Calling it a “vile provocation under the guise of humor,” Erdogan took to social media platform X (formerly Twitter) on Tuesday, asserting that individuals who act “insolently” towards the prophets would be held accountable under Turkish law.

“We will follow up on this,” Erdogan wrote, emphasizing that the Turkish judiciary and security forces had “immediately taken action regarding this hate crime.”

The cartoon, which appeared in the June 26 edition of Leman, was widely condemned by religious and political figures in Turkey. It featured a visual depiction—prohibited in Islam—of the two revered prophets standing over a bombed-out city, shaking hands. The image sparked public outrage, with critics accusing the magazine of deliberate blasphemy and exploiting geopolitical tensions for sensationalism.

Legal Measures and Public Reaction

Erdogan confirmed that the magazine issue had been confiscated, and legal procedures had been launched. He condemned the magazine’s editorial team as “immoral individuals, devoid of this nation’s values and of decency.”

“As long as we are in power,” Erdogan stated during a meeting with provincial leaders of his ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, “we will not tolerate anyone insulting our sacred values.”

He further urged young people not to let their anger cloud their reason, calling for restraint despite the offense. His statement aimed to temper rising tensions while affirming the government’s commitment to protecting Islamic values.

Protests Outside Leman Office

Following the cartoon’s circulation online, videos surfaced on social media showing angry crowds protesting outside Leman’s headquarters in Istanbul. Some demonstrators were seen attempting to storm the building, shouting religious slogans and demanding accountability.

While police prevented major clashes, the atmosphere remained tense. Religious leaders and public figures called on media outlets to act responsibly and avoid stoking sectarian or religious sensitivities under the pretext of free speech.

The Sacred Boundaries of Representation

In Islam, any visual depiction of the prophets is strictly forbidden. This includes not only the Prophet Muhammad, but also earlier prophets such as Moses and Jesus, all of whom are deeply revered in Islamic tradition. The prohibition aims to avoid idolatry and preserve the sanctity of the prophetic image.

The cartoon not only violated this tenet but did so in a context laced with political and religious sensitivities, triggering widespread condemnation across Turkish society.

Erdogan’s swift and decisive response underscores his long-standing position as a defender of Islamic values on the global stage. He has previously criticized Western publications—such as the French magazine Charlie Hebdo—for similar depictions, framing them as part of a broader pattern of Islamophobia in the West.

However, this time the offense came from within Turkey’s own borders, igniting debate over the limits of satire, freedom of expression, and respect for religious beliefs in a polarized society.

A Broader Context of Tension

The cartoon’s reference to the Israel-Iran conflict further inflamed opinion. Analysts argue that intertwining sacred religious imagery with geopolitical turmoil crosses an ethical line, particularly in a region where faith, identity, and politics are deeply interwoven.

While Turkey maintains complex relationships with both Iran and Israel, Erdogan’s government has often positioned itself as a moral voice in the Muslim world, particularly on issues concerning Palestinian rights, regional stability, and religious respect.

This latest controversy plays directly into that narrative, allowing Erdogan to reinforce his government’s image as both politically sovereign and spiritually committed.

Turkey’s propaganda media front, TRT World, has spearheaded anti-India narratives, peddling full-blown pro-Pakistani propaganda

Pakistan PM Shahbaz Sharif is meeting Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan TWICE in ONE month, post the Pahalgam terror attack and after #OperationSindoor.

This not only reveals the true nature of their alliance but also EXPOSES their transnational alliance against India!

What we’re seeing today is a reflection of years of planning and collaboration. From 2018’s coordinated social media campaigns to 2022’s RToK in Sarajevo, every major anti-India narrative has been amplified simultaneously from Islamabad and Istanbul!

The Erdoğan network isn’t just diplomatic — it’s operational. Through a web of NGOs spanning continents, the Erdoğan family has built an influence ecosystem that abets everything — from Hamas to Pakistan-sponsored anti-India campaigns, including terror attacks.

Two weeks ahead of the Pahalgam terror attack, a sequence of events transpired between Pakistan and Turkey:

a. A think tank linked to Turkey’s Erdoğan family hosted a propaganda event on Kashmir.
b. TRT World interviewed a white-collared terrorist, Muzzammil Thakur, for propaganda on Kashmir.

On 9th April, Pakistani think tank CISSAJK released a report whitewashing the Pulwama terror attack and blaming India’s ruling party for “pushing South Asia to the nuclear brink.”

On 6th April, Muzzammil Thakur was also the “chief guest” at TUGVA — an organization closely linked to the Erdoğan family. Bilal Erdoğan (Erdoğan’s son) sits on the advisory board of TUGVA. TUGVA pursues the political ambitions of Erdoğan’s AK Party via its programs.

Note: TUGVA is also known for corruption allegations, promoting extremist Islamist ideology through jihadist camps, and working with Insani Haq-o-Hurriyat (IHH), which supports Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

On one hand, TUGVA hosted Muzzammil Thakur; on the other hand, he was interviewed by Turkey’s state-affiliated media and propaganda arm, TRT World. Muzzammil also shared the stage with Hamas supporter Azzam Tamimi at Ummatics Istanbul — a network founded by a Pakistani-American.

This is not the first time Turkey has abetted this anti-India figure. In 2016, TRT was the first portal to interview Muzzammil and project him as the face of resistance in Kashmir globally. It was the first time Muzzammil Thakur began receiving an international platform.

This is not a one-off or isolated instance where Turkey has abetted the Pakistani agenda globally. In fact, it has even worked hand-in-hand with Pakistan against certain countries, including India. To put things in perspective, both Turkey and Pakistan are strategic partners.

Turkey not only provides military support to Pakistan, but their alliance is marked by various aspects, including:
a. Defence deals
b. Info-war coordination
c. Military exercises
d. Technology deals

Turkey’s propaganda media front, TRT World, has spearheaded anti-India narratives, peddling full-blown pro-Pakistani propaganda — including Pakistani fake news and giving space to Pakistani faces — weaving the narrative of an alliance between India and Israel as colonial settlers.

