In its efforts to woo foreign investment and overhaul its image, Pakistan is trying to sell the natural resources of Balochistan to the world.

The Government of Pakistan has imposed a series of restrictions to maintain law and order in Balochistan, the largest and most troubled province of the country. Issuing a notice on 17 May, the Government imposed Section 144 across Balochistan for a period of one month. The notification put restrictions on all public gatherings, including rallies and processions involving five or more people. Covering of faces in public places is also prohibited.

Imposition of restrictive measures in Balochistan vindicates the failure of the Pakistan Military, Federal Government, and the Provincial Government led by Chief Minister Sarfaraz Bugti to bring the armed struggle of Baloch rebels under control. Pakistan security forces have been incurring huge losses at the hands Baloch militants. On 12 May, in the latest case, a search operation team came under heavy fire from the Baloch militants in Barkhan District, killing five Pakistani military personnel.  

Pakistan’s Balochistan problem has lingered for eight decades. The ruling elite has failed to come up with a mutually acceptable solution to the problem that has led to four Baloch insurgencies in the short history of the country: 1948, 1958, 1973, and 2003. The latest insurgency intensified with the alleged rape of a Baloch doctor, from the Bugti Tribe, by a colonel of the Pakistan Army in 2005. 

The rape took place at Sui, Dera Bugti, in the heavily guarded government-owned natural gas plant. The colonel was never held accountable; instead, the doctor was held captive and threatened to stay silent. This not only provoked the Baloch but also united various tribes to seek justice for a Baloch woman, intensifying attacks on the Pakistan Army. In response, instead of addressing the heinous crime and punishing the colonel, Pakistani forces killed the prominent Bugti tribe leader, Akbar Bugti, in August 2006. 

Naturally, the killing stoked up anger, strengthening Baloch nationalist sentiment and escalating the conflict. Since then, the situation has been compounded further with huge human rights violations, with the adoption of the brutal “kill and dump” policy of the Pakistani State. 

In 2011, a senior vice-president of the Balochistan High Court Bar Association (BHCBA) had warned that if the “kill and dump” policy was not stopped, the situation in Balochistan could go out of control. Over 15 years later, the situation in Balochistan has only worsened further. Even the people who raise their voice on human rights violations of the Baloch people, like the leadership of Baloch Yekjehti Committee (BYC) and their supporters, are sent behind bars. 

The ruling elite remain deluded by the notion that the country’s strong military can help it to end the conflict in Balochistan. That is a grossly miscalculated assumption. Internal reports have time and again underlined the reality in Balochistan. Calling its 2025 report on Balochistan Balochistan’s Crisis of Trust, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) had said in its press release that “The mission’s findings reveal a disturbing pattern of continued enforced disappearances, shrinking civic space, erosion of provincial autonomy and unchecked impunity—conditions that continue to fuel public alienation and political instability.” 

At a time when Islamabad is trying to promote an image of being a regional stabilising force and making efforts to bring the two warring factions in the US-led war against Iran to the negotiation table, the persisting internal instability and Islamabad’s approach towards Balochistan and the Baloch people expose its efforts to portray the country in a positive light. 

Shorn of any credibility that it could utilise to overhaul the country’s image by overlooking conflict in Balochistan and security issues in general, the country’s leadership resorts to the practice of externalising the blame and accusing others of damaging its image. 

In a recent statement, Pakistani Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting Attaullah Tarar issued a long statement on X: “We understand quite clearly that behind such stories are certain elements, mainly the detractors of peace, who are unable to come to terms with Pakistan’s role for peace in the region as well as Pakistan’s continued and successful fight against foreign-sponsored and abetted terrorism.” Tarar stated that it seems some elements could not digest the fact that Pakistan was playing a role in regional stability and making progress in eliminating terrorism. 

Measures like the ones taken in Balochistan are a self-evident acknowledgement that the real situation in the province is worrying. Reality is that Balochistan remains Pakistan’s most deprived and poor province despite being rich in natural resources and having a long coastline. The poverty in Balochistan increased from 41.8 per cent in 2019 to 47 per cent in the Financial Year 2025, way high above the national poverty rate of over 29 per cent.

In its efforts to woo foreign investment and overhaul its image, Pakistan is trying to sell the natural resources of Balochistan to the world. Lately, it has tried to woo the US to invest in the critical minerals of Balochistan, including copper. When Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshall Asim Munir presented rare earth minerals to President Donald Trump while on a visit to the US in October 2025, the Chief Secretary of Balochistan said in a statement in December that “American and other companies are interested in investment in this mineral (antimony, among others), which is more precious than gold and copper.” 

While the government is making ambitious efforts to entice foreign countries to invest and dig minerals from Balochistan, regional parties like the Balochistan National Party (BNP) have raised questions on the laws that allow the extraction of Balochistan’s resources. 

The hard reality is that situation in Balochistan remains abysmal: use of force, threatening and arresting people like Mahrang Baloch and others. This will not resolve the Baloch problem; nor will it divert attention from the issue. The country needs concrete steps, acceptable to the Baloch people, to resolve the issue of continued Baloch resistance.

But the brutal use of force by the Pakistani state against the poorest province of Pakistan is unlikely to change in a country where the military’s domineering presence in politics remains strong. This will keep fuelling public apathy and disaffection in Balochistan and in the absence of any genuine and sincere approach by the state if Pakistan to resolve the issue of Baloch alienation, the situation in likely to aggravate further in the days to come.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is leveraging ISKP as a strategic asset to subdue the Afghan Taliban.

