The ongoing conflict over water distribution is likely to intensify as the country is facing a severe water crisis.

The conflict over water distribution in Pakistan has resurfaced. Sindh and Balochistan have registered a strong protest against the Indus River System Authority(IRSA)’s decision to reduce their water share by diverting it to Punjab. IRSA is Pakistan’s main body responsible for “the regulation and distribution of surface waters amongst the provinces according to the allocations and policies spelt out in the Water Accord” 1991.

Sindh’s ongoing water shortage stems from IRSA’s actions, which, by allocating more water to Punjab despite overall scarcity, intensify perceptions of unfairness and fuel the conflict over water distribution. This pattern has sharpened the provincial dispute, positioning Punjab as a consistent beneficiary at Sindh’s expense. 

This is not the first time that the issue of water distribution has been contested between Punjab and Sindh. The country has a long history in which smaller provinces complained against Punjab over the unfair distribution of resources, including water.

In a major development, after years of delay, the Government of Pakistan issued the first National Water Policy (NWP) in 2018. Claimed to be have formed after gaining the consensus of the chief ministers of all four provinces, the NWP, according to the Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Sartaj Aziz, “covered all water-related issues, including water uses and allocation of priorities, integrated planning for development and use of water resources, environmental integrity of the basin, impact of climate change, trans-boundary water sharing, irrigated and rain-fed agriculture.” However, the committee subsequently formed to oversee its implementation could not reconcile the interests of Punjab and Sindh, mainly. 

Sindh is of the view that the policy was formed under coercion, as the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), the party with a strong presence in Punjab, was leading the federal government, forcing the decision upon smaller provinces. Sartaj Aziz, the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, was considered to be close to Nawaz Sharif. So, the reservations of Sindh and Balochistan may not be entirely unfounded. 

In 2021, Sindh raised the issue and demanded a new water-sharing arrangement. The conflict came into the limelight in January 2025 when Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) chairman Bilawal Bhutto and the PML-N-led government in Punjab, led by Nawaz Sharif’s daughter Maryam Nawaz, issued strong statements against each other over a project in Punjab—the Cholistan canal project. 

In February 2025, Chief Minister of Punjab Maryam Nawaz and Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir inaugurated an ambitious project in Cholistan to irrigate barren land under the Green Pakistan Initiative. The project would draw new canals from the Indus River, impacting the lower riparian Sindh Province. 

The decision expectedly led to a reaction from Sindh and protests from the Sindhis. They alleged that allocations were already extensively in Punjab’s favour, and any new such project would cripple Sindh’s irrigation system. Bilawal Bhutto even threatened that if the canal project was not shelved, his party would leave the alliance government in the centre. Unmoved by such threats, Maryam Nawaz said in September 2025 that “If Punjab wants to construct canals for its water, why are you bothered? It is Punjab’s water. It belongs to the people, farmers and fields of Punjab.” To make such a statement would not have been possible without the support of the Army who seen siding with Punjab.

The Cholistan canal project’s inauguration illustrates how Punjab’s dominance in Pakistan’s power structure influences resource allocation. High-profile involvement of the Army leadership in the project reinforces the perception that Punjab’s interests prevail over those of the smaller provinces, exemplifying the central argument that resource disputes are shaped by entrenched political and institutional imbalances.

Second, the project was launched despite the fact that Sindh had strongly protested against it; thus, it showed that Punjab pays the least attention to the concerns of smaller provinces. In the past as well, Sindh and Balochistan have raised the larger question about the water distribution in the country, which they think is not fair and needs renegotiation, but have not received any response from the federation. 

The latest controversy underscores the same attitude of the Punjab Province towards the smaller and weaker provinces of the country. Instead of being mindful of the requirements and demands of Sindh and Balochistan, Punjab’s interests remain preferable for the country’s rulers. 

Former President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, had said that “Anyone who can solve the problems of water will be worthy of two Nobel Prizes—one for peace and one for science.” Kennedy had said these prescient words over sixty years ago. Still, Pakistan has been unable to address one of its core issues—the water scarcity and the distribution of its water resources among the provinces equally. 

For over 70 years of its formation, Pakistan’s colonial hangover continues. Despite all these challenges, the colonial structure has been deployed by the existing military-bureaucratic oligarchy, as the noted political scientist of Pakistan, Hamza Alavi, called it, to favour the powerful province, i.e., Punjab, over other weak provinces of the country. 

Resultantly, in the total share of the country’s water resources, equal distribution is hampered by the existing political system that remains overwhelmingly dominated by the Punjabis. For example, Field Marshall Asim Munir is the fourth successive Punjabi to lead the country’s powerful military, which remains dominated by the Punjabis. Of the last seven prime ministers since 2008, all but Imran Khan have been Punjabis. 

Implications of such a political system in which the largest province has been a dominant and driving force have often led to conflicts, for example, on the distribution of resources. Balochistan’s main complaint has been the exploitation of its resources by the Punjab Province at the cost of the local population: they call it Punjabi colonisation of Balochistan. And Sindh has often raised its concerns about the Punjab’s overuse of water that is meant for its use.

The ongoing conflict over water distribution is likely to intensify as the country is facing a severe water crisis. If Punjab continues its recklessness and prefers its interests over the weaker provinces, local resistance in Sindh and Balochistan will strengthen, forcing the provincial governments to take a stand against the federal government. That can lead to confrontational politics and even the fall of the government, if the PPP withdraws its support, as Bilawal had threatened. 

Overall, the situation remains grimmer than it seems. The military establishment might have forced the PPP to be part of the government, but if the local basic requirements, like water, are not delivered by the PPP-led government in Sindh, it cannot retain the support of the Sindhis, the third largest ethnic group of Pakistan- after Punjabis and Pashtuns. If their resistance revives against the Punjabi domination, the subsequent strengthening of the Sindhudesh movement can expose yet another fault line of Pakistan.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions.

The political unrest witnessed across Pakistan administered Kashmir since 2023 and the parallel grievances emerging in Gilgit-Baltistan represent one of the most significant governance challenges confronting Pakistan in recent years. While public attention has largely focused on the immediate triggers of protests; electricity tariffs, wheat subsidies, inflation and rising costs of living, the underlying causes are far deeper and more structural.

The rise of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has transformed local economic grievances into a broader movement demanding accountability, transparency and political responsiveness. The movement has highlighted growing dissatisfaction regarding governance practices, implementation of government commitments and the perceived disconnect between decision makers and ordinary citizens.

At the same time, recurring protests in Gilgit-Baltistan regarding constitutional status, resource utilisation, development priorities and economic opportunities have exposed similar governance fault lines. Although Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain distinct political entities, both regions demonstrate increasing demands for meaningful participation in decision making and a greater share of economic benefits arising from strategic projects.