According to a 2021 report, TRT World employed at least 50 Pakistanis out of 300-odd staff, collectively comprising correspondents, producers, and editors based in Istanbul. TRT World and Anadolu Agency are tasked with carrying propaganda favourable to the Turkey-Pakistan alliance.

Turkey under Erdoğan positions itself as a Muslim world leader, using Islamic identity to counter Western influence, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Pakistan has often aligned with Turkey’s narratives, including on Islamophobia, to resonate with global Muslim populations.

Targeting Muslim Brotherhood–targeted Countries:

Turkey and Pakistan jointly targeted countries that have also been targeted by the global radical Muslim Brotherhood — namely France, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and India.

In May 2020, #BoycottUAE trended in Pakistan after Turkish social media users promoted the hashtag. Turks were angered by the UAE’s support for Haftar’s forces in Libya (which opposed the Turkey-backed GNA) and the UAE’s ties with India.

In October 2020, Turkey and Pakistan united to push #BoycottFrenchProducts over France’s defence of free speech. Erdoğan urged Turks to shun French goods, while Pakistan’s parliament passed a resolution in 2020 backing Turkey’s call to boycott French products.

Similarly, this group also executed a slander campaign against Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). A number of pictures of the Saudi Prince with the Indian PM were recycled to suggest he was not standing up for the cause of Muslims.

As noted, Turkey supports Pakistan in several ways: endorsing its stance on Kashmir, pushing anti-India narratives like “Islamophobia,” and using diplomatic channels and state tools — including TRT World and social media — to fuel global boycott campaigns against India.

This alliance gained more visibility after the Indian government abrogated Article 370 in J&K. Turkey and Pakistan intensified coordinated disinformation campaigns on Kashmir, weaponizing tropes like ‘Islamophobia’ to malign India’s image and hinder India’s economic interests.

On August 5, 2019, after India revoked Articles 370 and 35A, while Pakistani media pushed aggressive propaganda, Turkish outlets like TRT World and Anadolu Agency were among the first international platforms to echo Pakistan’s Kashmir narrative against India.

TRT World published over 30 long stories related to Jammu and Kashmir, and interestingly, 14 of them were also recommended by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry. A word cloud and timeline of TRT World’s coverage on Kashmir is shown below.

Turkey’s state-funded Anadolu Agency amplified fake news claiming India issued 3.4 million bogus domiciles in Kashmir to alter its demography post-Article 370. The false report was widely shared by Pakistani media — later proven fake.

The first BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) call against India appeared on Facebook on August 8, 2019 — just 3 days after the abrogation of Article 370. By August 13, 2019, the Palestinian BDS Committee had released a statement amplified via Pakistani- and Turkish-aligned platforms.

Pakistan-backed accounts launched a coordinated BDS campaign targeting India using #BoycottIndia and #BoycottIndianProducts, with over 162K tweets on X — mostly from fake or new Pakistan-based handles.

In September 2019, then-Pakistan PM Imran Khan used the UN General Assembly to accuse India of “Islamophobia” post-Article 370 abrogation. That same year, Pak sympathizer CJ Werleman pushed the Islamophobia trope against India, amplified by Turkish and Pakistani networks.

Weaponizing the OIC

Pakistan and Turkey also weaponized the OIC to amplify anti-India narratives in 2020 — citing CAA/NRC and Kashmir to push claims of ‘Islamophobia’. Turkey’s Anadolu Agency, TRT World, and Erdoğan backed the line.

OIC Statement & Fake Arab Handles Campaign

In April 2020, after OIC criticized India over Islamophobia, Pakistan launched a fake social media campaign. Pak accounts posing as Arab royals unleashed a disinformation campaign (later exposed) to target India with Islamophobia.

Soft Calls for BDS Against India

In collusion, Turkey and Pakistan organized several events equating Kashmir with Palestine and called for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement against India. Seminars and events were organized jointly by this alliance.

In May 2020, an event was jointly hosted by Kashmir Civitas (based in Pakistan, Istanbul, Shanghai, and Qatar), along with Turkey-based Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA), to draw a parallel between Kashmir and Palestine and seek BDS against India.

Similarly, on June 29–30, 2020, Istanbul University organized an event on Kashmir attended by Pakistani ministers and convicted ISI agent Ghulam Nabi Fai among others. Masood Khan urged Turkey’s intervention in the Kashmir issue while seeking BDS against India.

To lend legitimacy to the BDS campaign against India, pro-Pakistan networks enlisted CJ Werleman to write an article on TRT World (July 2020) framing the Kashmir issue within the global BDS movement and internationalizing anti-India narratives.

A few months later, to test the waters, in September 2021, the #BoycottIndianProducts campaign trended on X — this time spearheaded by the global Muslim Brotherhood along with the nexus of Qatar-Turkey-Pakistan (QTPi).

Two months later, in December 2021, the Turkey-Pakistan nexus — including Pakistan’s Jamaat and Erdoğan-linked entities — backed by the Muslim Brotherhood nexus linked to Hamas, organized a hush-hush ‘Russell Tribunal on Kashmir (RToK)’ against India.

Major takeaway of the 3-day Tribunal: BDS Movement against India!

RToK & Erdoğan Link

Among the organizers of the RToK tribunal was the International University of Sarajevo (IUS). The president of IUS is Professor Dr. Sevgi Kurtulmuş, professor of Economics at Ankara University. Dr. Sevgi is the wife of Numan Kurtulmuş, who was Deputy PM of Turkey (2014–17), from the AKP.

IUS was founded by the Foundation for Education Development Sarajevo (SEDEF) in 2003. SEDEF is a pro-government Turkish businessmen and Islamist foundation backed by Erdoğan.

SEDEF’s constituent organization is ILIM YAYMA VAKFI, founded by Erdoğan on March 31, 1973. Bilal Erdoğan is its president.

Prior to the RToK event, IUS had never engaged with Kashmir. Yet, this Erdoğan-linked university co-organized the RToK — after months of seminars and online boycott campaigns against India. Erdoğan’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkish state media’s role in the MB-led boycott are well known.

