At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions.

The political unrest witnessed across Pakistan administered Kashmir since 2023 and the parallel grievances emerging in Gilgit-Baltistan represent one of the most significant governance challenges confronting Pakistan in recent years. While public attention has largely focused on the immediate triggers of protests; electricity tariffs, wheat subsidies, inflation and rising costs of living, the underlying causes are far deeper and more structural.

The rise of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has transformed local economic grievances into a broader movement demanding accountability, transparency and political responsiveness. The movement has highlighted growing dissatisfaction regarding governance practices, implementation of government commitments and the perceived disconnect between decision makers and ordinary citizens.

At the same time, recurring protests in Gilgit-Baltistan regarding constitutional status, resource utilisation, development priorities and economic opportunities have exposed similar governance fault lines. Although Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain distinct political entities, both regions demonstrate increasing demands for meaningful participation in decision making and a greater share of economic benefits arising from strategic projects.

The central question confronting Pakistan government is whether existing institutions can adapt to rising public expectations regarding accountability, representation and development.

The mountains of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan have historically been viewed through the lens of geopolitics. However, political developments of the last five years suggest a gradual shift in public priorities.

Increasingly, ordinary citizens are focusing on issues that directly affect their daily lives. The cost of electricity, availability of employment, quality of infrastructure, reliability of public services and effectiveness of governance have become central concerns. These issues have generated a new form of political mobilisation that differs significantly from traditional political movements.

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents perhaps the clearest example of this transformation. Unlike conventional political organisations, JAAC derived its legitimacy not from ideological positions or constitutional debates but from its ability to articulate practical concerns affecting ordinary citizens.

The current unrest should therefore be understood not simply as a reaction to economic hardship but as part of a broader process through which citizens seek greater accountability, responsiveness and participation in governance.

 Rise of  Joint Awami Action Committee

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents one of the most significant political developments in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir in recent years. Unlike traditional political parties, JAAC emerged organically from civil society and grassroots activism. Its origins can be traced to growing public dissatisfaction regarding inflation, rising electricity tariffs and the increasing cost of essential commodities.

Initially, the movement focused on economic concerns. Citizens questioned why regions possessing significant hydropower resources continued to face high electricity costs. Many argued that local populations were not receiving adequate benefits from resources generated within their own territory.

What distinguished JAAC from previous protest movements was its ability to unite diverse segments of society. Traders, transport unions, lawyers, students, labour organisations and civil society groups increasingly coordinated their activities under a common platform.

As demonstrations expanded, the movement’s demands evolved. Economic grievances gradually merged with governance concerns. Protesters began demanding greater transparency, accountability and implementation of previous commitments. Public discourse increasingly focused on whether institutions were capable of responding effectively to citizen concerns.

The rise of JAAC reflects broader regional trends where issue-based movements centered on governance, accountability and public services increasingly challenging the traditional political structures.

Accountability and Crisis of Trust

At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions. Repeated protests indicate growing concern regarding responsiveness, transparency and implementation of commitments. Disputes over agreements reached between protest leaders and authorities have reinforced perceptions that institutions are not adequately accountable. Economic hardship has intensified these concerns, while digital connectivity has enabled citizens to compare governance outcomes across regions and just across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. The resulting crisis is therefore not merely administrative but fundamentally political, centered on legitimacy and public confidence.

POJK and Balochistan: Similar Fault Lines, Different Challenges

Although Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Balochistan differ substantially in history and political context, both reveal recurring debates regarding resource utilisation, local participation and development outcomes. In both regions, citizens frequently question whether the benefits generated from local resources are distributed equitably. Another similarity concerns perceptions of centralised decision making and limited local influence over major policy choices. However, important differences remain. The movement in POJK has largely remained civil and issue based, while Balochistan has experienced a prolonged insurgency alongside political activism. The comparison highlights how governance grievances can evolve into broader political challenges when populations feel excluded from decision making processes.

Lessons from East Pakistan

The history of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 remains a significant lesson in political legitimacy, representation and governance. Historians point to a combination of political exclusion, economic disparities and institutional failures as contributing factors. The contemporary relevance of this experience lies not in drawing direct parallels but in recognising the importance of responsive institutions and public trust. States derive resilience from legitimacy as much as from administrative capacity. The lesson for policymakers is that sustainable stability requires meaningful participation, accountable governance and confidence that institutions represent citizen interests.

