Why Michael Rubin’s Yemen Prescription Is a Strategic Misstep for India
This approach maintains India’s credibility as a neutral actor, preserves its regional relationships, and avoids entanglement in ideological militancy or Iranian proxy politics.
The Red Sea tragedy involving the sinking of the vessel Eternity C on July 10, 2025, which endangered the life of an Indian national, has understandably stirred geopolitical anxieties. Yet, it should not be used as a launchpad for flawed diplomatic prescriptions.
In his recent opinion piece published by Firstpost, American analyst Michael Rubin proposes that India take a diplomatic lead in Yemen by supporting separatism in the south. Rubin’s thesis is not only historically inconsistent but strategically unwise—and risks aligning India’s image with the destabilizing agendas of Iran and its proxy militias.
Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, laments the so-called failure of Western diplomacy in Yemen, proposing that India should replace it by supporting the secession of South Yemen. His argument is built on three questionable premises: that unity has failed, that separatism would bring stability, and that India’s legacy and interests are best served through interventionist diplomacy in the Arabian Peninsula.
A Misreading of History and Strategy
Rubin’s narrative cherry-picks Yemeni history to justify separatism. It is true that Yemen’s unification in 1990 brought its own challenges. But portraying this union as the sole driver of instability is historically myopic. Yemen’s strife is primarily the result of decades of corruption, political exclusion, and, most critically, Iranian-backed insurgency through the Houthi militia.
By advocating a fragmented Yemen, Rubin ironically finds himself echoing Tehran’s strategic wishlist. As Saudi political analyst Salman Al-Ansari rightly noted in response, “The Houthis and Iran are actually very grateful for the actions of the separatists.”
That’s because separatism fractures the already strained national military, dilutes the central government’s authority, and distracts from the core task of defeating the Iranian-backed Houthi insurgency.
Rubin’s promotion of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist faction with limited legitimacy and narrow geographic influence, overlooks the broader political, tribal, and demographic complexities of Yemen.
It ignores the voice of Hadramout—a massive, resource-rich governorate in the south that remains largely resistant to STC’s ideology. Hadramout has consistently demanded greater autonomy within a federal framework, not secession. To paint all of South Yemen with the STC brush is analytically lazy and politically dangerous.
Iran’s Strategy: Divide and Conquer
Rubin suggests that dividing Yemen will curb Iranian influence. But the opposite is true. Tehran’s strategy in the Arab world has always thrived on institutional collapse, factionalism, and governance vacuums—be it in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon. Splintering Yemen into northern and southern states would only legitimize the Houthi coup in Sana’a and give Iran formal control over a puppet state in the north, while maneuvering to extend its tentacles into the south via co-opted militias.
Salman Al-Ansari highlighted a chilling but telling remark from Ali Larijani, former Iranian Speaker of Parliament, “We want a state loyal to us in the north, and another friendly state in the south.”
That alone should send alarm bells ringing for Indian strategists. Supporting the breakup of Yemen would play directly into Iran’s long game in the region—pitting tribes, provinces, and ideologies against one another to prolong chaos and weaken the regional coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
India’s Role: Stability, Not Subversion
Rubin also appeals to India’s historical ties with Aden and its anti-colonial legacy. While it is true that Indians once had a vibrant presence in southern Yemen during the British period, invoking this colonial history to advocate for Indian-backed secessionism today is both insensitive and ill-conceived.
India’s current posture in the region is one of non-intervention, stability, and multilateral diplomacy. As the fourth largest economy and a strategic stakeholder in the Indian Ocean basin, India gains from freedom of navigation, secure shipping lanes, and a united front against piracy and Iranian militarism.
Championing the disintegration of a sovereign Arab nation would mark a dramatic and unwelcome shift in India’s foreign policy ethos, alienating long-time allies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt—nations who view Yemeni unity as essential to regional security.
Moreover, Indian diplomats have successfully walked a tightrope in Middle East politics, maintaining relations with Iran while deepening strategic cooperation with Gulf Arab states and Israel. Rubin’s advice risks compromising this delicate balance.
Separatism Is Not a Silver Bullet
Rubin’s comparison of Yemen to Kosovo or Moldova is deeply flawed. Both Kosovo and Moldova were born of violent disintegration of multiethnic empires, not voluntary national unions like Yemen’s. Additionally, unlike Kosovo, South Yemen does not have unified political institutions, coherent leadership, or international recognition.
The Southern Transitional Council remains a militia-backed entity that has clashed violently with other Yemeni factions and has yet to present a credible vision for inclusive governance.
In fact, many Yemenis see the STC as a proxy force themselves—backed by competing foreign agendas that don’t necessarily align with the welfare of Yemenis at large.
What India Should Actually Do
India’s best move is to remain a force for balance, humanitarian engagement, and economic rebuilding in Yemen. Rather than choosing sides in a domestic power struggle, New Delhi should increase its engagement with the UN-led peace efforts and offer logistical and humanitarian support in Aden and other liberated cities. It must work closely with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure maritime routes and deter Houthi aggression in the Red Sea.
At the same time, India can support federalism and decentralization within a united Yemen—an approach that respects the aspirations of southern regions without compromising national sovereignty.
This approach maintains India’s credibility as a neutral actor, preserves its regional relationships, and avoids entanglement in ideological militancy or Iranian proxy politics.
Michael Rubin’s op-ed exemplifies a recurring pattern in Western commentary—well-articulated and perhaps well-meaning, but ultimately detached from on-the-ground realities. His argument overlooks the complex regional dynamics at play, misjudges the priorities of key stakeholders, and unintentionally echoes the agendas of actors like Iran and the Houthis who thrive on instability.
India, with its growing diplomatic weight and deep regional ties, should resist being drawn into such flawed narratives.
Salman Al-Ansari’s rebuttal serves as a timely reminder that durable peace in Yemen will come not from fragmentation, but from inclusive governance, national unity, and regional cooperation. India must stay the course—supporting stability over secession, diplomacy over division.
