Under the proposal, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would attend EU summits without voting rights, while Kyiv would also receive representation within the European Commission and non-voting seats in the European Parliament during the accession process.

The initiative, first discussed by Merz with European leaders last month, was outlined in a letter addressed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa.
“It is obvious that we will not be able to complete the accession process shortly, given the countless hurdles as well as the political complexities of ratification processes,” Merz wrote.

“What I envisage is a political solution that brings Ukraine substantially closer to the European Union and its core institutions immediately,” he added.
The German proposal would also extend the EU’s mutual assistance clause to Ukraine and provide Kyiv access to selected areas of the bloc’s budget framework, deepening institutional ties as the country continues to battle Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine has accelerated its push for EU membership since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, framing accession as central to its long-term economic recovery, political stability and security architecture.
Kyiv’s membership drive had faced persistent resistance from Hungary under former nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orban, whose government repeatedly delayed progress on accession negotiations.

His replacement by political rival Peter Magyar has raised expectations among EU officials that talks could regain momentum.

Despite that shift, Merz acknowledged that full accession remained politically and procedurally distant because EU enlargement requires unanimous approval among member states and ratification through national processes.

The proposal may encounter reservations both inside the EU and in Kyiv, where officials have expressed concern that interim arrangements could dilute or indefinitely postpone full membership ambitions.
Merz sought to address those concerns directly, insisting the initiative was not intended to replace eventual accession.

“It would not be a membership light,” he wrote, while urging EU leaders to open “all negotiation clusters” with Ukraine immediately.

Ukraine’s pursuit of deeper European integration has intensified as prospects for NATO membership remain uncertain following continued opposition from the United States to Kyiv joining the military alliance in the near term.

The meeting comes amid ongoing strategic and economic engagement between Washington and Beijing, where diplomatic channels remain central to managing bilateral relations.

The White House did not specify whether the talks would address trade, security, or broader geopolitical issues.The ambassador to China, former Republican Senator David Perdue of Georgia, was sworn into the role in May 2025 and represents Washington’s top diplomatic presence in Beijing.

No additional information was provided regarding the timing or outcomes expected from the meeting.

Zelensky has conducted a series of high-level visits to Gulf and regional states, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and Syria, positioning Kyiv as a provider of security expertise in a region where influence has often tilted toward Russia.

Analysts say Ukraine’s battlefield experience, particularly in countering Iranian-designed drones used by Russian forces, has enabled it to offer specialized anti-drone capabilities abroad.

Ukrainian officials said more than 200 experts were deployed to multiple countries in response to escalating drone activity during the regional conflict.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga said Moscow was reacting negatively to Kyiv’s expanding ties in the Gulf, accusing Russia and Iran of spreading disinformation aimed at undermining Ukraine’s role in the region.

The diplomatic push marks a shift from 2022, when Kyiv relied heavily on Western partners for military assistance following Russia’s invasion. The proliferation of drone warfare has since allowed Ukraine to develop niche capabilities that are now in demand internationally.

While details of the security agreements remain undisclosed, analysts say Ukraine may seek financial backing from Gulf states to scale its defense technologies. Some observers suggest Kyiv could leverage these partnerships to secure investment and sustain its military innovation sector.

However, analysts caution that the outreach has yet to produce a strategic breakthrough. Many Middle Eastern states have maintained balanced relations with both Kyiv and Moscow, avoiding sanctions on Russia while positioning themselves as mediators in the conflict.

The durability of Ukraine’s expanded role may also depend on the trajectory of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire and continued demand for its defense capabilities in the region.

Foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said at a regular news briefing that China is willing to work with North Korea to enhance exchanges and advance what she described as “traditional friendly and cooperative relations” between the two neighbors.

The visit comes as Beijing signals continued engagement with Pyongyang amid a complex regional security environment, where diplomatic alignments remain under close scrutiny.

Mao did not provide further details on the itinerary or specific agenda of Wang’s visit, but reiterated China’s commitment to maintaining stable and constructive ties with North Korea.

China has historically been North Korea’s closest ally and largest trading partner, playing a key role in diplomatic efforts on the Korean Peninsula.

The latest visit reflects ongoing efforts by Beijing to sustain high-level dialogue and reinforce its influence in the region.

Zelenskiy said the framework deal, signed ahead of talks with Mohammed bin Salman, establishes a basis for future contracts, joint technological development and investment between the two countries.

