billion dollars annually — are not just an economic statistic. They represent a web of human and institutional relationships that generates its own diplomatic weight.

When conflict has broken out in Yemen, Sudan, or Lebanon, India has mounted large-scale evacuation operations for its citizens. These operations do not happen without the quiet cooperation of Gulf governments. That cooperation reflects a relationship of mutual utility — not formalised in a treaty, not legible in alliance databases, but real. India also does not need troops in Riyadh to have influence in Riyadh. It needs Saudi Arabia to care whether India is doing well. Given the depth of economic and human ties, Saudi Arabia does.

More recently, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor — announced at the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi — represents exactly the kind of connectivity architecture that is supposedly absent from Indian foreign policy. It ties Indian ports to Gulf infrastructure to European markets, and it gives multiple partners a concrete stake in Indian diplomatic stability. It is slower than a defence pact. It is also, arguably, more durable.

Strategic Autonomy and its Variables

None of this means India’s foreign policy is without genuine limitations. The doctrine of strategic autonomy — India as friend to all, obligated to none — has real costs that deserve honest acknowledgement. A state that declines binding commitments on most contested questions of international order does not accumulate allies in the deep sense — states that owe their security to Indian support and therefore have a structural interest in Indian success. Strategic autonomy, practised consistently, means India has many friends and few clients. That is a real constraint on the kind of influence that gets exercised in crisis moments.

Whether that is a correctable policy or structural reality is the more interesting question. India’s size and economic trajectory mean that many states want its friendship regardless of whether it takes sides. The United States cultivated a similar posture through much of the early twentieth century — extensive economic engagement, minimal alliance obligations — and the transition from that posture to full great-power engagement was ultimately forced by external events rather than chosen. Whether the current deterioration of the regional security environment, including the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, might function as a similar forcing moment is perhaps the most consequential open question in South Asian foreign policy today.

What the Competition Actually Is

The framing of India versus Pakistan as competing models of diplomatic influence obscures something important: they are not competing for the same thing. Pakistan is optimised for crisis relevance — it is useful when things are going wrong, when parties cannot talk to each other, when someone needs a conduit. That is a real and valuable role. It is also, by definition, dependent on there being a crisis, on the crisis involving parties who both trust Pakistan, and on the political incentives of outside powers aligning in ways that make Islamabad useful rather than inconvenient.

India is building something slower and harder to see — economic interdependence, connectivity infrastructure, institutional presence across multilateral forums, and the accumulated credibility that comes from not being anyone’s instrument. Whether that model generates more durable influence over the next two decades than Pakistan’s brokerage model is a genuinely open question. But it is the right question to ask, and it is not answered by pointing to who was on the phone with Trump and Tehran in the same week. The broker gets the headline. Whether the broker shapes the outcome is a different matter entirely.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The paper, circulated among member states by the EU’s diplomatic service, proposes resuming the bloc’s 1978 cooperation agreement with Syria and initiating a High-Level Political Dialogue with transitional authorities starting May 11. The move signals a departure from years of limited engagement following the country’s prolonged conflict.

The EU also intends to “reframe and adapt” its sanctions regime to retain leverage while engaging Syria’s leadership, focusing restrictions on actors seen as obstructing the political transition. Most Western sanctions were lifted late last year as Damascus sought reintegration into the international system under interim President , who assumed power after the removal of former leader in 2024.

The document outlines plans to expand economic ties through trade and investment frameworks, including mobilising private sector funding and establishing a technical assistance hub to support regulatory and business reforms. The EU also aims to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of refugees, with more than one million Syrians currently residing in Europe, around half of them in Germany.

Brussels is additionally exploring Syria’s integration into regional connectivity initiatives such as the , positioning the country as a potential hub for transport, energy and digital links amid shifting global supply routes.

Syria has gained strategic relevance as an emerging transit corridor following disruptions linked to tensions affecting the . A tanker carrying Iraqi oil recently departed from the Syrian port of Baniyas after overland transport, highlighting evolving logistics patterns.
On security cooperation, the EU is considering support for training Syrian police forces, strengthening institutional capacity within the interior ministry, and coordinating efforts on counterterrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking.

The document also reaffirms EU backing for a political agreement between Damascus and Kurdish-led authorities aimed at integrating northeastern institutions into the state framework and expanding rights for Kurdish populations. Recent steps include the appointment of a senior Kurdish commander to a deputy defence role overseeing eastern territories.

The policy shift reflects a broader recalibration by European governments seeking stability, migration management and economic engagement following more than a decade of conflict and isolation.