Another key organizer of the RToK was Kashmir Civitas (KC), established in 2019 with bases in Istanbul, London, Beijing, Rome, and Toronto. Farhan Mujahid Chak is the face of KC. He is of Pakistani origin, Qatar-resident, and currently based in Canada.

A few days after RToK, UK-based firm Stoke White — whose founder Hakan Camuz is a Turkish citizen and close to the Erdoğan family — ran a smear arrest campaign against the Indian Army and India’s Home Minister, accusing India of human rights violations in J&K.

Hakan Camuz headed the UK-based Turken Foundation (2015–19), which has deep links with the Erdoğan family.

The Turken Foundation was established by two Turkish organizations: Ensar Foundation (est. 1979) and TURGEV (est. 1996 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan). Bilal Erdoğan was once a board member of the Turken Foundation UK.

Ensar Foundation

In 2016, Ensar Foundation was involved in a child abuse scandal in Karaman, a central Anatolian town in Turkey, in a guest house run by Ensar Foundation. The foundation is known to be run by close associates of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan!

The Relationship Goes Deeper

In 2014, Camuz represented Bilal Erdoğan in a case against CNBC and David L. Philips after they exposed alleged links between Bilal and Turkey’s Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) in funding terror group ISIS. IHH is a known tool of Turkey’s intelligence agency Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MİT).

Camuz’s Stoke White has run legal and smear campaigns targeting countries — UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, and France — all targeted by the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey. Its cases also echo Ankara’s narrative, even demanding action against Erdoğan’s rival, Mohammed Dahlan.

On Jan 19, 2022, Stoke White launched a hit job against the Indian Home Minister and Army Chief (from Jan 2021), accusing India of genocide in Kashmir.

This was based on an “investigation” with Pakistan-based Legal Forum for Oppressed Voices of Kashmir (LFOVK). The campaign was strategically made to trend in Turkey.

LFOVK is headed by Pakistani Judge Justice Ali Nawaz Chawhan (late) and Advocate Nasir Qadri. It is pertinent to note that while SW launched a hit job against the Indian HM and then-Indian Army Chief, it was LFOVK that started the #arrestindianarmychief trend and peddled the narrative of ‘war crimes in Kashmir’ with SW.

LFK collaborates with think tanks like IPRI and IPS — both deeply tied to the Pakistan Army and ISI. Asad Durrani, ex-IPS member, was the general of Military Intelligence (MI) and ISI. These institutions were tasked by Pakistan’s Senate in 2016 to identify and exploit India’s “fault lines.”

Just two weeks ahead of the RToK in Sarajevo, LFOVK head Nasir Qadri and primary organizer Farhan Mujahid Chak (Kashmir Civitas) attended the 17th IPS Working Group on Kashmir in 2021 — joined by others including Irshad Mahmood, Tajammul Altaf, and APHC officials.

The New Narrative

As noted, there have been strong efforts to seek BDS against India, just like the BDS movement against Israel. Through boycott campaigns, hit job campaigns, and RToK, this alliance has been forging a narrative linking India and Israel.

Hence, this transnational alliance — driven by Turkey’s vision of becoming the poster boy of the Islamic world — uses Turkish propaganda fronts along with Pakistani allies to craft the India-Israel narrative. Turkey actively abets and drives these efforts alongside Pakistan through state machinery and media.

Most recently, TRT World gave a platform to Nasir Qadri, who accused India of adopting Israel’s settler-colonial tactics. During the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, a number of Pakistani handles also peddled the same narrative as Nasir Qadri on TRT World.

Turkey is fast emerging as a new hub for anti-India radical Islamists.

This investigative article draws exclusively from verified research conducted by DisInfoLab, a leading organization renowned for uncovering global disinformation campaigns, propaganda networks, and hybrid warfare strategies. Every event, connection, and claim outlined in this exposé is rooted in meticulously documented findings from DisInfoLab’s reports.

This not only strengthens Pakistan’s foothold in Turkey’s strategic calculations but also aligns with Erdogan’s broader ambitions to lead the Muslim Ummah.

On August 15, 2019, a seemingly emotional piece appeared in a Turkish publication. Written by Ruwa Shah, the daughter of jailed Kashmiri separatist Altaf Ahmad Shah, the article lamented the “besieged” condition of Kashmir, portraying a picture of despair and victimhood. Shah, writing from Turkey, decried the “loss of childhood” among Kashmiri children—despite living thousands of miles away from the region.

While the article may appear at first glance to be a personal narrative, its deeper context and timing are far more consequential. The piece, and many others like it published in Turkish media, reflect an expanding ecosystem of information warfare aimed at maligning India’s global image, particularly in the Muslim world. The source and structure of this narrative appear increasingly tied to a broader project of political Islam, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The Altaf Shah Connection: Terror and Propaganda

Ruwa Shah’s father, Altaf Ahmad Shah, was no ordinary man. He was a key operative in Kashmir’s separatist ecosystem and is currently facing charges in India related to terror financing. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) registered a case in 2017 implicating him in illegally raising funds, including through hawala channels, to fuel street violence, destroy schools, and provoke unrest in the Kashmir Valley. His actions, far from the realm of peaceful protest, allegedly contributed to organized violence and efforts to destabilize the region.

Thus, Ruwa Shah’s presence in Turkey and her article in its media cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be seen in conjunction with the growing pattern of Turkish platforms becoming hubs for Pakistani-backed and separatist-driven disinformation campaigns.

A New Axis: Ankara and Islamabad’s Media Alliance

Under President Erdogan’s rule, Turkey has undergone a dramatic transformation—from a relatively secular, pro-Western democracy to a country increasingly under the sway of Islamist populism. Central to this transformation has been Erdogan’s use of media as a strategic weapon—both domestically and internationally.

Analysts have raised concerns that Erdogan’s government has gone beyond domestic control of press freedom and has now adopted a deliberate strategy of international ideological export. Turkish state-run media outlets like Anadolu Agency and TRT, which once hired Western journalists, are now seeing an influx of Pakistani nationals with strong ideological leanings.