The central question confronting Pakistan government is whether existing institutions can adapt to rising public expectations regarding accountability, representation and development.

The mountains of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan have historically been viewed through the lens of geopolitics. However, political developments of the last five years suggest a gradual shift in public priorities.

Increasingly, ordinary citizens are focusing on issues that directly affect their daily lives. The cost of electricity, availability of employment, quality of infrastructure, reliability of public services and effectiveness of governance have become central concerns. These issues have generated a new form of political mobilisation that differs significantly from traditional political movements.

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents perhaps the clearest example of this transformation. Unlike conventional political organisations, JAAC derived its legitimacy not from ideological positions or constitutional debates but from its ability to articulate practical concerns affecting ordinary citizens.

The current unrest should therefore be understood not simply as a reaction to economic hardship but as part of a broader process through which citizens seek greater accountability, responsiveness and participation in governance.

 Rise of  Joint Awami Action Committee

The emergence of the Joint Awami Action Committee represents one of the most significant political developments in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir in recent years. Unlike traditional political parties, JAAC emerged organically from civil society and grassroots activism. Its origins can be traced to growing public dissatisfaction regarding inflation, rising electricity tariffs and the increasing cost of essential commodities.

Initially, the movement focused on economic concerns. Citizens questioned why regions possessing significant hydropower resources continued to face high electricity costs. Many argued that local populations were not receiving adequate benefits from resources generated within their own territory.

What distinguished JAAC from previous protest movements was its ability to unite diverse segments of society. Traders, transport unions, lawyers, students, labour organisations and civil society groups increasingly coordinated their activities under a common platform.

As demonstrations expanded, the movement’s demands evolved. Economic grievances gradually merged with governance concerns. Protesters began demanding greater transparency, accountability and implementation of previous commitments. Public discourse increasingly focused on whether institutions were capable of responding effectively to citizen concerns.

The rise of JAAC reflects broader regional trends where issue-based movements centered on governance, accountability and public services increasingly challenging the traditional political structures.

Accountability and Crisis of Trust

At the centre of the ongoing unrest in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir lies a challenge that extends beyond electricity tariffs and inflation. The deeper issue is governance and a widening trust deficit between citizens and institutions. Repeated protests indicate growing concern regarding responsiveness, transparency and implementation of commitments. Disputes over agreements reached between protest leaders and authorities have reinforced perceptions that institutions are not adequately accountable. Economic hardship has intensified these concerns, while digital connectivity has enabled citizens to compare governance outcomes across regions and just across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. The resulting crisis is therefore not merely administrative but fundamentally political, centered on legitimacy and public confidence.

POJK and Balochistan: Similar Fault Lines, Different Challenges

Although Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Balochistan differ substantially in history and political context, both reveal recurring debates regarding resource utilisation, local participation and development outcomes. In both regions, citizens frequently question whether the benefits generated from local resources are distributed equitably. Another similarity concerns perceptions of centralised decision making and limited local influence over major policy choices. However, important differences remain. The movement in POJK has largely remained civil and issue based, while Balochistan has experienced a prolonged insurgency alongside political activism. The comparison highlights how governance grievances can evolve into broader political challenges when populations feel excluded from decision making processes.

Lessons from East Pakistan

The history of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 remains a significant lesson in political legitimacy, representation and governance. Historians point to a combination of political exclusion, economic disparities and institutional failures as contributing factors. The contemporary relevance of this experience lies not in drawing direct parallels but in recognising the importance of responsive institutions and public trust. States derive resilience from legitimacy as much as from administrative capacity. The lesson for policymakers is that sustainable stability requires meaningful participation, accountable governance and confidence that institutions represent citizen interests.

Gilgit-Baltistan: Pakistan’s Emerging Strategic Challenge

Gilgit-Baltistan occupies a critical strategic position linking South Asia, Central Asia and China. Its importance has increased significantly with regional connectivity projects and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite this strategic significance, recurring public debates concerning constitutional status, subsidies, electricity shortages, trade restrictions and local participation in development have generated periodic protests. Many residents argue that while the region contributes substantially to national strategic objectives, local communities do not always perceive proportional economic benefits. This tension between strategic priorities and local expectations represents one of the most significant governance challenges facing policymakers.

Comparative Development Across LOC

The digital age has transformed public awareness. Citizens increasingly compare governance outcomes, infrastructure, education, healthcare and economic opportunities across regions mainly in Jammu & Kashmir. Such comparisons influence perceptions of governance effectiveness and political legitimacy. Arguably, comparative narratives has shaped the public expectations and it has placed pressure on Pakistan government to demonstrate tangible development outcomes. Infrastructure, tourism, public services and employment opportunities have become important indicators through which populations evaluate governance performance.

Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma

Pakistan faces a complex challenge in balancing security, development and political responsiveness. Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan remain strategically important regions. However, democratic protest movements differ fundamentally from conventional security threats. While administrative and security measures may restore temporary stability, long term legitimacy depends upon public confidence, institutional credibility and meaningful participation. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of addressing governance concerns without overt or covert use of Pakistan Army to silence the people by use force or fear of jail.

Future Outlook and Policy Implications

The government of Pakistan immediately needs to restore confidence of the people of the region by increased participation in governance and central institutions. Exploitation of the resources allowed by Pakistan Army and China needs to stop. Failure to address recurring grievances, however, risks perpetuating cycles of protest and mistrust. The broader lesson is that development and governance must progress together. Citizens increasingly expect institutions to be accountable, responsive and capable of delivering measurable improvements in quality of life. Pakistan has to accept the internal challenges first without attributing all its problems to Indian state.

Conclusion

The ongoing protests in Pakistan occupied Jammu-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan highlight the growing importance of governance, accountability and public trust in contemporary politics. Economic concerns provided the initial catalyst for mobilisation, but the underlying debate increasingly concerns institutional responsiveness and legitimacy. Sustainable stability will depend not only on strategic considerations but also on the ability of institutions to address citizen expectations through transparent governance, meaningful participation and effective development policies. Pakistan needs to take cue from 1971 on how largescale suppression of homogenous communities can lead to outburst of violent protest. The country needs to look inside rather than involve itself in more that what it can chew.

If anything, the present nexus between the military establishment and the toothless civilian leadership has shown that it is difficult to have a fair space for criticism and dissent in Pakistan.

In yet another flummoxing display, Pakistan has charged the opposition leader in the National Assembly with treason. Mehmood Khan Achakzai, Chairman of the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), has been booked and charged with treason for his remarks at a public meeting in Balochistan. Achakzai is the president of Tehreek Tahaffuz Ayeen-i-Pakistan (TTAP), a multi-party opposition alliance formed to protect the Constitution of Pakistan, which, according to the opposition, is under attack from the military establishment, with the support of the government.