“We are ready to share our expertise and systems with Saudi Arabia and to work together to strengthen the protection of lives,” Zelenskiy said on Telegram, adding that Saudi capabilities were also of interest to Ukraine.

The visit comes as Kyiv reassesses its external support network in the fifth year of its war with Russia. A report by the Washington Post said the United States is weighing redirecting weapons supplies intended for Ukraine to the Middle East, where tensions linked to a conflict with Iran are straining American stockpiles.

Zelenskiy’s outreach to Gulf partners signals an effort to diversify defence cooperation and secure alternative funding and technology flows as geopolitical priorities shift.

Earlier this month, Ukraine sent more than 220 military and security experts to several Middle Eastern countries to advise on countering drone attacks targeting critical infrastructure.

According to video released by Zelenskiy’s office, the delegation included air defence specialists and officials from Ukraine’s SBU security service.

The group conducted workshops for Saudi officials, reported to the Saudi General Staff and is preparing to share operational experience in air defence.

Zelenskiy said Ukraine expects financial compensation and access to technology in exchange for providing such assistance.Drones have become a central feature of the battlefield in Ukraine’s war with Russia, prompting Kyiv to accelerate domestic production and innovation to offset Moscow’s manpower advantage.

Zelenskiy told Reuters this week that, with sufficient financing, Ukraine could produce up to 2,000 drone interceptors per day, underscoring the scale of its defence manufacturing ambitions.

The agreement with Saudi Arabia reflects a convergence of interests as Middle Eastern states seek to strengthen air defence capabilities against drone threats, while Ukraine looks to leverage its battlefield experience for strategic and economic gains.

Speaking at his second press conference since the start of the war, Netanyahu said pipelines running west across the Arabian Peninsula to Israel could bypass vulnerabilities in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes.

“Just have oil pipelines, gas pipelines, going west through the Arabian Peninsula, right up to Israel,” Netanyahu said, describing the concept as a long-term structural change that could emerge from the conflict.

Netanyahu said U.S. President Donald Trump had asked Israel to refrain from further attacks on Iranian gas infrastructure following a strike on Iran’s South Pars field, which marked a significant escalation in the war.

“President Trump asked us to hold off on future attacks,” Netanyahu said, adding that Israel had carried out the operation independently.

The comments reflect growing U.S. concern over rising energy prices and the broader economic impact of strikes on critical infrastructure, particularly as Washington pushes allies to help secure maritime routes in the Gulf.

Netanyahu said that after nearly three weeks of fighting, Iran no longer had the ability to enrich uranium or produce missiles, though he did not provide supporting evidence.

The claim was contested by Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who said in a media interview that significant elements of Iran’s nuclear programme remained intact.

The war began after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Feb. 28 following the collapse of negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear programme, and has since expanded to include attacks on energy facilities across the Gulf.

Netanyahu also signaled that Israel’s campaign could broaden beyond air operations, hinting at a possible ground component inside Iran.

He did not elaborate on timing or scope, but said Israel would continue military action to achieve its objectives, as hostilities between the two countries continue to drive volatility in global energy markets and regional security dynamics.

The discussion, which focused on Pakistan’s role as a global hub for jihadist activities, shed light on the historical, geopolitical, and ideological factors enabling this menace and explored strategies to counter its spread.

Pakistan: The Epicenter of Global Terror

Dr. Chaulia opened the episode by framing Pakistan as “Terroristan,” a nation that has become a global menace due to its long-standing habit of nurturing terrorism. Highlighting India’s recent military operation, Operation Sindoor, which destroyed nine terrorist training camps in Pakistan using precision-guided munitions, he emphasized the operation’s dual role as a military strike and a global exposé of Pakistan’s terrorist infrastructure.

“The scale of destruction and the videos of funerals and smashed buildings showed the extent of the problem festering in that country,” Chaulia noted, setting the stage for a deep dive into why Pakistan has become the epicenter of global terror.

Zahack Tanvir, introduced as a peace activist and director of Milli Chronicle, a platform dedicated to monitoring jihadist propaganda, provided a comprehensive historical perspective. He traced Pakistan’s trajectory back to its founding in 1946 by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, noting that the country was established on religious bigotry rather than ethnicity or language.

