India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) welcomed the Afghan minister in a post on X, formerly Twitter, stating: “We look forward to engaging discussions with him on bilateral relations and regional issues.”

Muttaqi, who will remain in India until October 16, is expected to meet External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval during his stay, according to diplomatic sources.

UN travel exemption cleared visit

The visit comes after weeks of delay caused by the need for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) exemption from travel restrictions placed on senior Taliban officials. Muttaqi’s name remains on a list of sanctioned individuals subject to a UN travel ban, which requires special permission for international travel.

Last week, MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal confirmed that the UNSC Sanctions Committee had granted permission for Muttaqi to visit India between October 9 and 16.

“All of you would have seen the exemption that has been granted by the UN Security Council Committee for the travel of the Afghan Foreign Minister to New Delhi,” Jaiswal said during a media briefing. “We shall keep you updated in this regard.”

India’s cautious engagement with the Taliban

Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, India has maintained a careful but pragmatic approach to engaging with the regime, stopping short of formal recognition while keeping diplomatic and humanitarian channels open.

“We have been having conversations with the interim government in Afghanistan,” Jaiswal said, noting past communications between the two sides.

“You would have seen the telecon that took place some time back between the External Affairs Minister and Foreign Minister Muttaqi. Also, we’ve had a conversation between the Joint Secretary in charge and his counterparts on the Afghan side.”

Diplomatic observers say New Delhi’s engagement reflects its efforts to safeguard regional security interests, prevent the spread of extremism, and ensure that Afghanistan’s territory is not used against India’s security concerns.

Humanitarian aid and reconstruction expected to top agenda

Humanitarian assistance, connectivity, and ongoing infrastructure projects are expected to feature prominently in the discussions. India has been among Afghanistan’s largest regional donors over the past two decades, funding roads, hospitals, and educational institutions.

“Recently, when the earthquake happened, we were able to transport relief material to Kunar province the same day, and subsequently we sent more relief material via Chabahar,” Jaiswal said, highlighting India’s continued humanitarian engagement despite the absence of formal diplomatic recognition.

New Delhi has also been quietly expanding cooperation on food and medical supplies, including wheat shipments and life-saving drugs. The recent visit of Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Medicine and Food, Hamdullah Zahid, to attend a pharmaceutical exhibition in India underscored growing functional ties between the two countries.

Broader diplomatic context

Muttaqi’s visit follows several months of behind-the-scenes diplomatic contact between India and Taliban officials. Earlier this year, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Afghan minister in January to discuss economic and regional issues.

Analysts view the latest visit as part of a gradual normalization process, in which India seeks to maintain influence in Afghanistan while avoiding premature recognition of the Taliban regime.

“India’s engagement with the Taliban is guided by both humanitarian necessity and strategic caution,” said a South Asia analyst based in Doha. “New Delhi does not want to leave a vacuum for Pakistan or China to fill.”

Regional security, counterterrorism, and the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan are also expected to be key points of discussion. Indian officials have repeatedly expressed concern about the potential for militant groups operating in Afghanistan to destabilize the wider region.

New Delhi is also closely watching Taliban interactions with Pakistan, China, and Iran, all of whom maintain varying degrees of engagement with Kabul.
“India recognizes the geopolitical reality that the Taliban are in control,” said a former Indian diplomat. “However, engagement does not equate to endorsement.”

No formal recognition yet

India has not recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the name used by the Taliban for their government. However, it has reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul in a limited capacity since mid-2022, primarily to oversee humanitarian programs and development assistance.

In past statements, India has emphasized that recognition of the Taliban government will depend on its actions on inclusivity, human rights—especially women’s rights—and counterterrorism commitments.

Despite these reservations, the continuation of dialogue signals a pragmatic shift in India’s foreign policy approach, particularly as the Taliban seeks broader regional legitimacy.