Although a long practice in the country, using the draconian law to silence critics of the military establishment/government has picked up in recent years. One reason for that is the nature of the present ruling administration.

It is interesting to see that the scope of these laws has expanded; now the political opponents of the existing “hybrid model” of government in Pakistan, as Defence Minister Khawaja Asif calls it, have borne the brunt of the sedition laws for their criticism of the government, or the hybrid regime, to put it in its truest description. The civilian leadership is forced to mitigate the adverse effects of the model simply because it cannot be in government or run functions if it were to break ties with the military establishment. That being the case, the civilian part of the model is subservient to the military establishment. How can that be called even a “hybrid model”?   

The civilian leaders act as intermediaries, while the military establishment pulls the strings on every decision. No wonder that in the last couple of years, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, and others have been currying favour with the country’s security forces, even on the economy. Prime Minister Sharif, known for his unhinged use of praise to extract favours from powerful personnel, went beyond even his own previous injudicious acts and said on an occasion recently that “History will always remember the wise and courageous leadership of the field marshal (Asim Munir) in golden words.”

Such flattering words from the Prime Minister tell a lot about the nature of the current model of governance in Pakistan: the civilian leaders will act on behalf of or for the military generals, and critics will bear the brunt.   

Achakzai’s case is not the only one. On a similar pattern, in yet another high-profile case, former Prime Minister Imran Khan was charged with treason for a rather bizarre accusation. Several activists and political opponents have been sent to jail after being charged with the draconian law.

All these cases are nothing but a mockery of such a serious penal law. While Imran Khan was accused of wrongfully dissolving parliament in 2022, Achakzai’s case is more interesting: he is charged with treason because he questioned the law and order situation in Balochistan and said that the government had failed to provide security to the people. There is no shortage of reports, even statements from the military establishment and the government on the situation in Balochistan that would mean the same, but it coming from the opposition leader is chargeable with the harshest possible penal code in the country, underscoring the strict policy of the current administration towards its opponents.   

More importantly, the case against the Opposition Leader in the National Assembly exposes the nature of politics in Pakistan. Essentially, the crux of the issue is that the military establishment is domineering in the present ruling political system, and any criticism of an issue points towards the failures of the military establishment. And given the stakes of Field Marshal Asim Munir in the system, the Army is unlikely to tolerate that. Therefore, conformity is sought in every case, at every possible cost.

It also shows that Pakistan’s perennial political crisis has taken a life of its own. There is no sign of it getting resolved. The Pakistani State has taken a clarion call: everyone must conform to the current administration, i.e., the military establishment, the deep state and its coterie in the civilian power circles.    

Historically, the military has dominated the country’s politics. Its domestic and foreign policies have been shaped by the generals. Even domestically, it is well documented that the military has “groomed” and “appointed” leaders in the country.

In politics, it is said that nation and state function as synonyms; in Pakistan, the military establishment and the state function as synonyms. So, any criticism against the military means the state is criticised. Such criticism therefore begets a strong punitive and legal response, including the charges of sedition. 

The story does not end here. Given that the military establishment is deeply involved in the government, any criticism, therefore, against the government is interpreted as a criticism against the military, and thus against the state. And there is a long list of such cases in Pakistan. Some of these include the cases of Baloch and Pashtun activists. In such cases, the people who have questioned the government policies towards Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have been accused of treason and put behind bars.  

Almost the entire leadership of Baloch Yekjehti Committee (BYC), a non-violent Baloch organisation mainly comprised of the Baloch whose relatives have been victims of enforced disappearances, is in jail. So is the former member of the National Assembly and Pashtun activist, Ali Wazir. Wazir has been behind bars for a long time on treason charges for questioning the policy of the military operations and their impact on the common Pashtun in KP. Ali Wazir has spent a good share of his life in jail. He was arrested a few hours after he was released on bail on 26 March. The cases against Wazir are various sedition cases.  

Likewise, Mahrang Baloch, a Baloch and doctor by profession, along with others, is facing multiple cases of sedition. Even if she gets some relief or bail in one case, other cases are invoked to keep her behind bars. The same method is used against the people who support or defend activists in the courts of the country. Imaan Mazari and Hadi Chattha, advocates who are fighting cases of several victims of state violence, have been booked, charged and sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment for social media posts that were critical of the country’s security institutions.  

If anything, the present nexus between the military establishment and the toothless civilian leadership has shown that it is difficult to have a fair space for criticism and dissent in Pakistan. Now, since the military establishment has increasingly taken control of the country into its hands, any civilian leadership or government is symbolic. Naturally, any criticism directed at the government will be seen as criticism of the military establishment. Therefore, in all likelihood, draconian laws like treason and others will be employed more to frighten and curb dissenting voices in Pakistan. 

On the one hand, Pakistan keeps China entangled by highlighting the potential of the CPEC; on the other, it abides by the dictates of the IMF to get new loans and delays CPEC projects.

Ishaq Dar, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, recently said that “Pakistan and China share a converging vision on regional and global issues.” Dar’s silver-tongue didn’t spell out the “vision”; he doesn’t have one. Pakistan doesn’t have one. That is the reason for its consistent loan-seeking and reliance on foreign bailouts to keep the country’s economy afloat.

Islamabad has been knocking at every possible door with its begging bowl. It holds the record of taking the maximum number of loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – 23 in a short span of over 75 years since joining the financial body in 1950.

A part of Dar’s statement highlighted the true intention behind Pakistan’s relationship with China. Dar said that the ties between Islamabad and Beijing have “grown from strength to strength into a robust economic and strategic partnership”. The downside of the latter part of the statement is that it is overwhelmingly one-sided, heavily favouring Pakistan.

Pakistan has been shrewd in buttering up China to extract maximum economic help from the Chinese. Celebrating Pakistan-China’s 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations with much fanfare remains part of the same policy. Even the Senate passed a resolution praising China for its support for Pakistan. The latter, in turn, has led to Beijing’s entanglement in Pakistan’s economic mess.

Pakistan has become a rentier state, living off financial support provided to it by others. It has time and again failed abysmally to reform its economic structure. From the money coming from outside the country, the ruling elite and the military establishment siphon off a large chunk. Some portion of it is used to manage macroeconomic indicators, to keep hopes of the local population alive and, at the same time, keep money flowing in from countries like China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and international financial institutions.

Islamabad’s relations with China are emblematic of what can be called Pakistan’s rent-seeking policy. For example, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been presented by Islamabad as a “game changer” for the country. The project has been seen as vindicating “ironclad friendship” between Pakistan and China. It is sold to build infrastructure, create jobs, and transform the country’s economic structure for lasting suitability.