“Pakistan was called the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, purely based on religious identity,” Tanvir explained. He pointed to key historical moments, including the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which emboldened Islamists globally, and the 1980s Afghan jihad against the Soviets, during which Pakistan became a hub for global mujahideen, supported by the United States and Gulf countries.

Tanvir highlighted how Pakistan redirected these militias toward Kashmir after the Soviet conflict, with groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba wreaking havoc. “Pakistan has a history of nurturing militancy,” he asserted, citing its footprints in major terrorist attacks, including 9/11, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the recent Pulwama and Pahalgam attacks.

He also referenced the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and admissions by Pakistan’s defense minister about funding terrorists on behalf of Western powers.

The Role of ISI and Radical Madrassas

Tanvir identified four key factors sustaining Pakistan’s terrorist ecosystem. First, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has extensive experience training not only Kashmiri insurgents but also Chechen, Bosnian, and Taliban fighters, including the Haqqani network. “ISI sustains this whole ecosystem,” he said, noting Pakistan’s policy of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts” as revenge for the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war.

Second, he pointed to the role of radical madrassas in Pakistan, where impoverished and illiterate youth are recruited and given military training, unlike madrassas in India, which do not engage in such activities.

Tanvir shared an anecdote from his interactions with Pakistanis from Peshawar and Waziristan, describing their extreme illiteracy and vulnerability to exploitation by groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed, backed by the state and ISI.

Third, Pakistan’s strategic location, sharing borders with Afghanistan and the Line of Control, facilitates the smuggling of drugs and weapons into India. Tanvir recounted his 2023 visit to the Suchetgarh border, where India uncovered and sealed tunnels used by Pakistan for smuggling.

Finally, he addressed the role of foreign powers, particularly the United States, which historically financed and armed jihadist groups via Pakistan, and China, which has turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s jihadist activities to counter India.

“China vetoed UN sanctions against Jaish-e-Mohammed’s Masood Azhar until 2019,” Tanvir noted, highlighting China’s strategic support for Pakistan’s military capabilities, including supplying drones and bombs.

Complicity of Regional Powers

The discussion also explored the role of regional powers like Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Malaysia in enabling Pakistan’s jihadist agenda. Tanvir explained that Turkey’s support is driven by its ambition to revive an Ottoman-style caliphate, with initiatives like training Pakistan’s Dolphin police unit and promoting propaganda through dramas like Ertugrul, which was broadcast on Pakistan’s national television in 2020.

Azerbaijan’s support, though less pronounced, stems from Pakistan’s backing during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict against Armenia, influenced by Turkey and Israel.

Dr. Chaulia emphasized the need to “name and shame” these countries for indirectly sponsoring terrorism by supporting Pakistan. He noted that 81% of Pakistan’s military imports over the past five years have come from China, with Turkey supplying offensive weapons, including drones used against India post-Operation Sindoor.

Countering the Jihadist Narrative

A significant portion of the discussion focused on countering the jihadist ideology propagated by Pakistan, which thrives on a victimhood narrative claiming that Muslims are persecuted and must fight to defend Islam.

Tanvir debunked this narrative, contrasting the treatment of minorities in Pakistan and India. “In 1946, Hindus made up 30% of Pakistan’s population; now they have vanished,” he said, noting the dwindling Christian minority as well. In contrast, India’s Muslim population has grown from 9% to 15-18%, with diverse Muslim sects enjoying freedom to practice their faith.

Tanvir, a proud Muslim, emphasized that Indian Muslims are safe and thriving, with the ability to travel freely from Kashmir to Kanyakumari. He contrasted this with Pakistan, where ethnic groups like Pashtuns and Punjabis face restrictions, and celebratory gunfire with AK-47s during events like Eid or cricket matches often leads to civilian casualties.

“Indian Muslims are educated and respected globally as engineers, doctors, and AI experts,” he said, lamenting the lack of such recognition for Pakistani Muslims.

To counter Pakistan’s propaganda, Tanvir advocated amplifying the voices of Indian Muslims who refute claims of persecution. He cited instances where Indian Muslims, including himself, used social media to challenge false narratives propagated by figures like UK-based Islamist Mohammed Hijab, who urged Indian Muslims to support Pakistan.

“Indian Muslims came forward and said, ‘We are safe, and your narrative is not true,’” Tanvir recounted.

