Until Pakistan matches words with actions, its participation in regional counterterror frameworks will remain a facade.

When Pakistan assumed the chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s permanent anti-terror body, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), last month, the optics were striking: a state sponsor of terrorism now overseeing a regional network tasked with combating it.

The irony is hard to ignore. For Islamabad’s international posture and domestic rhetoric to carry credibility, its territory must no longer serve as a safe haven for groups trained and funded to strike Indian soil. Yet, the evidence suggests this condition remains far from met.

Pakistan’s enduring militant ecosystem aligns closely with the country’s long-standing military doctrine of “bleeding India with a thousand cuts”—a strategy that leverages proxies and covert militants to impose costs on India while avoiding direct conventional conflict. Under this logic, groups like Jaishe-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) serve not merely ideological but strategic purposes. 

If Pakistan is serious about counterterrorism, the persistence of this doctrine is inexplicable. The question remains: why does Islamabad continue to nurture a system that directly contradicts its international obligations and its stated commitment to counterterrorism?

Persistent Militant Ecosystems and Digital Adaptations

Notwithstanding India’s precision strikes on select Pakistani terrorist camps in May 2025, Pakistan’s militant ecosystems remain largely intact. Take the case of Masood Azhar-led JeM, which continues to plan operations, maintain training facilities, and innovate its fundraising mechanisms. Recent investigative reporting reveals that JeM has shifted toward digital-wallet fundraising and is attempting to rebuild as many as 313 terror hubs across Pakistan.

Despite severe losses during Operation Sindoor—which killed more than a dozen members of Azhar’s family and destroyed JeM’s headquarters in Bahawalpur—he remains defiant in his terrorist drive against India.

In a recent speech at a JeM site in Bahawalpur, Azhar announced plans to establish a women’s jihad course, Jamat-ul-Mominat. The 15-day training program reportedly aims to establish female combat units within JeM. If implemented, this can be a critical operational development for JeM, reminiscent of the Islamic State and Boko Haram, both of which have deployed women as suicide bombers and assault operatives.

Further worrying is the public conduct of the sons and successors of designated terror figures. The son of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) chief Hafiz Saeed, for example, has openly defied extradition calls, using public rallies to proclaim that Pakistan will continue to shield his father while praising military operations and urging “jihad.” 

An anti-regime Pakistani journalist recently reported that Talha Saeed has assumed leadership of an LeT-linked mosque in Lahore—signaling a generational shift in the group’s command and control. These are not isolated cases but part of a broader ecosystem in which religious, militant, and political networks overlap with visible impunity. Their continued prominence underscores the depth of Pakistan’s structural complicity and the normalization of militant influence in public life.

The Digital Evolution of Terror Financing

Pakistan’s counterterrorism narrative further collapses under the scrutiny of its financial oversight. While Islamabad touts its cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), militant funding has evolved faster than its regulatory mechanisms. Groups such as JeM have reportedly shifted from traditional banking channels to fintech platforms, mobile wallets, and decentralized e-payment systems within Pakistan to sustain operations.

This digital adaptation is not evidence of militant defeat but proof of resilience. Despite a recent implicit warning from FATF President Elisa de Anda Madrazo that Pakistan’s removal from the Grey List in 2022 was not “bullet-proof” and Pakistan’s own finance minister’s admission of rampant unregulated digital transactions, terrorist financing remains largely unchecked. The shift into digital ecosystems allows militant organizations to operate under the radar, with minimal state interference or consequences.

Paradoxical Cover from the United States

Pakistan’s growing diplomatic and economic proximity to the United States may paradoxically weaken Washington’s leverage over Islamabad’s behavior. Historically, U.S. pressure has occasionally forced Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment to rein in militant proxies. But today, the strategic calculus appears to have shifted. 

As Pakistan portrays itself as a “regional counterterror partner” and a reliable economic hub, Washington remains inclined to prioritize a transactional relationship over accountability. These dynamic risks emboldening Pakistan’s military leadership, led by Field Marshal Asim Munir, to maintain its use of jihadist groups as tools of statecraft. Islamabad’s confidence that its strategic importance shields it from meaningful repercussions only deepens the challenge.

The policy risk for India and its partners is that Pakistan will use its SCO-RATS role to deflect scrutiny while continuing asymmetric operations. If training camps are allowed to be rebuilt, if digital funding networks flourish, and if terrorist rallies continue with active state approval, then Pakistan’s leadership in counterterror structures becomes an exercise in hollow symbolism rather than substantive change.

Pakistan’s claim to regional leadership in counterterrorism rests on fragile ground so long as its own territory hosts—and in many cases, protects—the very networks it purports to combat. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship, increasingly transactional and detached from shared security priorities, risks reinforcing Islamabad’s belief that it can pursue dual policies: cooperation abroad and complicity at home. 

Until Pakistan matches words with actions, its participation in regional counterterror frameworks will remain a facade. The question for the international community is not whether Pakistan can change, but whether it wants to.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

For Saudi authorities, the rise of Pakistan-linked drug trafficking poses a complex challenge.

In a pattern troubling regional authorities, Pakistani nationals now make up the majority of foreign prisoners in Saudi Arabia, many held on serious narcotics charges. From bustling drug markets in Karachi to methamphetamine (“shabu”) busts in the Gulf, experts and officials are increasingly alarmed by the intertwining of narcotics trafficking, shadow economies, and extremist financing networks rooted in Pakistan.

