Foreign interference is unacceptable in Canada. It shouldn’t become acceptable simply because it’s aimed at India.

I don’t pretend to have deep, on-the-ground knowledge of Alberta’s separatist debate. But Canada’s near-universal pushback against foreign interference in that conversation has been heartening, because it reveals a civic reflex Canadians still share, whatever your view on separation, you don’t want outsiders manipulating a domestic question.

Recent reporting has made the concern concrete. A study summarized by Global News warned that foreign actors, including American and Russian ones, are meddling in Alberta’s separatist debate in ways that threaten Canadian sovereignty (Global News, May 2026). Canada’s National Observer reported research showing inauthentic ‘news’ channels and influence campaigns amplifying Alberta secession and annexation narratives (Canada’s National Observer, April 2026). The Guardian reported a major Alberta voter-data breach linked to separatist organizing, exactly the kind of vulnerability experts warn can be exploited (The Guardian, May 2026).

So, Canada’s standard is clear: foreign interference is unacceptable, especially when it rides on disinformation, data exposure, and community targeting. Good. Now apply that same standard to how many Indians, across political views, have experienced the Khalistan file for years.

From India’s perspective, the core complaint is at least a few decades old that Canadian political space, and institutions have enabled an overseas separatist ecosystem to operate openly from Canada, often wrapped in ‘rights’ language, even as India links that ecosystem to extremism, intimidation, and criminality. That is not a characterization I’m inventing; it is an official position India has put on record. In September 2023, India’s Ministry of External Affairs explicitly referred to ‘Khalistani terrorists and extremists’ sheltered in Canada and said, ‘the space given in Canada to a range of illegal activities including murders, human trafficking and organised crime is not new’.

Canadians can disagree with India’s framing. But the asymmetry in Canadian instincts is hard to miss. When Alberta becomes the target, Canadians immediately reach for the language of sovereignty, manipulation, coercion, and democratic integrity. When India raises similar concerns about separatist organizing from Canadian soil, often paired with intimidation politics and crime allegations, Canada’s reflex is too often to repackage it as ‘a disagreement about free speech’.

Canada’s own intelligence reporting has, in fact, moved closer to India’s concern than Canada’s political class admits. The CSIS Public Report states that ongoing involvement in violent extremist activities by Canada-based Khalistani extremists continues to pose a national-security threat to Canada and Canadian interests, and notes that some fundraising can be diverted toward violent activity (CSIS Public Report, 2025). That is not India lobbying Canada. That is Canada describing a domestic threat.

The double standard isn’t only about what is tolerated on Canadian soil. It’s also about what Canadian politicians choose to amplify abroad and that record spans parties.

During the 2020–21 farmers’ protest, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly called the situation ‘concerning’ and signalled support for peaceful protest and dialogue (Hindustan Times, December 2020). Conservative MPs spoke too. In the House of Commons, Arnold Viersen said Sikhs were ‘thinking of and praying for India’s farmers’ protesting new legislation (House of Commons Hansard, November 2020).

Conservative MP Brad Vis tabled petitions from constituents ‘concerned for the safety of farmers’ protesting domestic legislative changes in India (House of Commons Hansard, December 2020). Conservative MP Tim Uppal likewise said India’s farmers ‘deserve to be heard and respected’, a message amplified in media coverage (Scroll, December 2020). Ontario NDP MPP Gurratan Singh was also cited among Canadian politicians voicing concern about the protests, showing the commentary extended beyond Ottawa into provincial politics (Canada’s National Observer, December 2020).

The Amritpal Singh episode in 2023 is even more instructive because it involved public order and violence, not merely protest. Al Jazeera reported that Amritpal and supporters armed with swords, knives and guns raided a police station in February 2023 after an aide was arrested, an event central to the later crackdown and manhunt (Al Jazeera, April 2023). India Today reported Punjab Police describing the Ajnala, Punjab incident as an attack on police and highlighting pressure on authorities during the confrontation. (India Today, February 2023).

Now ask a simple question: if a mobilized group stormed a police station in Canada to force the release of an aide, under threat, with weapons visible, would Canadian authorities treat it as ‘civil liberties’ theatre, or would they enforce criminal law and restore public order?

Canadian political reactions again moved quickly into public positioning. Global News reported that MPs from multiple parties criticized India’s crackdown and internet restrictions, and it specifically noted Conservative voices as well. Conservative deputy leader Tim Uppal and Conservative MP Jasraj Singh Hallan among them (Global News, March 2023). Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly said Canada was following developments ‘very closely’ (The Indian Express, March 2023). Jagmeet Singh called the crackdown ‘draconian’ and urged Canadian intervention (Hindustan Times, March 2023).

Outside government, the World Sikh Organization of Canada issued a formal statement condemning the “security operations” in Punjab and raising fears about extrajudicial harm, illustrating how non-government actors in Canada also shaped the narrative internationally (World Sikh Organization of Canada, March 2023)

India’s response to both episodes followed the same script: formal diplomatic pushback and a clear message that Canada was commenting on internal Indian matters. In 2020, India summoned Canada’s envoy, warned that Trudeau’s remarks could ‘impact ties’, and called the commentary ‘ill-informed’, ‘unwarranted’, and ‘interference’ (Al Jazeera, December 2020) (India Today, December 2020) (Reuters, December 2020).

