The interim government has not limited itself to the United States. It has launched unnecessary and highly ambitious initiatives with other countries as well.

On 13 June 2024, Bangladesh’s current interim government, led by Dr Yunus, signed an NDA agreement with the United States. The explanation was a familiar one: urgency, and the need to reduce “reciprocal taxes” imposed under the Donald Trump administration. But the way it was done matters as much as what was done. The agreement was rushed through without meaningful consultation with relevant stakeholders. And because it was a Non-Disclosure Agreement, the public had no way to know what was promised, traded, or quietly conceded.

The government kept repeating one line: nothing in the deal goes against national interest. Yet it never answered the obvious follow-up. If there was nothing to hide, why was the public denied the right to see it? Later, when a draft leaked from Bangladesh’s National Board of Revenue, the government’s claim, collapsed on contact with the text. This 20-page NDA did not read like a harmless confidentiality instrument. Page after page, Bangladesh’s interests were weakened. The authority to make decisions linked to national security, the economy, natural resources, and foreign relations was, in effect, handed over to a foreign state.

At the time the NDA was signed, media reports said the agreement included a plan to buy 25 Boeing aircraft and import wheat from the United States. Then, in August, Commerce Adviser Sheikh Bashir Uddin claimed that during discussions with US officials, they did not seem serious about selling Boeing aircraft. Biman Bangladesh Airlines, too, said it was not aware of any Boeing purchase plan. And yet, within just four months, Biman finalised a decision to buy 14 Boeing aircraft. That decision was taken at Biman’s board meeting on 30 December 2025.

Under Yunus’s interim government, work is now underway to finalise this massive unnecessary procurement, valued at 37,000 crore TK, roughly 3 billion dollars. To speed up the process, on 27 August 2025, Commerce Adviser Sheikh Bashir Uddin was appointed Chairman of Biman. Then, on 14 January, Security Adviser Khalilur Rahman, Yunus’s Special Assistant Faiz Ahmed Taiyeb (serving with the rank of State Minister), and Akhtar Ahmed, Senior Secretary of the Election Commission Secretariat, were appointed to Biman’s board. Each is widely known as close to Dr Yunus. The interim government has also finalised a decision to buy Black Hawk helicopters from the United States for the armed forces.

In July 2025, the interim government signed an MoU with the US Wheat Exporters Association to import wheat from the United States. Under this agreement, Bangladesh will import 3.5 million tonnes of US wheat over five years. The contract set the price at 308 dollars per tonne, with a note that the price may be adjusted over time. But wheat is currently available on the international market at 226–230 dollars per tonne. Already, under this arrangement, Bangladesh has imported 220,000 tonnes in three batches. Importing at inflated prices will raise the price of flour in the open market. That increase will spread quickly across food prices. The cost will land on ordinary people.

On 12 August 2025, the interim government approved a decision to purchase two bulk carrier ships from the United States, from Hellenic Dry Bulk Ventures LLC, for nearly 1,000 crore taka. The oddity is glaring: the United States is not even among the world’s top ten shipbuilding and ship-exporting countries, yet Bangladesh is buying at prices well above market rates. And then comes the detail that makes the whole thing feel like a bad joke: both ships will be built in China. In other words, Chinese-made ships are being purchased not from China, but through the United States, at a higher price.

The interim government has also signed a 15-year LNG purchase agreement with Excelerate Energy worth around 1 lakh crore taka (8.5 billion dollars). Under the Awami League government, Bangladesh had signed a preliminary agreement with Excelerate Energy in November 2023. Before that, Bangladesh imported LNG at competitive prices through long-term deals with Qatar Energy (signed in 2017) and OQ Trading Limited, Oman (signed in 2018). The stated idea behind Excelerate was competition, with supplies expected to begin from 2026.

But after the fall of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024, Excelerate Energy intensified its efforts to expand in Bangladesh. In September, Bangladesh-focused former US ambassador Peter D Haas left the US State Department and joined Excelerate as a Strategic Advisor. In October, Excelerate’s CEO Steven M Kobos flew to Bangladesh to meet Dr Yunus. After that effective single control of LNG exports to Bangladesh moved into Excelerate’s hands. Under the interim government’s revised agreement, the price of gas purchased from Excelerate is set at 15.69 dollars per MMBtu, at least 2.5 dollars higher than the spot market. In April 2024, Bangladesh purchased LNG from the spot market at 9.5–9.93 dollars.

On 30 December, the interim government decided to buy short-term LNG from Switzerland-based SOCAR Trading S.A. Although the office is in Switzerland, it is essentially the commercial arm of SOCAR, the state oil and gas company of Azerbaijan. Notably, on 7 December, Azerbaijan’s president’s two daughters, Leyla Aliyeva and Arzu Aliyeva, visited Bangladesh and met Dr Yunus. It was Dr Yunus’s personal intervention that drove the decision to purchase LNG from the controversial SOCAR-linked company.

The interim government has not limited itself to the United States. It has launched unnecessary and highly ambitious initiatives with other countries as well. These include plans to buy JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan, purchase Eurofighter Typhoon jets from a European consortium, establish a drone factory under a G2G agreement with China and buy J-10CE fighter jets, purchase submarines from South Korea, buy T-129 ATAK helicopters from Turkey, and sign a defence agreement with Japan.