Currently, nearly half of the copy-editing staff in Anadolu Agency comprises Pakistani nationals. Many of these journalists have known affiliations with hardline ideologies, and some have shown clear sympathies with separatist movements in South Asia. Turkish media, particularly these two flagship outlets, are now actively providing platforms to voices that echo the narratives of Islamabad and anti-India actors.

ISI’s Invisible Hand?

Foreign policy observers argue that the placement of Pakistani journalists in Turkish media is not merely a reflection of Ankara-Islamabad camaraderie—it may very well be an orchestrated move by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. The intent: to amplify Pakistani geopolitical interests, challenge Indian narratives, and use Turkish soft power as a megaphone for radical Islam.

This not only strengthens Pakistan’s foothold in Turkey’s strategic calculations but also aligns with Erdogan’s broader ambitions to lead the Muslim Ummah. It explains why separatists from Kashmir, like Ruwa Shah, are finding Turkish media an inviting space to propagate their agenda.

Erosion of Sufi Pluralism in Turkey

One of the most tragic consequences of this media radicalization is the cultural loss within Turkey itself. Historically rooted in Sufi traditions, Turkish Islam was celebrated for its pluralism and syncretism. However, with the increasing dominance of Pakistani-Deobandi interpretations of Islam—promoted by the new wave of Pakistani journalists and clerics—there is growing concern about an erosion of Turkey’s spiritual heritage.

This ideological shift is being fueled not only through newsrooms but also through Turkey’s expanding religious institutions. The Diyanet, Turkey’s powerful Directorate of Religious Affairs, has witnessed exponential growth in both influence and budget. It is actively promoting a curriculum increasingly aligned with political Islam.

One such example is Erdogan’s controversial move in 2020 to convert Heybeliada Sanatorium—originally a hospital on one of Istanbul’s Princes’ Islands—into a religious school under Diyanet’s control. This follows the pattern of converting key historical monuments like Hagia Sophia and Kariye Church into mosques, symbolic of Erdogan’s Islamization campaign.

Observers worry that Turkey’s religious education sector is now being weaponized to raise generations of youth loyal to a singular, rigid ideological framework—one that is uncritical, conformist, and detached from Turkey’s once-rich theological diversity.

Radicalization of the Marginalized

Erdogan’s strategy doesn’t target the elite. Instead, his focus is on Turkey’s marginalized and underprivileged communities. For academically weaker students who are unable to get into mainstream education systems, religious schools are increasingly becoming the only option. Many of these schools promote a curriculum that serves political interests rather than religious or moral development.

In the long term, this has the potential to create an entire generation susceptible to radical ideologies and blind allegiance to Erdogan’s leadership. The role of imported media ideologues—especially Pakistani journalists—in this radicalization project cannot be underestimated.

A Caution for Turkish Society

Ruwa Shah’s article may have been a drop in the ocean, but it is emblematic of a larger, more dangerous tide. Turkish media, under Erdogan, is being transformed into a global hub for political Islam. It is actively collaborating with Pakistan’s ideological machinery, offering space to separatists and radicals, while undermining secular, moderate narratives.

The Turkish people—once custodians of a rich, pluralistic Islamic tradition—must now reckon with the possibility that their society is being reengineered. If unchecked, the radicalization of Turkish media and religious institutions could lead to long-term domestic instability and international isolation.

As for the rest of the world, particularly nations grappling with terrorism and separatism, the emerging Ankara-Islamabad axis of ideological influence poses a new frontier in the battle against extremism. What appears on the editorial page may just be a soft echo of a harder, strategic plan being executed in real time.

Erdoğan’s foreign policy has always been marked by extreme pragmatism. He shifts the country’s moves east and west based on the interest he could gain from such moves.

Turkey has all of a sudden nearly reversed its approach to Russia, announcing its support for Ukraine’s NATO bid as well as approving Sweden’s. The move has sent shockwaves throughout the European Union—which the Turkish president has long been criticizing for blocking Turkey’s accession bid—and Russia, which is locked in a cutthroat war with Ukraine, behind which the West is rallying in the face of Moscow. This Turkish shift raises questions about how the Turkish foreign policy—particularly with regard to Russia—will proceed in the coming period and what is the scope of Russia’s reaction—retaliation—following the Turkish move. 

The Turkish moves over the past week has been surprising—given the course in which the relations have been proceeding until very recently. Things have turned upside down—with Turkey abandoning Russia in favor of Europe and the West, with which it had a bitter rivalry and which it particularly accused of being the 2016 failed military coup. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has taken several steps—all unfavorable and disliked by Russia.

He (A) announced support for Ukraine’s NATO bid, (B) approved Sweden’s NATO membership—which until then appeared unlikely given Turkey’s strong protests and ferocious opposition to the move given what it calls Sweden’s permissions of attacks on Islam and Quran burnings as well as hosting members of the PKK organization, designated terrorist by Turkey, (C) President Erdoğan received Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky and—moreover—handed him over the Azov Brigade commanders held in Turkey under an agreement with Russia. 

All these actions signify a shift in Turkey’s position towards Russia concerning the latter’s war on Ukraine. Turkey has always adopted neutrality, called for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and brokered deals between Russia and Ukraine—foremost of which is the Black Sea Grain Initiative according to which grain exports via three Ukrainian ports are permitted. 

Yet, the newly adopted Turkish position raises questions, given the improved ties between Russia and Turkey over the past few years, coordination on Syria and some ‘realignment of positions’ in the face of the West and down the path of ‘forming a multipolar new order’. 

History of the Russo-Turkish relations has been filled with ups and downs, ebbs and flows. The two nations—empires—have engaged in fierce wars as well as alliances. 

Interestingly, Russia and Turkey sprung up as independent powers almost concurrently – in 1380 and 1389. There followed an impressive rise for the Ottoman Empire, which expanded rapidly and had become a superpower by the 16th century. Since this simultaneous rise, the two have vacillated between hostility and uneasy friendship. 

The two nations had engaged in three wars in the 18^th century, resulting in Turkey—the Ottoman Empire—ceding territories to Russia, a small part of which was reclaimed at later stages. 