Hardly anything concrete has been achieved from the billions of dollars of investment from China. In the last few years, about $8 billion in potential investment was lost due to the failure to woo foreign investors. An editorial in Dawn vindicates the larger failure of the project: “The gap between ambition and delivery is too wide to ignore. The fact that only four SEZs have moved beyond the planning stage in over a decade exposes the deeper failure of execution.” This remains important as 75 per cent of the CPEC was supposed to go into the development of new and old Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that could have boosted outputs to be transported on the corridor to other countries, helping in increasing exports.

Pakistan’s decision not to establish SEZs was taken because the IMF had set no SEZ condition for new loans. On the one hand, Pakistan keeps China entangled by highlighting the potential of the CPEC; on the other, it abides by the dictates of the IMF to get new loans and delays CPEC projects. In this way, it keeps both sponsors hooked.

Despite all hyperbolic talks and symbolism about the potential of the project, given Pakistan’s structural constraints for economic reforms and security threats for foreign investors, CPEC has underperformed in achieving whatever goals it was supposed to achieve. Already, various issues are being raised over the CPEC. Many projects started since it was rolled out in 2014 have not been completed; work on many goes slowly, and many are yet to take off. And whatever has been completed has not yielded economic benefits.

China has realised that. The Chinese have expressed their frustration with Pakistan time and again. The Chinese were “not happy with the current progress of CPEC projects” and wanted the government of Pakistan to work to remove bottlenecks in the implementation of the project. Later, China’s concerns were compounded by increasing armed attacks in Balochistan, also targeting Chinese investments and nationals working on various projects and political instability in Pakistan, asking Pakistan to overcome its political crisis. None of these issues has been addressed. In fact, armed attacks in Balochistan have increased, and political instability remains.

There is a difference in the views of CPEC as well. While for Pakistan the CPEC is projected as a solution to all its problems, for China, it is part of larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Therefore, expectations of the two are consequently different. Both, China and Pakistan, however, are aware of the fact that the CPEC is not meeting the desired expectations. Still, they keep selling it, in Pakistan particularly, by overstating its potential. Both countries have their interests in doing so; more so, Pakistan.

Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves always fall short of the country’s needs to pay for imports and pay back loans to countries and institutions. Pakistan has mostly suffered a current account deficit; lately, again in April, the current account deficit was $324 million. That being the case, Pakistan needs two things: continuous foreign financial aid and its deferment, since it cannot pay back loans on time.

That is the reason Pakistan wants to be in China’s good books: it does so by showering praise on China and highlighting the potential of CPEC, which it knows very well has not been achieved. By rolling a narrative about “iron-clad” relationship, “all-weather” friendship, etc., Pakistan seeks keep China hooked on to the Pakistani dream. Time to time, high level visits and requests from the Pakistani side aim to convince China about investing its fortunes in Pakistan. The recent visit by President Asif Zardari to China was also aimed at securing Chinese assurance to stay engaged economically under CPEC.

Pakistan is eternally busy dragging China into various sectors of its economy. After welcoming Chinese investment in infrastructure, industry and agriculture, Pakistan has now opened the defence sector to China. During Zardari’s visit, it was clear that Islamabad wanted to present provinces as new potential investment options. He went on to sign memorandums of understanding (MoUs) on agriculture technology, water desalination, and tea production, with a focus on provincial-level collaboration: at least two agreements were signed with the Sindh Government.

Even China seems to know it well and has lost its enthusiasm in CPEC. Given the failure of CPEC to achieve its goals, its consistently rising costs, and the security threats to the investment, China now wants to protect the huge investment at all cost. To do so, it has announced new small projects — more to keep a watch on the current investment than being hopeful of securing benefits from them. China has not so far announced any major investment, knowing that previous ones have not yielded desired dividends.

Pakistan has been trying to increase its labour-intensive exports but faces tough competition from countries like Bangladesh and Vietnam. Any possible success in this sector would depend on credible policy determination and a viable business environment. Both these are lacking in Pakistan. And given the mindset of the Pakistani ruling elite, they are likely to continue their rent-seeking policy vis-à-vis China by playing various cards, like offering new sectors for investment, of late.

It is unlikely, however, that the inscrutable but highly mercantile Chinese will fall for Pakistani charm in the realm of economics. This would mean that while Pakistan-China will try to remain geopolitically together, geo-economic bonding between the two will not be as strong as Pakistan would like the world to believe.  

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

When children grow up hearing that their neighbors and minority peers are existential threats, empathy dies early.

For generations, Pakistan’s school system has done far more than teach kids how to read, write, and pass exams. It operates as a quiet, methodical machinery—one that molds exactly how young Pakistanis view religion, nationalism, history, and, most crucially, those they are taught to see as “the enemy.”

Ideally, a classroom should spark curiosity. It should teach a child how to question the world. But in Pakistan, critics point out a grim reality: the public-school system serves as an assembly line for ideological conformity rather than independent inquiry.

This is not a new debate, but it just took on a sharp, urgent relevance. A major 2025 report by IMPACT-se titled Review of Pakistani Textbooks—authored by Ratnadeep Chakraborty and edited by Madeleine Ferris—blew the lid off the current curriculum.

After investigating 86 government-approved textbooks across Punjab, Sindh, and the Federal Directorate, the study exposed a deeply unsettling reality. Historical distortion, religious exclusivism, and aggressive nationalistic messaging are systematically baked into everything from social studies and Urdu to geography and Islamic education.

The report highlights how India is routinely painted as an existential, permanent threat. Meanwhile, discussions regarding Jews and Israel rely heavily on hostile stereotypes, classical antisemitic tropes, and highly selective historical narratives.

Furthermore, the concept of jihad is frequently framed not as an internal spiritual struggle, but as a noble, militaristic obligation, with virtually zero discussion about the human cost of violence or extremism.

A National Identity Built on Exclusion

This is no sudden shift. It is the continuation of a dark pattern researchers have warned about for decades. Way back in 2003, a seminal study titled The Subtle Subversion revealed that Pakistan’s textbooks were actively promoting intolerance and glorifying militarism.

More recently, a report by the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), Quality Education vs. Fanatic Literacy, reached the exact same conclusion: discriminatory narratives and exclusionary ideas about citizenship are deeply embedded in both provincial and federal classrooms.

At its core, this is a symptom of Pakistan’s ongoing identity crisis. Ever since the partition of British India in 1947, successive governments have tried to manufacture national unity through religion-centered nationalism. This project peaked in the 1980s under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, whose sweeping “Islamization” policies hardwired religious ideology into state institutions—especially the schools.