Then there is the question of ports and terminals, where decisions today can lock a country into dependencies for decades. In November, the interim government signed a 33-year agreement with APM Terminals to build and operate the Laldiya Terminal at Chattogram Patenga. The Chattogram Port’s New Mooring Container Terminal is being handed over for 30 years to UAE-based DP World. And the Pangaon inland water terminal near Dhaka has been leased for 22 years to Switzerland’s Medlog S.A..

Put all of this together and a picture forms. Dr Yunus has seized control of Bangladesh’s governing authority and, used it in two directions at once: to serve personal interests, and to satisfy those who “employ” him by pushing through agreement after agreement that runs against the country and the state. The long-term damage will not be theoretical. Bangladesh will face deeper long-term loss, the economy will deteriorate, and ordinary people will be the ones left carrying the burden.

And now comes the political insurance policy. To secure impunity for these actions and corruption, Dr Yunus has planned a referendum-style drama designed to deliver a “Yes” victory. He wants that outcome to serve as a shield. Beyond that, he is moving to amend the constitution to build a governing structure in which no future political government can undo the decisions he has made. Western powers are openly consenting because it would secure their long-term influence and business interests in Bangladesh.

The purpose for which Dr Yunus took control of Bangladesh’s governance, has been fully executed. The staged election on the 12th is meant to apply the final seal.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The secret dealing refereed here is the recent Washington Post report that exposed that US diplomats, behind close doors, have signalled their openness to work with resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami and to ‘want to be their friends.

On 12 February Bangladesh is to participate in its 13^th national election.

In the country’s history, this election stands as unique for many reasons—a) the first election held after July Uprising that deposed Sheikh Hasina’s rule on 5 August 2024, b) In a first, this national election is not seeing participation of the country’s largest party Awami League due to the ban on its party activities, c) It is also the first time that former political allies—Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) are contesting as opponents, d) the 11-party alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami puts Islamist parties at the forefront of the electoral game, a huge boost to country’s Islamist politics.

The election campaign for 13^th national election launched on 22 January, with BNP yielding the highest number of candidates (288) and Jamaat the second (224) to compete in the country’s 300 constituencies.

The resurgence of Islamists in Bangladesh owes much to the political vacuum left by Awami League after the July Uprising. The interim government aided Jamaat-e-Islami’s comeback in mainstream politics by lifting the ban, later enabling its restoration of party registration, allowing its re-entry in the electoral game after 2013.

Moreover, the interim period witnessed many Islamists convicted for 1971 war crimes or terror activities after being acquitted of all charges, allowing their arrival in the political scenario once again. One of them is ATM Azharul Islam, now contesting from Rangpur-2 constituency as Jamaat candidate. Nevertheless, Jamaat-e-Islami attempted to rebrand itself as a progressive, moderate party that seeks to create an “Islamic welfare” state.

The comeback of Islamist political parties in post-Hasina Bangladesh alongside witnessed the revival of Islamist extremism, making their loud presence in the country’s socio-cultural life. The steep rise in violence against religious and ethnic minority communities, rise in sexual violence, and mob attacks in cultural festivals should be seen as a byproduct of Islamists resurgence.

Notwithstanding the fact that Islamists political parties occasionally displayed dissatisfaction over these developments and claims its distance from radicals, one cannot ignore that the Islamists—be it political parties or extremist factions—share the same ideological goals—to create an Islamic state in Bangladesh which would be based on Sharia-based law.

These forces are essentially against the country’s state principles (one being secularism) enshrined in the 1972 Constitution and want to replace the present constitution with a new one which would follow Islamic principles instead of what they claim as ‘man-made laws.’ Undoubtedly, if these parties come to power, one would likely see a convergence of their goals being translated into violent actions. Bangladesh’s own history 1990s-mid 2000s testifies to this. 

In the mid 2025 the Islamist coalition started taking shape when five Quami- Madrasa-based registered Islamist parties—Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, Nezam-e-Islam Party, Khelafat Majlish and Islami Andolan—expressed  interest on an electoral compromise by filing a single candidate in the national election. At this stage, Jamaat attempted to forge a unity with this alliance, but it was kept out because of unity’s initial hesitation with Jamaat with respect to ideological differences as well as its controversial past.

However, in September 2025 protest called by Islami Andolan, Khelafat Majlis and Jamaat-e-Islami, alignied on five key demands which includes July Charter referendum and trial of July atrocities and introducing proportional representation in both houses. This protest was referred as ‘moving closer to forming an alliance’.

The alliance then expanded to eight ‘like-minded’ parties, this time including Jamaat-e-Islami and compromising of Islami Andolan Bangladesh, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, Khelafat Majlis, Nezame Islam Party, Bangladesh Khelafat Andolon, Bangladesh Development Party, and Jatiya Ganatantrik Party (JAGPA), declaring to contest 2026 election through a seat-sharing arrangement.

Following the official Jamaat-led coalition, Jamaat-e-Islami, resorted to aggressive historical revisionism in their speeches on the occasion on Intellectuals Martyrs Day, calling ‘India’s conspiracy’ behind the murder of intellectuals and blaming ‘Delhi loyalists’ shaping the present narrative on Liberation War.

Jamaat leaders also remarked on all government institutions to be governed only by ‘Allah’s law’, promising that if they come to power, no other man-made laws would be able to operate in the country. Indeed, the rebranding as a tolerant, moderate party was just an electoral gimmick to enter this coalition.

