Balochistan’s modern history is inseparable from the manner in which it entered Pakistan.

On December 10, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Islamabad, Natalie Baker, announced that the U.S. Exim Bank had approved a package of $1.25 billion in financing to support mining operations at Reko Diq, one of the world’s richest untapped copper and gold deposits. On the surface, Washington framed the decision as a step toward securing global supply chains for critical minerals.

Islamabad portrayed it as a sign of renewed confidence in Pakistan’s investment climate. But for Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province by land but its poorest by every measure, the announcement landed like yet another reminder that its natural wealth is a prize others are free to carve up.

This Exim Bank financing flows directly after two MoUs were signed on September 8, 2025, between Pakistan and the United States for “critical minerals cooperation.” The military dominated Shehbaz Sharif government heralded the agreements as a milestone. But in Balochistan, they are yet another chapter in an old story: the extraction of Balochistan’s resources by outside powers, facilitated by a central government that treats the province not as a partner but as a colony.

For decades, Pakistan has perfected a model of imperial governance in Balochistan, which combines military control, political manipulation, and economic dispossession. What is new today is not the extraction but the identity of the extractors. The United States now joins China, whose multibillion-dollar projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have already given Beijing expansive access to Balochistan’s ports, highways, and mineral deposits.

Pakistan’s rulers have turned Balochistan into a marketplace where global powers shop for resources while the people who live above those riches remain among the most deprived in South Asia.

Balochistan’s modern history is inseparable from the manner in which it entered Pakistan. After the forced accession of 1948, the province was governed with suspicion and repression. Islamabad treated Baloch aspirations for autonomy as rebellion, not politics. The result is a province where the most powerful institution is not the provincial assembly but the Quetta cantonment, whose writ supersedes that of any civilian office.

Even today, Balochistan’s political leadership is crafted in military corridors of Rawalpindi and the condonement at Quetta. The current chief minister, Sarfaraz Bugti, is widely viewed as a product of the military establishment, who is another local administrator empowered to manage dissent rather than address the province’s material deprivation. The result is a governance system more interested in securing resource corridors than building schools, hospitals, or representative institutions.

Under this militarized order, resource extraction has been carefully organized to ensure that wealth flows outward to Pakistan’s dominant province, Punjab, and to foreign partners courted by the military-led state. Balochistan’s natural gas from Sui fueled Pakistan’s industrial growth for decades, yet most Baloch households cook on firewood.

Today, its copper and gold fields promise to enrich foreign corporations and deliver revenue to Islamabad, while the communities living in the shadow of these mines remain jobless, landless, and under surveillance.

Even menial jobs at major projects like security guards, cleaners, construction labor, are routinely filled by workers imported from Punjab. The message is unmistakable that the state does not merely extract from Balochistan, it excludes Baloch people from even the crumbs of that extraction.

The rush by both China and the U.S. for access to Balochistan’s minerals reflects how Pakistan’s ruling elite has repositioned the province within global competition. Beijing’s footprint was first to expand, anchored by the Gwadar port and a series of infrastructure and mining agreements.

CPEC promised development but delivered a model where Chinese companies received generous concessions, security cordons were erected to protect foreign workers, and local fishing communities were pushed to the margins.

Now, Washington enters the scene, not as a counterweight to China’s influence but as another partner in Pakistan’s long tradition of opaque, extractive deals. It reflects a bipartisan plunder with Pakistan inviting multiple patrons to mine a region whose own residents are denied the most basic political and economic rights.

The most striking thing about Balochistan is how starkly its material reality contradicts its mineral wealth. Despite being mineral rich in every aspect, the province ranks at the bottom of every development index in Pakistan. For instance, the poverty appears near-universal with 71 percent of the provincial population living in multidimensional poverty. It is nearly double the national average of 38 percent and in districts like Awaran, Kharan, and Panjgur, even exceeds 80 percent.

Likewise, education is in an equally dire state. Literacy hovers around 40–44 percent, the lowest in the country, with female literacy dropping below 25 percent in many rural districts. More than 60 percent of Balochistan’s children are out of school. These are not statistics of a neglected province; they are the metrics of deliberate underdevelopment.

The story is same across healthcare with the province recording the highest maternal mortality ratio of 785 deaths per 100,000 live births. It is abysmal compared to the national average of 186.

Nevertheless, the new U.S. financing for Reko Diq along with the other critical mineral MoU is significant not because it marks a shift in Washington’s policy but because it reveals a continuity in Pakistan’s own governing logic of treating Balochistan as a frontier to exploit.