A Call for Global Action

Dr. Chaulia concluded the episode by underscoring that Pakistan’s use of religion for geopolitical gain, driven by its military and clerical establishment, is the root of its “Terroristan” status. He praised India’s military response but stressed the need for a broader ideological struggle to win the hearts and minds of young people, particularly moderate Muslims.

“The voices of moderate Muslims from India must show that faith and nationalism can coexist,” he said, rejecting Pakistan’s “fake nationalism” based on hatred and violence.

Tanvir’s appearance on Doordarshan was hailed as a significant moment for raising global awareness about Pakistan’s role in terrorism. “His courageous work with Milli Chronicle, often at personal risk”, was lauded by Dr. Chaulia, who thanked him for his insights and activism.

As the episode wrapped up, Chaulia called for concerted action by like-minded countries and social movements to wage a “long counter-jihad” in the ideological sphere.

“This is not a clash of civilizations but a challenge to show that Muslims and non-Muslims can coexist,” he said, urging a generational transformation to dismantle Pakistan’s jihadist mentality.

The discussion, broadcast on India’s national television, underscored the urgency of addressing Pakistan’s role as a global terror hub and highlighted the pivotal role of informed voices like Zahack Tanvir in shaping a counternarrative to foster peace and coexistence.

To Dean, the implications are not just unrealistic, but dangerous.

In a compelling commentary that has stirred debate across diplomatic and analytical circles, Aimen Dean — former MI6 operative inside Al-Qaeda, author of Nine Lives, and now a respected political analyst and podcaster — has sounded the alarm over what he describes as Israel’s “Buffer Illusion” in southern Syria. His critique goes beyond routine regional analysis and touches upon a broader, deeply rooted issue: the dangerous confluence of fantasy-driven geopolitics and expansionist ambitions.

Dean, whose insider knowledge of Middle Eastern militancy and intelligence lends weight to his views, draws attention to a strategy being quietly nurtured within Israel’s far-right establishment — the idea of carving out a so-called “Druze Corridor” from southern Syria to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The plan, as he outlines, is riddled with strategic absurdities and moral hazards.

A Strategy of Buffers within Buffers

Dean begins with an explanation of the “buffer zone” concept — a long-standing tool of geopolitical defense. In its classical form, a buffer is a neutral or allied territory intended to serve as a cushion against external threats. But Dean argues that Israel’s ultra-right government has taken the idea to impractical extremes, creating a doctrine in which each buffer demands a buffer of its own, resulting in an endless nesting of expansionist outposts.

He describes this approach as “a game of strategic nesting dolls that soon loses all clarity.” The original objective of safeguarding national security becomes overshadowed by an increasingly untenable geographic ambition — one that defies not only logic but the basic realities of the land and its people.

The Druze Dilemma in Southern Syria

Nowhere is this “Buffer Illusion” more visible than in Israel’s covert interest in Suwayda, a Druze-majority province in southern Syria. With a population of roughly 380,000, Suwayda has historically remained on the fringes of Syria’s broader conflicts, maintaining a cautious distance from both government and opposition forces. Some factions within the Druze community — reportedly with Israeli encouragement — are now flirting with the idea of forming an independent Druze state.

To Dean, the implications are not just unrealistic, but dangerous. He warns that such aspirations are not merely about community self-determination but could be a front for creating a pro-Israel entity that ultimately seeks to physically link up with the Golan Heights — forming what he dubs the “Druze Corridor.”

But standing in the way of that ambition is a significant obstacle: the Sunni Arab-majority province of Daraa. Home to more than 1.3 million people, Daraa lies directly between Suwayda and the Golan, making the dream of a contiguous Druze corridor a demographic and geographic impossibility.

“You cannot simply leapfrog over a million people,” Dean writes, “many of whom are fiercely tied to their ancestral lands.” Any attempt to do so, he warns, would require forced displacement or large-scale violence — a move that could cost tens of thousands of Israeli lives and ignite a region-wide conflagration.

A Strategic Blunder in the Making

Dean sharply criticizes the lack of strategic foresight in entertaining such scenarios. He suggests that Israel’s current political leadership — emboldened by ideological rigidity and military confidence — is toying with plans that defy logic and disregard regional sensitivities.

He questions the endgame of such a policy: “Is it truly about security, or is it about reshaping Syria’s south to Israel’s liking under the guise of minority protection?” If so, he warns, the move could backfire disastrously by inflaming sectarian tensions and undermining Israel’s broader diplomatic standing.

