Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said the two sides, along with China, committed to continued dialogue after seven days of negotiations in the western Chinese city.

The parties agreed to address key issues in bilateral relations, with terrorism identified as the central concern affecting ties.

“The three parties agreed to explore a comprehensive solution to the issues in the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and clarified the core and priority issues that need to be addressed,” Mao said at a regular press briefing in Beijing.Both Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged they would not take actions that could “escalate or complicate the situation,” according to the Chinese readout.

Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Abdul Qahar Balkhi said the talks concluded in a “constructive atmosphere,” focusing on security, bilateral relations and regional stability.

Writing on X, he thanked Beijing for facilitating the discussions and expressed hope the process would build trust and enhance cooperation.There was no immediate comment from Pakistan on the outcome of the talks.

The discussions were convened after fighting that began in February escalated into what Pakistan described as “open war,” including airstrikes inside Afghanistan, among them in the capital Kabul.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the conflict has displaced about 94,000 people, while roughly 100,000 residents in two Afghan border districts have been cut off from assistance since the violence began.

Despite the talks, Afghan officials have continued to accuse Pakistan of cross-border shelling, while Islamabad has long alleged that Afghanistan provides safe haven to militants, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, an insurgent group allied with the Afghan Taliban.

Kabul denies the operations.

The 47-year-old former member of the Australian Defence Force was detained at Sydney Airport and will face charges carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, according to the Australian Federal Police.

Police allege the victims were not participating in hostilities and were detained, unarmed, and under the control of Australian forces at the time of their deaths. Authorities further allege the killings were either carried out directly by Roberts-Smith or by subordinates acting under his orders.

Roberts-Smith, who received the Victoria Cross for his service, has previously denied wrongdoing. Allegations against him first emerged in 2018 through media investigations and later became the subject of a high-profile defamation case.

In 2023, a Federal Court judge ruled that reports by Nine Entertainment had substantially proven several accusations, including the unlawful killing of detainees. His final appeal was dismissed by the High Court in 2025.The charges follow a broader inquiry into alleged misconduct by elite Australian forces in Afghanistan.

A 2020 military report found credible evidence that members of the Special Air Service Regiment unlawfully killed dozens of prisoners and civilians.The investigation into Roberts-Smith was conducted jointly by the Australian Federal Police and the Office of the Special Investigator, led by Ross Barnett, who said the process was complicated by limited access to crime scenes in Afghanistan.

Authorities said 53 war crimes allegations have been examined, with several cases ongoing. Another former special forces soldier is scheduled to stand trial on similar charges next year.

Roberts-Smith is expected to appear before a court in New South Wales later on Tuesday.

The 47-year-old suspect, whose identity has not been officially confirmed by authorities, was arrested at Sydney Airport after arriving on a domestic flight from Brisbane, Australian Federal Police Commissioner Krissy Barrett said.

He is due to appear in a Sydney court later on Tuesday.Police allege the victims were not taking part in hostilities at the time of their deaths and were detained, unarmed, and under the control of members of the Australian Defence Force.

Barrett said the accused either directly carried out the shootings or ordered subordinate personnel to do so.The charges come as part of a broader investigation into alleged misconduct by elite Australian forces in Afghanistan.

A landmark 2020 military inquiry found credible evidence that special forces personnel unlawfully killed 39 Afghan prisoners, farmers, and other noncombatants.Barrett said the latest case involved only a limited number of personnel and emphasized that the allegations did not reflect the conduct of the wider military.

She described the accused actions as confined to “a very small section” of the defence force.The Office of the Special Investigator, established to examine war crimes allegations, has reviewed 53 incidents to date, with 39 cases concluding without charges, according to its director Ross Barnett.

The case follows separate proceedings against former SAS soldier Oliver Schulz, who has pleaded not guilty to a charge of war crime murder over the alleged killing of an Afghan man in Uruzgan province in 2012.

War crime murder is a federal offense in Australia and carries a potential sentence of life imprisonment. Around 40,000 Australian personnel served in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, during which 41 troops were killed.

The quake hit at 8:42 p.m. local time (1612 GMT) at a depth of 186 km, with its epicentre in Badakhshan Province, according to the United States Geological Survey.

Afghanistan’s health ministry said the fatalities occurred in the Gosfand Dara area of Kabul Province, where a single family was buried under the impact of the tremor. “Eight members of a family died as a result of the earthquake,” ministry spokesman Sharafat Zaman said in a statement.

He added that a child, estimated to be around two years old, survived but was injured. The country’s disaster management agency confirmed the child had sustained injuries during the incident.

Journalists reported that the tremors were felt in Kabul and other parts of the country, though no immediate wider casualty figures were released.