The province is secured by force, governed through proxies, and opened to whichever foreign power is willing to invest billions with no questions asked about political rights or local consent.

Even when the government speaks of “benefit-sharing,” it does not specify it that the benefit is for Punjabis and Punjabi military and political elite that dominates the levers of power in Pakistan. As such, it is not partnership but a plunder with legal paperwork.

The tragedy is not just that Balochistan’s resources are being plundered. It is that this plunder is now bipartisan, endorsed by Islamabad, welcomed by Washington and Beijing, and justified in the name of development that never arrives.

For the people of Balochistan, the empire has simply added new partners. The loot continues. The province remains impoverished. And the world’s most powerful countries now share in the spoils of a land whose own residents have yet to taste the prosperity lying beneath their feet.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

The latest incident occurred on 27 September in the Dasht Konchati area of Kech, where Pakistani forces reportedly carried out a late-night raid. Two men — Altaf, son of Habtain, and Gulab, son of Ayub Baloch — were seized from the area. According to family members, no information has been provided by authorities about their location or condition.

Two days earlier, on 25 September, Saud, son of Haji Rahim, was taken from his home in Hairabad. His relatives remain unaware of his fate, heightening concerns he too has been forcibly disappeared.

Human rights activist Noora Marri, commenting on the pattern of detentions, said the situation has become unbearable for families across the province.

“Every week brings new names of disappeared Baloch men. Their families are left to suffer in silence while the state refuses to acknowledge their arrests,” she wrote in The Baloch Circle. “This cycle of fear must end.”

While several individuals remain missing, there have been a few recent releases. Sheeraz, son of Ghulam Qadir, from Barkhan, who was detained on 20 September, returned home a week later.

In Turbat, Siraj, son of Sanjar, was freed on 27 September after being detained the day before. Meanwhile, Asghar Karmdani has also been reunited with his family after spending three months in custody.

Security operations continue across the wider region. In Buleda, forces stormed homes in the Gardank area on Saturday, with local witnesses reporting gunfire in residential neighbourhoods — though no casualties have been confirmed. In Panjgur district, raids were conducted in Haji Isa Bazaar, Haji Hakeem Bazaar and Kadaan, where houses were searched and the surroundings photographed and filmed. No arrests or injuries have been reported in these operations.

For many in Balochistan, such raids — often followed by disappearances — have become a grim routine, reinforcing long-held fears of unchecked security powers and a lack of accountability.

In a formal communication dated 13 August 2025, UN Special Rapporteurs requested clarification from Islamabad following reports concerning the deaths of journalist and human rights advocate Abdul Latif Baloch and his son, Saif Baloch, as well as the arrest of civil society coordinator Gulzar Dost.

The experts said they were deeply concerned by allegations that the killings were linked to reprisals against Mr Baloch’s family. They called on authorities to ensure an “independent, impartial and transparent” investigation, warning that accountability was essential.

According to the letter, Abdul Latif Baloch was shot dead by unidentified armed men at his home in Mashkay, Awaran district, on 24 May 2025. His son Saif was reportedly detained by Pakistani military personnel on 28 February and subsequently disappeared. His body was recovered on 26 March, prompting fears of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial execution.

The communication also referred to Mr Baloch’s earlier detention and alleged torture by security agencies. It noted that his brother, Rasheed Ali Baloch, died in custody in 2011 – raising what the UN experts called a pattern of human rights abuses linked to security operations in Balochistan.

Concerns were also raised over the case of activist Gulzar Dost, coordinator of the Turbat Civil Society Forum. He was taken from his home on 6 July 2025 and charged under anti-terrorism laws despite the lack of an arrest warrant, the letter said. He was released on bail on 1 August, but UN experts argued the case illustrated how anti-terror legislation was being used to target human rights defenders.

The letter set out seven specific questions for the Pakistani government, including updates on investigations into the deaths of Abdul Latif, Saif and Rasheed Baloch, and clarification of the legal basis for Mr Dost’s arrest.

Pakistan, the experts said, remains bound by international obligations to safeguard the right to life, protect freedom of expression and ensure the safety of those defending human rights. They urged authorities to act swiftly in addressing the allegations.

Islamist terrorism did not rise in a vacuum. It was engineered, cultivated, and weaponized—first by colonial powers, then by Cold War strategists, and now by regional regimes.

