Foreign interference is unacceptable in Canada. It shouldn’t become acceptable simply because it’s aimed at India.

I don’t pretend to have deep, on-the-ground knowledge of Alberta’s separatist debate. But Canada’s near-universal pushback against foreign interference in that conversation has been heartening, because it reveals a civic reflex Canadians still share, whatever your view on separation, you don’t want outsiders manipulating a domestic question.

Recent reporting has made the concern concrete. A study summarized by Global News warned that foreign actors, including American and Russian ones, are meddling in Alberta’s separatist debate in ways that threaten Canadian sovereignty (Global News, May 2026). Canada’s National Observer reported research showing inauthentic ‘news’ channels and influence campaigns amplifying Alberta secession and annexation narratives (Canada’s National Observer, April 2026). The Guardian reported a major Alberta voter-data breach linked to separatist organizing, exactly the kind of vulnerability experts warn can be exploited (The Guardian, May 2026).

So, Canada’s standard is clear: foreign interference is unacceptable, especially when it rides on disinformation, data exposure, and community targeting. Good. Now apply that same standard to how many Indians, across political views, have experienced the Khalistan file for years.

From India’s perspective, the core complaint is at least a few decades old that Canadian political space, and institutions have enabled an overseas separatist ecosystem to operate openly from Canada, often wrapped in ‘rights’ language, even as India links that ecosystem to extremism, intimidation, and criminality. That is not a characterization I’m inventing; it is an official position India has put on record. In September 2023, India’s Ministry of External Affairs explicitly referred to ‘Khalistani terrorists and extremists’ sheltered in Canada and said, ‘the space given in Canada to a range of illegal activities including murders, human trafficking and organised crime is not new’.

Canadians can disagree with India’s framing. But the asymmetry in Canadian instincts is hard to miss. When Alberta becomes the target, Canadians immediately reach for the language of sovereignty, manipulation, coercion, and democratic integrity. When India raises similar concerns about separatist organizing from Canadian soil, often paired with intimidation politics and crime allegations, Canada’s reflex is too often to repackage it as ‘a disagreement about free speech’.

Canada’s own intelligence reporting has, in fact, moved closer to India’s concern than Canada’s political class admits. The CSIS Public Report states that ongoing involvement in violent extremist activities by Canada-based Khalistani extremists continues to pose a national-security threat to Canada and Canadian interests, and notes that some fundraising can be diverted toward violent activity (CSIS Public Report, 2025). That is not India lobbying Canada. That is Canada describing a domestic threat.

The double standard isn’t only about what is tolerated on Canadian soil. It’s also about what Canadian politicians choose to amplify abroad and that record spans parties.

During the 2020–21 farmers’ protest, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly called the situation ‘concerning’ and signalled support for peaceful protest and dialogue (Hindustan Times, December 2020). Conservative MPs spoke too. In the House of Commons, Arnold Viersen said Sikhs were ‘thinking of and praying for India’s farmers’ protesting new legislation (House of Commons Hansard, November 2020).

Conservative MP Brad Vis tabled petitions from constituents ‘concerned for the safety of farmers’ protesting domestic legislative changes in India (House of Commons Hansard, December 2020). Conservative MP Tim Uppal likewise said India’s farmers ‘deserve to be heard and respected’, a message amplified in media coverage (Scroll, December 2020). Ontario NDP MPP Gurratan Singh was also cited among Canadian politicians voicing concern about the protests, showing the commentary extended beyond Ottawa into provincial politics (Canada’s National Observer, December 2020).

The Amritpal Singh episode in 2023 is even more instructive because it involved public order and violence, not merely protest. Al Jazeera reported that Amritpal and supporters armed with swords, knives and guns raided a police station in February 2023 after an aide was arrested, an event central to the later crackdown and manhunt (Al Jazeera, April 2023). India Today reported Punjab Police describing the Ajnala, Punjab incident as an attack on police and highlighting pressure on authorities during the confrontation. (India Today, February 2023).

Now ask a simple question: if a mobilized group stormed a police station in Canada to force the release of an aide, under threat, with weapons visible, would Canadian authorities treat it as ‘civil liberties’ theatre, or would they enforce criminal law and restore public order?

Canadian political reactions again moved quickly into public positioning. Global News reported that MPs from multiple parties criticized India’s crackdown and internet restrictions, and it specifically noted Conservative voices as well. Conservative deputy leader Tim Uppal and Conservative MP Jasraj Singh Hallan among them (Global News, March 2023). Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly said Canada was following developments ‘very closely’ (The Indian Express, March 2023). Jagmeet Singh called the crackdown ‘draconian’ and urged Canadian intervention (Hindustan Times, March 2023).