Afghanistan lies along the seismically active Hindu Kush region, where the Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates converge, making earthquakes a frequent occurrence.

The latest quake follows a series of deadly seismic events in recent years, including an August tremor that killed more than 2,200 people in eastern Afghanistan after devastating remote mountain communities.

The attacker was believed to be targeting a nearby police station but struck a civilian residence before reaching the intended site, said Muhammad Sajjad Khan, a local police official. The blast caused significant casualties among residents inside the house, he added.

The death toll was confirmed by Bannu assistant commissioner Ikramullah Khan, who said the injured had been shifted to nearby medical facilities.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. However, suspicion is likely to fall on Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which has intensified attacks in the region in recent years, frequently targeting security installations.

Bannu lies in a volatile region bordering areas that were formerly part of Pakistan’s semi-autonomous tribal belt, long affected by militancy and counterinsurgency operations.

Pakistan has repeatedly accused neighboring Afghanistan of failing to eliminate militant sanctuaries used to plan cross-border attacks, an allegation denied by the Taliban authorities in Kabul.

Senior officials from both countries are participating in the discussions, which are being facilitated by China as part of efforts to broker a negotiated settlement between the neighbours, long linked by security ties but increasingly at odds over militancy and cross-border attacks.

The talks are expected to focus on securing a ceasefire and reopening key border crossings to restore trade and travel flows, according to sources cited in earlier reports, signalling an attempt to stabilise economic and civilian movement disrupted by months of hostilities.

“Our efforts for talks will continue despite the problems that will keep coming,” a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson said during a regular media briefing, underscoring Islamabad’s position that dialogue remains the primary channel for de-escalation.

Pakistan has also acknowledged China’s role in facilitating the engagement, describing Beijing as an important global actor whose diplomatic efforts are complementary to regional stability initiatives.

Tensions between the two countries have escalated sharply since late 2025, with Islamabad accusing the Afghan Taliban authorities of harbouring militants from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an insurgent group it says is responsible for attacks inside Pakistan.

The Afghan Taliban has rejected those allegations, maintaining that militancy within Pakistan is an internal issue and denying any official support or sanctuary for the group.

The two countries share a 2,600-kilometre border that has historically been porous and contested, and recent fighting has marked a significant deterioration in ties that had initially shown signs of alignment following the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021.

The distribution is part of the Kingdom’s Food Security and Emergency Support Project. KSrelief continues to support vulnerable communities in conflict-affected regions.

Families received essential food supplies to recover from displacement. The initiative addresses hunger, poverty, and socio-economic hardship.

KSrelief focuses on migrants and displaced populations. The project strengthens resilience and social welfare in Nangarhar Province.

The initiative supports international humanitarian cooperation and regional solidarity. It ensures resources reach communities affected by conflict and instability.

Saudi Arabia’s aid highlights global humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. KSrelief promotes accountability, efficiency, and sustainability in its programs.

The project monitors the impact on community well-being and health outcomes. It provides immediate relief while supporting long-term stability.

In Sudan, KSrelief delivered food baskets to 1,050 displaced families returning from South Sudan. This forms part of the Mudad Sudan Project for 2026.

The project addresses urgent nutritional needs and emergency relief. Sudan has been affected by conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces since April 2023.

Violence is concentrated in the southern Kordofan region. The program helps families affected by displacement and economic collapse.

KSrelief’s support promotes regional stability and humanitarian diplomacy. It also reinforces sustainable development initiatives and international cooperation.

The aid program collaborates with local authorities and NGOs. Transparency and accountability are prioritized in food distribution.

By targeting vulnerable populations, the initiative prevents further humanitarian deterioration. Families receive nutrition, shelter, and basic resources.

Saudi Arabia’s efforts highlight the importance of food security programs. Emergency support and disaster relief strengthen social resilience in both Afghanistan and Sudan.

The project supports livelihood recovery and regional stability. It also promotes humanitarian values and cross-border cooperation.

KSrelief’s work reflects Saudi Arabia’s long-term commitment to global aid. The organization continues to address urgent needs for displaced populations.

Food assistance programs ensure returning migrants and displaced families survive and recover. Nutrition and emergency support remain the top priority.

The initiative strengthens community resilience in post-conflict regions. It reduces the impact of forced migration, armed conflict, and socio-economic challenges.

Through strategic interventions, KSrelief supports vulnerable families. Its programs contribute to regional peace, social welfare, and humanitarian development.

The Kingdom’s humanitarian efforts demonstrate global leadership in disaster relief. KSrelief continues to protect at-risk populations and deliver essential resources efficiently.

A return to the zero-sum mentality that dominated earlier epochs — where Kabul was binary: allied or hostile — will not suffice.