In December, Islamist-led alliance further expanded when National Citizen’s Party, Liberal Democratic Party and Amar Bangladesh and joined to form an 11-patry alliance. These parties earlier that month formed a separate alliance known as Democratic Reform Alliance, posing itself as an alternative to ‘old-style politics’ of Jamaat and the BNP.

The change in decision was justified by NCP as ‘changed political landscape’ and not an ‘ideological alliance’. Nevertheless, NCP’s joining of Jamaat-led alliance proved heavy for the apparent ‘revolutionary’ party, as nearly 30 members of NCP, issued a joint letter to the party convenor, opposing this move, questioning the party’s ‘democratic ethics.’

About 16 NCP members, including 13 central leaders of the party (and 16 in total), resigned from NCP, despite efforts at reconciling. The student-led political party is now openly admitting that its sole aim is to win the upcoming election, a tight slap to those who joined the party thinking of forming ‘New Bangladesh’.

The alliance’s seat-sharing was announced at a press briefing on 16 January. Jamaat announced allocations for 253 constituencies, with Jamaat contesting for 179 seats, NCP 30, Mamunul Haque-led Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish 20, Khelafat Majlish 10, Liberal Democratic Party seven, AB Party three, and Nizame Islami Party and Bangladesh Development Party two seats each. Islami Andolan, believed to have been allocated 47 seats, however, boycotted the briefing.

Amidst this, Islami Andolan’s party spokesperson claimed that Jamaat is taking all decisions unilaterally and authoritatively, leading to mistrust and divisions within the alliance. Soon after, Islami Andolan officially left led Jamaat-led 11-party alliance and stated to file independently in 268 constituencies, and expressed to support candidates aligning with its party ideals for the remaining 32 constituencies.

The party also extended its support for Khelafat Majlis’s chief Mamunul Haque, announcing withdrawal of two seats where Haque is contesting, ‘out of respect and his contributions to Islamic politics’. After leaving the alliance, Islami Andolan chief accused Jamaat of ‘using religion (Islam) to pursue conspiratorial political goals’ and even criticised its secret dealings with Washington. The same accusation has also been raised by Jamaat’s main contender Bangladesh Nationalist Party.

The secret dealing refereed here is the recent Washington Post report that exposed that US diplomats, behind close doors, have signalled their openness to work with resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami and to ‘want to be their friends’, on the prediction that Bangladesh has ‘shifted Islamic’ and that Jamaat ‘would do better than it has ever done before.

The report also stated that Jamaat, since Hasina’s ousting, has held four meeting with US officials in Washington and several in Dhaka, signalling a possible understanding. While Washington claims this conversation to be ‘off-the record discussion’ and ‘routine gathering’, Jamaat’s Barguna2 candidate’s confirmation of ‘even America moving forward by relying on Jamaat’, and also European Union, IMF and the Work Bank’s interest for Jamaat-led government in Bangladesh eliminates any suspicion of America’s influence on Jamaat in the 2026 polls.

The February national election is witnessing Islamist political parties fielding record number of candidates (36.35 per cent of total candidates) in the upcoming polls. Besides 224 candidates contesting from Jamaat, 253 candidates are contesting from Islami Andolan Bangladesh, 34 from Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis and 32 from National Citizen Party-NCP. The 11-party alliance now remains intact with  Bangladesh Labour Party joining the Jamaat-led alliance. 

The expansion of alliance to include non-Islamist parties is to paint before the world of a democratic political alliance that seeks to make Bangladesh prosperous. It, however, hides its overtly Islamist goals from them, which has only been made evident to Bangladesh’s local audience.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Bangladesh’s interim government recently gave its final approval to the draft of ‘July Mass Uprising Protection and Liability Determination Ordinance’ that grants indemnity to those who participated in the 2024 July Uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina to end her 15-year political rule and flee the country. The ordinance, believed to be the interim government’s fulfilment of ‘earlier commitment’ to ensure ‘legal protection’ to July participants, would take the shape of a law soon.

The ordinance provides impunity to participants from ‘activities carried out with the purpose of political resistance’ during 2024 uprising in July and August. Meaning, if criminal cases are slapped any of uprising participants for carrying out ‘political resistance during uprising’, such cases will be withdrawn by the government. Moreover, the ordinance adds that ‘no new cases will be filed’ against them, from now on, for their activities during the uprising.

The events of July-August have various connotations—uprising, revolution, political coup and political resistance. Those who participated in the uprising called it a ‘revolution’ that paved the way for ‘New Bangladesh’ or ‘Second Republic’. This group, composed mostly of student leaders who led the uprising and some later formed the National Citizen’s Party (NCP), has not only framed the uprising as ‘second liberation’ but also introduced a new political discussion where 1971 Liberation was brought back, reinterpreted and even compared with the 2024 uprising.

The 2024 ‘revolution’ has been portrayed by this group as fulfilling what 1971 could not, a liberation that gave Bangladesh its ‘true independence’. The same narrative is also echoed by another faction—the Islamists—for whom 2024 Uprising rolled the red carpet for their resurgence in the political field and now forms the main contending group against Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the February 2026 national election.

Collectively, the Awami League is now branded as a ‘fascist’, a justification used by the interim government for banning Awami League’s political activities in May, closing the League’s door to participate in the February 2026 national election. 