According to Pakistani government figures, 10,279 Pakistani nationals are imprisoned in Saudi Arabia as of early 2025 — nearly half of all Pakistanis jailed abroad. While Riyadh does not publicly release detailed breakdowns, independent reports indicate that a substantial share of these prisoners are convicted on drug trafficking and smuggling charges.

Saudi media has frequently reported high-profile busts involving Pakistanis. In May 2024, two Pakistani nationals were arrested in Medina for selling crystal methamphetamine and heroin.

A year later, Saudi authorities intercepted a 147-kilogram meth shipment at Jeddah’s port, allegedly linked to three Pakistani nationals. Analysts note that among “hundreds of drug busts” in recent months, the majority of those apprehended have been Pakistanis.

A Growing Methamphetamine Hub

While Afghanistan’s opium fields have historically dominated global narcotics conversations, Pakistan is increasingly seen as a key player in the methamphetamine trade.

In April 2025, Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force seized 200 kilograms of crystal meth hidden in spice packets aboard a Karachi-bound container destined for Dubai. Earlier this year, Philippine customs authorities seized 404 kilograms of meth smuggled from Karachi and concealed as “noodles and custard”.

The pattern suggests that Pakistan has become both a transit hub and an emerging production center. Large seizures of meth precursors like ephedrine at Karachi port — including 540 pounds in 2011 and 1,750 pounds in 2012 — hint at the scale of underground meth synthesis operations.

Regional routes run from Pakistan through Gulf ports like Dubai’s Jebel Ali and onward into Europe and Southeast Asia. Law enforcement across Oman, UAE, and Saudi Arabia increasingly report Pakistani nationals as key suspects in meth smuggling cases.

“Pakistan’s strategic location has long facilitated drug trafficking,” notes a regional narcotics expert. “But meth’s rise has brought new criminal dynamics far beyond traditional opium routes.”

Allegations of State Collusion

Compounding the crisis are persistent allegations that Pakistan’s powerful military-intelligence complex, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, has historically been intertwined with the narcotics trade.

In his 2022 NATO-sponsored study Narco-Insecurity, Inc., researcher David Winston asserts that Pakistan’s ISI “launched several covert operations” with jihadist groups reliant on narcotics trafficking. According to Winston, this covert alliance “extended drug routes” through Pakistan into the Gulf, Europe, and the Balkans.

Winston specifically identifies the Haqqani Network, operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as a key ISI proxy that relied heavily on drug revenues to sustain operations. “Pakistan invested in their bases and facilitated narcotics flows that funded terrorism,” he writes.

Retired Indian Army General Jagatbir Singh similarly describes Pakistan as a “narco-nuclear” state, where “the deep state enriched itself with drug money while ordinary citizens battled poverty” (Singh, 2022). Singh argues that narcotics revenues were critical to financing Pakistan’s strategic ambitions, including its nuclear program.

Nonetheless, analysts note that patterns of collusion — historic or current — remain difficult to disprove due to the clandestine nature of intelligence operations. “The absence of smoking-gun evidence does not eliminate the reality of structural enablers,” says one European intelligence official, speaking anonymously due to diplomatic sensitivities.

A Shadow Economy Fueled by Narcotics

Beyond state complicity, economic pressures also help drive Pakistan’s entanglement with drug trafficking. UNODC-2024 Report suggests that a significant portion of Pakistan’s informal economy — estimated at over 36% of GDP — may be fueled by illicit trades including narcotics.

Meth production offers high profit margins with relatively low initial investment compared to traditional opiates. Winston’s research warns that as synthetic drugs like meth proliferate, criminal networks will “deepen their global reach,” posing new security threats far beyond Pakistan’s borders.

Meanwhile, disturbing social trends have emerged among incarcerated Pakistanis in the Gulf.

Prominent counter-extremism expert, Zahack Tanvir who spent more than 12 years in Saudi Arabia, noted that some arrested Pakistani traffickers in the Kingdom offered religious justifications for their crimes. Zahack wrote, “Shockingly, some of them justify their actions by arguing that Islam only forbids alcohol, not narcotics”.

Other Pakistanis allegedly argued that selling drugs to Arabs, particularly Saudis, was permissible — an attitude described by Zahack as one combining economic desperation with deep-rooted animosity. “Some even claim it’s permissible to sell drugs to Arabs, while exuding extreme disgust towards Saudis.”

Saudi Arabia’s Dilemma

In Saudi Arabia, authorities face the brunt of these operations. Methamphetamine — known locally as “shabu” — has proliferated despite the kingdom’s notoriously harsh anti-narcotics laws, including mandatory death sentences for drug smuggling.

For Saudi authorities, the rise of Pakistan-linked drug trafficking poses a complex challenge. Riyadh maintains some of the world’s strictest drug laws — including the death penalty for smuggling — yet diplomatic relations with Pakistan complicate enforcement efforts.

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has occasionally lobbied for clemency in death penalty cases, such as the February 2025 release of a Pakistani family previously sentenced for drug charges. However, Saudi authorities insist that “zero tolerance” policies will remain in place, amid surging meth demand and growing public concern.

As regional trafficking routes shift and Gulf states grapple with the influx of narcotics, policymakers across the Middle East increasingly view Pakistan’s internal struggles with organized crime as a shared security threat — one that cannot be contained by national borders alone.