Gilgit-Baltistan: Pakistan’s Emerging Strategic Challenge

Gilgit-Baltistan occupies a critical strategic position linking South Asia, Central Asia and China. Its importance has increased significantly with regional connectivity projects and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite this strategic significance, recurring public debates concerning constitutional status, subsidies, electricity shortages, trade restrictions and local participation in development have generated periodic protests. Many residents argue that while the region contributes substantially to national strategic objectives, local communities do not always perceive proportional economic benefits. This tension between strategic priorities and local expectations represents one of the most significant governance challenges facing policymakers.

Comparative Development Across LOC

The digital age has transformed public awareness. Citizens increasingly compare governance outcomes, infrastructure, education, healthcare and economic opportunities across regions mainly in Jammu & Kashmir. Such comparisons influence perceptions of governance effectiveness and political legitimacy. Arguably, comparative narratives has shaped the public expectations and it has placed pressure on Pakistan government to demonstrate tangible development outcomes. Infrastructure, tourism, public services and employment opportunities have become important indicators through which populations evaluate governance performance.

Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma

Pakistan faces a complex challenge in balancing security, development and political responsiveness. Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain strategically important regions. However, democratic protest movements differ fundamentally from conventional security threats. While administrative and security measures may restore temporary stability, long term legitimacy depends upon public confidence, institutional credibility and meaningful participation. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of addressing governance concerns without overt or covert use of Pakistan Army to silence the people by use force or fear of jail.

Future Outlook and Policy Implications

The government of Pakistan immediately needs to restore confidence of the people of the region by increased participation in governance and central institutions. Exploitation of the resources allowed by Pakistan Army and China needs to stop. Failure to address recurring grievances, however, risks perpetuating cycles of protest and mistrust. The broader lesson is that development and governance must progress together. Citizens increasingly expect institutions to be accountable, responsive and capable of delivering measurable improvements in quality of life. Pakistan has to accept the internal challenges first without attributing all its problems to Indian state.

Conclusion

The ongoing protests in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan highlight the growing importance of governance, accountability and public trust in contemporary politics. Economic concerns provided the initial catalyst for mobilisation, but the underlying debate increasingly concerns institutional responsiveness and legitimacy. Sustainable stability will depend not only on strategic considerations but also on the ability of institutions to address citizen expectations through transparent governance, meaningful participation and effective development policies. Pakistan needs to take cue from 1971 on how largescale suppression of homogenous communities can lead to outburst of violent protest. The country needs to look inside rather than involve itself in more that what it can chew.

India has tended to treat each episode as a bilateral matter, protest, and move on.

On April 10, 2026, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs unveiled its sixth round of “standardised” place names for what it calls “southern Tibet”—a reference to India’s Arunachal Pradesh—adding 23 new entries to its expanding list. This latest exercise continues a pattern that began in 2017, taking the cumulative number of renamed locations to over 110.

Before 2017, such efforts were limited, with just 16 names officially retained between 2009 and 2017. However, the pace has accelerated significantly in recent years, with successive batches introduced in 2017 (6 names), 2021 (15), 2023 (11), 2024 (30), 2025 (27), and now 2026 (23), reflecting a sustained and deliberate push.

Notably, the 2026 list is overwhelmingly focused on geographical features rather than inhabited areas. Only two names—Chaku and Xinjing (Shincheon)—refer to settlements, both located in zones of historical or strategic relevance dating back to the Sino-Indian War. The remaining 21 names are assigned to mountains, peaks, and slopes, many situated around the Yarlung Tsangpo basin and its adjoining valleys, underscoring a targeted approach to cartographic assertion in sensitive terrain.

Three Fronts, One Target

Arunachal Pradesh is only one corner of a much larger game. In Nepal’s northern districts — Humla, Rasuwa, Sindhupalchowk — there have been documented encroachments over the last several years: border pillars moved, Chinese infrastructure appearing on areas Nepal’s own maps show as Nepali territory, grazing land that Himalayan communities have used for generations quietly absorbed into what Beijing treats as administered Chinese space. The renaming of these locations follows the encroachment, retrospectively assigning Chinese names to places already brought under de facto control.