Dean offers a hypothetical but thought-provoking counterstrategy for the Syrian government, now reportedly under President Farouq al-Shara’: grant Suwayda its independence, if that is what its people desire. The catch, however, is clear — such an entity would be landlocked, resource-poor, and wholly dependent on Damascus and Amman for basic sustenance and international recognition.

“If independence is what they demand, let them test the waters of sovereignty,” Dean states. “No blood need be shed. Let them go, not out of weakness, but out of strength and confidence.”

He argues that doing so would strip Israel of any pretext for military intervention and would reveal whether the Druze nationalist push is about genuine autonomy or strategic alignment with Israel.

No Corridor, No Fantasy

Dean’s analysis culminates in a stark warning: “There is no corridor. There never was.” Geography and demographics, he insists, are not variables that can be negotiated away. “No strategic imagination, no military maneuver, no political manipulation can erase geography or overwrite demographics.”

His commentary serves as a sobering reminder that policies rooted in wishful thinking — especially in the volatile Middle East — often lead to unintended consequences. In the case of the Druze Corridor fantasy, the cost of pursuing illusion over reality may prove far greater than any perceived security benefit.

As regional dynamics continue to shift, Dean’s words resonate as a cautionary tale against ideological overreach and the perils of ignoring the immutable truths of land and people.

Choosing Jeddah wasn’t random—it’s a strategic signal.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day trip to Saudi Arabia in April 2025 is more than just a diplomatic formality—it’s a pivotal moment in India’s West Asia strategy. What makes it even more significant is that Modi is the first Indian Prime Minister in over 40 years to visit Jeddah, the commercial heart of Saudi Arabia and a key gateway to Islam’s holiest cities. This move is loaded with both symbolic and strategic meaning, reflecting how India is reshaping its foreign policy priorities and deepening its bond with a critical regional partner.

Modi’s earlier visits to Saudi Arabia—in 2016 and 2019—took him to Riyadh, the political capital. But this time, the focus is on Jeddah. This city isn’t just an economic hub; it’s deeply tied to the spiritual journeys of millions of Muslims, including the vast number of Indian pilgrims who pass through its port on their way to Mecca and Medina. The last time an Indian PM visited Jeddah was Indira Gandhi in 1982, so Modi’s presence there ends a 43-year gap and sends a clear message: India is engaging with Saudi Arabia not just diplomatically, but culturally and historically too.

Why Jeddah?

Choosing Jeddah wasn’t random—it’s a strategic signal. Located along the Red Sea, Jeddah is crucial to Saudi Arabia’s trade and plays a key role in the Kingdom’s ambitious Vision 2030 economic diversification plan. By choosing to visit this city, Modi is aligning India’s long-term goals with Saudi Arabia’s, making it clear that India wants to be more than a customer for oil—it wants to be a partner in the Kingdom’s transformation.

Strategic Partnership Council: Moving from Talk to Action

A major highlight of this visit is the third meeting of the India-Saudi Strategic Partnership Council (SPC), co-chaired by Modi and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Since it was launched in 2019, the SPC has helped turn friendly ties into structured cooperation, operating across two main tracks: political-security-cultural and economy-investment.

This isn’t just about reviewing progress—it’s about launching new initiatives. Key areas on the agenda include green hydrogen, supply chains for critical minerals, defence manufacturing, and digital infrastructure. Both India and Saudi Arabia are economic powerhouses in the Global South and are members of the G20. Their partnership is increasingly relevant not just for regional affairs but on the world stage.

Defence Relations: No Longer Just for Show

One of the most striking shifts in India-Saudi relations is happening in the defence sector. What used to be limited to polite visits and symbolic gestures has transformed into meaningful military cooperation.

Take 2024, for example. That’s when the two countries held their first joint land military exercise, Sada Tanseeq, in Rajasthan. That same year, they also conducted a second edition of the naval drill, Al Mohed Al Hindi. Even more notable, in February 2024, India and Saudi Arabia signed their first-ever defence contract—a $225 million deal for artillery shells, involving India’s state-run Munitions India Limited (MIL). This deal included the export of advanced 155mm towed artillery guns.