In the aftermath of European colonialism, the world has seen many upheavals—but few have been as globally disruptive and persistently violent as the rise of Islamist terrorism. It is one of the darkest legacies of the colonial era, ironically shaped and sharpened by the very empires it now claims to oppose. Today, it stands as a transnational threat, claiming lives from Karachi to Kuala Lumpur, and from Tel Aviv to London.

The data tells a haunting story. Since 1979—the year of the Shia Islamic Revolution in Iran—there have been more than 49,000 Islamist terror attacks worldwide, resulting in over 220,000 deaths. But what is often overlooked is the fact that 89.5% of these attacks occurred in Muslim-majority countries, with the vast majority of victims being Muslims themselves. Even the holiest of sites, such as Mecca, have not been spared. The carnage is indiscriminate, and the ideology behind it is far more complex than simplistic narratives often suggest.

Islamist groups would have the world believe that their violence is a response to foreign occupation or injustice. Yet the overwhelming facts betray that narrative. Most Islamist terrorism does not take place in occupied territories but in nations where Muslims are the majority. This disproportionality demands a deeper, more historically rooted investigation into how this ideology emerged and why it continues to thrive.

The Colonial Incubator of Political Islam

To understand the modern-day menace of Islamist terrorism, we must go back to the time of European imperialism—particularly British colonial rule. Colonizers, determined to suppress nationalist uprisings and maintain control over their dominions, employed a classic divide-and-rule strategy. In this context, religious identity became a tool of political manipulation.

Extremist elements were co-opted and even fostered by colonial administrators to counter secular, anti-colonial movements. It is no coincidence that key Islamist movements—such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamaat-e-Islami in India—were born during this time. These Islamist movements did not rise organically from within their societies as spiritual or theological reforms; rather, they were often sponsored or tolerated by colonial regimes as buffers against resistance.

Figures like Sir Syed Ahmed, who promoted the divisive “two-nation theory” in British India, and Sir Agha Khan, who founded the Muslim League, played pivotal roles in politicizing Islam. Their ideas—encouraged, amplified, or at least facilitated by the British—ultimately contributed to the partition of India and laid the groundwork for modern political Islam. This ideological framework would later become fertile ground for the rise of violent jihadist movements.

From West Africa to Southeast Asia, similar patterns emerged: colonial authorities empowering Islamist elements for short-term control, only to leave behind long-term instability.

Cold War Complicity and the Rise of Armed Jihad

The Cold War did not reverse this legacy—it accelerated it. In Afghanistan, for example, the United States and its allies, including Pakistan, armed and trained Islamist fighters to push back against Soviet expansion. The result was the creation of well-equipped and ideologically radicalized groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

What was once political Islam turned into militant jihadism. The West had, once again, fed the very forces it would later call its enemies.

The Twin Threats: State-Sponsored and Non-State Jihadism

In the modern context, Islamist terrorism operates under two primary umbrellas: non-state actors and state-sponsored networks.

Non-state actors are dispersed, often embedded within societies, waiting for ideological or operational cues. Their roots trace back to political Islamist thought developed during colonialism, shaped further by theological radicalism and geopolitical grievances. Their dream of a global caliphate transcends borders, and they are often motivated not by poverty or lack of opportunity—but by ideology. No amount of economic aid or deradicalization programs alone can address this; it requires ideological confrontation led by credible scholars and religious authorities.

On the other hand, state-sponsored Islamist terrorism is far more organized—and dangerous. Here, nation-states actively fund, shelter, or enable terrorist proxies to project power or destabilize rivals. Iran, since the 1979 revolution, stands out as the most prolific actor. From supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza, and from Houthi insurgents in Yemen to Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, Iran’s fingerprints are evident across some of the most devastating conflicts in the Middle East.

Turkey and Qatar, despite being close Western allies, also play significant roles. Both states have financially supported Islamist groups—including the Muslim Brotherhood and others—across North Africa and the Levant. Media outlets like TRT (Turkey) and Al Jazeera (Qatar) have become soft-power instruments, often amplifying Islamist narratives under the guise of journalistic independence.

Then there is Pakistan—arguably the most paradoxical player. Created as a result of colonial partition, Pakistan has, since its inception, used Islamist militancy as statecraft. Its long-standing doctrine of “Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts” has led to decades of cross-border terrorism. From Kashmir to Punjab, from Naxalite regions to the Northeast, India has faced relentless proxy warfare orchestrated from across the border.