For decades Islamabad regarded Afghanistan as a strategic depth and a zone of influence — a buffer to be shaped, not simply neighboured. That assumption has been upended. What was once a relationship of patronage and leverage has become a volatile adversarial space in which Pakistan’s ability to shape outcomes is eroding fast.

The proximate causes are familiar: the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) resurgence, the Afghan Taliban’s evolving priorities, and renewed regional manoeuvring — but the deeper story is institutional: Pakistan’s coercive and diplomatic instruments have less purchase in Kabul than they did a decade ago, and the result is a dangerous ambiguity for peace along a porous frontier.

The unraveling of influence

Pakistan’s influence was built on long-term ties with elements of the Afghan insurgency, cross-border sanctuaries for proxies and a security apparatus that assumed it could cajole Kabul.

After the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021 Islamabad briefly believed those ties would translate into control over insurgent groups that threaten Pakistan’s internal security, especially the TTP. That belief has been proven increasingly fragile.

Since 2023 and into 2024–25, the TTP has consolidated, carrying out a wave of attacks inside Pakistan and openly operating from Afghan territory, according to Pakistani officials and independent monitors — a reality Islamabad blames on Kabul’s unwillingness or inability to rein in militants.

The rhetoric has hardened into kinetic confrontation. October and November 2025 saw some of the deadliest border clashes since 2021, with both sides trading heavy accusations of cross-border strikes and of harbouring militants.

Pakistan’s military leadership framed the dispute in stark terms: peace depends on the Taliban preventing attacks originating on Afghan soil — an implicit admission that Islamabad’s old levers of influence are no longer decisive.

Kabul, for its part, denies institutional complicity while insisting it is a sovereign government contending with its own domestic pressures and complex local actors.

Analysts have been blunt. “Pakistan misread the Taliban and lost peace on the frontier,” wrote commentators after a string of confrontations, arguing Islamabad had underestimated the Afghan leadership’s need to assert independence from Islamabad and to cultivate alternative patrons and legitimacy.

The practical consequence is a loss of predictive power: Islamabad cannot reliably forecast which militant actors Kabul will tolerate or contest, and therefore cannot control the border dynamics that have long defined its security calculus.

New players, old grievances

The decline of unilateral influence does not mean Pakistan has been entirely sidelined; rather, the relationship has been recalibrated amid a broader regional realignment.

China and Turkey have moved to mediate and cajole, economic corridors and diplomatic initiatives have proliferated, and even India has quietly sought to re-engage with Kabul, reopening channels that complicate Islamabad’s calculations.

These shifts give the Afghan Taliban alternatives for diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation that do not depend on Pakistan’s patronage.

Inside Pakistan, the domestic politics of counter-terrorism and the resurging profile of the Pakistani Taliban have also altered official thinking. Policymakers face a grim choice: assertive military options across the border that risk escalation and international censure, or a patient diplomatic strategy that depends on a Kabul willing and able to act.

The ambiguity has produced episodic violence rather than a durable settlement; ceasefires have been brokered and violated, and confidence-building measures are fragile. Observers note that Islamabad’s traditional tools — patronage networks, cross-border pressure and economic inducements — are necessary but not sufficient to resolve the multi-layered conflicts now playing out.

The human cost is immediate. Civilians on both sides of the Durand Line have borne the brunt of the violence: displacement, disrupted trade and a renewal of mistrust that undercuts any long-term reconciliation.

The border is not simply a line on a map; it is a lived geography of interdependence and grievance. As violence spikes, international actors — from Qatar and Turkey to regional capitals — are scrambling to re-establish mediation channels even as the ground reality resists neat diplomatic fixes.

What comes next

If Pakistan’s grip is slipping, the strategic implication is that South Asia’s security architecture must be rethought. A return to the zero-sum mentality that dominated earlier epochs — where Kabul was binary: allied or hostile — will not suffice.

Instead, any viable approach must accept multiplicity: a Taliban government with agency, non-state militant actors with transnational reach and regional powers willing to assert influence through economic and diplomatic means. This requires Pakistan to invest in multilateral mechanisms, to deepen intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation that respects Afghan sovereignty, and to concede that punitive cross-border strikes are not a sustainable substitute for political solutions.

The stakes transcend bilateral rivalry. A durable peace on the frontier matters to refugee flows, counter-terrorism, narcotics trafficking and the broader stability of a region that is again the focus of great-power competition.

If Islamabad wants to protect its core security interests it must adapt to an Afghan polity that no longer responds predictably to old incentives. That adaptation will be neither quick nor comfortable, but it is necessary: failing to do so will leave both countries mired in a costly oscillation of strikes, reprisals and diplomatic ruptures that benefits no one.