In 2023, as Canadian politicians and organizations criticized the Punjab crackdown, Indian officials framed the operation as law-enforcement action to ‘nab a fugitive’, signalling that Canada’s commentary was external noise while India pursued policing. (The Indian Express, March 2023.)

Put the pattern together and the hypocrisy becomes harder to ignore. Canada is right to reject foreign interference in Alberta. But Canada’s political class has repeatedly engaged in rhetorical interference in India, on mass protests and on an internal security crackdown triggered by a police-station attack, then bristled when India said, plainly, ‘this is our internal matter’.

That is why the Alberta interference debate matters beyond Alberta. It has forced Canadians to admit, in real time, that democratic debates can be manipulated through proxies, disinformation, intimidation, and exploitation of institutional openness. Canada is suddenly fluent in the language of foreign influence because it can taste it.

The underlying principle is that sovereignty is not selective. If foreign interference is wrong when aimed at Canadian unity, it is equally wrong when Canadian space is used to inflame separatist politics abroad.

Foreign interference is unacceptable in Canada. It shouldn’t become acceptable simply because it’s aimed at India.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Officials have also pointed to comparative international examples to argue that such engagement does not necessarily compromise electoral fairness.

On 12 February 2026, Bangladeshis are scheduled to make two significant choices on the same day: electing the country’s 13th National Parliament and voting in a referendum on proposed constitutional reforms. As polling day approaches, however, a legal challenge before the High Court has raised questions about whether the conditions necessary for a credible and trusted vote are still intact.

The writ petition does not allege wrongdoing by any political party. Instead, it focuses on the conduct of state institutions during an election period — a distinction that has drawn both legal and public attention. At its core is a concern familiar to many democracies: what happens to electoral legitimacy when the boundary between neutral administration and political advocacy becomes blurred?

According to the petition, senior figures associated with the interim administration, along with other state-linked actors, have publicly expressed support for a “Yes” vote in the referendum. The petitioner argues that such actions may be inconsistent with provisions of the Election Code of Conduct and the Representation of the People Order, which are intended to ensure that those exercising executive authority do not influence voter choice during an election period.

A detailed constitutional analysis of the filing outlines these claims and the legal provisions involved (summary here).

One aspect of the case has proven particularly contentious: the alleged use of official government platforms, including a state-run website, to promote a specific referendum outcome. Critics argue that when state infrastructure is used in this way, it risks creating what constitutional lawyers describe as “structural bias” — a situation where the state itself is perceived as an interested party rather than an impartial referee.

These allegations, and the legal remedies sought in response, are outlined in reporting on the petition’s filing (details here).

The petition also places significant emphasis on the role of the Election Commission. It claims that the Commission was formally notified of alleged violations, supported by documentary evidence, but failed to take corrective or preventive measures. Under Bangladesh’s constitution, the Commission is an independent authority charged with safeguarding electoral integrity. Whether inaction in such circumstances constitutes a breach of constitutional duty is now a central question before the court.

Beyond individual actions, the case challenges the decision to hold a parliamentary election and a constitutional referendum on the same day. While not without precedent internationally, the petitioner argues that elections and referendums serve distinct democratic purposes and are governed by different legal standards. Conducting both simultaneously, it is claimed, may heighten voter confusion and complicate the requirement of a level playing field.

An overview of these arguments, as presented to the court, has been publicly reported (background here).

The interim government has rejected the suggestion that its conduct undermines democratic norms. In public statements, it has argued that expressing support for constitutional reform falls within its mandate and is consistent with democratic practice in a transitional context. Officials have also pointed to comparative international examples to argue that such engagement does not necessarily compromise electoral fairness.

The government’s position has been summarised in independent constitutional commentary (see overview here).

Procedurally, some related petitions have been returned or deferred by the courts without substantive hearings, citing workload and jurisdictional considerations. These decisions have not resolved the underlying issues, which continue to be debated both inside and outside legal circles.

What makes this moment particularly sensitive is not only the legal complexity, but the question of trust. Elections draw legitimacy not simply from compliance with procedural rules, but from public confidence that those rules apply equally to all participants — including the state itself. When that confidence weakens, even technically valid electoral processes can struggle to command broad acceptance.

Bangladesh has experienced contested elections before, and its institutions have navigated periods of intense political strain. The present challenge, however, raises broader questions about how neutrality is defined and enforced during political transitions. The court’s eventual ruling may therefore carry implications beyond the immediate electoral calendar, shaping expectations of institutional conduct in future contests.

Ultimately, the court’s decision will not just determine the fate of one election or referendum. It will help clarify how Bangladesh defines neutrality in moments of political transition, and how resilient its constitutional guardrails remain under pressure. In democracies everywhere, trust in the process is often harder to rebuild than laws themselves — and once eroded, it can linger long after the ballots are counted.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.