The interim government, in its official capacity, recognised the July participants as ‘july warriors’ (July Joddha), similar to ‘war heroes’ (Mukti Joddha) of Liberation War. On the first anniversary of the uprising, the interim government unveiled the July Declaration on 5 August 2025, following pressures from Student Against Discrimination (SAD), the main force behind the July Uprising and NCP to give 2024 events a constitutional recognition.

The Declaration, declared to be given a constitutional status, was supposed to be a statement to recognise the July Uprising and its ambitions for ‘Second Republic’. Rather, it became a political fatwa against Awami League and its political past since 1971 (as interpreted by its opponents), an obituary of the 1972 Constitution that is now labelled as ‘Mujibist Constitution’, and legitimising the ‘unconstitutionally’ formed interim government. 

There is little doubt about the interim government’s biases towards leaders of the July Uprising. Indeed, it was the student leaders of SAD that invited Muhammad Yunus to come back to Bangladesh and take the role of the chief advisor of the interim government on 8 August 2024.

In return, three of the advisors in the interim government were student leaders of July Uprising. Many in the political circle believe that the interim government that helped the formation of National Citizen’s Party (NCP), a King’s Party, by intentionally delaying the announcement of an election roadmap. The neutrality became exposed when one of the advisors resigned to become the convenor of the NCP, while another resigned only recently to become the NCP’s spokesperson.

Since NCP’s establishment, the interim government displayed its soft corner for the student party, echoing the same political narrative as that of NCP, and even actively taking measures of historical revisionism to erase Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy.

The recognition of July warriors has not been without controversy either. The gazetted list of about 1,402 warriors declared as ‘national heroes’ are promised tax benefits, welfare and rehabilitation, and now legal protection as per the 14 January ordinance. However, the gazetted lists were accused of including fake claimants, irregularities and political misuse, ironically the accusations slapped against Sheikh Hasina during the early phase of July Uprising when it was in the stage of anti-quota protest.

The ‘July warriors’ also violently clashed with police on the day of signing of the July Charter in October demanding for state recognition of martyr status, in addition to compensation and legal immunity—demands that were ultimately added as Clause 5 of the July Charter.

The latest move to this shenanigan—the July Mass Uprising Protection ordinance—justifies all kinds of acts that happened in July-August, especially violence against minorities and looting of arms from security forces, by indirectly branding these acts as ‘political resistance’. The wave of communal violence witnessed during this time, and continues even today were dismissed by the interim government as ‘political’.

Despite international reports, the interim government insists on these being ‘non-communal’ attacks. With only less than three weeks before 13^th national election, over one-third of the polling booths are also marked as ‘risky’, while about 1,3331 of the 5,763 firearms and explosive looted during July Uprising remain missing, posing an alarming risk to security during the election time.

The protection ordinance potentially shields all human rights abuses. Although the interim government clarified that only ‘political resistance’ is to be given legal protection, the tweaking of human rights abuses as ‘political reaction’ leaves little room to comprehend that all these criminal acts will also be treated as ‘political resistance’.

The shameful attempt to equate 2024 July with the 1971 Liberation War, by providing equal status, benefits, memorials, and now legal protection not only downplays Bangladesh’s painful history but also changes the whole political trajectory of the country where political violence will get state protection.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Authorities confirmed that the explosions caused no casualties. However, the incident added to an atmosphere of fear that has gripped the capital following several days of political unrest and violent disruptions.

Sheikh Hasina, aged 78, is currently on trial in a domestic war crimes case. She faces charges related to alleged crimes against humanity tied to the government’s response to student-led protests in mid-2024.

The former leader has been living in India since August of last year. She left the country after being removed from power during a period of intense political upheaval and mass demonstrations.

The verdict in her case is scheduled for Monday. Officials and residents fear that the announcement may trigger a fresh wave of unrest, regardless of the outcome.

Dhaka has experienced a marked increase in attacks during the buildup to the verdict. Authorities reported that on November 12 alone, more than 30 crude bombs exploded across the capital and nearby districts.

In addition to the bombings, dozens of buses were set on fire on the same day. The attacks forced authorities to heighten patrols and impose strict security measures across key locations.

Police have detained numerous supporters of Hasina’s political party, the Awami League. Officials say the arrests were made on allegations of involvement in arson, explosions, and widespread acts of sabotage.

One of the targeted locations was a local branch of Grameen Bank. The institution gained renewed visibility after the appointment of its founder, Muhammad Yunus, as the head of the interim government.

A train carriage stationed at Dhaka’s central railway terminal was also burned. Images of the incident spread quickly across local media, further heightening public concern about the escalating violence.

The police and auxiliary forces have been placed on high alert. Security officials said they are working around the clock to prevent further attacks and disrupt planned acts of unrest.

Authorities have increased checkpoints on major routes entering Dhaka. Commuters have experienced long delays as officers conduct searches of vehicles and passenger belongings.

The city’s administration has announced restrictions on public gatherings until further notice. Events involving large crowds have been suspended due to the risk of coordinated attacks.

More than 400 personnel from the Border Guard Bangladesh have been deployed across the capital. Their presence is intended to support local police and ensure rapid response capabilities.

Residents of Dhaka say the atmosphere feels increasingly unstable. Many people have reduced non-essential travel and remain indoors after sunset due to safety concerns.

Businesses have also been affected by the unrest. Shops in several commercial districts closed early this week, citing fears of property damage and potential clashes.

Analysts say the situation reflects the broader political divide that has shaped Bangladesh’s recent history. Hasina’s long tenure in power and her abrupt removal have contributed to competing narratives about accountability and justice.