Unlike Iran, Pakistan has largely escaped Western censure or sanctions, remaining a “major non-NATO ally” and benefiting from strategic utility. Whether during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets or the post-9/11 conflict, Pakistan’s duplicity has been tolerated, if not rewarded.

A recent example was the attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, where 26 innocent civilians were killed by Pakistan-sponsored Islamist militants. It is part of a consistent pattern—not an anomaly.

Solutions Begin with Truth and Courage

Combating Islamist terrorism requires more than drones, security checkpoints, or surveillance. It demands truth—about its origins, its enablers, and its geopolitical underpinnings.

The first step must involve addressing state actors that perpetuate terrorism under ideological or strategic pretexts. In this context, resolving the “Pakistan-Iran-Turkey” triad is essential. And one of the most viable ways to do this is by supporting the self-determination of oppressed peoples within those states.

The liberation of Balochistan (currently divided between Pakistan and Iran) and Kurdistan (spanning parts of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria) is not just a moral imperative—it could be a strategic game-changer. Empowering these freedom movements would strike at the very heart of the Islamist-terror ecosystem and weaken the foundations upon which these regimes rely.

Time for a Reckoning—and a Response

India, Israel, and democratic states across the world must come together, not just to condemn terrorism, but to confront its root causes and supporters. The West, too, has an opportunity—a responsibility—to correct the historical wrongs of colonialism. This means no longer appeasing authoritarian allies who feed Islamist extremism for their own ends.

Islamist terrorism did not rise in a vacuum. It was engineered, cultivated, and weaponized—first by colonial powers, then by Cold War strategists, and now by regional regimes. To dismantle it, we must stop treating the symptoms and start confronting the disease.

And that means standing with those who fight for freedom—not those who hide behind religion to suppress it.

Discrimination is one of the prominent characteristics of Mullahs’ regime.

The mullahs of Iran are the masters of hypocrisy and throughout history never practiced what they preached. They easily do and justify what they proclaim sinful for others and punish others for it.  

Before entering Iran, Khomeini, while in Paris, spoke of freedom and well-being of the people and that in Islam, freedom is one of the most fundamental principles. He promised free water and electricity for the people. He said that after coming to Iran, he would go to the city of Qom as a simple cleric and would not interfere in politics. However, when he grabbed the power, he consciously and selectively gave up all his promises and established a religious dictatorship called Velayat-e-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) under the pretext of establishing an Islamic state.  

He did his best to eliminate all his opponents by either killing them or locking them up. He did not even show mercy to those who helped bring him to power, such as Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who was his foreign minister, and executed him and Bani-Sadr, who became Iran’s first president, but was forced to flee Iran for fear of having a similar fate as Ghotbzadeh. 

Khomeini legitimized all forms of torture, even to the point of death in prisons. He executed thousands of teenage girls and boys just because they opposed his ideas and demanded freedom. 

He allowed the rape of girls in prisons and sent tens of thousands of schoolboys to their death in minefields during the eight years war with Iraq to fulfill his desire to conquer Iraq. 

Discrimination is one of the prominent characteristics of Mullahs’ regime. That is why we see that while the majority of Iranians now live below the poverty line, the affiliates of the regime’s leaders have millions of dollars in wealth, and their children live like kings and queens in the United States and Europe.

With this introduction, it is very clear that the treatment of the regime’s elites is not the same as ordinary people. While most Iranians are deprived of basic medical treatment and many small towns do not have hospitals and specialist doctors, regime leaders and their affiliates go to Europe for medical treatments when needed. For example, Mojtaba, son of Ali Khamenei, and his wife went to London accompanied by his mother-in-law and 20 bodyguards, rented a floor of an expensive hotel, and stayed there for two months for treatment of his wife. 

This was a glimpse at the major discrimination in the treatment of ordinary people and the regime’s officials and affiliates. 

The deprived people on the outskirts of cities and ethnic minorities such as Balochs, Kurds, and Arabs, whose provinces are among the poorest in Iran are doubly oppressed compared to other provinces in terms of medical facilities and care.  

For example, according to Moinuddin Saeedi, a member of parliament from the city of Chabahar in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan, with a population of more than 800,000, there is only one hospital with 196 beds, which also lacks the requirements to treating coronavirus. Or, according to Malek Fazeli, a representative of the city of Saravan, this city of 480,000 people has only one hospital and does not have any ward for treatment of coronavirus. 