The first of these three wars (1735-9) arose from the War of Polish Succession (1733-8). France encouraged Turkey to support it in its fight against Russia and Austria. Russia declared war on Turkey in late 1735. The Treaty of Nissa, signed in October 1739, ended the war, with the Russians pleading for peace. The second war, the first Turkish war against Catherine the Great of Russia, was terminated in July 1774 by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. The Treaty of Jassy in January 1792 ended the third war, which was the second Turkish War against Catherine of Russia, with Russia relinquishing Moldavia and Bessarabia to Turkey but holding the lands east of the Dniester as well as Ochakov port.

In modern history—particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings which brought Russian military to the Turkish border as Moscow has been aiding Syria’s Bashar al-Assad crush the domestic uprisings—tensions between Ankara and Moscow soared, with Turkey protesting Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and shooting down a Russian SU-25 fighter jet in the following year. Strikingly, the economic relations between the two nations during this period continued to boom. 

Personal relations between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin strengthened economic relationships. In 2003, an undersea gas pipeline was constructed, and by 2014, Russia had become Turkey’s largest importer. Tourism has also developed as an important link between the two nations, with Russia sending the most tourists to Turkey in 2013-14. This shows how economics and politics have taken different paths in the Russo-Turkish relations, with the former growing steadily regardless of the status of the latter and the ups and downs it experiences. 

There are various explanations for the shift in Turkey’s policy towards Russia. The Russian president’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, blamed the return of Ukrainian Azovstal officers on Kiev’s “failure of the counterattack” launched in early June to retake Russian-controlled territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. He additionally referred to Ankara’s desire to show “solidarity” with Kiev ahead of the NATO summit in Lithuania.

Other analysts believe that Turkey’s shift away from Russia and toward Europe resulted from the Russian weakness exposed by Wagner’s rebellion. After Wagner’s rebellion late last June, Turkey, paradoxically, expressed solidarity with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Perhaps it’s the same rebellion that ‘encouraged’ Erdoğan to take such a bold stance in favor of Ukraine and Sweden’s NATO bid, which he has long rejected, citing Stockholm’s permission to burn the holy Islamic book the Quran and its support for the PKK, which the Turkish state considers a terrorist organization and with whom it has been locked in fierce battles in the country’s southeastern region.

In a nutshell, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has always been marked by extreme pragmatism. He shifts the country’s moves east and west based on the interest he could gain from such moves. He leans towards strong allies to form unshakable fronts. But when those enemies become weak and unable to weather domestic storms, Erdoğan shies away from them, joining the ranks of those more powerful and gaining the upper hand—the US and NATO. Still, the way how Erdoğan will fix relations with Russian president Vladimir Putin if any major breakthroughs on the part of Russia occur remains to be seen. But there’s a tough venture head for Erdoğan. 

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab

Erdoğan’s goal is to establish a new legacy that will finally replace the century-old Kemalist legacy, which has crushed political Islam and forced it to operate underground

A century ago, the Ottoman Empire was dismantled. The glory had faded, the sultanate perished and the sultan gone. Everything in the sprawling empire was turned upside down. First of all, the empire no longer became an empire. It instead turned into a nation-state ruled by secular Kemalism, a philosophy laid down by the Turkish republic’s founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It’s the legacy upon which the new Turkish republic would be established for a century to come.

Throughout this period, Kemalism has ruled the country uncontested. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was the Turks’ idol. The principles he laid out have continued to govern the country even posthumously. All those who dared to deviate from his line were severely punished. It has been the Kemalist legacy that ruled Turkey for nearly a century until President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2001.

Since then, he has been in charge of Turkey’s top job, whether as a prime minister or a president afterwards. Throughout his tenure, he has been slowly seeping through the state apparatuses, making slow-paced, nuanced and well-considered reforms aimed primarily to replace the Kemalist legacy with the Erdoğanist one.

Erdoğan has never said he is against Ataturk. Portraits of Ataturk are always put up at his public rallies and government offices. He has never embarked on a hard-power process of eliminating the Kemalist legacy. But instead, he pursued a gradualist approach coated in dissimulation (Taqiya) by alleging that Turkey is a secularist state toeing the line of Kemal Ataturk. At the same time, Erdoğan and his AKP team was working to erase this line, replacing it with Erdoğan’s.

Throughout his career, Erdoğan has experienced milestones and setbacks. He was fortunate. He reaped the benefits of the milestones: revoking the decision to ban hijab in public offices, expanding the building of religious schools, changing the state’s system of government from parliamentary to presidential, reopening Hagia Sophia as a mosque among others.

Erdoğan has always functioned not as a tyrannical strongman seeking to carve out his own position in Turkish modern history. Instead, Erdoğan’s goal is to establish a new legacy that will finally replace the century-old Kemalist legacy, which has crushed political Islam and forced it to operate underground.

For him, it’s a zero-sum game: either the Islamists continue to control and dominate the country, imposing their new legacy, or the Kemalist legacy survives, forcing Erdoğan and his comrades into hiding.

Therefore, Erdoğan has fought a ferocious battle that peaked in 2016 when some senior army commanders, purportedly in connection with the Gulen Movement, aka the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO), launched a failed coup d’etat. This coup was the apex. It’s either you or we. Erdoğan, on the other hand, has survived, launching a purge of the state apparatus to clear his authority of the ‘viruses’ purposely implanted to wipe away his rule overnight.

Erdoğan has devised a strategy to build this legacy. The longevity in office was the most important cornerstone of this plan. A ruler can do nothing unless he has long-term plans that he or his successors who share the same ideological line can put into action. As a result, Erdoğan has worked hard to ensure that his rule lasts as long as possible, modifying the country’s government structure to fill the role of president, but only after injecting it with the necessary legal powers—which were previously reserved for the prime minister under the now-dismantled parliamentary system.

From the very start of his political career, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been taking aim at Ataturk—whether as a role model that he sought to emulate or as an opponent with a legacy that he sought to eliminate—as part of the above-mentioned two-faced approach.