The fallout of those choices is what children are breathing in today. According to the IMPACT-se report, multiple textbooks explicitly teach that Pakistan was created “exclusively as a free state for Muslims.” While wrapped in the flag of patriotism, this language effectively strips religious minorities of their stakes in the country. It implies that Hindus, Christians, and Shia communities exist completely outside the central national story.

The textbooks pay lip service to equality, but the daily reality for these minority communities is one of severe social and institutional marginalization—a truth completely erased from the classroom.

The portrayal of history is equally black-and-white. Complex historical events are flattened into a simplistic narrative: Muslims are always the victims; Hindus are always the aggressors. The “Two-Nation Theory”—the political idea that Indian Muslims required a separate homeland—is taught as infallible divine truth rather than a debated historical theory.

When children grow up hearing that their neighbors and minority peers are existential threats, empathy dies early. Education built on fear yields an adult population ruled by suspicion.

The Slow Death of Independent Thought

The crisis isn’t just what these kids are learning; it’s how they are being taught. Pakistan’s education system rewards rote memorization over actual analysis. Students get top marks for parroting official state talking points, not for questioning them.

The CSJ report highlights an even more aggressive trend: religious material has spilled far beyond the boundaries of Islamic Studies (Islamiyat). It now shows up in science, social studies, and language textbooks.

Consequently, non-Muslim students are routinely subjected to compulsory Islamic teachings inside mainstream classes. This directly violates Articles 20 and 22 of Pakistan’s own Constitution, which explicitly guarantee religious freedom and protection from forced religious instruction.

The Structural Breakdown

Pakistan is already battling a massive educational emergency. Millions of children are entirely out of school, literacy rates are stagnant, and public spending on education hovers around a dismal two percent of GDP. But the deeper tragedy is what happens to the children who do make it inside the classroom.

When you feed students a diet of simplified history, rigid dogmas, and state-sanctioned hostility, you produce adults completely unequipped for democratic participation or informed citizenship. A society that outlaws questions eventually hollows out its own intellect.

Is Real Reform Possible?

There have been piecemeal attempts to fix the system. The CSJ notes that some provincial boards have tried to introduce more inclusive content. Sindh’s curriculum, for example, features a bit more material on diversity and peaceful coexistence. Reformers continuously advocate for human rights education, peace studies, and comparative religion to be taught from an early age.

Yet, these efforts are drop-in-the-bucket fixes against a massive, rigid structure. The state still treats national identity as something incredibly fragile—something that will collapse if it isn’t guarded by strict ideological conformity.

The profound irony is that this fearful approach completely betrays the vision of Pakistan’s own founder. In his famous speech on August 11, 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah explicitly declared that religion should have nothing to do with the business of the state, and that all citizens would be equal. Today, that speech is rolled out for ceremonial occasions but kept far away from civic textbooks. Instead, patriotism remains fiercely shackled to religious conformity.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s textbook crisis is a mirror of the society it is choosing to build. Schools can either raise a generation capable of critical thought, empathy, and healthy debate, or they can continue to manufacture individuals trained only to repeat inherited grievances. A curriculum rooted in fear might enforce short-term obedience, but it will never build intellectual confidence or regional stability.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

In its efforts to woo foreign investment and overhaul its image, Pakistan is trying to sell the natural resources of Balochistan to the world.

The Government of Pakistan has imposed a series of restrictions to maintain law and order in Balochistan, the largest and most troubled province of the country. Issuing a notice on 17 May, the Government imposed Section 144 across Balochistan for a period of one month. The notification put restrictions on all public gatherings, including rallies and processions involving five or more people. Covering of faces in public places is also prohibited.

Imposition of restrictive measures in Balochistan vindicates the failure of the Pakistan Military, Federal Government, and the Provincial Government led by Chief Minister Sarfaraz Bugti to bring the armed struggle of Baloch rebels under control. Pakistan security forces have been incurring huge losses at the hands Baloch militants. On 12 May, in the latest case, a search operation team came under heavy fire from the Baloch militants in Barkhan District, killing five Pakistani military personnel.  

Pakistan’s Balochistan problem has lingered for eight decades. The ruling elite has failed to come up with a mutually acceptable solution to the problem that has led to four Baloch insurgencies in the short history of the country: 1948, 1958, 1973, and 2003. The latest insurgency intensified with the alleged rape of a Baloch doctor, from the Bugti Tribe, by a colonel of the Pakistan Army in 2005. 

The rape took place at Sui, Dera Bugti, in the heavily guarded government-owned natural gas plant. The colonel was never held accountable; instead, the doctor was held captive and threatened to stay silent. This not only provoked the Baloch but also united various tribes to seek justice for a Baloch woman, intensifying attacks on the Pakistan Army. In response, instead of addressing the heinous crime and punishing the colonel, Pakistani forces killed the prominent Bugti tribe leader, Akbar Bugti, in August 2006. 

Naturally, the killing stoked up anger, strengthening Baloch nationalist sentiment and escalating the conflict. Since then, the situation has been compounded further with huge human rights violations, with the adoption of the brutal “kill and dump” policy of the Pakistani State. 

In 2011, a senior vice-president of the Balochistan High Court Bar Association (BHCBA) had warned that if the “kill and dump” policy was not stopped, the situation in Balochistan could go out of control. Over 15 years later, the situation in Balochistan has only worsened further. Even the people who raise their voice on human rights violations of the Baloch people, like the leadership of Baloch Yekjehti Committee (BYC) and their supporters, are sent behind bars. 

The ruling elite remain deluded by the notion that the country’s strong military can help it to end the conflict in Balochistan. That is a grossly miscalculated assumption. Internal reports have time and again underlined the reality in Balochistan. Calling its 2025 report on Balochistan Balochistan’s Crisis of Trust, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) had said in its press release that “The mission’s findings reveal a disturbing pattern of continued enforced disappearances, shrinking civic space, erosion of provincial autonomy and unchecked impunity—conditions that continue to fuel public alienation and political instability.” 

At a time when Islamabad is trying to promote an image of being a regional stabilising force and making efforts to bring the two warring factions in the US-led war against Iran to the negotiation table, the persisting internal instability and Islamabad’s approach towards Balochistan and the Baloch people expose its efforts to portray the country in a positive light. 

Shorn of any credibility that it could utilise to overhaul the country’s image by overlooking conflict in Balochistan and security issues in general, the country’s leadership resorts to the practice of externalising the blame and accusing others of damaging its image. 