Observers note that uncertainty over the upcoming verdict is fueling tension. Supporters of the former prime minister maintain that the charges are politically motivated, while critics argue that accountability is necessary.

Human rights groups have expressed concern about the rise in violent incidents. They have urged authorities to ensure that security measures respect civil liberties while maintaining public safety.

The interim government has urged the public to remain calm in the days leading up to the verdict. Officials say they are prepared for any scenario and are coordinating closely with security agencies.

As Monday approaches, Dhaka remains on edge. The city continues to brace for possible unrest, even as security forces intensify efforts to stabilize the situation.

For now, residents wait for the court’s decision in one of the most closely watched legal cases in Bangladesh’s recent political history.
The outcome is expected to have lasting implications for the country’s political landscape and public order.

Co-author Faiyaz Hossain

The OHCHR report attributes the most serious incidents, including mass shootings and organized attacks, to Sheikh Hasina’s command.

The OHCHR’s Fact-Finding Report on Bangladesh’s July–August 2024 protests arrived under the guise of impartial justice, yet beneath its lofty language lurks a narrative unmistakably tilted in favor of the July anarchists. Marketed as a breakthrough for human rights accountability, the report accuses the former Awami League government and its security agencies of widespread repression and arbitrary killings.

But a closer examination reveals a document that selectively amplifies certain voices, overlooks key actors, and compresses timelines in a way that seems designed to exonerate protestors while vilifying the state. Far from the neutral lens of international justice, this report reads more like a chronicle of grievances for one side, raising urgent questions about political bias masquerading as fact-finding.

Previous UN and OHCHR reports have faced significant criticism from various global actors. The US Senate and Congress have criticized these reports, highlighting concerns about the UN Human Rights Council’s credibility, with the US even withdrawing from the Universal Periodic Review process. Former Australian Prime Minister John Howard notably opposed UN declarations related to indigenous rights and showed skepticism toward some UN findings.

Scott Morrison also contested narratives about Australia’s climate and human rights issues at the UN, defending national achievements against criticism. UN Watch has criticized the OHCHR reports as biased and often based on selective and unverified data, with some allegations treating urban destruction as evidence of genocide. Despite the International Commission of Jurists declaring the 1971 Bangladesh war as genocide, the UN has not officially recognized it. It is time to question the investigators on their approach to findings.

A Methodology That Omits More Than It Reveals

The OHCHR report claims to have interviewed over 250 people and examined thousands of pieces of evidence, yet it provides almost no insight into how these sources were selected. Who were these witnesses? Were they victims, bystanders, or protest organizers? Crucially, the report does not include testimony from state actors, police command, the deployed army, or the accused political leadership. The omission is glaring: while protestors’ grievances are amplified in rich detail, state narratives are largely absent.

Transparency is critical in any fact-finding exercise, especially one accusing a government of “systematic abuse” (UNOG Newsroom, 12 Feb 2025). Yet the OHCHR provides no methodology annex, no criteria for witness selection, and no explanation for why key actors were excluded. The report’s timing—released under the interim Yunus government after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster—further complicates its claim to neutrality.

It reads less like an independent UN inquiry and more like a politically convenient document, quietly validating protestor claims while sidelining alternative accounts. The OHCHR factfinding team omitted interviewing the Chief of Bangladesh Army, key in forming the interim government post-August 5. Ignoring such sources questions the report’s credibility and methodology of sampling integrity.

The lack of oversight from an ethics committee for this research and the sampling anonymity of the fact-finding mission could have led to too many loopholes. It was risking the report to have significant methodological limitations to generate neutral findings.

Selective Storytelling: Elevating Protestors, Ignoring Contradictions

Throughout the report, protestors are depicted almost universally as innocent victims, while state forces are cast as unprovoked aggressors. This framing is reinforced by repeated references to “brutal, systematic repression” without adequately acknowledging the broader context of escalating violence, destruction of property, or attacks on law enforcement during the protests (UN Bangladesh, 12 Feb 2025).

Evidence that complicates the narrative is largely ignored. The report notes deaths and injuries among protestors but largely omits the fatal consequences suffered by police officers and civilians caught in the crossfire. Multiple sources, including local media investigations, highlight how some fatalities attributed to state violence actually resulted from protestor actions or unrelated incidents (AFP Fact Check, 14 Aug 2024; Prothom Alo, 2024).

Yet the OHCHR report repeatedly presents protestor casualties as a settled fact, while state casualties are minimized or absent. The report also failed to mention until the time Protesters were peaceful, there was no violence or repression from Government’s side.

The consequence is a one-sided story that exalts protestors’ suffering while rendering state actions inherently malicious. Such selective storytelling erodes the credibility of the report and undermines the very principle of impartial investigation.

The August 5 Timeline: Convenient Compression of Events

The OHCHR report attributes the most serious incidents, including mass shootings and organized attacks, to Sheikh Hasina’s command. Yet the timeline it presents raises serious doubts. Hasina left Bangladesh early on August 5, hours before many of the reported killings occurred. The report makes no attempt to distinguish between pre- and post-departure events, effectively compressing the timeline to assign maximum blame to the former government.

This approach conveniently shields protestors from scrutiny, while painting the state as singularly culpable. In reality, the situation on the ground involved a chaotic power vacuum, with multiple actors—including armed protest groups—engaging in violence. By neglecting to account for these dynamics, the report simplifies a complex scenario into a politically charged narrative favoring protestors.