As one regional analyst put it, the old script for influence has been burned; the question for Pakistan is whether it can write a new, more cooperative one before the next conflagration.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

According to a statement from Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs early Sunday, the two South Asian nations committed not only to a halt in hostilities but also to “the establishment of mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries”.

They further affirmed that follow-up meetings will be held in the coming days “to ensure the sustainability of the cease-fire and verify its implementation in a reliable and sustainable manner”.

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, welcomed the accord as “a first step in the right direction”.

Posting on X, he expressed appreciation for the “constructive role played by brotherly Qatar and Türkiye”. He also flagged the next meeting to be hosted by Türkiye, underlining the need for “a concrete and verifiable monitoring mechanism … to address the menace of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil towards Pakistan”.

He added: “It is important to put all efforts in place to prevent any further loss of lives.”

Earlier, both Islamabad and Kabul held talks in Doha on Saturday after the worst violence between the neighbours since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

According to Afghan government spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, negotiations took place in Doha with Kabul’s team led by Defence Minister Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob. Meanwhile Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed its Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif led discussions with Taliban leadership.

The cross-border flare-up was triggered by Pakistan’s demand that Afghanistan rein in insurgent groups accused of staging increasingly frequent attacks on Pakistani territory—and which Islamabad says operate from safe havens inside Afghan soil.

The Taliban government denies harbouring armed groups for attacks on Pakistan, instead accusing Islamabad of misinformation, and of sheltering ISIL-linked militants undermining Afghan sovereignty.

On Friday, a suicide bomb near the border killed seven Pakistani soldiers and wounded 13 others, according to security officials. Pakistan’s Army Chief, Asim Munir, warned on Saturday that “the Afghan regime must rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan and are using Afghan soil to perpetrate heinous attacks inside Pakistan.”

While the cease-fire agreement marks a positive step, analysts caution that the true test will lie in sustained verification, cross-border monitoring and addressing deep-rooted mistrust. Establishing a credible mechanism to monitor adherence and respond promptly to violations will be crucial if peace is to hold.

Deoband’s embrace of the Taliban foreign minister is dangerous — but also offers an opening.

Amir Khan Muttaqi, Foreign Minister of the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and a senior figure in its political and ideological leadership, has recently completed a six-day visit to India — an episode loaded with meaning.

From his informal ban on female journalists, to the cancellation of his Agra leg, and his carefully choreographed stop at the Vivekananda Foundation. Yet, it is his visit to Dar ul Uloom Deoband, the theological heart of South Asian Deobandi Islam, that has invited sharpest scrutiny.

For years, Indian Muslims — particularly those aligned with the Deobandi school — have tried to draw a distinction between “their Islam,” described as democratic and egalitarian, and the Taliban’s brutal, patriarchal regime. Muttaqi’s pilgrimage to his ideological fountainhead has challenged that narrative.

When the Taliban’s foreign minister visits Deoband, and the seminary receives him with honor, it becomes almost impossible to sustain the claim that the Taliban are merely “misguided” Muslims. Why, then, should men who have subjugated women and silenced dissent be treated as heroes?

What emerges instead is a chilling recognition: the Taliban are not a deviation from Deobandi Islam according to the seminary, but one of its most literal political manifestations.

The confusion within India’s religiously-inclined Muslim intelligentsia over how to respond to this visit is telling — and repetitive. Some rush to rationalize it as “cultural diplomacy” or a gesture of goodwill in the national interest, strangely bringing the Muslim right and the Hindu right onto the same page.

Others recoil in discomfort but stop short of open criticism. Deoband’s endorsement of Muttaqi symbolically affirms the very doctrines that have justified gender apartheid, banned girls from education, and institutionalized moral policing across Afghanistan.

This moment is not merely about Afghanistan; it reflects a moral crisis within Indian muslims as well — a refusal to confront its own regressive solidarities under the pretext of religious kinship. The spectacle of Deoband greeting Muttaqi with reverence reveals the unbroken theological thread linking the 19th seminary to the taliban led theocratic governance.

Deoband’s embrace of the Taliban foreign minister is dangerous — but also offers an opening. If the Taliban truly draw their ideological legitimacy from Deoband, then Deoband carries a moral responsibility: to humanize that ideology, to insist that justice and compassion, not repression, define Islam.

The seminary has a proud history of standing against colonial injustice and for India’s freedom. Can it now stand for Afghan women denied education, or men imprisoned for thought?

If Dar ul Uloom Deoband wishes to remain relevant in a plural democracy, it must decide where it stands — with democracy, gender justice, and education, or with those who burn books, bury dissent, and blind the future of half their population.