These developments fit well with the broader vision on both sides. India’s “Make in India” push complements Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, which includes reducing dependency on Western arms suppliers by building up local defence industries. The partnership now extends beyond just equipment—it includes training, exchanges between military colleges, and high-level defence talks. In a region marked by tension and instability, especially around the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, this evolving defence cooperation marks India as a serious and steady strategic partner.

Energy: From Oil to Green Hydrogen

Energy is still the bedrock of India-Saudi ties, but the way both countries are approaching it is changing. While oil trade continues as a major pillar, there’s a big push toward green energy, especially green hydrogen.

During this visit, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on green hydrogen is expected. This makes perfect sense—Saudi Arabia has vast solar energy potential, while India brings technological expertise and policy support for renewables. Together, they can lead the charge in clean energy innovation.

This collaboration isn’t just about national interests. It also helps both nations contribute to global climate action goals and cushions them against the volatility of traditional energy markets, especially with growing geopolitical tensions affecting global supply.

The Indian Community: A Vital Human Link

One of the strongest and most human dimensions of India-Saudi relations is the Indian diaspora. About 2.7 million Indians live and work in Saudi Arabia, making it one of the largest overseas Indian communities anywhere in the world. They’re not just workers—they’re a vital part of Saudi society and contribute significantly to India through remittances.

Modi plans to visit a Jeddah factory that employs Indian workers—a gesture that goes beyond symbolism. It’s a way of recognizing the role of Indians in building Saudi Arabia’s economy and underlining India’s commitment to its citizens abroad.

But there are also tough conversations to be had. Nearly a quarter of all Indian prisoners abroad are in Saudi Arabia. Although some agreements exist for prisoner transfers, very few have actually been repatriated. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri confirmed this issue would be “high on the agenda.” Making progress here could boost Modi’s domestic image and showcase a foreign policy that values human dignity alongside strategic interests.

A Region in Flux

Modi’s visit is happening against a backdrop of regional unrest. The Israel-Palestine conflict remains unresolved and increasingly volatile. Meanwhile, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are putting global shipping routes at risk. These developments concern both India and Saudi Arabia—not only as regional stakeholders but as key players in global trade and energy supply chains.

Both Modi and MBS have built relationships with powerful global figures—U.S. President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky among them. This ability to maintain ties across a polarized international arena gives their partnership a unique edge, especially as the Global South looks for new leadership on issues like climate finance, economic justice, and peacebuilding.

The Bigger Gulf Picture: Revisiting the FTA

Another topic expected to come up is the long-discussed India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Free Trade Agreement. The GCC—comprising Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—is a vital trade and energy region for India. An FTA would mean lower tariffs, better access to markets, and smoother labour mobility.

Negotiating such a deal is crucial as global trade dynamics shift post-pandemic and amid ongoing global tensions. For India, it’s about diversifying economic relationships and securing its trade routes—especially through a region where millions of Indians live and work.

More Than Optics

In essence, PM Modi’s 2025 Saudi Arabia visit isn’t just another stop on the diplomatic calendar. It’s a strategic recalibration that touches nearly every major aspect of India’s global ambitions—security, energy, trade, and people-to-people ties.

It signals that India and Saudi Arabia are stepping into a more mature, multifaceted relationship. What once revolved around oil and labor is now about mutual growth, resilience, and global impact. As the world becomes more unpredictable, partnerships like this—rooted in shared goals and diversified interests—could help shape a more stable and balanced international order.

S M Faiyaz Hossain

Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ policy acts like a globalized version of the old Monroe Doctrine, called ‘Monroe Doctrine 2.0.

In 1823, President James Monroe introduced the Monroe Doctrine, a crucial U.S. policy to stop European nations from taking over or interfering with countries in the Americas. Monroe stated that new European colonies were not allowed in the Western Hemisphere and that any attempt by European powers to control or harm independent nations in this area would be a threat to the U.S. The United States promised not to get involved in European issues or their existing colonies but wanted to protect newly independent Latin American countries. At that time, Spain wanted to reclaim its old colonies, and Russia aimed to expand along North America’s Pacific coast. The U.S. couldn’t enforce the policy alone due to a weak military, but Britain supported the doctrine because it aligned with their trade interests in Latin America. Over time, the Monroe Doctrine evolved, with President Theodore Roosevelt adding the Roosevelt Corollary, which allowed U.S. intervention in Latin America to keep Europeans out. By the mid-20th century, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the focus shifted to cooperation and non-interference with the Good Neighbour Policy. The Monroe Doctrine remains a vital part of U.S. foreign policy and symbolizes America’s role in the Western Hemisphere.