In a recent statement, Pakistani Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting Attaullah Tarar issued a long statement on X: “We understand quite clearly that behind such stories are certain elements, mainly the detractors of peace, who are unable to come to terms with Pakistan’s role for peace in the region as well as Pakistan’s continued and successful fight against foreign-sponsored and abetted terrorism.” Tarar stated that it seems some elements could not digest the fact that Pakistan was playing a role in regional stability and making progress in eliminating terrorism. 

Measures like the ones taken in Balochistan are a self-evident acknowledgement that the real situation in the province is worrying. Reality is that Balochistan remains Pakistan’s most deprived and poor province despite being rich in natural resources and having a long coastline. The poverty in Balochistan increased from 41.8 per cent in 2019 to 47 per cent in the Financial Year 2025, way high above the national poverty rate of over 29 per cent.

In its efforts to woo foreign investment and overhaul its image, Pakistan is trying to sell the natural resources of Balochistan to the world. Lately, it has tried to woo the US to invest in the critical minerals of Balochistan, including copper. When Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshall Asim Munir presented rare earth minerals to President Donald Trump while on a visit to the US in October 2025, the Chief Secretary of Balochistan said in a statement in December that “American and other companies are interested in investment in this mineral (antimony, among others), which is more precious than gold and copper.” 

While the government is making ambitious efforts to entice foreign countries to invest and dig minerals from Balochistan, regional parties like the Balochistan National Party (BNP) have raised questions on the laws that allow the extraction of Balochistan’s resources. 

The hard reality is that situation in Balochistan remains abysmal: use of force, threatening and arresting people like Mahrang Baloch and others. This will not resolve the Baloch problem; nor will it divert attention from the issue. The country needs concrete steps, acceptable to the Baloch people, to resolve the issue of continued Baloch resistance.

But the brutal use of force by the Pakistani state against the poorest province of Pakistan is unlikely to change in a country where the military’s domineering presence in politics remains strong. This will keep fuelling public apathy and disaffection in Balochistan and in the absence of any genuine and sincere approach by the state if Pakistan to resolve the issue of Baloch alienation, the situation in likely to aggravate further in the days to come.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Foreign interference is unacceptable in Canada. It shouldn’t become acceptable simply because it’s aimed at India.

I don’t pretend to have deep, on-the-ground knowledge of Alberta’s separatist debate. But Canada’s near-universal pushback against foreign interference in that conversation has been heartening, because it reveals a civic reflex Canadians still share, whatever your view on separation, you don’t want outsiders manipulating a domestic question.

Recent reporting has made the concern concrete. A study summarized by Global News warned that foreign actors, including American and Russian ones, are meddling in Alberta’s separatist debate in ways that threaten Canadian sovereignty (Global News, May 2026). Canada’s National Observer reported research showing inauthentic ‘news’ channels and influence campaigns amplifying Alberta secession and annexation narratives (Canada’s National Observer, April 2026). The Guardian reported a major Alberta voter-data breach linked to separatist organizing, exactly the kind of vulnerability experts warn can be exploited (The Guardian, May 2026).

So, Canada’s standard is clear: foreign interference is unacceptable, especially when it rides on disinformation, data exposure, and community targeting. Good. Now apply that same standard to how many Indians, across political views, have experienced the Khalistan file for years.

From India’s perspective, the core complaint is at least a few decades old that Canadian political space, and institutions have enabled an overseas separatist ecosystem to operate openly from Canada, often wrapped in ‘rights’ language, even as India links that ecosystem to extremism, intimidation, and criminality. That is not a characterization I’m inventing; it is an official position India has put on record. In September 2023, India’s Ministry of External Affairs explicitly referred to ‘Khalistani terrorists and extremists’ sheltered in Canada and said, ‘the space given in Canada to a range of illegal activities including murders, human trafficking and organised crime is not new’.

Canadians can disagree with India’s framing. But the asymmetry in Canadian instincts is hard to miss. When Alberta becomes the target, Canadians immediately reach for the language of sovereignty, manipulation, coercion, and democratic integrity. When India raises similar concerns about separatist organizing from Canadian soil, often paired with intimidation politics and crime allegations, Canada’s reflex is too often to repackage it as ‘a disagreement about free speech’.

Canada’s own intelligence reporting has, in fact, moved closer to India’s concern than Canada’s political class admits. The CSIS Public Report states that ongoing involvement in violent extremist activities by Canada-based Khalistani extremists continues to pose a national-security threat to Canada and Canadian interests, and notes that some fundraising can be diverted toward violent activity (CSIS Public Report, 2025). That is not India lobbying Canada. That is Canada describing a domestic threat.

The double standard isn’t only about what is tolerated on Canadian soil. It’s also about what Canadian politicians choose to amplify abroad and that record spans parties.

During the 2020–21 farmers’ protest, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly called the situation ‘concerning’ and signalled support for peaceful protest and dialogue (Hindustan Times, December 2020). Conservative MPs spoke too. In the House of Commons, Arnold Viersen said Sikhs were ‘thinking of and praying for India’s farmers’ protesting new legislation (House of Commons Hansard, November 2020).

Conservative MP Brad Vis tabled petitions from constituents ‘concerned for the safety of farmers’ protesting domestic legislative changes in India (House of Commons Hansard, December 2020). Conservative MP Tim Uppal likewise said India’s farmers ‘deserve to be heard and respected’, a message amplified in media coverage (Scroll, December 2020). Ontario NDP MPP Gurratan Singh was also cited among Canadian politicians voicing concern about the protests, showing the commentary extended beyond Ottawa into provincial politics (Canada’s National Observer, December 2020).

The Amritpal Singh episode in 2023 is even more instructive because it involved public order and violence, not merely protest. Al Jazeera reported that Amritpal and supporters armed with swords, knives and guns raided a police station in February 2023 after an aide was arrested, an event central to the later crackdown and manhunt (Al Jazeera, April 2023). India Today reported Punjab Police describing the Ajnala, Punjab incident as an attack on police and highlighting pressure on authorities during the confrontation. (India Today, February 2023).

Now ask a simple question: if a mobilized group stormed a police station in Canada to force the release of an aide, under threat, with weapons visible, would Canadian authorities treat it as ‘civil liberties’ theatre, or would they enforce criminal law and restore public order?

Canadian political reactions again moved quickly into public positioning. Global News reported that MPs from multiple parties criticized India’s crackdown and internet restrictions, and it specifically noted Conservative voices as well. Conservative deputy leader Tim Uppal and Conservative MP Jasraj Singh Hallan among them (Global News, March 2023). Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly said Canada was following developments ‘very closely’ (The Indian Express, March 2023). Jagmeet Singh called the crackdown ‘draconian’ and urged Canadian intervention (Hindustan Times, March 2023).