Outside government, the World Sikh Organization of Canada issued a formal statement condemning the “security operations” in Punjab and raising fears about extrajudicial harm, illustrating how non-government actors in Canada also shaped the narrative internationally (World Sikh Organization of Canada, March 2023)

India’s response to both episodes followed the same script: formal diplomatic pushback and a clear message that Canada was commenting on internal Indian matters. In 2020, India summoned Canada’s envoy, warned that Trudeau’s remarks could ‘impact ties’, and called the commentary ‘ill-informed’, ‘unwarranted’, and ‘interference’ (Al Jazeera, December 2020) (India Today, December 2020) (Reuters, December 2020).

In 2023, as Canadian politicians and organizations criticized the Punjab crackdown, Indian officials framed the operation as law-enforcement action to ‘nab a fugitive’, signalling that Canada’s commentary was external noise while India pursued policing. (The Indian Express, March 2023.)

Put the pattern together and the hypocrisy becomes harder to ignore. Canada is right to reject foreign interference in Alberta. But Canada’s political class has repeatedly engaged in rhetorical interference in India, on mass protests and on an internal security crackdown triggered by a police-station attack, then bristled when India said, plainly, ‘this is our internal matter’.

That is why the Alberta interference debate matters beyond Alberta. It has forced Canadians to admit, in real time, that democratic debates can be manipulated through proxies, disinformation, intimidation, and exploitation of institutional openness. Canada is suddenly fluent in the language of foreign influence because it can taste it.

The underlying principle is that sovereignty is not selective. If foreign interference is wrong when aimed at Canadian unity, it is equally wrong when Canadian space is used to inflame separatist politics abroad.

Foreign interference is unacceptable in Canada. It shouldn’t become acceptable simply because it’s aimed at India.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

In February, Indian and Pakistani participants met in Doha for a round of Track 2 talks, according to people familiar with the matter, even as formal relations between the two countries remain tense.

The meeting comes against the backdrop of India’s concerns over cross-border terrorism following the Pahalgam attack, which has kept official engagement limited.

Track 2 dialogues between India and Pakistan have continued for decades, at times involving nearly 20 parallel channels. These discussions, conducted away from official scrutiny, involve former officials, academics, journalists and civil society representatives. No formal statements are issued and participants typically do not confirm their involvement, preserving deniability while allowing candid exchanges.

One of the longest-running such initiatives has been the Neemrana Dialogue, which has historically brought together stakeholders from both sides to discuss contentious issues outside formal diplomatic frameworks.

The concept of Track 2 diplomacy was coined in 1981 by American diplomat Joseph Montville to describe unofficial, non-structured interactions aimed at building trust and testing ideas. Unlike formal government negotiations, these engagements provide flexibility and confidentiality.

A related format, Track 1.5, combines serving officials acting in an unofficial capacity with non-government participants. Such mechanisms have gained relevance globally in periods of diplomatic deadlock.

Informal engagements played a role in early contacts leading to the 1993 Oslo Accords, where preliminary discussions between Israeli and Palestinian representatives were held outside formal channels. India has employed similar approaches in multiple geopolitical contexts.

After the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which led to a freeze in official engagement between India and China, Track 2 exchanges helped maintain communication.

Subsequent high-level interactions, including a meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin in 2025, signalled a tentative thaw.

Direct flights resumed in October 2025 after a five-year suspension, and cross-border trade and people-to-people contacts have begun to recover. Chinese leadership is expected to participate in the BRICS summit in India later this year.

During the 2022 outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, India engaged in Track 2 and Track 1.5 discussions involving European, Russian and Ukrainian interlocutors. These interactions focused on humanitarian issues and de-escalation options, complementing New Delhi’s publicly stated policy of strategic autonomy.

A similar pattern was observed in India’s engagement with Canada following tensions over allegations related to the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar.

Informal diplomatic channels preceded high-level meetings between Prime Minister Modi and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the G7 summit in June 2025 and the G20 summit in November.

These interactions contributed to the return of high commissioners and renewed bilateral engagement. Carney’s visit to India in early 2026 advanced discussions on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement aimed at boosting bilateral trade to $50 billion by 2030, alongside cooperation in energy, critical minerals, defence and nuclear sectors.

Officials and analysts view Track 2 diplomacy as a supplementary tool rather than a substitute for formal negotiations.

It allows stakeholders to exchange perspectives, explore policy options and maintain contact in politically sensitive environments where official dialogue may be constrained.

“Indian interference” has since become a reflexive explanation for Nepal’s recurring instability, invoked across party lines.

“India interferes in our politics” has become South Asia’s most reusable political slogan. It works in Ottawa, too, apparently. When governments face domestic anger, legitimacy crises, or inconvenient security failures, blaming the neighborhood giant is an easy shortcut: it turns messy internal problems into a clean external conspiracy.