In the desolate, mineral-rich expanses of Afghanistan, a new chapter of the “Great Game” is being written, one where the old rules of insurgency and statecraft are colliding with the ruthless ambitions of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

For Beijing, the withdrawal of Western forces from Kabul was supposed to herald a golden era of economic expansion—a chance to extend the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into the heart of Central Asia.

Yet, as Chinese engineers break ground and diplomats shake hands with the Taliban, a sinister reality has emerged. China is no longer just an investor; it is a target. And arguably the most disturbing element of this security crisis is not just the ferocity of the jihadists, but the calculated geopolitical machinations of China’s “all-weather friend,” Pakistan.

The Dragon in the Crosshairs

The resurgence of ISKP in the post-US Afghanistan landscape poses an existential threat to Chinese interests that Beijing appears ill-equipped to handle. Unlike the Taliban, who crave international legitimacy and economic aid, ISKP operates on a nihilistic theology that views the Chinese state not as a partner, but as a godless oppressor of the Uyghur Muslims.

Intelligence reports and propaganda channels from the group have increasingly explicitly included Chinese citizens in their “kill lists,” marking a terrifying pivot from local sectarian violence to transnational terrorism.

This is not merely rhetoric. ISKP has engaged in a systematic campaign to obstruct the China-Afghanistan cooperation process. By attacking Chinese personnel, hotels frequenting Chinese businessmen, and infrastructure projects, they aim to achieve a dual victory: punishing Beijing for its Xinjiang policies and humiliating the Taliban administration by exposing its inability to protect its most powerful patron.

Every dead Chinese engineer is a billboard for the Taliban’s security failure, driving a wedge between Kabul and Beijing. For China, the risk is compounding; their economic strategy relies on stability, yet their very presence incites the instability they fear.

The Double Game: Islamabad’s Dangerous Proxy

However, to view the ISKP threat solely as a byproduct of Afghan chaos is to miss the deeper, more cynical geopolitical undercurrents. Security analysts and regional intelligence have long pointed to a disturbing pattern in Pakistan’s strategic calculus—a continuation of the “double game” that once bedeviled the Americans.

The central allegation, supported by a growing body of evidence, is that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is leveraging ISKP as a strategic asset to subdue the Afghan Taliban.

Islamabad finds itself in a precarious position. The Afghan Taliban, once their proxies, have become defiant, sheltering the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and refusing to recognize the Durand Line. In response, observers argue that the Pakistani security establishment has tacitly allowed ISKP to operate as a counter-pressure force.

By facilitating—or at the very least, turning a blind eye to—ISKP sanctuaries, Pakistan aims to weaken the Taliban’s grip on power and force them into subservience. The logic is brutal but familiar: use one monster to fight another.

This strategy, however, comes with a catastrophic collateral cost for China. While Pakistan acts as Beijing’s closest ally, the very groups it nurtures to checkmate Kabul are the ones turning their guns on Chinese citizens. It is a perilous gambit where Islamabad attempts to walk a tightrope, utilizing jihadist assets for regional leverage while simultaneously claiming to be a victim of terrorism to secure international funds.

The Tirah Valley Revelation

Nowhere is this duplicitous reality more stark than in the recent, murky events of the Tirah Valley in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. This rugged terrain, historically a smuggler’s paradise and militant stronghold, has become the epicenter of a new security failure involving Chinese nationals.

Recent violent incidents in the region resulting in the deaths of Chinese personnel were swiftly framed by Pakistani narratives as the work of Baloch separatists or generic “militants.” The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is a convenient scapegoat; they are secular, anti-state, and openly hostile to Chinese investment. Blaming them fits a tidy narrative that absolves the state of religious extremism problems.

However, a forensic look at the Tirah Valley incident suggests a different author. The operational sophistication and the specific targeting methodologies bore the hallmarks of ISKP. Credible intelligence suggests that the Tirah Valley has been functioning as a sanctuary where ISKP operatives regroup, allegedly under the watchful surveillance of the ISI.

The accusation is damning: that elements within the Pakistani state apparatus, in their zeal to maintain ISKP as a thorn in the Taliban’s side, allowed these networks to fester until they lashed out at the Chinese.

The attempt to shift blame to the Baloch separatists serves a dual purpose for Islamabad. It demonizes the Baloch independence movement, justifying harsh military crackdowns in Balochistan, while simultaneously concealing the state’s lingering flirtation with Islamist terror groups like ISKP.

For Beijing, the realization is dawning that the “iron brothers” relationship with Pakistan might be riddled with rust. The Chinese are dying not just because of ideological hatred, but because they are pawns in a fratricidal struggle between regional intelligence agencies and the proxy groups they cultivate.

A Fracture in the Alliance

As China doubles down on its security protocols, importing private security contractors and demanding “thorough investigations,” the silence from Beijing regarding Pakistan’s role is deafening. It is a silence born of necessity; China has no other viable route to the Indian Ocean.

Yet, the blood spilled in the Tirah Valley and the streets of Kabul serves as a grim warning.

The resurgence of ISKP is not an accident of history but a monster fed by the cynical strategies of regional powers. If Pakistan continues to view ISKP as a useful lever against the Taliban, it does so at the peril of its most critical economic partnership.

For China, the lesson is harsh and historically consistent: in the Hindu Kush, the hand that shakes yours in friendship may also be the one feeding the tiger that stalks you.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.