Anonymity and Lack of Oversight

Unlike formal UN commissions, this report does not disclose the identities of its investigators or panel members. This lack of transparency raises serious questions about impartiality. Who selected the team? What qualifications or affiliations did they have? Could prior biases or political connections have influenced the findings?

When investigators operate in anonymity, the credibility of their conclusions suffers. In this case, the absence of oversight amplifies concerns that the report may have functioned more as a political tool than a neutral fact-finding exercise. The tilt toward protestors becomes even more conspicuous when viewed alongside selective sourcing and omitted perspectives.

Inflated Numbers and Uncorrected Errors

The OHCHR cites up to 1,400 deaths during the protests (UN Bangladesh, 12 Feb 2025), yet multiple investigations reveal serious discrepancies. AFP Fact Check (14 Aug 2024) confirmed that a Bengali newspaper’s original death toll of 201 was later revised to 193. Prothom Alo found numerous cases where accidental deaths or land dispute-related killings were falsely counted among “July martyrs” (Prothom Alo, 2024). The Business Standard reported cases of individuals presumed dead who later reappeared alive (The Business Standard, 2024).

Despite mounting evidence, the OHCHR made no effort to correct these figures. Inflated numbers serve the narrative of widespread state repression, reinforcing the portrayal of protestors as victims while ignoring inconvenient facts. In a credible fact-finding exercise, such discrepancies would necessitate correction—yet here, accuracy appears subordinate to political storytelling.

Overlooked Forensics and Contradictory Evidence

Several deaths attributed to state forces are questionable upon closer forensic examination. The report cites numerous fatalities caused by 7.62 mm ammunition, yet police insist they do not use this caliber (Prothom Alo, 2024). Other deaths occurred far from police presence or inside private homes, including the killings of children. While the OHCHR acknowledges these anomalies, it provides no independent forensic follow-up, no annex, and no detailed review of ballistic evidence.

This lack of rigorous verification strengthens the impression that the report prioritizes narrative over truth. By selectively presenting evidence that supports protestor claims while sidelining contradictory facts, the OHCHR risks transforming fact-finding into advocacy.

Weaponization of a Human Rights Report

Perhaps the most alarming outcome is how the report is being used. Despite its own disclaimer that findings “cannot themselves be used as a criminal charge” (The Daily Star, 12 Feb 2025), the report has already been cited in prosecutions against Sheikh Hasina. This effectively converts a flawed human rights document into a political weapon, legitimizing charges that might otherwise be challenged for lack of due process.

When a report meant to uphold justice becomes an instrument for political prosecution, the damage extends beyond Bangladesh. It undermines international human rights mechanisms, showing how moral language can be harnessed to serve partisan objectives rather than truth.

The Costs of Bias Toward Protestors

The OHCHR report’s bias toward protestors carries real consequences. By portraying protestors as universally innocent, it obscures the violent and destructive elements within the uprising, neglects state and civilian casualties, and inflates the scale of repression. Such skewed framing inflames polarization, diminishes accountability, and undermines public trust in both domestic and international justice systems.

Moreover, the report risks normalizing selective fact-finding in future crises. If protestor narratives are automatically elevated and state actors demonized, subsequent inquiries may repeat the same errors, leaving real victims—on all sides—without a voice. The OHCHR Report’s findings standard may lead to confirmation bias due to reliance on selective, unverified data, narrow timeframes, and predetermined narratives, undermining neutrality and comprehensive analysis.

Conclusion: Demand for Balanced Accountability

No one disputes the tragedy of the July–August 2024 protests. Innocent civilians were killed, and violations occurred. But justice cannot emerge from a report that elevates one side while marginalizing others. The OHCHR Fact-Finding Report, for all its moral rhetoric, reads as a politically convenient document favoring protestors, leaving fundamental questions of accuracy, context, and fairness unresolved.

Bangladesh—and the international community—must demand a genuinely impartial investigation. Such an inquiry would engage all parties, rigorously verify claims, and resist the temptation to craft a narrative that fits political convenience. Until then, the OHCHR report stands less as a testament to justice than as a cautionary example of how human rights language can be weaponized to serve partial agendas.

The OHCHR report reads like an exploratory discussion highlighting one side while completely ignoring the previous Government. It is time the UN call for a impartial judicial investigation with international oversight and documentations.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The interim government’s influence extends deep into the judiciary. Judges are pressured; prosecutors are politicized.

Instead of being released on bail granted by the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, on 4 September 2025, Khodadad Khan Pitu (60), former President of the Naogaon District Bar Association and President of the Human Rights Lawyers’ Forum, Naogaon, was re-arrested by Naogaon Sadar police from the gate of Naogaon District Jail.

On 5 September, he was produced before the court in connection with a 2024 case filed over an incident in 2022 under the Explosive Substances Act, and the court ordered him sent to jail.

Earlier, in the early hours of 17 July 2025 (around 2:30 a.m.), police had arrested him from his residence in the Chokmoyrdi Post Office area of Naogaon town. Although his name was not initially included in the 2024 case of vandalism and arson at the local BNP office, it was later added during the investigation, and he was sent to prison after being presented in court. He subsequently obtained bail from the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.

Prior to that, he had voluntarily surrendered and obtained bail in another case filed during the July movement against attacks on students and ordinary citizens.