From Canada to Bangladesh, Nepal to Pakistan, governments and political actors facing domestic crises often invoke Indian meddling as an explanation for internal instability. The narrative is emotionally powerful and politically useful. Yet it is frequently detached from evidence, conflating diplomatic proximity, diaspora politics, and regional asymmetry with covert interference.

India is not a passive actor in its neighborhood, nor is it immune from scrutiny. But the prevailing discourse often obscures more than it reveals. Allegations of interference are often employed as political tools, rather than analytical conclusions.

Canada and the Expansion of “Interference” Narratives

The most serious allegations against India have emerged not from South Asia but from Canada. Following the 2023 killing of Canadian Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau told Parliament that Canadian agencies were pursuing “credible allegations” linking Indian agents to the murder. The episode escalated into diplomatic expulsions and a public rupture between Ottawa and New Delhi.

In 2024, Canada’s intelligence agencies and law enforcement further alleged intimidation and threats against members of the Sikh diaspora. The issue deepened when the US Department of Justice announced charges in a foiled plot to assassinate a US-based Sikh separatist leader, alleging involvement by an “Indian government employee.”

These are not rhetorical claims; they involve legal processes, indictments, and intelligence assessments.

Many allegations crumbled under scrutiny and revealed gaps in evidence and alternative motivations. In the Canadian case, while intelligence from allies like the US supported initial claims, India’s denials and calls for evidence have highlighted inconsistencies in Ottawa’s handling of the investigation.

Reports suggest Trudeau’s accusations were timed to bolster domestic support amid a political crisis, with Sikh diaspora politics playing a key role. A Canadian inquiry into foreign interference noted transnational repression concerns but emphasized that claims against India “likely only scratch the surface,” without conclusive proof of state-directed killings. Such a narrative ignores Canada’s historical leniency toward Sikh separatists, whom India views as terrorists.

For India, the right response is not automatic denial, but careful distinction. When allegations involve criminal investigations or trusted partner governments, they should be addressed through legal and diplomatic processes, not emotional reactions.

However, using such cases to claim that India is systematically interfering in other countries’ politics stretches the evidence and turns isolated incidents into an exaggerated narrative rather than a fact-based assessment.

Bangladesh and the Politics of Scapegoating

In Bangladesh, accusations of Indian interference function differently. They are less about covert action and more about political symbolism.

After the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, Dhaka formally asked India to stop the former prime minister from making “false statements” from Indian territory, accusing New Delhi of enabling political destabilization. India responded that Hasina was speaking in a personal capacity, not as an Indian proxy.

This exchange illustrates a recurring pattern. India’s long-standing partnership with Hasina’s Awami League—particularly on counterterrorism and border security—delivered tangible outcomes, including reduced insurgent violence in India’s northeast.

But that same proximity fostered a perception that India had “chosen sides” in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. Once Hasina was removed, that perception hardened into accusation.

Bangladesh’s internal polarization did not originate in Delhi. It emerged from contested elections, economic stress, and institutional mistrust. Yet anti-India rhetoric quickly became a mobilizing frame, redirecting public anger outward.

Analysts have noted how Bangladeshi media and political actors amplified claims of Indian involvement without substantiation, especially during periods of unrest. The interference narrative thus serves as a domestic function. It externalizes responsibility and simplifies complex political failures.

India’s problem in Bangladesh is less about what it does and more about how its actions are perceived. As the bigger and more powerful neighbor, almost any Indian involvement is viewed with suspicion.

This means India needs careful, disciplined diplomacy rather than stepping back entirely. By backing institutions instead of individual leaders and staying visibly neutral during political transitions, India may not stop all accusations, but it can make them harder to sustain.

Nepal and Pakistan: Interference as Political Memory and Doctrine

Nepal offers a cautionary example of how interference narratives can calcify into national memory. The 2015–16 blockade period, which coincided with Nepal’s constitutional crisis, remains widely interpreted as an Indian attempt to coerce Kathmandu, despite India’s denial of imposing an official blockade. The political impact has outlasted the logistical reality.

“Indian interference” has since become a reflexive explanation for Nepal’s recurring instability, invoked across party lines.

Nepal’s case underscores how perception can outweigh intent. Once hardship becomes associated with external pressure, interference claims gain emotional permanence. Every subsequent crisis is filtered through that precedent, regardless of current Indian behavior.

New Delhi’s room for maneuver shrinks not because of action, but because of accumulated distrust.

In Pakistan, allegations of Indian interference are closer to state doctrine. Islamabad routinely accuses New Delhi of backing separatists in Balochistan and fomenting internal unrest—claims India rejects. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav is frequently cited as proof of Indian covert activity, even as the case also involves disputed confessions and international legal proceedings over consular access.