President Donald Trump didn’t talk about the Monroe Doctrine during his 2016 campaign, but it became key to his “America First” foreign policy as president. In 2018, he brought up the doctrine in a United Nations speech, saying it was important to keep outside interference out of the Western Hemisphere. By his 2024 campaign, the Monroe Doctrine had become very important, especially to push back against China’s influence in Latin America. Many historians and experts believed that if Trump were elected again, he would focus more on the Monroe Doctrine. This would mean trying to have more control in the Western Hemisphere while reducing involvement in Europe and Asia. Hal Brands, a historian, thought Trump would give the doctrine more energy during a second term, matching his “America First” approach. James Jay Carafano from the Heritage Foundation also suggested reinvigorating the doctrine to counter foreign influence, particularly from China. Experts at Foreign Affairs and Carnegie Endowment pointed out that Trump’s policies reflected a modern take on the doctrine, trying to expand U.S. influence beyond the Western Hemisphere.

Trump’s trade policies aimed to reduce the influence of other countries and strengthen U.S. control in nearby regions. One key move was imposing 25% tariffs on goods from Mexico. He argued these tariffs would help decrease migration and stop fentanyl trafficking, but they also served to pressure Mexico to follow U.S. interests, reflecting an idea similar to the Monroe Doctrine, which emphasizes U.S. influence in the Americas. In his trade conflict with China, Trump focused on reducing China’s growing economic power in Latin America. His goal was to curb China’s influence and shift supply chains back to the Americas. To achieve this, he implemented reciprocal tariffs, including a basic 10% tariff on most Latin American countries, with higher rates for Guyana and Nicaragua. This approach was about claiming economic control in the region and showed Trump’s willingness to prioritize U.S. interests over existing free trade agreements like CAFTA-DR. Trump also used tariffs to push countries toward aligning with U.S. priorities in areas like security cooperation and trade agreements. For instance, Paraguay’s purchase of U.S. radars and Ecuador’s consideration of hosting a U.S. military base highlight how his economic measures were tied to broader geopolitical goals.

The Monroe Doctrine originally aimed to keep European powers out of the Americas, but Trump wanted it to apply worldwide. He believed some large organizations and allies were trying to weaken the U.S. or take advantage of its resources without giving enough return. Trump was sceptical of NATO and the EU because he thought Europe relied too much on American security and didn’t spend enough on their own defence. His administration wanted European countries to handle their security more, so the U.S. could reduce its role and investment in NATO. This was a significant change from the usual U.S.-Europe partnership. Trump’s interest in Greenland shows his use of the Monroe Doctrine approach. He wanted to buy Greenland to increase U.S. influence in the Arctic, where there are lots of valuable resources. This move was also meant to challenge China and Russia’s presence in the region. Although Denmark rejected the idea, Trump’s focus on Greenland aligns with the Monroe Doctrine by trying to control key areas and preventing other countries from gaining power there. In addition, his tariff actions against Europe and his efforts to strengthen the U.S. dollar show his desire to change the global economy to favour the United States.

Trump’s actions against the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) demonstrate how he applies his “America First” ideas. He targeted USAID because some argued it supported projects that hurt U.S. interests or advanced foreign agendas conflicting with his policy. By freezing foreign aid and stopping USAID activities in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Ukraine, Trump aimed to align U.S. foreign assistance with domestic priorities. This decision also fits with Trump’s reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which he used to address perceived threats from non-state actors or certain ideologies. Critics claimed USAID funding supported initiatives associated with regime changes or left-wing agendas abroad, which Trump viewed as harmful to U.S. sovereignty and regional stability.

Donald Trump’s “America First” policy acts like a globalized version of the old Monroe Doctrine, called “Monroe Doctrine 2.0.” He used this idea to show U.S. power around the world. Trump challenged Global institutions like NATO, the EU. He decided to bypass these institutions and put tariffs on both allies and competitors of the U.S. His interest in buying Greenland showed a Monroe-like plan to control important areas to compete with China and Russia. Trump’s aim to shift supply chains more toward the Americas followed the doctrine’s focus on this region. Years, decades later another U.S President may emulate President Donald Trump’s Policies and commentators may name it America First 2.0, or Monroe Doctrine 3.0. 

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.