Growing regional diplomacy

Muttaqi’s trip to India is seen as part of Kabul’s broader diplomatic outreach to regional powers. Over the past year, Taliban officials have made visits to China, Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar, seeking investment and political engagement amid Afghanistan’s worsening economic isolation.

The timing of the visit is also notable, coming amid rising regional uncertainty over the security situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces and reports of renewed militant activity linked to the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP).

For India, observers say the talks offer an opportunity to reassert its presence in Afghanistan and ensure its aid and investment efforts align with its long-term strategic interests in Central and South Asia.

A delicate balancing act

Experts caution that while India is expanding its contacts with the Taliban, it remains wary of being seen as legitimizing the group’s rule. “India’s position is clear — humanitarian engagement and talks on regional stability do not amount to recognition,” said a senior policy researcher at an Indian think tank.

Muttaqi’s visit, therefore, represents both a test and an opportunity for New Delhi — testing how far it can engage without crossing the recognition threshold, while offering a platform to advance shared interests such as trade, connectivity, and counterterrorism.

The decision to dispatch Muttaqi to New Delhi is therefore not just about outreach to India — it is also a stinging rebuke to Pakistan.

In a significant turn that could recalibrate South Asian geopolitics, Afghan-Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi will travel to New Delhi on October 9 — his first official visit since the Taliban regained power in 2021. The United Nations Security Council has granted him a temporary waiver from international travel sanctions, allowing the trip to proceed until October 16.

The visit marks more than a symbolic breakthrough. It reflects months of quiet backchannel diplomacy between Indian officials and Taliban leaders in neutral venues such as Dubai, and culminated earlier this year in a direct conversation between India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Muttaqi.

In June this year, India handed over control of the Afghan consulate in Hyderabad to a Taliban appointee, Mohammad Rahman as the consular representative.

That call came soon after the Taliban condemned the Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir — an extraordinary moment, considering the Taliban’s long association with Pakistan’s security establishment.

India has simultaneously expanded its humanitarian footprint in Afghanistan, delivering wheat, medicines, earthquake relief tents, and medical supplies. Since the Taliban’s takeover, New Delhi has sent nearly 50,000 tonnes of wheat, over 330 tonnes of medicines, and substantial food and shelter assistance.

Following the devastating September earthquake, India was among the first responders, dispatching relief material within days. For Kabul, Delhi is emerging as a partner willing to engage pragmatically and without the overbearing demands that have characterized Pakistan’s approach.

The decision to dispatch Muttaqi to New Delhi is therefore not just about outreach to India — it is also a stinging rebuke to Pakistan. For decades, Islamabad claimed the Taliban as its creation and asset. Yet today, that influence has eroded so sharply that the Taliban are actively seeking to diversify away from Pakistan’s orbit.

From Patron to Pariah: Pakistan’s Broken Bond

Pakistan’s role in nurturing the Taliban is well documented. Seminaries like Darul Uloom Haqqaniyah produced many of the movement’s cadres, and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies offered sanctuary, arms, and financing.

For Islamabad, the Taliban were a tool to secure “strategic depth” against India. But influence is not permanent, and Pakistan has squandered it through hubris, duplicity, and coercion.

One turning point was Islamabad’s airstrikes inside Afghan territory. In December 2024, Pakistani aircraft struck Barmal district in Paktika province, reportedly killing civilians under the pretext of targeting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hideouts.

The Taliban reacted furiously, calling the raid a “violation of sovereignty” and warning of consequences. By repeatedly bombing Afghan soil, Pakistan crossed a line from patron to aggressor, undermining whatever goodwill remained.

Another blow came with Islamabad’s decision to expel Afghan refugees. More than 80,000 Afghans were forced to return earlier this year, many with nowhere to go. Kabul viewed this as a callous betrayal. Rather than brotherhood, Pakistan treated refugees as pawns in its strategic game.

For the Taliban, already struggling to manage humanitarian needs, the expulsions were proof that Islamabad valued leverage over solidarity.