The same situation prevails in many of these deprived areas while regime leaders brag about social justice! 

With the outbreak of coronavirus, all Iranians fell victim to the anti-human policies of the mullahs. The pandemic coincided with the parliamentary elections in Iran. Although several people in the city of Qom had contracted the disease before the election, and some doctors had warned about an imminent outbreak of the virus, on Khamenei’s behest, (since he wanted to fill up the parliament with his direct affiliates in an engineered election and defeat the opposition and did not want any interruption in his plan), regime officials, including the Ministry of Health, denied the existence of any coronavirus patient in Iran and took no action to quarantine Qom or ban flights from China that caused the outbreak. As a result, the disease spread throughout the country at a rapid rate.  

Furthermore, when the disease was taking heavy casualties all over Iran, Khamenei banned the import of vaccines from the US, France, and Britain. They did not even accept the help offered by other countries and did not allow entry to a team of Doctors Without Borders from France that brought a field hospital with them. They return them to France. Because they knew that with their presence, the catastrophic situation of the disease in Iran would become public and they could no longer hide it.  

This led to the killing of many people in Iran. According to reliable statistics obtained by the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) from its sources inside Iran, the actual number of victims has reached over 460,000. But Khamenei, fearing a backlash from the people, always put the figure at a quarter of the actual number, threatening to silence the doctors and those who challenged the figures or provided real figures  

In essence, Khamenei’s intention was to keep the people of Iran occupied with the coronavirus and forget about the social and economic challenges they were dealing with. Khamenei was fearful that because of people’s discontent with its regime, another widespread uprising, similar to the November 2019 uprising, might take place. At the same time, he banned any gathering under the pretext of fighting the disease. To achieve his goal, Khamenei used the network of Friday prayer Imams to blame all the shortages of vaccine – medicine and equipment on the United States and sanctions. While the United States has repeatedly stated that imports of medication and medical equipment were never among the sanctioned items.  

Meanwhile, the mafia in control of the drug supply, instead of buying vaccines from the countries that succeeded in producing them, looted more than $120 million, with the promise that Iran itself is producing vaccines. But after two years, under various excuses, they broke their promises to produce a domestic vaccine. Meanwhile, their fraudulent action inflicted heavy casualties on the people who paid a big price for it. 

But now, after nearly two years of the outbreak, while many Iranians have lost one or more family members to this disease, everyone blames Khamenei for this situation. It is quite clear to the Iranian that the main culprit is Khamenei, and this can be seen in the statements of people on social media who want Khamenei and the regime leaders held accountable for this massacre. 

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the Middle East countries in general and Iran in particular.

The society has turned into a powder keg ready to explode at any moment with a little spark…

On the first day of Persian New Year of 1400 (March 21st), the Supreme Leader of the Iranian regime, Ali Khamenei, devoted the most important part of his Nowruz speech to Iran’s presidential elections scheduled to be held in June. During the last 32 years that Khamenei has ruled Iran as the supreme leader, eight presidential elections have been held.

In 2009, President Ahmadinejad was re-elected due to widespread fraud on Khamenei’s orders which led to major protests across Iran. The regime responded with lethal force, killing protesters.

Since the 2017 nationwide protests, Iranians have actively expressed their hatred towards both factions, the hardliners, and the so-called reformists, and have called for regime change. So why are Iran’s presidential elections so important to Khamenei?

The Iranian regime is in its weakest state since the 1979 revolution that brought down the Shah. Even according to regime officials, more than 70 million people in Iran are dissatisfied with the current situation and want fundamental change in the ruling system. The economic and living conditions of Iranians have deteriorated during the last 42 years with more than 60% of the population living below the poverty line. The middle class has disappeared and nearly 35 million people have been driven to the outskirts of cities due to poverty and inability to pay for housing. Many workers have not received even their meager wages for months. Inflation in the food sector has reached over 60% in almost all provinces of Iran, and as a result, many people have long removed items such as meat and fruits from their food baskets and even buy bread in installments.

Searching in the trash, selling body parts, and even selling children, which has no precedent in Iran, has become commonplace. Addiction and suicide rates have reached unprecedented levels, especially among young people in lower classes. Iranians who overthrew the Shah in hope of freedom and a better life are now facing oppression, and dictatorship on the one hand, and poverty, misery, and rampant corruption on the other.