For decades, Ataturk had been the Turks’ idol, and Erdoğan aspired to be the Turks’ new idol—at times by alleging that his project complements that of Ataturk and at others by declaring that his rule represents a resurrection of the Ottoman legacy that Ataturk had pulverized.

Among his both backers and rivals, Erdoğan is hailed as Turkey’s new sultan. Actually and ceremonially, he acts like a sultan. He receives world leaders with Ottoman-era honor guards.

Like his approach, Erdoğan’s legacy has also two faces. He is credited with the massive economic growth in Turkey as well as succeeding in getting the military out of politics after decades of strangling guardianship over the country’s politics.

Still, he is accused by critics at home and overseas of leaning heavily towards authoritarianism and repressing individual freedoms. According to Erdoğan’s rivals, the measures Erdoğan is taking—which are chiefly inspired by religious orientations—will see an increase whereas public freedoms will start to diminish. Some of Erdoğan’s opponents have even suggested that he wants to reinstate the caliphate though he doesn’t dare to announce this explicitly. Erdoğan, thus, has consolidated his power and changed the country’s system of government in order to sit himself on top of the Islamic world’s leaders—an objective that, among others, reverses Ataturk’s legacy.

Erdoğan’s allegations about following in the footsteps of the Turkish republic’s founder have remained unchanged. Meanwhile, however, he was working in full swing to profoundly transform the country he rules, taking it away from the Kemalist roots upon which it was established. Upon thwarting the military coup of July 15, 2016, Erdoğan took a major step towards setting up the system that best serves his interests. Within less than a year, Turkey saw a landmark referendum on changing the country’s system of government from the parliamentary to the presidential. Erdoğan was lucky. He won the referendum and finally got what he has long been seeking to achieve. This referendum, in which 51% of the voters favored the presidential system, put the country on the threshold of the second republic. The referendum has formally instituted a substantial change in the mode of governance that had prevailed in the first republic (Ataturk’s republic) a century ago.

Erdoğan has always been seeking to resurrect the sultanate that Ataturk had buried. He wants to be the country’s post-Ottoman—or neo-Ottoman—sultan. He wants to kill the legacy of Ataturk whose laws trampled on the sultanate and ushered in the new republic. Erdoğan’s two-faced approach— that depends on inwardly working to resurrect the old Turkish state while outwardly gushing praise upon the one who buried it—appears to be working. But now it’s the time to openly work to oust Ataturk’s legacy. The Turkish regime seems more consolidated, emboldened and entrenched. There’s no need for dissimulation.

If Erdoğan’s schemes proceed uninterrupted, we could witness ‘The Islamic Republic of Turkey’ sooner than we could ever expect. The bottom line: There are two conflicting legacies in Turkey as well as two faces of Erdoğan’s approach. And no one knows which legacy will finally prevail and which face will come out on the global stage and declare: Hey, this is the new Turkey.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view. 

PM Modi tweeted, “Congratulations @RTErdogan on re-election as the President of Türkiye!”.

The Indian premier also expressed his desire to strengthen the bilateral ties between India and Turkey, and to work together on issues of mutual interest.

“I am confident that our bilateral ties and cooperation on global issues will continue to grow in the coming times”, he said.

President Erdogan won a resounding victory in Turkey’s presidential elections held on May 14th, securing a third term in office with over 52.14% of the vote.

The election campaign was marked by a fierce debate over Turkey’s future direction, with Erdogan’s opponents accusing him of authoritarianism and curtailing civil liberties.

However, the Turkish President dismissed the criticism, arguing that his policies were necessary to maintain stability and security in a volatile region.

Modi’s congratulatory message comes at a time when India and Turkey have been working to strengthen their ties, particularly in the areas of trade and investment.

In recent years, India and Turkey have signed several agreements aimed at boosting economic cooperation, including a bilateral trade agreement and an investment protection pact.

Both countries have also been keen to enhance cultural and people-to-people ties, with the Turkish government recently announcing plans to establish a cultural center in New Delhi.

In February, PM Modi instructed his office to offer all possible support to deal with the earthquake in Turkey. Later, the picture of Turkish woman tightly hugging an Indian female military officer, won the hearts.

Modi’s message of congratulations is likely to be welcomed by Erdogan and his supporters, who have been keen to highlight the international support for the Turkish President’s reelection.

Erdogan has faced criticism from some quarters for his crackdown on political opponents and the media, as well as his controversial policies on issues such as Syria and the Kurdish minority in Turkey.

With Modi’s message of congratulations, Erdogan can now add another high-profile endorsement to his list of international supporters.

Herzog’s message of congratulations, which was delivered via Twitter, expressed his hope for improved relations between the two countries, stating that “Congratulations to President @RTErdogan of Türkiye on his election victory. I am convinced that we will continue to work together to strengthen and expand the good ties between Türkiye and Israel”.

Herzog’s action is a notable deviation from the hostile language that has marked the relationship between Israel and Turkey in recent times. Once strong allies, their bond weakened after Israel’s 2010 raid on a Turkish aid flotilla en route to Gaza, which led to the death of nine Turkish activists. This event triggered a range of disagreements between the two nations, including disputes over Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and Turkey’s support for Hamas.

Turkey was the first Muslim-majority nation to recognize Israel in March 1949, leading to a strong alliance between the two nations and a shared concern over the instability in the Middle East. However, the relationship between the two countries has soured in recent years. Nevertheless, in 2022, the two countries restored their relationship and normalized their ties.

Herzog’s message of congratulations to Erdogan is another indication of the willingness of both countries to move past their differences and work towards a more positive relationship. It is also a reflection of Herzog’s commitment to promoting peace and dialogue in the region. Since taking office in July 2021, Herzog has been vocal about his desire to improve Israel’s relations with its neighbors and has taken steps to reach out to leaders in the Arab world.

The fact that Herzog congratulated Erdogan on his election win is also significant, as it underscores the importance of respecting democratic processes and institutions. While Turkey’s recent elections have been subject to criticism from some quarters, Herzog’s message of congratulations is a clear signal that Israel recognizes the legitimacy of the country’s electoral process and institutions.