On 2 September 2025, twelve lawyers in Barguna District surrendered before the District and Sessions Judge in a case related to vandalism and arson at a BNP office. The court denied them bail. Eight days later, the High Court granted six weeks’ bail to ten of them. Yet, moments before their release, they were re-arrested under a newly fabricated case filed under the Special Powers Act by Betagi Police Station and sent straight back to prison.

Among those re-arrested were Mahabubul Bari Aslam, former President of the Barguna District Bar Association, and Advocates Mojibur Rahman, Saimum Islam Rabbi, Humayun Kabir Poltu, and Nurul Islam. Their brief taste of freedom became a cruel illusion, underscoring a chilling reality: even High Court bail cannot protect lawyers from politically engineered persecution.

These are not an isolated incidents. Rather, between August 2024 and September 2025, Justicemakers Bangladesh in France (JMBF) documented 75 incidents of imprisonment affecting 203 lawyers. Each case reveals a deliberate strategy: fabricated charges, coerced surrenders, manipulated court procedures, and prolonged pre-trial detentions.

The largest share of these imprisonments arose from attempted murder (15 incidents, 103 victims) and murder (25 incidents, 43 victims)—serious accusations crafted to discredit and intimidate. Other allegations include sabotage, vandalism, seditious conspiracy, and extortion, laws selectively revived to target politically active lawyers or those defending victims of state abuse.

The regime has weaponized the law itself, turning courts into instruments of fear rather than justice. Lawyers affiliated with the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) have been particularly targeted, with legal compliance—surrendering or filing bail applications—used against them as evidence of guilt.

The case of Advocate Abu Sayeed Sagar, former Dhaka Bar Association president, epitomizes this tactic. During the 2023 Supreme Court Bar Association election, a minor scuffle became the pretext for charges against him. After securing six weeks of anticipatory bail, Sagar voluntarily surrendered on 5 October 2025 to renew it. Instead of a hearing, he was denied bail and jailed. Under the Yunus-led interim government, surrender no longer signifies compliance with the law—it becomes a trapdoor into imprisonment, illustrating how even lawful acts are punished.

Among the 75 documented incidents, 57 involved arrests leading directly to imprisonment. Lawyers have been detained at home, in offices, and even in courtrooms, signaling that no professional stature offers protection.

Each detention removes one voice and intimidates countless others. Bar associations hesitate to convene; young lawyers adopt silence as a survival tactic. The courtroom, once a sanctuary of justice, now functions as a stage for repression.

Behind these numbers are shattered lives. Prisoned lawyers endure overcrowded cells, denial of medical care, and restricted family visits. Many have lost their livelihoods; some have fled abroad to continue their work in exile. Families live in fear, and entire legal communities operate under siege, paralyzed by collective anxiety.

Since mid-2024, the Yunus administration, installed under the banner of “transition and reform”, has systematically dismantled civil liberties, silenced journalists, and targeted professionals aligned with the Awami League. A Nobel Peace laureate now presides over a government that governs through fear, betraying the principles for which he was once celebrated internationally.

The interim government’s influence extends deep into the judiciary. Judges are pressured; prosecutors are politicized. Bail hearings are postponed indefinitely, and lawyers are denied access to case files. This violates Bangladesh’s Constitution and Article 9 of the ICCPR, which prohibits arbitrary detention. Courts have shifted from being protectors of justice to instruments of political repression.

In today’s Bangladesh, detention is preventive, not punitive. Lawyers are imprisoned before dissent occurs, neutralizing critics and stifling independent advocacy. By incarcerating defenders of justice, the government effectively incarcerates the legal conscience of the nation.

Bangladesh is obliged to follow the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (1990) and the ICCPR, both guaranteeing lawyers the right to perform their duties “without intimidation, hindrance, harassment, or improper interference.” The mass imprisonment of lawyers under the Yunus government is a direct violation of these commitments, making the administration complicit in systematic human-rights abuse.

The international community must act decisively. The UN and other human-rights bodies should conduct thorough fact-finding missions, while international legal associations monitor trials and document violations of due process. Governments should consider targeted measures, including visa bans and asset freezes against officials responsible for repression, and provide emergency visas or asylum for lawyers facing imminent arrest. Silence from Nobel committees, universities, or civil-society leaders can no longer be tolerated; neutrality in the face of such abuses is complicity.

The mass imprisonment of lawyers in Bangladesh represents a moral collapse of governance. By criminalizing advocacy itself, the Yunus-led interim government has weaponized justice as an instrument of fear.

Muhammad Yunus, once celebrated for empowering the powerless, now presides over a regime that suppresses those who defend them. The world must judge him not by accolades, but by the lives of those jailed for defending the law.

When defenders of justice are silenced, it is not only lawyers who are imprisoned—it is the conscience of Bangladesh itself.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

This situation also reflects a collapse of the justice system. A culture of impunity has taken root, eroding public faith in the legal system.

For the first time in Bangladesh’s history, an interim government has been formed under the leadership of a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Many hoped this government would end political unrest and repression, ushering in a new era of good governance and justice. Yet, in just ten months, this government has become synonymous with suffering and disillusionment for ordinary citizens.

On July 9, 2025, in the heart of Old Dhaka, the brutal broad-daylight murder of a businessman was not merely a homicide—it was a stark, naked revelation of state failure. This failure goes beyond the cruelty of the act or the audacity of the perpetrators. It is rooted in the government’s silence, the inaction of the administration, and, above all, the arrogance of criminals operating under political protection.