As a result, the society has turned into a powder keg ready to explode at any moment with a little spark. The nationwide protests that took place in 2017 and 2019 in Iran are manifestations of this fact. Although Khamenei was able to eventually stop the protests and prevent the downfall of his regime with brutal crack downs at the time, it is unlikely he would be able to control and suppress future protests.

Despite his power over everything in the regime including his title as Commander-in-Chief and his absolute sway over the Judiciary, Khamenei has always claimed innocence when it comes to the people’s misfortunes. He has always blamed the government and the President for the people’s plight.

But now the situation is so dire that there is a feud between the two factions within the regime to maintain and save the ruling system. Although the “reformists” have always stolen the wealth of the Iranian people and have cracked down on protests along with the hardliners, they see the way out of the current impasse in interaction with the West and the United States and want to reduce the power of the Supreme Leader and increase the president’s prerogatives.

Current President Hassan Rouhani, who is a so-called reformist, recently raised the issue of holding a referendum on increasing the president’s prerogative, though it received strong opposition by the hardliners.

However, the main issue for Khamenei is neither the dispute over the JCPOA nor the disagreement with his own presidents.

Khamenei knows the economic crisis, corruption, unemployment, poverty, and other problems that anger Iranians have put the society in an explosive state, prone to protests that can bring down his regime.

Therefore, for his regime’s survival and to maintain his hegemony, he must take control of the situation. The first thing he is trying to do is end the current divisions among regime elites by engineering Iran’s presidential elections, even though the current and previous presidents were all his partner in crime and in agreement for, repression, looting and terrorism.

Khamenei knows that if he falls short of his authority as the Supreme Leader, this will create even more divisions in the ruling system and bring down his regime. He sees the way out of this situation by unifying his regime as much as possible while increasing repression inside Iran.

He made this clear during his Nowruz speech and said that the Presidential elections must be “unipolar”.

The various protests that are seen almost daily in Iran can quickly turn into a confrontation between the people and security forces and the IRGC, the last of which we saw last month in Sistan and Baluchistan and Hormozgan provinces and recently in Bushehr province. Any of these protests can be the spark that both sides of the regime are afraid of and constantly remind each other that if people take to the streets, the regime’s “boat will sink” and will take with it both the hardliners and the “reformists”.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the social issues and economy of the middle east countries that are relying on the oil revenue and comparing their progress to their ruling system, especially covering a variety of topics about Iran.

A Voice says, “We will celebrate the fire festival to the dismay of Khamenei. Death to Khamenei and the Islamic Republic”.

On March 16, 2021, Iranians celebrated the ancient festival of Chaharshanbe Soori or fire festival which has its origin in ancient Iranian rituals, on the eve of the last Wednesday before Nowruz (the first day of New year in the Iranian calendars).

Before the start of the festival, people gather brushwood in an open, free exterior space. At sunset, after making one or more bonfires, they jump over the flames while singing.

The regime hates Chaharshanbe Soori festival and views it as a threat to its security. Iranians celebrate regardless of the regime’s threats against the celebration of the Fire Festival.

On Tuesday, Mar. 16, Despite broad efforts by the regime to prevent celebrations people across Iran, celebrated this Persian tradition.

The regime fears that such assemblies can lead up to anti-regime protests. Therefore the security forces prepared intense measures to prevent any kind of celebration.

According to reports obtained from different cities, there was a heavy presence of security forces in different cities. In Karaj, Alborz province, security forces were patrolling the streets to prevent people from congregating.

In Tehran, the people celebrated the Fire Festival in the Gomrok and Abbasi Squares by lighting firecrackers. In Javadieh, the people lit firecrackers despite the presence of security forces.

In Varamin, Southeast of Tehran province, the youth threw firecrackers at the wall of a base of security forces in defiance of the regime’s efforts to prevent celebrations. “Varamin’s flag is always up”, one youth said as he threw a firecracker at the headquarters of security forces.

In Karaj, near Tehran, Iran. The voice of firecrackers and bonfires tonight were heard till midnight. In a clip on social media, a Voice says, “We will celebrate the fire festival to the dismay of Khamenei. Death to Khamenei and the Islamic Republic.”

The state-run Tasnim News Agency quoted the commander of State Security Forces in Tehran Hossein Rahimi as saying that there have been at least 25 explosion incidents on the night of Fire Festivals despite the heavy repressive measures held by the regime to prevent assemblies and festivities. “The situation this year is not good in comparison to last year”, Rahimi said.