It is uncertain whether this act of goodwill will result in significant changes in the relationship between Israel and Turkey. There are still numerous issues that separate the two countries, and it will take more than a friendly message to bridge the gap. Nonetheless, Herzog’s move is a positive step in the correct direction, and it is expected that Erdogan and other Turkish leaders will reciprocate it.

Michael Arizanti

There are indications that the opposition is making progress and working to unify

Turkey is gearing up for an upcoming presidential election set for 2023, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be seeking re-election in a bid to maintain his hold on power. Erdogan has been in power since 2003 as prime minister and later, as president, with little opposition facing him in recent years. However, with the country’s economy in turmoil and a waning popularity for the incumbent President, the opposition might have a chance to unseat him to take control of the government.

The question, however, remains: Can the opposition unite to defeat Erdogan in the upcoming presidential election?

The opposition in Turkey is divided and lacks a common front, with varying parties and factions jostling for power. In the past, this has been a significant disadvantage as the opposition has struggled to present a united front against Erdogan’s ruling party, the AKP. While the opposition was able to win a majority of seats in the 2018 parliamentary election by forming an alliance, it’s unclear whether they will be able to replicate that success in the presidential election.

One of the major challenges facing the opposition is the question of leadership. There are several prominent personalities in the opposition, such as Kemal Kilicdaroglu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Meral Aksener of the Good Party (IYI). However, there is no clear leader to unite the opposition, create a common agenda, and rally support around it. This absence of conclusive leadership could be a significant obstacle to the opposition in the presidential election.

Another challenge facing the opposition is the question of ideology. The opposition is a diverse group of parties and factions, each with their own agenda and priorities. Some are more liberal and secular, while others are more conservative and nationalist. This ideology divide could make it challenging to present a united message to voters and could lead to internal conflicts and divisions.

Despite the challenges, there are signs that the opposition is making attempts to come together. In March 2021, the CHP and IYI announced the formation of an alliance for the upcoming local elections. It was seen as a step towards greater cooperation between opposition parties. However, whether this alliance can be sustained and whether it will be sufficient enough to defeat Erdogan in the presidential election remains to be seen.

In conclusion, the question of whether the opposition can unite to defeat Erdogan in the presidential election is a complex one. Despite the many challenges they are facing, there are indications that the opposition is making progress and working to unify. Ultimately, the success of the opposition will depend on their ability to put their differences aside, come together and present a unified vision to voters. If they can achieve this feat, they might have a chance to overthrow Erdogan’s regime and usher in a new era of Turkish politics.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab

A mood of reconciliation is developing throughout the Middle East. Four main regional actors—Saudi Arabia vs. Iran and Egypt vs. Turkey—have agreed to bury the hatchet and start again.

There have been shuttle diplomatic tours over the past period in the Middle East to mend relations between the region’s longtime arch-foes Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Egypt vs Turkey. Egypt and Turkey have been locked in a nearly one-decade feud over Turkey’s sympathy with and support for the Muslim Brotherhood and late President Mohammed Morsi.

The ideological congruence between the Turkish AKP-led government and the Muslim Brotherhood has always aroused sensitivities in Egypt, particularly after ousting the Muslim Brotherhood government in July 2013 following mass protests.

The problem between Egypt and Turkey is essentially one of security. Dissidents of Egypt’s regime are being hosted and protected by Turkey. It also has ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian government’s arch-foe.

Yet, it plays a key supporting role for the Tripoli-based National Accord Government, which competes with the Libyan National Army. This significant Turkish security presence, which appeared to be a thorn in Egypt’s side, necessitated lengthy security talks before beginning any diplomatic meetings in order to test the waters and determine whether there was a prospect of changing the current approach to each other.

Following these meetings between senior security and intelligence officials from both countries, media outlets in both countries were directed to tone down their rhetoric, abstaining from insulting the leaders of both countries.

The Qatar 2022 World Cup opening game was the pinnacle of these efforts, with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Egypt’s president Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shaking hands and declaring the end of a decade-long standoff.

Egypt-Turkey ties have been the subject of lengthy talks at the security levels between the two countries’ competent officials. The signature of a maritime border demarcation agreement with Greece in August 2020, taking into consideration the Turkish navy’s requests, was the first major step toward easing and ending the diplomatic split between the two sides. Yet, in February 2021, Egypt launched a bid for gas exploration, pledging not to infringe on the Turkish continental shelf.

According to analysts, there has always been a desire to strengthen economic relations. Given that there are motivations to toss a stone into the still pond, all indications show that proper conditions were being created to accomplish rapprochement. There’s a Turkish desire to enhance ties with Egypt in energy projects, the experts added, citing the Ukrainian crisis and the concerns it raised about the shortage in gas supplies, not to mention the two countries’ desire to restore ties to cope with the developments on the regional and global arenas.

The Turkish presence in Libya, its support for the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated dissenters and the differences over Mediterranean gas shares were the three main obstacles to restoring the diplomatic relations. Turkey has started doing its part and taking tangible steps to bring to a halt the diplomatic breakup with Egypt and improve the strained ties.

Ankara has restricted the Muslim Brotherhood’s mouthpieces—which have been launching fierce propaganda campaigns against President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s regime, playing on economic grievances—ordering them to shut down.

Over the past two decades, Iran’s role in the Middle East has been expanding—with proxy actors spreading and nearly occupying four Arab capitals—Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Sana. To Iran, Saudi Arabia is on the opposing side. Saudi Arabia is a major Sunni Arab nation and home to Muslims’ two holiest mosques. It never supports militias or non-state actors. It has no troops deployed overseas. It has no IRGC or Qassem Soleimani. Thus, the political agendas adopted by Saudi Arabia and Iran are diametrically opposed.  

As for Iran and Saudi Arabia, the way the shift happened wasn’t so much different from that of Egypt and Turkey. Saudi Arabia and Iran have always been at loggerheads—but the tensions on the surface have always been a tip of the iceberg. The breaking point came when Iranian protesters had breached the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Najaf following Riyadh’s execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr in 2016, a point at which the relationship between the two countries was severed. This diplomatic breakup was followed by a streak of estrangement and proxy war.