Outside government, the World Sikh Organization of Canada issued a formal statement condemning the “security operations” in Punjab and raising fears about extrajudicial harm, illustrating how non-government actors in Canada also shaped the narrative internationally (World Sikh Organization of Canada, March 2023)

India’s response to both episodes followed the same script: formal diplomatic pushback and a clear message that Canada was commenting on internal Indian matters. In 2020, India summoned Canada’s envoy, warned that Trudeau’s remarks could ‘impact ties’, and called the commentary ‘ill-informed’, ‘unwarranted’, and ‘interference’ (Al Jazeera, December 2020) (India Today, December 2020) (Reuters, December 2020).

In 2023, as Canadian politicians and organizations criticized the Punjab crackdown, Indian officials framed the operation as law-enforcement action to ‘nab a fugitive’, signalling that Canada’s commentary was external noise while India pursued policing. (The Indian Express, March 2023.)

Put the pattern together and the hypocrisy becomes harder to ignore. Canada is right to reject foreign interference in Alberta. But Canada’s political class has repeatedly engaged in rhetorical interference in India, on mass protests and on an internal security crackdown triggered by a police-station attack, then bristled when India said, plainly, ‘this is our internal matter’.

That is why the Alberta interference debate matters beyond Alberta. It has forced Canadians to admit, in real time, that democratic debates can be manipulated through proxies, disinformation, intimidation, and exploitation of institutional openness. Canada is suddenly fluent in the language of foreign influence because it can taste it.

The underlying principle is that sovereignty is not selective. If foreign interference is wrong when aimed at Canadian unity, it is equally wrong when Canadian space is used to inflame separatist politics abroad.

Foreign interference is unacceptable in Canada. It shouldn’t become acceptable simply because it’s aimed at India.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Some disappeared are released, broken by torture. Some are formally charged. Some are killed and their bodies dumped.

Some human rights crises burst into international consciousness through a single image, a single video, a single act of resistance that the world cannot ignore. Other crises unfold in the dark, year after year, building a pile of unaddressed suffering that grows so high it becomes invisible. Balochistan belongs to the second category. It is the most underreported sustained human rights crisis in modern South Asia, and the international community’s silence on it is one of the diplomatic failures of our time.

The numbers, when assembled, are difficult to dismiss. The Baloch Yakjehti Committee documented over 1,250 cases of enforced disappearance in 2025. The Human Rights Council of Balochistan recorded 1,455 cases in the same year. Paank, the human rights wing of the Baloch National Movement, documented 95 enforced disappearances in November 2025 alone, along with 21 cases of severe torture and 20 extrajudicial killings. These figures, reflecting only what could be verified, suggest that what is happening in Balochistan is not occasional repression but a sustained campaign of state violence against a population.

The Pattern of Disappearances

The mechanism of enforced disappearance in Balochistan follows a well-documented pattern. Pakistani security forces, operating in plain clothes or in uniform, conduct raids on homes, often at night, and take individuals away without warrants, charges, or notification of family members. The detained person enters a network of informal detention centres run by the army or intelligence services, where they may be held for weeks, months, or years without external contact.

Some of the disappeared are eventually released, often visibly broken by torture, with explicit warnings against speaking publicly about their experience. Some are formally charged after extended periods in incommunicado detention and transferred to regular prison. Some are killed during their detention, with their bodies dumped near roads or in remote areas, in what Baloch activists call kill and dump operations. And some simply vanish, never accounted for, leaving families to wait indefinitely for information that does not come.

The targets of disappearance are not, by and large, militants. They are students, lecturers, journalists, doctors, lawyers, and human rights activists. Mahrang Baloch, the woman human rights defender who has emerged as the most prominent voice of the movement, is a medical doctor. Many of her colleagues in the Baloch Yakjehti Committee come from professional and academic backgrounds. The pattern is one of targeting the educated, articulate, and organisationally capable members of Baloch civil society, not just suspected separatists.

Some disappeared are released, broken by torture. Some are formally charged. Some are killed and their bodies dumped. Some simply vanish, never accounted for, leaving families to wait indefinitely.

The Recent Escalation

The crisis in Balochistan has escalated sharply since 2024. The triggering events have included a March 2025 attack by Baloch separatists on a passenger train, after which Pakistani authorities launched broad sweeps under the Counter Terrorism Department and arrested or disappeared several prominent Baloch human rights defenders. In response to peaceful protests organised against these arrests, Quetta police stormed a Baloch Yakjehti Committee gathering at the University of Balochistan in March 2025. A subsequent sit-in, organised by Mahrang Baloch and other activists, was raided by police using batons and tear gas at five-thirty in the morning.

The pattern continued through 2025 and into 2026. The provincial government’s approval of the Balochistan Prevention, Detention and Deradicalisation Rules 2025, signed off by Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti, was understood by human rights organisations as a state attempt to legalise the disappearance system that had been operating informally for years. The new rules permit the designation of individuals as suspects subject to interrogation in detention centres, formalising what had previously been an extra-legal practice.

Federal-level changes have made the situation worse. Amendments to Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 now allow law enforcement to detain individuals for up to three months without charge or judicial oversight. This power has been used repeatedly against Mahrang Baloch and other Baloch Yakjehti Committee activists. The legal framework that emerged in 2025 essentially provides Pakistani authorities with broad discretion to detain whoever they wish for as long as they wish, with minimal accountability.

The International Response Gap

The international response to Balochistan has been thin compared to the scale of the crisis. UN human rights experts have issued statements. Some Western governments have raised concerns in private diplomatic channels. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have published reports. But there has been no sustained international campaign comparable to those organised around other comparable crises. There has been no UN Security Council attention. There have been no targeted sanctions against the Pakistani officials responsible. There has been no equivalent of the Magnitsky-style measures that Western states use for other human rights abusers.

The reasons for this gap are partly geopolitical. Pakistan has been treated as an important state by various Western governments, by China, and by Saudi Arabia. Each of these relationships has imposed costs on the willingness of those states to confront Pakistan publicly on its conduct in Balochistan. But the gap is not just about external geopolitics. It is also about the difficulty of access. Foreign journalists are largely barred from Balochistan. Foreign human rights observers face severe restrictions. The information space is, by Pakistani design, opaque. As a result, what is happening in Balochistan does not generate the kind of viral images and stories that drive sustained international attention.

This dynamic has allowed the Pakistani state to operate in Balochistan with a degree of impunity that would not be tolerated anywhere with greater external scrutiny. The pattern of disappearances has continued for over two decades. The international response has been incremental concern, rarely translating into structural pressure.

What Operation Sindoor Changed

Operation Sindoor, indirectly, has begun to change the international information environment around Pakistan. The detailed exposure of Pakistan’s relationship with Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba during the May 2025 conflict, combined with international attention to the Pahalgam massacre, has raised broader questions about the Pakistani state’s conduct. Some of those questions extend naturally to Balochistan. If Pakistan’s security establishment is willing to host UN-designated terrorists in major cities, what is it willing to do to its own citizens in marginalised provinces?