The official IRNA news agency also reported that in Kerman, Fire Festival ceremonies were more intense than in past years.

In Sanandaj (west of Iran), the regime has dispatched motorcades of security forces to prevent celebrations. Security forces are also controlling entrances and exits to the city.

In Ardebil, (NW Iran) the people chanted  “No to the Islamic Republic”, the sky lantern says. Iranians are taking advantage of the Fire Festival to express their resentment towards the regime.  

In the fire festival, the Iranian burned a turban, worn by the mullahs, to show their resentment towards Iran’s ruling clerics that has brought them nothing but 42 Years Of Misery.

According to the state-run Tasnim News Agency, Manuchehr Nasiri, the deputy commander of the State Security Forces in Yazd province, threatened the people and said, “Vehicles and persons who disrupt social norms and comfort will be arrested and held by the police until 15 days after the New Year”.

Nasiri said that State Security Forces are on high alert across the province and are monitoring activities on the streets and on social media.

Social media exploded with clips of fire festival showing that the locals in Zahedan (Balochistan center) and in Rasht (Northwest of Iran) torched Khamenei effigies. Fire Festival celebrations continued through the night.

Reports and videos obtained from different cities in Iran pertain that festivities continued despite the heavy presence of security forces. In Kermanshah (west of Iran), the people lit fires in Nastaran Blvd and Markazi Sq and celebrated the Fire Festival.

In Urmia (west of Iran), people lit fireworks and firecrackers across the city. In Eslamshahr (south of Tehran), the sounds of firecrackers could be heard in different parts of the city. In Baneh (west of Iran), the people lit firecrackers in the streets. In Rasht  (Northwest of Iran) a large crowd gathered and celebrated the Fire Festival with firecrackers and bonfires.

To end this, the significance of this year’s fire festival compared to the last year is that the people were more organized and more resilient against despotism. The Resistance Units had an important role in leading and organizing the people and  slogans such as, “down with the dictator, hail to freedom”, “The supreme leader’s end is near”, “We will take back Iran”, and “We will turn Iran into a burning cry for freedom”.

Hassan Mahmoudi is a Europe-based social analyst, researcher, independent observer, and commentator of Middle Eastern and Iranian Politics. He tweets under @hassan_mahmou1. 

The necessary factors for massive, widespread and regime-changing protests are well in place.

The five days of protests by locals in Sistan-Baluchestan, Iran’s most
impoverished province, shows how volatile Iran is.

The protests began when Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps created obstacles and dug large ditches on the roads to prevent the flow of fuel to neighboring Pakistan by Baluch fuel traders.

The guards shot and killed dozens of innocent, defenseless people on February 22. Facing dire poverty, violent repression, and constant violations of their dignity, the fuel traders rebelled against the Revolutionary Guards. The people staged a strike action on February 25 and closed their shops.

They took their anger to the streets and government offices, occupying and destroying them fearlessly, despite the Revolutionary Guards and security and law enforcement forces’ heavy presence.

The guards fired directly at the protestors and used tear gas to disperse them. The Iranian authorities, unable to contain the protests despite firing and killing and bringing in armored vehicles, cut off the Internet and flew helicopters over Zahedan to intimidate the protestors.

Of course, the show of anger and dissatisfaction in Sistan-Baluchestan province is just the tip of the iceberg. The state’s looting, corruption, ignorance and mismanagement have now reached such a level that, according to regime officials, 96 percent of the poor and hungry people are several times below the poverty line on the one hand; and 4% of government officials and offices and those affiliated with Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, are in the possession of key monetary sources and investments in Iran.

On February 25, Mohebati, the governor of Sistan-Baluchestan, also warned that if protests turned into a revolution “all the officials would do down together”.

After so many years of corruption, repression and mismanagement by the regime and their inability to govern, the Iranian society has reached the point of explosion. In other words, the necessary factors for massive, widespread and regime-changing protests are well in place.

Even a minor and insignificant friction between the people and the government will cause a spark that can spread to other cities. The Sistan and Baluchestan protests and the November 2019 protests are testimony to this.

According to remarks made by many of the regime’s officials and analysts, the next uprising in Iran is not even comparable to those in November 2019 or December 2018.

Mostaghel state-run daily wrote on February 23 that Iranians would use “weapons and explosives” to counter the regime in future protests.

What made the Sistan and Baluchestan protests in Saravan significant was the rapid spread of protests and attacks against security forces by angry locals.