Negotiations were resumed in April 2021 in Baghdad. The two sides held unannounced meetings in Baghdad’s Green Zone. They held five rounds of talks, the last of which was held in April 2022. These rounds of talks yielded limited results.

These rounds of talks were characterized by secretiveness. According to Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh, an agreement with Saudi Arabia stipulates that the details of the talks should never be revealed. There has been deep divergence between the two sides. This was indicated by the slow and prolonged talks between the two sides—with the intervals between the rounds of talks—particularly the fourth and fifth rounds—extending to seven months.

The internal and regional developments that accompanied these talks weren’t stable. In Iran, President Ebrahim Raisi took power following a controversial presidential contest marked by voter apathy. The reign of Mostafa al-Kadhimi ended and his successor Mohammed Shaya al-Sudani took office and took over the coordination of the talks. Some even argue that the Saudi-Iranian rapport’s seed was soon in Iraq, as there has been rapprochement between Riyadh and Baghdad since al-Kadhimi took power.

Thus, there are similarities shared by the talks between Egypt and Turkey on the one hand and Iran and Saudi Arabia on the other. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are concerned with the security issues, since Iran and Turkey have been nurturing an increasing deployment in the Middle East and beyond, using non-state actors and ideology-infused groups. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology—globalist Islam, establishing the caliphate and, to some extent, restoring the now-fading Ottoman glory—is Turkey’s asset. Meanwhile, Iran’s asset is militias indoctrinated by the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih who seek to establish the Shiite version of the globalist Islam. Ironically, Iran has strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, too.

Another similarity is the climb-down, or concessions made by Turkey and Iran in order to mend relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. To promote its political project, Iran has traditionally relied on militancy and proxy actors. Despite sanctions and severe pressures, it has continued with this political project. However, when the sanctions hurt the country’s economy and the regime’s legitimacy at home as well as its credibility among Shiites, the regime was forced to back down, taking several steps back and sitting down with its archrival Saudi Arabia to end the decades-long rivalry. Similarly, Turkey’s Erdoan has always opposed normalizing relations with Egypt’s regime, claiming that he would never shake hands with someone like El-Sisi—but he climbed down and did it.

The bottom line: A mood of reconciliation is developing throughout the Middle East. Four main regional actors—Saudi Arabia vs. Iran and Egypt vs. Turkey—have agreed to bury the hatchet and start again. The talks were slow and laborious. Concerns about security have taken precedence over political issues. There are stronger parties and those that have made concessions. Yet, the newly reconciled nations haven’t fully restored ties, allowing each other time to test their intentions and see if each side would follow through on what was agreed upon. As a result, a significant step has been accomplished, yet there is still a mountain to climb.

Mostapha Hassan Abdelwahab is the former editorial manager of the English edition of the Baghdad Post. He is focusing on Iraq, Iran and political Islam movements, with articles posted on the Herald Report, Vocal Europe, the Greater Middle East and other platforms.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Qatar Gate scandal exposed corruption of European Union Parliamentarians by Qatari regime involving bribe and money laundering of over €300,000. What’s less known is the kingpin in the scandal — Hakan Camuz is also mastermind behind orchestrated attack on India, including Indian Army Chief.

Camuz is a UK-based legal consultant of Turkish origin. His entities, Stoke White (SW) and The Radiant Trust, paid Equality Consultancy (company linked to Qatar Gate suspects, ex-MEP Pier Antonio Panzeri and his assistance Francesco Giorgi) €75,000 for “ethical lobbying services”.

It’s the same SW that had launched a hitjob against Indian Home Minister and Army Chief in Jan-2021, accusing India of genocide in Kashmir. Based on an “investigation” with Legal Forum for Oppressed Voices of Kashmir (LFOVK), SW had filed a case in UK against the Indian Home Minister and Army Chief.

Now, LFOVK is another dubious entity headed by Pakistani Judge Justice Ali Nawaz Chawhan and Advocate Nasir Qadri. It was LFOVK which had started the Twitter trend #arrestindianarmychief and peddled the narrative of ‘war crimes in Kashmir’ with SW.

Getting back to Camuz, he has close relations with Turkey’s Erdoğan family. He served as Director of two Turkish fronts: MUSIAD and Turken Foundation UK Turken foundation’s parent organizations — Ensar Foundation and “TURGEV” (est. in 1996 by present Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan).

Erdoğan family-backed NGOs are also involved in crimes against humanity. In 2016, Ensar Foundation, which is also run by the close associates of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was involved in a child abuse scandal in Karaman, central Anatolian town in Turkey.

In 2014, Camuz also represented Erdoğan’s son Bilal Erdoğan pertaining to a terror funding case when linkages of Bilal and Turkey’s Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) with the ISIS were exposed. Note: IHH is closely linked to Erdoğan family.

Notably, TURGEV works in alliance with IHH, which has also been accused of funding terror groups such as Al-Qaeda, Chechen separatists, and Hamas apart from ISIS. IHH was named in the UN Security Council documents and investigated for supporting terrorist groups in Syria.

IHH also works with Kathmandu-based Islami Sangh Nepal (ISN) in the Indian-Nepal border. ISN is under the radar of Indian intelligence agencies for allegedly providing sanctuary to fugitive Indian terrorists in 2018.

His other front, The Radiant Trust, where Camuz serves as a Trustee, also has a questionable background. The operations manager of the company, Zafer Altinbas has served a jail term of 6 years and 9 months for immigration law breach and receiving money from proceeds of crime.

One must also ask the ‘International News Media’, especially AP News, which had given uncritical propaganda space to Camuz’s SW, without having done even the basic research about the motive and agenda, were these shady aspects of his story weren’t worth mentioning?

Story goes deeper: Camuz is one of the architects of a nexus seeking the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement against India. SW had in past also targeted UAE and France. Incidentally, France, UAE, and India were targets of Muslim Brotherhood’s boycott campaign.

Article derived from DisInfoLab’s Thread. Read their detailed research on Muslim Brotherhood’s New Startup : Kashmir.