This strategic move marks the largest-ever foreign investment in India’s financial sector, reinforcing the country’s position as a global hub for banking and digital finance innovation.

The acquisition—set to be executed through a preferential issue of shares—reflects Emirates NBD’s long-term commitment to India’s fast-evolving financial landscape.

In a joint statement, both banks highlighted that this partnership is not just a commercial transaction but a strategic alliance aligning with the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an emerging framework to boost connectivity, trade, and financial integration across regions.

A Bold Step in Cross-Border Banking

The investment by Emirates NBD is a strong expression of confidence in India’s rapidly growing economy, its robust regulatory framework, and its expanding financial services industry. The deal follows a wave of global interest in India’s banking sector, coming shortly after Japan’s Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation announced its plan to acquire up to 25% of Yes Bank.

“This investment reflects our deep faith in India’s potential as a global growth driver,” Emirates NBD said, adding that the partnership aims to strengthen cross-border banking capabilities and bring innovative financial solutions to millions of customers.

With this move, Emirates NBD will become the “promoter” of RBL Bank, giving it management control and the right to nominate directors to the board. The acquisition also triggers an open offer to retail shareholders under India’s takeover regulations, allowing them to sell an additional 26% stake at ₹280 per share.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)—which permits up to 74% foreign ownership in private sector banks—has reportedly offered informal backing for the transaction, recognizing its potential to bring fresh capital and global expertise into India’s banking ecosystem.

Strengthening RBL Bank’s Future

For RBL Bank, the deal represents a transformative opportunity. The infusion of capital will significantly enhance its Tier-1 capital ratio, fortify its balance sheet, and position it for long-term sustainable growth.

The lender currently serves over 15 million customers across 562 branches in 28 Indian states and union territories, ranking as the 13th largest private sector bank in the country.

Industry experts view this as a turning point for the bank, which has rebounded strongly in recent years. RBL’s stock has surged nearly 90% in 2025, outperforming India’s benchmark Nifty 50 index, which grew by just 8% during the same period.

“Emirates NBD’s entry will not only inject much-needed growth capital but also introduce global best practices in digital banking, compliance, and customer service,” said Anand Dama, head of financial sector research at Emkay Global. “This deal could open the floodgates for more foreign investments into India’s small and mid-sized banks.”

Boosting the India–UAE Economic Corridor

This transaction further deepens the strategic financial partnership between India and the UAE, both key members of the G20. It highlights how Gulf-based financial institutions are expanding their reach into high-growth emerging markets such as India, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

Emirates NBD, which is majority-owned by the Government of Dubai, already operates across 13 countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

With total assets exceeding $297 billion, the bank has been steadily diversifying beyond oil-based economies, investing in technology-driven financial services and sustainable financing.

The bank’s acquisition of Turkey’s DenizBank in 2019 set a precedent for successful cross-border expansion. The RBL Bank deal takes that strategy to the next level—connecting the financial ecosystems of two of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

Analysts believe this partnership could lead to greater innovation in fintech, digital payments, and trade financing, strengthening financial inclusion in India while enhancing Emirates NBD’s regional influence. Both banks are expected to collaborate on developing digital banking products tailored to India’s expanding middle class and tech-savvy population

“The combination of RBL’s local expertise and Emirates NBD’s global experience will create a powerful synergy,” said a senior industry observer. “It represents a convergence of trust, technology, and transformation.”

As the global financial landscape evolves, this partnership embodies a shared vision for sustainable, inclusive, and technology-driven growth. It also reflects the growing confidence international investors have in India’s regulatory maturity and economic resilience.

In essence, Emirates NBD’s $3 billion investment in RBL Bank is not just a financial transaction—it’s a landmark in the evolving India–UAE economic relationship.

It symbolizes a bridge between two thriving regions, united by a vision of prosperity, innovation, and cooperation. As both banks prepare for a new chapter of growth, the deal promises to redefine cross-border banking for a more connected and resilient global economy.

With Cyprus assuming a leadership role in the EU soon, India has secured an empathetic voice in Brussels.

On the sun-drenched Mediterranean island of Cyprus, June 15, 2025, became more than just a summer day—it became a chapter in the shared diplomatic history between India and Europe. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi stepped onto Cypriot soil, he did not just bring the weight of protocol or policy. He brought a message: India remembers its friends, honors its partnerships, and is ready to lead on the world stage, with humility, history, and hope.

This marked the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Cyprus in over two decades, and yet it felt like a reunion long overdue. For Cyprus, the visit was symbolic, a nod of affirmation from one of the world’s fastest-growing powers. For India, it was an expression of gratitude, strategic foresight, and emotional bonding with a nation that has consistently stood by it on critical global matters.