The border dispute has deepened the rupture further. The Taliban refuse to recognize the Durand Line — the colonial-era boundary imposed by the British. Pakistan’s efforts to fence and formalize the border have sparked repeated clashes, especially at Torkham, where crossings have been closed and trade disrupted.

For Afghans, resisting the Durand Line is a matter of sovereignty; for Pakistan, enforcing it is a security imperative. The clash is zero-sum, and Pakistan underestimated the symbolic power of the issue.

But perhaps Pakistan’s most corrosive mistake has been its double game. For years, Islamabad “hunted with the hounds and ran with the hare” — selling cooperation to Washington while harboring Taliban leaders, then betraying them when convenient.

The Taliban leadership has not forgotten the arrests and handovers of commanders to the U.S. during the post-9/11 years. Those betrayals bred deep suspicion of Pakistani intentions.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s internal security crisis has spilled across the border. The TTP, inspired by the Taliban’s victory in Kabul, has intensified its insurgency inside Pakistan. Islamabad demanded that Kabul rein in the group, but the Taliban balked at turning their guns on fellow militants.

The result has been open recrimination, with Pakistan accusing the Taliban of harboring terrorists and the Taliban accusing Pakistan of exporting instability.

Underlying all of this is a question of dignity. The Taliban, now rulers of Afghanistan, refuse to be treated as clients or proxies. Pakistan’s patronizing posture — airstrikes, expulsions, fencing, and demands — has alienated a movement that now insists on equal footing.

Kabul’s outreach to India, once unthinkable, has become a declaration of independence.

Why India, and Why Now?

India’s renewed relevance in Afghanistan is not ideological but pragmatic. For Kabul, Delhi offers what Islamabad no longer can: stability, resources, and respect.

First, India has sustained its humanitarian assistance. Wheat, medicines, earthquake relief, and development projects have directly benefited millions of Afghans. This tangible aid bolsters the Taliban’s domestic credibility at a time when international recognition remains elusive.

Second, India provides historic continuity. From constructing Afghanistan’s parliament building to investing in roads, dams, and schools during the 2000s, Delhi has built goodwill across generations. Even after 2021, when most Western embassies evacuated Kabul, India cautiously maintained a presence and continued delivering aid.

Third, India offers alternatives to Pakistan’s chokehold on trade. Through the Chabahar port in Iran, Afghanistan gains a maritime outlet that bypasses Karachi. For a landlocked country, this access is transformative — and strategically liberating.

Fourth, India’s diplomatic approach is carefully calibrated. It has engaged the Taliban without formal recognition, striking a balance between protecting its interests and avoiding premature legitimization. For Kabul, this provides engagement without subordination.

Finally, embracing India signals to other powers — from Russia to the Gulf states — that the Taliban are not beholden to Islamabad. Diversification of partners enhances Kabul’s strategic autonomy.

Pakistan’s Strategic Miscalculation

At its core, Pakistan’s loss of influence over the Taliban stems from one fatal error: mistaking coercion for control. By bombing Afghan soil, expelling refugees, fencing contested borders, and treating Afghans as pawns, Islamabad alienated the very force it once nurtured. Its duplicity — supporting militants while courting Washington — has left it distrusted by all sides.

The Taliban, in turn, have chosen pragmatism. They see in India a partner who delivers aid without interference, offers trade without humiliation, and engages without betrayal.

For New Delhi, the opportunity is clear: to secure its long-term interests in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan its long-cherished “strategic depth,” and to assert itself as a stabilizing force in the region.

As Amir Khan Muttaqi steps into his meetings in New Delhi, the symbolism will be unmistakable. The Taliban — once Pakistan’s prized proxy — are now opening their doors to India, Islamabad’s arch-rival. It is more than a diplomatic engagement. It is the visible consequence of Pakistan’s failed policies, its double game, and its arrogance.

In the great chessboard of South Asia, Afghanistan is moving away from Pakistan’s shadow and toward India’s embrace. For Islamabad, the message is painful but clear: the days of monopolizing Kabul are over.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.