The details of the incident expose extreme brutality. The victim, Lal Chand alias Sohag, aged 39, was a scrap trader. The murder took place around 6 p.m. in front of Gate No. 3 of Mitford Hospital on Rajani Ghosh Lane—at a time when the city’s bustle had not yet paused for the evening. Approximately 19 to 20 assailants arrived on seven motorcycles and surrounded him. They beat him with bricks, stones, and concrete blocks, dragged him through the street, stomped on his body, and celebrated with barbaric delight. Bystanders, terrified, dared not intervene. The killing was filmed and quickly went viral, sparking outrage across the country.

But this was not an isolated act of violence. It was a premeditated murder over extortion. According to local sources, influential leaders of the BNP’s affiliated organizations—Jubo Dal, Chhatra Dal, and Swechchhasebak Dal—had demanded five lakh takas in extortion from the victim. Upon refusal, he was murdered. The most alarming aspect is that despite political names being linked to the incident, no visible or effective administrative action has been taken. While a few arrests have been made, the masterminds remain untouched.

This single murder reflects the severe deterioration of Bangladesh’s law and order situation. But the broader statistics are even more terrifying. According to data from the Bangladesh Police Headquarters, under the interim government led by Nobel Peace Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, crime has surged at an alarming rate in just ten months (September 2024 to June 2025).

During this time, 3,554 murders were committed nationwide. There were 4,105 cases of rape and 12,726 incidents of violence against women and children. Additionally, 610 armed robberies, 1,526 cases of banditry, and 97 riots occurred. There were 819 kidnappings, five acid attacks, 2,304 burglaries, and 7,310 thefts. Disturbingly, there were also 479 recorded attacks on law enforcement agencies, underscoring the gravity of the situation and the state’s loss of control.

These figures are not just numbers—they are testimony to a historic failure of governance and a complete collapse of public safety. That such horror could unfold in such a short span does not merely indicate governmental incompetence; it suggests a troubling absence of political will.

Dr. Muhammad Yunus is a globally renowned figure. He earned the Nobel Peace Prize for empowering women through microcredit. Yet, under his leadership, this interim government has utterly failed to guarantee even the most basic level of security for its citizens.

People had hoped that this administration would eliminate irregularities, corruption, and repressive politics, and establish a peaceful political climate. The reality, however, is grim: instead of confronting crime, this government appears to have surrendered to it.

Even more alarming is how senior members of the interim government, particularly the press wing of the Chief Adviser, continue to deny the surge in crime, downplaying the justice crisis with shocking indifference.

In most cases, perpetrators are shielded from the law due to their political affiliations. Political influence over police investigations is so blatant that many cases are suppressed before any inquiry begins. Even the judiciary appears to be under invisible pressure, casting serious doubt over the possibility of justice.

This is not merely a failure of the police force—it is a reflection of a profound moral and political void within the government. The interim administration came to power promising to protect human rights and uphold the rule of law. Yet, its actions suggest it has become a guardian of special interest groups, abandoning the safety of ordinary citizens. How incompetent must a government be for a businessman to be murdered so savagely in one of the capital’s busiest areas in broad daylight?

This situation also reflects a collapse of the justice system. A culture of impunity has taken root, eroding public faith in the legal system. As hope for justice fades, people either remain silent or are tempted to take the law into their own hands. This is a dangerous trend that is pushing society toward chaos.

Citizens’ basic demands are security, justice, and accountability from the state. A government that fails to provide these cannot claim to be democratic or people-oriented.

Dr. Yunus’s interim government wanted to be seen as an ethically superior body before the next elections. But now, one must ask: How ethical is this government? A businessman was killed in the street, and the government responded with token statements instead of concrete actions.

International human rights organizations, usually vocal about Bangladesh, have gone conspicuously silent. Groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, which previously condemned rights violations in the country, have offered no reaction to this alarming deterioration—as if law and order and human rights are flourishing under Dr. Yunus’s interim government.

In reality, police forces are increasingly accused of collusion with criminals, damaging Bangladesh’s image globally. And while mainstream media remains cautious due to fear of reprisals, social media is abuzz with criticism and outrage. Yet the government has offered no substantive response. Instead, it continues labeling these incidents as “isolated,” denying the depth of the crisis—an attitude that signals something even more dangerous.

What the country urgently needs now is an independent, neutral, and accountable administration—one that serves the people, not political or financial elites. Not just in Sohag’s case, but for every murder, rape, or major crime of the past ten months, there must be impartial investigations and swift justice.

The government must move beyond press briefings and acknowledge reality. It must immediately publish a clear roadmap to combat crime, ensure access to justice, and hold institutions accountable.

Bangladesh is no longer a poor, repressed nation. Its citizens are now aware, digitally connected, and demand answers. If those in power fail to act now, the people will soon hold them accountable in the court of history.

In the end, if even a Nobel Peace Prize winner cannot bring peace to the people, then that Nobel Prize becomes a cruel irony of history. And if this interim government cannot ensure even basic security, then the legitimacy of any future election or political process it oversees will be called into question. The answer must come now—not in words, but in action.

Author: Human Rights Lawyer; Laureate of the French Government’s Marianne Initiative for Human Rights Defenders 2023; Founder President of JusticeMakers Bangladesh in France (JMBF). You can reach him by email: shahanur.islam@jmbf.org; Website: www.jmbf.org