A Corridor of Opportunity : India–Middle East–Europe Connectivity

One of the most significant strategic undertones of the visit was the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), a transformative connectivity project that aims to establish a robust trade and transport route linking India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and now potentially Cyprus.

By positioning itself as a gateway into the European Union, Cyprus is not just offering India geographical access; it’s offering a launchpad for diplomacy, trade, and digital partnerships across the continent. As the European Union Council Presidency rotates to Cyprus in 2026, the timing couldn’t be more perfect. PM Modi’s presence now ensures that New Delhi has a firm handshake with Brussels, delivered via Nicosia.

At the business roundtable in Limassol, the Prime Minister emphasized the strength of India’s economy and invited Cypriot investors to explore the vast opportunities in Indian sectors such as renewable energy, shipping, pharmaceuticals, digital payments, and space technology. “

India is no longer just a big market,” Modi reportedly said. “India is a trusted partner.”

Shared Support, Shared Struggles

Beneath the smiles and state dinners, there were deeper undercurrents of shared history and mutual empathy. Cyprus has long supported India on international platforms, be it on the sensitive issue of Jammu & Kashmir, or in backing India’s legitimate aspirations for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It has also consistently voted in India’s favour regarding Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) inclusion.

PM Modi took time to publicly acknowledge and appreciate this long-standing support, reinforcing the notion that India’s diplomacy is not transactional—it is rooted in trust, tradition, and thankfulness. In a world increasingly driven by short-term alignments, this gesture stood out. It reminded observers that India does not forget those who stand by it during moments of global scrutiny.

A Diaspora Moment: Where India Meets Its Own

Perhaps the most touching segment of the visit was Modi’s interaction with the Indian diaspora in Cyprus. Hundreds of community members—professionals, students, workers, and second-generation Indian Cypriots, turned up in tricolour-themed attire, waving flags and singing patriotic songs. They didn’t just see a leader; they saw a reflection of their own identity validated on the global stage.

Modi’s words were laced with warmth. “Wherever you go, you carry a bit of Bharat with you. And today, I’ve come to carry a bit of you back to Bharat,” he told them.

It was a moment of emotional diplomacy, where national strategy meets the human spirit. The diaspora in Cyprus, though small, now feels more integrated into the larger Indian story, acknowledged and embraced by the highest office of the land.

Strategic Subtext: A Quiet Message to the Region

The timing and symbolism of the Cyprus visit also carried a geopolitical message. Turkey, which has strained ties with Cyprus and has increasingly aligned with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, has been expanding its footprint in the Mediterranean and Islamic world. India’s outreach to Cyprus, a nation at odds with Ankara, is a calibrated balancing act.

Without naming any country, Modi’s presence underscored India’s intent to deepen friendships with democratic, pluralistic societies in sensitive geostrategic locations. It was a reminder to adversaries: India is not limited to its neighborhood; it is a global player with reach, vision, and friends across continents.

A Civilizational Connect

Beyond trade routes and policy dialogues, this visit echoed something older: a civilizational connect. Cyprus, with its ancient Greek roots, and India, the cradle of Indic civilization, have shared traditions of pluralism, tolerance, and intellectual discourse. These are not merely modern diplomatic allies, they are cultural cousins, whose stories have long intersected across history, mythology, and trade.

The two nations also share colonial pasts, movements for independence, and transitions into modern democracies. Modi’s visit, rich in cultural symbolism, reaffirmed this timeless affinity.

Looking Ahead: A Partnership for the Future

As the visit concluded, the outcomes weren’t just recorded in joint statements, they were felt in handshakes, smiles, and the hopeful eyes of young students holding the flags of two nations. Several MoUs were signed in the fields of maritime cooperation, fintech, digital infrastructure, and higher education, laying the foundation for deeper collaboration.

With Cyprus assuming a leadership role in the EU soon, India has secured an empathetic voice in Brussels. With IMEC gathering pace, Cyprus may become India’s launch point into Europe. And with cultural and diaspora ties reenergised, the two peoples are now closer than they’ve been in decades.

In Closing: More Than a Visit

This was not just another entry in a diplomatic diary. It was a statement of intent, that India, while growing into a world power, remembers the value of friendships built on respect and reciprocity. It showed that diplomacy isn’t just about signing agreements, it’s about building narratives of trust that last beyond election cycles.

Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Cyprus will be remembered not just for what it accomplished, but for how it made two nations, on opposite ends of Asia and Europe, feel a little more like neighbors.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.