Indian diplomatic engagement with international human rights bodies has also become more sophisticated. The contrast between India’s open society in Kashmir, where journalists work and tourists travel, and Pakistan’s closed system in Balochistan has been highlighted in international forums by Indian representatives in ways that previously felt heavy-handed but now resonate more credibly.

The Baloch movement itself has become more articulate, more organised, and more capable of presenting its case in international languages. Mahrang Baloch’s prominence as a face of the movement has helped. So has the work of diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Gulf, who have built advocacy networks that did not exist a decade ago.

These developments are early. They have not yet translated into the structural international pressure that would force a change in Pakistani conduct. But they represent a shift in the information landscape that, if sustained, may eventually force the world to look more carefully at what has been happening in Balochistan for far too long. The first step is to refuse to look away. Operation Sindoor, by exposing what Pakistan does abroad, may help sustain attention on what Pakistan does at home. That is a small consolation for the families of the missing. It is not nothing.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.

Police confirmed that several hostage-takers and hostages were inside the bank, according to a statement issued during the ongoing operation.

Authorities said the driver of a cash transport vehicle was among those being held.Large numbers of police officers were deployed around the area, which was cordoned off as security forces responded to the incident.

German police did not disclose the number of hostages involved, identify the suspects or provide details about possible demands.

The incident remained ongoing as authorities worked to secure the release of those inside the bank.Hostage situations are relatively rare in Germany, where heavily armed police tactical units are routinely deployed in major security incidents involving banks or public institutions.

No injuries had been reported at the time of the police statement.

The international community has, for too long, accepted Pakistan’s victim narrative at face value. The reasoning has often been geopolitical.

Every time the world confronts Pakistan with evidence of its support for terrorism, it responds with the same script. It is a victim of terrorism, not a sponsor. Its neighbours are out to defame it. The groups operating from its soil are rogue actors, beyond state control. The script has worn thin. Operation Sindoor, in May 2025, demolished it.

The Indian airstrikes on the night of May 6 to 7, 2025, did not target shadowy hideouts in remote tribal regions. They targeted Bahawalpur, a city of nearly a million people in central Punjab, well within Pakistan’s settled and policed heartland. They targeted Muridke, the sprawling Lashkar-e-Taiba complex on the outskirts of Lahore. They struck nine sites in total, four in Pakistan proper and five in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The locations told their own story. These were not camps that Pakistan had failed to find. These were camps that Pakistan had built.

The Family Business of Terror

Consider the case of Jaish-e-Mohammed, the group whose Bahawalpur headquarters India struck on May 7. Jaish was founded in 2000 by Masood Azhar, a man Pakistan released from Indian custody in December 1999 in exchange for hostages on a hijacked plane. According to multiple accounts cited by Pakistani journalists and Western researchers, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate paraded Azhar through Pakistan after his release on a fundraising tour, and helped him stand up the new outfit.

Pervez Musharraf, who served as Pakistan’s president from 2001 to 2008, admitted in a 2019 interview that Jaish-e-Mohammed had carried out attacks in India on the instructions of Pakistani intelligence. This was not an Indian allegation. This was the former military ruler of Pakistan acknowledging that Pakistan’s spy agency had directed terror operations against a neighbouring country.

Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group whose Muridke complex India also struck, has a similar profile. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies has documented that Lashkar conducts its attacks, including the 2008 Mumbai siege, with the consent and support of the ISI. David Coleman Headley, the Pakistani-American operative who scouted the Mumbai targets, testified that he met with six different ISI officers during his time with Lashkar. American investigators identified one of them, known only as Major Iqbal, as having provided 25,000 dollars in cash and direct operational guidance for the attack that killed 166 people.

What the Strikes Revealed

If Jaish and Lashkar were really rogue outfits operating outside Pakistani state control, the strikes of May 7 should have produced confused and uncertain reactions. Pakistan should have struggled to identify what had been hit, who had died, and why. Instead, the response was immediate and revealing. Pakistan’s military leadership knew exactly what had been targeted, because the targets were on Pakistan’s books in all but name.

In September 2025, a senior Jaish commander named Masood Ilyas Kashmiri appeared at the group’s annual Mission Mustafa conference and openly admitted that Masood Azhar’s family had been killed in the Bahawalpur strikes. Ten members of the family died, including Azhar’s sister, her husband, a nephew, a niece, and five children. Four close aides also died. The location of the strike was Jamia Masjid Subhan Allah, the headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammed, sitting comfortably inside Pakistani territory, with a UN-designated terrorist living openly within its walls.

The picture this paints is unambiguous. Masood Azhar, listed as a global terrorist by the United Nations Security Council since May 2019, was not in hiding. He was at home, with his family, in a complex protected by the Pakistani state. His brother Abdul Rauf Asghar, also a UN-designated terrorist and the operational head of Jaish, was reportedly killed in the same strike. Pakistan’s posture of plausible deniability has rested for decades on the fiction that men like these are difficult to find. India’s strikes proved that the only people who found them difficult to find were Pakistan’s own authorities.

The Cost of the Charade

The international community has, for too long, accepted Pakistan’s victim narrative at face value. The reasoning has often been geopolitical. Pakistan was a frontline state in the Cold War. Pakistan was a partner in the war on terror. Pakistan held nuclear weapons that demanded careful handling. Each of these arguments contained a fragment of strategic logic. None of them justified the systematic protection of men who killed civilians in Indian cities and villages.

The cost of this charade has been borne by India and by the broader region. Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of terror groups has poisoned the entire South Asian neighbourhood. It has prevented the development of normal trade and travel relations. It has consumed resources that could have built schools and hospitals on both sides of the border. And, most tragically, it has cost thousands of innocent lives across decades of attacks that Pakistan’s intelligence services helped plan, fund, and execute.

Operation Sindoor changed the equation. By striking Bahawalpur and Muridke, India made plain what had always been true. The terrorist infrastructure attacking India operates from inside Pakistan, with the protection of the Pakistani state. The terrorist leadership lives in Pakistani cities, raises families in Pakistani neighbourhoods, and runs operations from Pakistani buildings. The fiction of state distance from these activities has collapsed.

The world now has a choice. It can continue to accept the Pakistani script of victimhood, in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Or it can finally treat Pakistan as what it has long been: a state that uses terrorism as an instrument of policy, and that pays a price every time it does. India has decided which path it will follow. The international community must now decide which path it can credibly continue to ignore.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Milli Chronicle’s point-of-view.