Here, interference claims serve strategic purposes: internationalizing domestic insurgency, justifying security policies, and reinforcing national narratives of external threat. Whether evidence exists becomes secondary to narrative building, and the accusation itself remains the objective.

Separating Reality from Rhetoric

What links these cases is not Indian behavior alone, but structural asymmetry. India’s size, economy, diaspora, and proximity create an unavoidable influence. The misconception lies in collapsing influence, alignment, and interference into a single category.

Diplomatic support for a government, hosting exiled leaders, or prioritizing security cooperation can all be portrayed as meddling by domestic opponents. Bangladesh’s post-Hasina politics demonstrate how quickly perceived alignment becomes alleged intervention. This does not absolve India of responsibility.

Where allegations are backed by legal processes and allied intelligence—as in North America—India must engage seriously. But where claims function primarily as political theater, responding defensively risks reinforcing the narrative.

Debunking misconceptions does not mean dismissing accountability. It means restoring distinctions between influence and coercion, diplomacy and subversion, perception and proof. India’s most effective response lies not in public rebuttals, but in consistent restraint and seriousness when credible allegations arise.

In a region defined by asymmetry, India cannot eliminate suspicion. The goal is not to win every argument about interference but to prevent the accusation itself from becoming a destabilizing weapon in South Asia’s fragile political landscape.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The decision, announced after high-level talks between the foreign ministers of both nations in New Delhi, marks the beginning of a renewed phase in bilateral relations following a period of tension.

The new agreement focuses on economic collaboration, technological innovation, and shared growth, reflecting the two countries’ mutual commitment to progress and partnership.

The meeting between India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Canada’s Foreign Minister Anita Anand highlighted a spirit of optimism and forward-looking diplomacy. Both leaders agreed to work together in key areas such as trade, critical minerals, clean energy, education, and agricultural value chains.

The joint statement emphasized that this renewed cooperation aims to not only boost economic engagement but also create resilience against global uncertainties.

“Reviving this partnership will not only create opportunities for enhanced economic cooperation but also help mitigate vulnerabilities arising from shifting global alliances,” the statement read, underscoring a mutual understanding of the evolving global order.

This new roadmap represents an important milestone in bilateral relations, aligning both countries’ strategic interests and long-term economic goals.

Anand, in her remarks, praised India’s role as a crucial partner for Canada in the Indo-Pacific region. “Both of our governments agree on the importance of elevating the relationship,” she said, reaffirming Canada’s intent to foster deeper engagement and collaboration.

Her discussions with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Jaishankar were described as warm and constructive, focusing on shared values such as democracy, multiculturalism, and sustainable development.

The renewed dialogue comes after nearly two years of strained relations, following allegations made in 2023 regarding the death of Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada. India firmly denied any involvement in the incident, while expressing concern over the activities of certain extremist elements operating from Canadian soil. The new phase of diplomacy signals that both sides are ready to move beyond past misunderstandings and focus on building a future-oriented relationship grounded in mutual respect and cooperation.

The meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Mark Carney during the G7 Summit in Kananaskis earlier this year played an instrumental role in restoring trust. Both leaders agreed that stronger engagement in areas like technology, education, and trade could bring tangible benefits to citizens of both nations.

Canada, with its strong academic institutions and technological capabilities, and India, with its vast talent pool and growing market, make natural partners in driving innovation and sustainable development.

Trade diversification remains a top priority for both nations, particularly as they navigate new global economic realities. With rising tariffs and shifting supply chains, India and Canada see value in developing alternative trade routes and exploring new sectors for cooperation.

India continues to be Canada’s largest source of international students and temporary foreign workers, strengthening cultural and educational ties that form the foundation of people-to-people relations. Meanwhile, Canada remains a vital market for Indian exports and agricultural imports, especially pulses such as lentils and yellow peas.

The roadmap also includes collaborative efforts in green energy, digital transformation, and climate action. Both countries are committed to advancing clean technologies and renewable energy partnerships that align with global sustainability goals.

Analysts view this as a mutually beneficial partnership, combining Canada’s expertise in sustainable resource management with India’s expanding energy and manufacturing sectors.

Beyond economics, the renewed partnership carries deep symbolic importance. It represents a shared desire to promote peace, cooperation, and inclusivity on the global stage.

The strong presence of the Indian diaspora in Canada, particularly the vibrant Sikh community, continues to serve as a bridge for cultural understanding and economic collaboration between the two nations.

As both governments turn the page on past challenges, the focus now rests on building a future defined by mutual respect, shared prosperity, and sustainable growth.

The India-Canada roadmap symbolizes not just diplomatic reconciliation, but a powerful commitment to global partnership and collective progress.