Protesters stormed a Governor’s Office and IRGC bases and torched police vehicles.

Despite Iran’s attempt to block the Internet, the news of the unrest was spread widely and was accompanied by widespread popular support throughout Iran. Other neighboring cities, including Iranshahr, Zahedan and Khash staged their own strikes, closed their shops in support of Saravan.

Amateur video from the Saravan showed that protesters fought with security forces empty-handed and were not afraid of bullets shot back at them. The recent Sistan and Baluchestan protests send a clear message to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

In the 1979 revolution against the Shah, the protests reached a point when every shot fired by the military and the Shah’s army, led to more anger and protests which eventually led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dictatorship. This will happen again in Iran.

Cyrus Yaqubi is a Research Analyst and Iranian Foreign Affairs Commentator investigating the economy of the middle east countries that are relying on the oil revenue and comparing their progress to their ruling system, specially covering a variety of topics about Iran.

These protests showed the Iranian society’s explosive state and how a spark could trigger protests.

Today marks the 8th day of Sistan and Baluchestan protests that started in Saravan, southeastern Iran. The protests erupted on February 22 when the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) opened fire and killed fuel porters in Saravan county, near the Iran-Pakistan border. IRGC forces in the Saravan border area opened fire on a group of Baluch fuel porters, killing and injuring several people.

The regime shut down or disrupted internet connections on Wednesday night to quell the Sistan and Baluchestan protests. However, sporadic clashes and other forms of protest have continued and have spread to several other cities in the province including in the provincial capital, Zahedan.

On Saturday, the youth in Dashtyari county blocked the road to Bahukalat in protest to the killing of fuel traders at the Saravan border crossing.

In the city of Zabol, security forces are on high alert. Security forces have set up several check points in the city. According to reports from Doust Mohammad, there’s a heavy presence of security forces across the county.

Under severe pressure by protests across Sistan and Baluchestan and fearing the expansion of protests to other parts of Iran, the regime was forced to restore the work permit of some fuel traders. IRGC units have evacuated some of their border outposts in fear of protests.

A citizen reported on Saturday: “We’re still facing an internet blackout. We tried to take our wounded to locations where security forces could not harm them. Since yesterday evening, we brought a few nurses and doctors from 400 kilometers away to tend to the wounded. I haven’t slept in two days. We just had short access to internet 30 minutes ago in Zahedan.”

According to citizen reports from Zahedan, the city is in a state of martial law. Security forces are filling the streets and the regime has brought reinforcements from neighboring cities and towns. Some of the units have been brought in from the neighboring Kerman province. The government is continuously dispatching reinforcements from other provinces including Isfahan, in central Iran and neighboring Kerman.

Military helicopters continue to fly over many cities, including Zahedan and Ghaleh Bid.

On Friday, Reporters Without Borders expressed concern over the regime-imposed internet blackout across Sistan and Baluchestan “to deprive the population of independent information on the uprising that took place after several civilians were killed by the border police of Baluchistan and to better repress without witnesses.”

On Saturday US State Department Expresed its concern over the state violence agianst the balouch citizens .

Military helicopters continue to fly over many cities, including Zahedan and Ghaleh Bid.

On the other hand while trying to undermine people’s justified anger of the regime’s oppressive measures, Ahmad Ali Mohebati, Sistan and Baluchistan’s governor, warned the regime’s officials:

“We are now in an atmosphere where rationality does not prevail, but emotions and excitement prevail [i.e., people’s hatred toward the regime], we must be vigilant. If something unpleasant happens, the dry or wet, hardliner or reformist and all officials will burn together,” he said on Thursday.

The recent uprising in Sistan and Baluchistan has several characteristics:

1- These protests showed the Iranian society’s explosive state and how a spark could trigger protests.

2- Protests rapidly spread across the province.

3- The uprising received wide social support from the Iranian people, with small businesses going on strike in solidarity with the uprising.

4- The uprising also showed that despite its hollow power exhibition, the regime’s local oppressive forces are not able to control the situation. Thus, the regime has to send forces from other cities, showing the regime’s force mobilization crisis in facing a nationwide uprising.

In a nutshell, the ongoing protests in Sistan and Baluchistan foretell an inevitable uprising in Iran which will succeed to end the mullahs’ 42 years of oppression.

Hassan Mahmoudi is a Europe-based social analyst, researcher, independent observer, and commentator of Middle Eastern and Iranian Politics. He tweets under @hassan_mahmou1.