Nepal’s response has been muted, for reasons that are not hard to understand. Its Belt and Road commitments — including the Pokhara International Airport, financed by Chinese loans and opened in 2023 — create financial obligations that generate strong incentives to avoid confrontation. Beijing’s United Front Work Department has invested heavily in cultivating relationships within Nepal’s major political parties and media institutions. And Nepal’s political instability — the country has cycled through governments with remarkable speed since its 2015 constitution — means there is rarely an administration in Kathmandu with both the institutional continuity and the political will to push back consistently.

In Bhutan, the stakes are starker still. China and Bhutan have been negotiating their border since 1984, with more than 25 rounds of talks without resolution. In 2020, China introduced an entirely new dispute by listing Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary as a “disputed area” at a Global Environment Facility board meeting, despite having raised no prior claim there. Sakteng lies in eastern Bhutan, far from the longstanding western disputes, abutting Arunachal Pradesh. The strategic logic was transparent: manufacture a new bargaining chip to trade for concessions in Doklam, the plateau whose military value China has coveted ever since the 73-day standoff of 2017.

Doklam matters not because of its size but because of where it points. A Chinese military presence there would command the Chumbi Valley, which in turn points directly at the Siliguri Corridor — the narrow strip of Indian territory, roughly 22 kilometres at its narrowest, that connects India’s entire northeastern region to the rest of the country. Strategists sometimes call it the Chicken’s Neck. It is the most consequential piece of geography on the eastern front, and it is what sits at the end of the thread that runs from Doklam through Bhutan’s border negotiations to Beijing’s renaming exercises in Arunachal.

The Real Prize Is Not on the List

None of the 23 newly named locations in Arunachal Pradesh are what China actually cares about most. Arunachal is a display case — a pressure point kept warm to ensure that India cannot concentrate its diplomatic and military energies on the one piece of territory that China genuinely cannot afford to lose: Aksai Chin.

China’s National Highway 219, which traverses the Aksai Chin plateau at an altitude, is the primary logistical link between Tibet and Xinjiang — two regions whose stability is central to the CCP’s territorial narrative. Beijing quietly built the road through Aksai Chin in the late 1950s before India even knew construction had begun. When New Delhi eventually discovered it, the resulting crisis fed directly into the 1962 war. India has never formally conceded the territory. Every official Indian map still shows Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh. The 2019 reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir, which created the Union Territory of Ladakh with Aksai Chin explicitly within its stated boundaries, was a deliberate signal — and Beijing read it precisely that way. The military buildup in Ladakh that led to the Galwan Valley clashes of June 2020 was, at least in part, a response to Indian infrastructure development that China interpreted as preparatory to a more assertive posture.

The shadow of Zhou Enlai’s “package deal” offer to Nehru still haunts the diplomatic architecture. In 1959, China proposed recognising the McMahon Line in the east in exchange for India’s acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin in the west. Nehru rejected it, and the offer was never formally revived. What China appears to be doing today is inflating the price of any future version of that deal: each new disputed name in Arunachal, each encroachment in Humla, each manufactured claim in Sakteng adds another chip to Beijing’s side of the eventual table. India’s domestic political constraints — no government can publicly concede Aksai Chin and survive — mean that formal negotiation remains frozen. But in the meantime, the ground shifts.

What India Has Got Right, and What It Hasn’t

India’s response since Galwan has been more serious than its pre-2020 posture. The acceleration of border infrastructure in Ladakh and Arunachal — roads, tunnels, forward helipads — has been real and measurable. The forward deployment of additional mountain divisions has followed. The Modi government’s decision to ban hundreds of Chinese apps, restrict Chinese investment in sensitive sectors, and publicly call out Beijing’s encroachments represented a departure from the studied ambiguity that characterised Indian China policy for most of the 2000s.

What India has not done well is tell this story internationally. The cumulative pattern of China’s toponymic campaigns, its physical encroachments in Nepal, its manufactured Bhutan disputes, and its administrative restructuring in Xinjiang is not a series of bilateral irritants. It is a coherent grey-zone strategy whose logic would be recognised—and should concern—any government that has watched Beijing deploy the same playbook in the South China Sea.

India has tended to treat each episode as a bilateral matter, protest, and move on. It has not systematically built the international narrative that would make Beijing’s methods legible and costly in global opinion.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.